Roberts v. CatonRoberts v. Caton
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- Norcott
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether an amendment to
The pleadings and the plaintiff’s testimony at a prejudgment remedy hearing establish the following facts for the purposes of this appeal.1 The plaintiff was born on October 15,1968. Between 1973 and 1979, the defendant coerced the plaintiff to engage repeatedly in various sexual activities with him. As a result, the plaintiff suffered temporary physical injury to her genital area as well as temporary and permanent severe psychological and emotional distress. The psychological injury suffered by the plaintiff has manifested itself in acts of self-mutilation, drug abuse, severe anxiety, anorexia, flashbacks and sleep disturbances. Since 1990, the plaintiff has received psychotherapy on a
After testimony had been presented, the defendant argued that probable cause for the prejudgment remedy2 could not be established because the statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiff’s action,
The defendant claims that, because the statute of limitations had already expired, the trial court improperly found that there was probable cause to enter a prejudgment remedy order. The defendant’s arguments center on whether
We begin our analysis by restating the general proposition that statutes of limitation are presumed to apply retroactively. See Moore v. McNamara, 201 Conn. 16, 22, 513 A.2d 660 (1986); Andrulat v. Brook Hollow Associates, 176 Conn. 409, 412-13, 407 A.2d 1017 (1979); Jones Destruction, Inc. v. Upjohn, 161 Conn. 191, 195-96, 286 A.2d 308 (1971). Although substantive legislation is not generally applied retroactively absent a clearly expressed legislative intent, legislation that affects only matters of procedure “is presumed to [be] applicable to all actions, whether pending or not, in the absence of any expressed intention to the contrary.” Lavieri v. Ulysses, 149 Conn. 396, 401, 180 A.2d 632 (1962); E.M. Loew’s Enterprises, Inc. v. International Alliance, 127 Conn. 415, 418, 17 A.2d 525 (1941). Statutes of limitation are generally considered to be procedural, “ ‘especially where the statute contains only a limitation as to time with respect to a right of action and does not itself create the right of action . . . .’ ” (Citation omitted.) Moore v. McNamara, supra, 22; Jones Destruction, Inc. v. Upjohn, supra, 195. Therefore, unless specifically tied to a statutory right
The plaintiff attained majority in October, 1986, and she filed this suit in January, 1992. At the time the suit was filed, the governing statute of limitations for a civil action arising out of sexual assault of a minor was
The defendant argues that
Substantive rights are those that can be identified as existing between the parties at the time the cause of action accrued. Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 212 Conn. 509, 521, 562 A.2d 1100 (1989). “In Connecticut, a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff suffers actionable harm.” Id. The defendant contends that
First, the defendant argues that the language of
Second, the defendant argues that because the legislature anticipated that § 52-577d as amended would be used in cases of incest, a statutory exception to the doctrine of parental immunity in tort actions was created. Under this doctrine “ ‘a parent is not liable civilly to his child for personal injury inflicted during [the child’s] minority . . . .’ ” Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 523, 542 A.2d 711 (1988). Parental immunity has been partially abrogated already by
We do not have before us, and need not decide for the purposes of this case, whether parental immunity would in fact bar an action by a minor child against his or her parent for personal injuries arising out of sexual abuse, sexual assault or sexual exploitation. What is clear is that the plain language of § 52-577d as amended makes no mention of parental immunity being abrogated by its provisions. Furthermore, the legislative history of the statute does not address parental immunity and does not suggest, beyond the nebu
Third, the defendant argues that § 52-577d as amended altered the defendant’s substantive rights by expanding the period of liability by fifteen years. By this argument, the defendant suggests that a new liability is imposed by the mere fact that a preexisting liability is no longer barred by the passage of time. This court, however, has never recognized a vested right in the lapsing of a statute of limitations. “Although changes in the statute of limitations may not retroactively bar actions already pending . . . they do govern actions brought subsequent to the effective date of the amended statute.” (Citations omitted.) Andrulat v. Brook Hollow Associates, supra, 412-13. We have consistently interpreted the limitations period to be part of the remedy alone, unless the statute in which the period of limitations is found itself creates the right. Ecker v. West Hartford, 205 Conn. 219, 231-32, 530 A.2d 1056 (1987); Moore v. McNamara, supra, 22-23; Jones Destruction, Inc. v. Upjohn, supra, 195-96. Therefore, the expansion or reduction alone of the period of limitations, if the statute in which the limitations period is fixed does not also create the right of action, does not by itself alter a substantive right. We conclude, therefore, that § 52-577d as amended did not create a substantive change in the law that would preclude its retroactive application.
The defendant finally argues that, even if we find that § 52-577d as amended is procedural, it should not apply retroactively because considerations of good sense and justice dictate otherwise. “[T]he test of whether a statute is to be applied retroactively is not a purely mechanical one and even if it is a procedural statute, which
The retroactive application of § 52-577d as amended to this case subjects the defendant to a lawsuit for acts that occurred, most recently, thirteen years ago. Although statutes of limitation generally operate to prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale claims; Lametta v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 139 Conn. 218, 221, 92 A.2d 731 (1952); one object of § 52-577d is to afford a plaintiff sufficient time to recall and come to terms with traumatic childhood events before he or she must take action.8 The defendant’s assertion that
The prejudgment remedy order is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
Notes
This appeal arises out of an order granting the plaintiff’s application for prejudgment remedy in the second of two applications relating to an identical complaint and affidavit. The plaintiffs initial application was filed October 10,1991, and was granted after testimony was heard on November 18,1991. The plaintiffs complaint, however, was subsequently dismissed without prejudice due to insufficiency of service of process. The plaintiff refiled her application for prejudgment remedies on December 23, 1991, and a hearing was held on January 27, 1992. At this hearing, the parties stipulated to the testimony and orders of the November 18,1991 hearing.
At the time the action was commenced, the plaintiff was twenty-three years old. The defendant argued before the trial court that “the statute ran out when the plaintiff obtained the age of twenty.”
Before this court, however, the defendant argues that neither
In considering whether probable cause is present, the trial court must consider the evidence of both parties because a valid defense may defeat probable cause. As this court noted in Augeri v. C.F. Wooding Co., 173 Conn. 426, 429, 378 A.2d 538 (1977), “at a prejudgment remedy hearing a good defense, such as infancy or the running of the statute of limitations, will be enough to show that there is no ‘probable cause that judgment will be rendered in the matter in favor of the plaintiff.’ ” (Emphasis added.) The trial court, therefore, improperly failed to address the statute of limitations issue raised at the prejudgment remedy hearing. Our review of the propriety of the trial court’s order must necessarily consider the applicability of the statute of limitations to the plaintiffs action.
The defendant makes the following arguments either in his brief or in oral argument before this court: (1) the plaintiffs action is governed by
Generally this exception will apply where the procedural statute affects substantive rights or obligations. See, e.g., Sherry H. v. Probate Court, 177 Conn. 93, 100-102, 411 A.2d 931 (1979). We have concluded, however, that
Speaking before the House of Representatives on No. 91-240 of the 1991 Public Acts, Representative Richard D. Tulisano commented: “[T]he main focus of legislation is [sic] before us today and now extended to individuals potentially thirty-five years old is to give an opportunity for a person that has recognized, in most cases these are women, an opportunity to do something for themselves. . . . I think it’s good legislation. It brings Connecticut in the forefront and gives individuals an opportunity to help redress their own wrongs.” 34 H.R. Proc., Pt. 13, 1991 Sess., pp. 4706-4707.
Before the Senate, Senator Anthony V. Avallone commented: “[W]e had substantial testimony before the Committee that minor victims of sexual assault often do not understand or recognize the damage which they have sustained until a substantial number of years after they attain majority. In fact, it is not just two or three years, but can be substantially longer than that. ... So the Committee in recognition of that extends the statute of limitations on which one can bring an action.” 34 S. Proc., Pt. 7, 1991 Sess., p. 2495.