Tara S. v. Charles J.
176 A.3d 602
| Conn. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff (Tara S.), now 36, alleges sexual assaults by her father (defendant Charles J.) when she was four; criminal prosecution previously occurred.
- Plaintiff filed a civil action and an application for a prejudgment remedy to attach defendant’s real property; court granted $150,000 attachment.
- Defendant moved to dismiss the prejudgment remedy application and the action, arguing § 52-577d (30-year limit from age of majority for childhood sexual-abuse claims) is unconstitutional as applied.
- At the prejudgment remedy hearing, plaintiff testified she had memory of the assaults but court found much of that memory was derived from recent review of records and family discussion.
- Defendant argued § 52-577d was intended for repressed-memory cases, and that applying it violated his rights to a speedy trial, confrontation, double jeopardy, and property interests.
- Trial court denied the motion to dismiss and granted the prejudgment remedy; appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutionality of § 52‑577d as applied | §52‑577d permits timely suit within 30 years of majority; plaintiff entitled to rely on statute | Statute was meant for repressed‑memory victims; plaintiff did not repress memories so statute is inapplicable/unconstitutional as applied | Statute text is plain; it does not require repressed memories and applies regardless; claim is timely and constitutionally permissible |
| Application of criminal constitutional protections to civil suit | Not applicable; civil remedy | Civil action is "quasi‑criminal" so defendant entitled to speedy trial, confrontation, double jeopardy protections | Those protections are confined to criminal proceedings; they do not apply here |
| Overbreadth / impact on protected conduct | Statute limits only remedy, not conduct | Statute is overbroad and interferes with constitutionally protected conduct/property | Statutes of limitation restrict remedies only; § 52‑577d is not overbroad and does not impair property rights |
| Retroactivity / due process / vested rights | Plaintiff entitled to seek remedy within statutory window | Reviving time‑barred claims violates defendant’s vested rights/due process | Supreme Court precedent: no vested right in statute‑of‑limitations defense; retroactive application justified by legislative purpose |
Key Cases Cited
- Giordano v. Giordano, 39 Conn. App. 183 (1995) (standards for prejudgment remedy; probable cause review)
- Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 317 Conn. 357 (2015) (upheld § 52‑577d retroactive application as rational legislative response)
- Roberts v. Caton, 224 Conn. 483 (1993) (permitted retroactive application of § 52‑577d; legislative purpose to allow victims time to recall trauma)
- Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 279 Conn. 207 (2006) (interpreting § 52‑577d’s plain meaning)
- Sasso v. Aleshin, 197 Conn. 87 (1985) (interlocutory nature of motion to dismiss)
- Canty v. Otto, 304 Conn. 546 (2012) (jurisdictional discussion where prejudgment remedy encompasses appealable issues)
- Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542 (1987) (confrontation and cross‑examination protections limited to criminal prosecutions)
- In re Ceana R., 177 Conn. App. 758 (2017) (civil proceedings do not carry Sixth Amendment protections applicable to criminal cases)