Steven Kelly v. United States, 819 F.3d 1044

Steven Troy Kelly pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and to being a felon in possession of a firearm.
The PSR applied the Guidelines career-offender enhancement (U.S.S.G. §4B1.1) based on two prior felony convictions: second-degree robbery (2000) and an enhanced domestic-abuse assault under Iowa Code §708.2A(3)(b) (2011).
The career-offender enhancement raised Kelly’s offense level from 31 to 37 and criminal-history category from IV to VI, increasing the Guidelines range from 110–137 months to 262–327 months before departures.
At sentencing counsel did not object to the career-offender designation; Kelly requested a continuance to contest whether the 2011 conviction was a felony under the Guidelines, which the district court denied.
The court applied downward adjustments (substantial assistance and variance) and sentenced Kelly to 144 months. Kelly did not appeal but filed a pro se §2255 petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the career-offender enhancement.
The district court denied the §2255 petition (no hearing), concluding the law was unsettled at the time and counsel’s failure to object was not constitutionally deficient; this Court affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to application of the career-offender enhancement based on Kelly’s 2011 domestic-abuse-assault conviction	Kelly: an objectively reasonable attorney would have objected because the Iowa conviction did not qualify as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. §4B1.2(a)	Government/Court: prevailing precedent was unsettled; reasonable attorneys could conclude an objection would be futile given then-applicable Eighth Circuit cases	Counsel’s failure to object was not objectively unreasonable; no deficient performance established (affirmed)
Whether Iowa §708.1(2)(b) necessarily qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the categorical/modified categorical approach	Kelly: subsection can be violated by merely placing someone in fear of insulting/offensive contact, which may not involve violent force	Government/Court: under the modified categorical approach (and then-applicable Parks/Pearson precedent), Shepard documents showed Kelly’s conduct involved throwing a bottle and striking a car — conduct consistent with violent-force element, so the conviction could qualify	Court held the record and then-circuit precedents supported a reasonable belief that the conviction qualified; Ossana did not foreclose that result

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-part ineffective assistance standard)
United States v. Ossana, 638 F.3d 895 (8th Cir. 2011) (interpreting "violent force" and application of categorical/modified categorical approaches)
Hamberg v. United States, 675 F.3d 1170 (8th Cir. 2012) (standard of review for §2255 denials)
United States v. Parks, 620 F.3d 911 (8th Cir. 2010) (permitting modified categorical approach even where statute not textually divisible; applicable when Kelly was sentenced)
United States v. Pearson, 553 F.3d 1183 (8th Cir. 2009) (similar to Parks regarding overinclusive statutes)
United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617 (8th Cir. 1999) (discussed Iowa assault statute; relevant dicta but not controlling here)
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (identifies permissible documents for modified categorical inquiry)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (later clarified limits on modified categorical approach; decided after Kelly’s sentencing)
United States v. Tucker, 740 F.3d 1177 (8th Cir. 2014) (en banc overruling Parks/Pearson; decided after Kelly’s sentencing)