Ortiz v. Kazimer
811 F.3d 848
6th Cir.2016Background
- Officers Kazimer and Crisan responded to a reported armed-robbery; dispatch indicated suspects ran toward an apartment complex and one wore a red shirt and jeans.
- Officer Kazimer chased a fleeing person who turned out to be 16-year-old Juan Ortiz, a boy with Down syndrome; bystanders told Kazimer of Juan’s disability but he continued the pursuit.
- Eyewitnesses say Juan stopped, hugged his mother, and surrendered; Kazimer allegedly pulled him from his mother, slammed him against an SUV, handcuffed him, and pinned his face to the vehicle for about fifteen minutes while Juan cried in pain.
- Kazimer signaled “ALL OK” to dispatch during the incident; bystanders repeatedly told officers Juan was not the suspect. Officer Crisan arrived, observed the restraint, said nothing to intervene, and allegedly used racial slurs.
- Juan and his parents sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force and failure-to-intervene) and under Ohio tort law; the district court denied qualified immunity on excessive-force and some state-law claims, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Kazimer used excessive force in seizing a surrendered, nonresisting minor | Kazimer slammed and pinned a surrendered, nonviolent boy (with Down syndrome) against an SUV for ~15 minutes, causing injury | Force was reasonable given pursuit of felony suspect and chaotic scene; risk of feigned surrender | Denied qualified immunity — factual disputes supported an excessive-force claim for a jury |
| Whether the excessive force was clearly established such that qualified immunity fails | Precedent clearly labels gratuitous force against surrendered, nonresisting suspects as unconstitutional | Officer claims need for split-second judgment and uncertainty about rules in some situations | Denied — controlling circuit precedent made the unlawfulness of the conduct clearly established before 2010 |
| Whether Crisan can be liable for failing to intervene | Crisan observed Juan pinned, heard cries and bystanders, had opportunity to intervene but did nothing | Crisan contends his conduct did not amount to a constitutional violation or he lacked ability to prevent it | Denied — failure-to-intervene claim viable because he observed and could have prevented the force |
| Whether Kazimer is immune from state-law tort claims under Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03 | Plaintiffs claim conduct was reckless/wanton or malicious, satisfying exceptions to immunity | Kazimer claims statutory immunity for official acts | Denied — plaintiffs’ version shows at least reckless conduct (possible maliciousness), so immunity not resolved on summary judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (use-of-force claims judged under objective reasonableness)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (summary-judgment credibility limits where video plainly contradicts claimant)
- Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (qualified immunity protects all but plainly incompetent or knowing violators)
- Miller v. Sanilac County, 606 F.3d 240 (6th Cir. 2010) (slamming surrendered, nonviolent suspect can be excessive force)
- Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893 (6th Cir. 2004) (pressing a surrendered, nonresisting suspect face-down longer than needed can be excessive force)
- Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 2005) (excessive-force jurisprudence examples)
- Baker v. City of Hamilton, 471 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2006) (gratuitous force against surrendered suspect is unconstitutional)
- Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425 (6th Cir. 1997) (officer liability for failure to intervene when capable of preventing excessive force)
- Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295 (6th Cir. 2002) (excessive force standards)