197 Conn. 87 | Conn. | 1985
The plaintiffs in this action, Tamara Eva Sasso and the state of Connecticut,
The procedural history of this case is unusual. The first hearing was held on January 28,1982, before the court, Spada, J. Although the court found the defendant to be the father of the child,
The threshold question that must be determined is whether this court has jurisdiction over the appeal. Although this issue was not raised by the parties, the court has a duty to dismiss, even on its own initiative, any appeal that it lacks jurisdiction to hear. L. G. DeFelice & Son, Inc. v. Wethersfield, 167 Conn. 509, 511, 356 A.2d 144 (1975); Hoberman v. Lake of Isles,
The procedural confusion in this case may have led the parties to the erroneous conclusion that there was a final judgment. At the March 25, 1982 hearing, the court entered an order requiring the defendant to reimburse the state for support payments in an amount agreed upon for the child, but this order was subject to the determination of the issues raised by the motion to dismiss. The parties subsequently stipulated, however, to open that part of the judgment relating to the amount of the arrearage. After a motion for opening a judgment is granted, the case stands as though no judgment had ever been rendered. State v. Phillips, 166
Because the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss is not a final judgment, the appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The state’s involvement is derived from requirements imposed on it by the federal government. See 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (26) (b). The mother of a child receiving public assistance is required to identify the child’s father and, in the event that he does not acknowledge paternity, to bring an action
The defendant took the witness stand, and upon the court's inquiry he admitted that he was the father of the named plaintiff’s child.
We note that we have entertained interlocutory appeals from denials of motions to dismiss based on double jeopardy claims. See In re Juvenile Appeal (85-AB), 195 Conn. 303, 308-309, 488 A.2d 778 (1985); State v. Aillon, 189 Conn. 416, 425, 456 A.2d 279, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 124, 78 L. Ed. 2d 122 (1983); State v. Seravalli, 189 Conn. 201, 206 n.6, 455 A.2d 852, cert. dismissed, 461 U.S. 920, 103 S. Ct. 2076, 77 L. Ed. 2d 291 (1983). That constitutional right not only protects against being twice punished but also “is a guarantee against being twice put to trial for the same offense." (Emphasis in original.) Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661, 97 S. Ct. 2034, 52 L. Ed. 2d 651 (1977). There is no similar constitutional or statutory right that would require us to extend the privilege of an interlocutory appeal to the case before us.