125 Conn. App. 276
Conn. App. Ct.2010Background
- Oral H. was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree sexual assault and 24 counts of third-degree sexual assault against his daughter.
- The offenses occurred between February 2002 and June 2003, with at least one instance in a parked car in a public park.
- Defendant challenged multiple trial motions on appeal, including dismissals of the third-degree counts and the first-degree count, selective-prosecution claims, and admission of expert testimony without a Porter hearing.
- The court had previously stayed a ruling on the constitutionality of § 53a-72a(a)(2) until the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the statute in State v. John F.M.; the statute was later held constitutional.
- The trial court denied the motions; the jury acquitted on kidnapping and the court imposed a total sentence of 25 years with 20 years served and 10 years of probation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 53a-72a(a)(2) was unconstitutional at the time of arrest | State argued the statute was valid and could be applied despite prior declarations of unconstitutionality. | Oral contended the statute was unconstitutional at arrest and void ab initio. | No defect; statute valid at arrest, denial affirmed. |
| Whether amending the information adding the first-degree count violated separation of powers | State maintained amendment was permissible under Practice Book § 36-17 and did not prejudice rights. | Oral argued amendment circumvented judicial probable-cause review and violated separation of powers. | Permissible amendment; no separation-of-powers error. |
| Whether the third-degree charges were selectively prosecuted | State asserted the defendant’s history and coercive control over the victim justified charging the offenses. | Oral claimed unequal treatment based on age/gender and lack of similarly situated prosecution. | No selective-prosecution violation; charging decision supported by record. |
| Whether expert testimony was admitted without a Porter hearing | Garnet's testimony about delayed disclosure was non-scientific and not subject to Porter. | Kumho Tire should extend Porter to technical or specialized testimony; trial court erred by not conducting a Porter hearing. | No Porter hearing required; admission proper. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Courchesne, 296 Conn. 622 (2010) (de novo review of motions to dismiss; jurisdictional questions)
- State v. John M., 94 Conn. App. 667 (2006) (earlier ruling that § 53a-72a(a)(2) violated equal protection)
- State v. John F.M., 285 Conn. 528 (2008) (Supreme Court upheld constitutionality of § 53a-72a(a)(2))
- State v. Perez, 82 Conn. App. 100 (2004) (selective-prosecution precedent; prima facie showing)
- State v. Delossantos, 211 Conn. 258 (1989) (standard for proving selective prosecution)
- State v. Sullivan, 244 Conn. 640 (1998) (evidentiary rulings; Porter standard respected)
- State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 (1997) (Daubert/Porter standard for scientific testimony)
- Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (extension of Daubert to technical and specialized testimony)
- State v. Vumback, 68 Conn. App. 313 (2002) (distinguished expert testimony not scientific in delayed disclosure context)
- State v. John M., 278 Conn. 916 (2006) (Supreme Court certification and final ruling on constitutionality)
