935 F.3d 56
2d Cir.2019Background
- The dispute concerns whether the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (CWA), 42 U.S.C. § 670 et seq., creates a private right enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to recover “foster care maintenance payments.”
- A panel of the Second Circuit held that the CWA does create a § 1983–enforceable right for at least some foster parents/providers; the State of New York sought rehearing en banc.
- A majority of active circuit judges declined en banc rehearing (6–5), prompting this published dissent from that denial arguing the panel ruling is incorrect and presents issues of exceptional importance.
- The dissent emphasizes that the CWA provides only partial federal reimbursement for certain enumerated costs (§ 675(4)(A)) and that HHS has long treated the statute as setting reimbursement eligibility, not a federal spending mandate.
- The dissent warns the panel’s implication of a private right will require federal courts to set foster-care payment rates without statutory guidance, impose litigation and administrative burdens on states, and risk diverting scarce funds from non-federally eligible children.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the CWA unambiguously creates a private right enforceable under § 1983 to recover foster care maintenance payments | CWA’s language (e.g., “States shall make” payments and §675 definitions) manifests an individual right to payments that can be enforced under §1983 | The CWA supplies only eligibility for partial federal reimbursement; it does not unambiguously confer an individual §1983 right | Panel held yes (private right exists); court declined rehearing en banc over dissent arguing this holding is erroneous and not supported by precedent |
| Whether §§ 672 and 675 impose a mandatory state spending obligation (not merely reimbursement eligibility) | The statute’s payment provisions impose a floor that states must pay for listed items | The provisions identify reimbursable categories; states retain discretion which payments to make and federal reimbursement is partial | Panel construed as imposing a spending obligation; dissent contends this is an unreasonable reading |
| Whether federal courts can administratively and competently set foster-care reimbursement rates under the statute | Plaintiffs: courts may review and enforce proper amounts for “cost of” listed items | States: rate-setting involves complex policy judgments unsuitable for courts and unsupported by statutory standards | Dissent: judicial rate-setting would be unadministrable and inappropriate; panel implicitly required district courts to perform rate-setting |
| Whether Supreme Court precedents (Blessing, Gonzaga, Armstrong, Pennhurst, Suter) allow implying a §1983 right here | Plaintiffs: CWA language and purpose suffice to support implication | Defendants: Gonzaga requires unambiguous congressional intent; Armstrong and related cases counsel against implication in complex Spending Clause schemes | Dissent: Blessing factors, Gonzaga, and Armstrong weigh against implying a §1983 right; panel majority disregarded this line of precedent |
Key Cases Cited
- New York State Citizens’ Coal. for Children v. Poole, 922 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2019) (panel held CWA creates a §1983–enforceable right to foster care maintenance payments)
- D.O. v. Glisson, 847 F.3d 374 (6th Cir.) (holding CWA creates a privately enforceable right)
- Cal. State Foster Parents Ass’n v. Wagner, 624 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding CWA confers §1983–enforceable foster care payment rights)
- Midwest Foster Care & Adoption Ass’n v. Kincade, 712 F.3d 1190 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding CWA does not create a privately enforceable right to maintenance payments)
- Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015) (complex administrative schemes and available administrative remedies indicate Congress did not intend private equitable enforcement)
- Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (§1983 requires rights to be unambiguously conferred by statute)
- Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) (articulated factors for assessing whether statute confers enforceable rights)
- Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (Spending Clause statutes are contractual; rights and conditions must be unambiguous)
- Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992) (consent to federal spending conditions and implication of private rights require clarity)
- Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979) (recognition of state primacy in traditional areas of state concern)