Case Information
*1 Bеfore: DAUGHTREY, CLAY, and COOK, Circuit Judges. _________________
COUNSEL ARGUED: Richard F. Dawahare, MCCLELLAND & ASSOCIATES, PLLC, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellants. David Brent Irvin, CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Richard F. Dawahare, MCCLELLAND & ASSOCIATES, PLLC, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellants. David Brent Irvin, CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
COOK, Circuit Judge. The federal Child Welfare Act (“the Act”) specifies that “[e]ach State with a plan approved under this part shall make foster care maintenance payments on behalf of each child who has been removed from the home of a relative . . . into foster care.” 42 U.S.C. § 672(a). This appeal asks whether the Act creates a private right to foster-care maintenance payments enforceable by a foster parent under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We find that it does, and therefore reverse the district court’s contrary decision.
I.
In 2012, Kentucky’s Health and Family Services commenced a Dependency, Neglect, and Abuse proceeding against the mother of two young boys. The mother stipulated to neglecting her children, and Kentucky placed both boys in foster care. Plaintiff R.O., the mother’s aunt, sought custody of the children. The state “conducted a standard home evaluation and criminal background check on R.O. and eventually both children were placed in her home by Court Order.” In September 2014, the family court closed the action and granted joint custody to both the mother and the aunt, though the boys remained living with the aunt.
R.O. filed a motion with the family court seeking foster care maintenance payments. The court declined to rule on the issue, however, “indicating that permanency had been achieved.” R.O. then sued the Secretary for Kentucky’s Cabinet for Health and Family Services (“the Cabinet” or “Kentucky”) in state court, arguing that the federal Child Welfare Act required the state to provide maintenance payments, and that the failure to make payments violated the Constitution’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. The Cabinet removed the case to federal court and filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the Cabinet’s motion, reasoning that the Child Welfare Act provides no privately enforceable rights, that the family lacked a property interest in the payments, and that Kentucky’s scheme rationally distinguished between relative and non-relative foster care providers. The family appealed.
II.
The court “review[s] a grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence and
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.”
Hirsch v. CSX Transp., Inc.
,
III.
In 1980, Congress passed the Child Welfare Act, also known as Title IV-E of the Social Security Act. This federal-state grant program facilitates state-run foster care and adoption assistance for children removed from low-income homes. See 42 U.S.C. § 670. Congress passed the Act under its Spending Clause power, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, and like other federal-state cooperative programs, states are given the choice of complying with the Act’s conditions or forgoing federal funding.
Three sections of the Act are relevant here. First , to be eligible for federal funds, a state must submit a plan to the Secretary of Health and Human Services that satisfies thirty-five specific criteria. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a). If a state’s plan fails to “substantial[ly] conform[]” to the Act’s requirements, id. § 1320a-2a, the Secretary, after giving the state an opportunity tо implement a corrective action plan, must withhold federal money, id. § 1320a-2a(b)(3)(A), (4)(A).
Second , the plan must “provide[] for foster care maintenance payments in accordance with section 672.” § 671(a)(1). Under § 672, “[e]ach State with a plan approved under this part shall make foster care maintenance payments on behalf of each child who has been removed from the home of a relative . . . into foster care.” Id . § 672(a)(1). Foster care maintenance payments cover the cost of, among other things, the child’s food, clothing, and shelter. Id. § 675(4)(A).
Third , after the state remits maintenance payments to the foster family, it may seek partial reimbursement from the federal government. Section 674(a)(1) provides that “each State which has a plan approved under this part shall be entitled to a payment equal to the sum of” an “amount equal to the Federal medical assistance percentage . . . of the total amount expended during such quarter as foster care maintenance payments under section 672 of this title for children in foster family homes or child-care institutions.”
IV.
We first address the central issuеs on appeal: 1) whether the Act confers upon foster families a private right to foster care maintenance payments; and 2) whether that right is enforceable under § 1983.
1. Private Right
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes liability on anyone who, acting under color of state law,
deprives a person “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”
This section authorizes suits to enforce individual rights under federal statutes as well as the
Constitution.
Maine v. Thiboutot
,
For this court to find an individually enforceable right: 1) “Congress must have intended
that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff”; 2) the asserted right must not be “so vague
and amorphous that its enforcement would strain judicial competence”; and 3) “the statute must
unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States.”
Blessing v. Freestone
,
To illustrate, in
Harris v. Olszewski
,
By contrast, in
Gonzaga University
the Supreme Court held that the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”) failed to grant students a privacy right in their education
records.
No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records (or personally identifiable information contained therein . . .) of students without the written consent of their parents to any individual, agency, or organization. at 279 (omission in original) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)). The Court reasoned in part
that FERPA lacked “the sort of ‘rights-creating’ language critical to showing the requisite
congressional intent to create new rights.” at 287 (citing
Alexander v. Sandoval
, 532 U.S.
275, 288–89 (2001), and
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi.
,
Applied here, we conclude the Act confers upon foster parents an individually
enforceable right to foster care maintenance payments.
First
, the Act mandates payments “on
behalf of each child.” 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1). This focus on individual recipients is similar to
language creating private rights in
Harris
and
Barry
. Unlike
Gonzaga
, the Act requires
individual payments and focuses on the needs of specific children, as opposed to merely
speaking to the statе’s policy or practice.
Second
, the Act confers a monetary entitlement upon
qualified foster families and includes an itemized list of expenses that the state must cover.
42 U.S.C. § 675(4)(A). It therefore lacks vague and amorphous terms that might strain judicial
competence.
Finally
, § 672(a)(1)’s “shall make” language “unambiguously impose[s] a binding
obligation on the States.”
Blessing
,
Kentucky makes several arguments to the contrary, though none are persuasive. It first
argues that § 672(a) simply sets out the preconditions that a state must satisfy to receive federal
reimbursement. In support, it points to а different statutory section, § 674(a)(1), which provides
that “each State which has a plan approved under this part shall be entitled to a payment equal to
the sum of” an “amount equal to the Federal medical assistance percentage . . . of the total
amount expended during such quarter as foster care maintenance payments under section 672 of
this title for children in foster family homes or child-care institutions.” 42 U.S.C. § 674(a)(1).
Based on this section, Kentucky invokes the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning that the “function of
§ 672(a) is to serve as a roadmap for the conditiоns a state must fulfill in order for its expenditure
to be eligible for federal matching funds; otherwise, the state bears the full cost of these
payments.”
Midwest Foster Care & Adoption Ass’n v. Kincade
,
We disagree. If § 672(a) simply provides a roadmap that states may choose to follow to receive matching funds, then Congress would not have phrased the section in mandatory terms. Indeed, once the Secretary approves the state’s plan, the state “ shall make foster care maintenance payments.” 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1) (emphasis added). It isn’t optional. And although a separate section of the Act requires the federal government to partially reimburse these costs, nothing in § 672(a) mentions funding.
Kentucky next contends that the Act “‘do[es] not speak directly to the interests’ of foster parents; rather, [it] ‘speak[s] to the states as regulated participants in the [Act].’” Appellee Br. 36 (quoting Midwest Foster Care , 712 F.3d at 1197). Kentucky suggests that when Congress writes in the active voice, making the state the subject, its focus is on the state as the regulated entity, and courts should not infer a private right to whatever benefit the state is supposed to provide. Thus, because Congress wrote in the active voice—“[e]ach State with a plan approved under this part shall make foster care maintenance payments on behalf of each child,” 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)—Kentucky argues the law does not create a private right. Cf. New York State Citizens’ Coal. for Children v. Carrion , 31 F. Supp. 3d 512, 521 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“If the statute were worded differently, and § 672(a)(1) read: ‘No eligible child shall be denied foster care maintenance payments by a State with an approved plan,’ a reasonable reader might find the requisite ‘rights-creating’ language.”).
Both the Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit, however, have found that lаws phrased in
the active voice, with the state as the subject, confer individually enforceable rights.
See Wilder
v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n
, 496 U.S. 498, 502–03, 509–10 (1990),
superseded on other grounds by
statute
;
Harris
,
Last, Kentucky argues that because the Act “does not dictate the amounts that States must
pay to foster parents,” it is not “sufficiently specific and definite to qualify as enforсeable under
§ 1983.” But the Supreme Court in
Wilder
recognized a private right to a monetary benefit even
though the law granted states discretion to set the applicable rate.
[1]
“That the [statute] gives the
States substantial discretion in choosing among reasonable methods of calculating rates may
affect the standard under which a court reviews whether the rates comply with the [statute], but it
does not render the [statute] unenforceable by a court.”
Wilder
, 496 U.S. at 519. And as the
Ninth Circuit explained when evaluating this provision, “[i]f a statute or applicable federal
requirement does not prescribe a particular methodology for calculating costs, we give deference
to a reasonable methodology employed by the State.”
Cal. State Foster Parent Ass’n v. Wagner
,
Accordingly, § 672(a) confers an individually enforceable right to foster care maintenance payments.
2. Enforcement Under § 1983
Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a statute creates a private right, “there is only a
rebuttable presumption that the right is enforceable under § 1983.”
Abrams
, 544 U.S. at 120
(quoting
Blessing
,
In
Wilder
, the Medicaid Act “authorize[d] the Secretary to withhold approval of plans,”
to “curtail federal funds to States whosе plans are not in compliance,” as well as required States
to set up an administrative review system. 496 U.S. at 521–22. Notwithstanding these
procedures, the Court found that “the Secretary’s limited oversight” and “[t]he availability of
state administrative procedures . . . do[] not foreclose resort to § 1983.” at 522–23.
Similarly, in
Harris
, we held that a plaintiff could sue under § 1983 because the Medicaid Act
“does not provide other methods for private enforcement of the Act in federal court.” 442 F.3d
at 462 (citations omitted). Further, we noted that the Secretary’s authority to “withhold funds to
non-complying States” and “the Act’s requirement that States grant an opportunity for a fair
hearing . . . [are not] inconsistent with a private action.” at 463 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted);
see also Blessing
,
Here, the Act’s weak enforcement mechanisms fall short of foreclosing access to § 1983
remedies. Like in
Wilder
,
Blessing
, and
Harris
, the Secretary rеviews the state’s plan only on a
program-wide basis, and lacks authority to ensure the state provides benefits to individual foster
parents. Indeed, a state could implement a plan that substantially conforms to the Act’s
requirements, yet neglect to pay foster parents in individual cases. Absent resort to § 1983,
foster families possess no federal mechanism to ensure compliance with the Act. And although
the Act requires states to provide for administrative review of denied claims, 42 U.S.C.
§ 671(a)(12), the “availability of state administrative procedures ordinarily does nоt foreclose
resort to § 1983.”
Wilder
,
Kentucky’s arguments to the contrary rely on the Supreme Court’s Gonzaga decision . There, however, FERPA “expressly authorized the Secretary of Education to ‘deal with violations’ of [FERPA],” and established a review board to adjudicate individual written complaints. Gonzaga , 536 U.S. at 289 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(f)). The Court found that “[t]hese administrative procedures squarely distinguish this case from Wright and Wilder , where an aggrieved individual lacked any federal review mechanism.” Id. at 289–90. Notably, the Court inserted a footnote opining that it “need not determine whether FERPA’s procedures are ‘sufficiently comprehensive’ to offer an independent basis for precluding private enforcement, due to our finding that FERPA creates no private right to enforce.” at 290 n.8 (citation omitted). In any event, the Child Welfare Act, unlike FERPA, includes no private federal review mechanism that an aggrieved foster family can employ.
In sum, we hold that the Act confers foster families with an individual right to foster care maintenance payments enforceable under § 1983.
V.
Having determined that the Act creates an individually enforceable statutory right, we next evaluate whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to maintenance payments. Section 672(a) restricts the class of children entitled to benefits in two relevant ways. First , the child must be in the Cabinet’s custody; once the child is adopted or placed in a permanent guardianship, the Act no longer requires maintenance payments. 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(2)(B). Second , the child must be placed in a licensed or approved “foster family home.” § 672(a)(2)(C). The district court did not address whether the children satisfy these qualifications because it found the Act failed to create a private right. Plaintiffs contend that both conditions are met, and ask the сourt to order the Cabinet to make payments. We address each criterion in turn.
1. State Custody
Section 672(a)(2)(B) requires the Cabinet to make maintenance payments only when “the child’s placement and care are the responsibility of . . . the State agency administering the State plan.” 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(2)(B). Both parties agree that the Cabinet need only make payments on behalf of children that are in its custody. Furthermore, there is no doubt that the Cabinet obtained responsibility for the children when the family court removed them from their mother’s home.
The issue is whether the family court discharged the children from the Cabinet’s care when it ordered the boys to live with the aunt and closed the case. The answer turns on Kentucky law. In Kentucky, “[i]f a child has been removed from the home and placed in the custody of . . . the cabinet, a judge of the District Court shall conduct a permanency hearing” on an annual basis. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 610.125(1) (West 2016). At the permanency hearing, the judge must decide, among other things, whether the child should be placed for adoption, placed with a permanent custodian, returned to the parent, or kept in foster care. The Family Court Rules of Procedure and Practice provide that “[a]ny order of permanent custody” must be on form AOC-DNA-9. Fam. Ct. R. P. Prac. 22(4). Pursuant to that form, the court must affirmatively place the child in permanent custody and discharge the Cabinet of further responsibility.
The parties proceeded below on stipulated facts because the family court records are sealed. The only facts regarding the children’s placement with the aunt are as follows:
“R.O. was granted temporary custody by the Fayette Family Court of D.O. on March 27, 2013.”
“R.O. also accepted placement of A.O. on February 21, 2014 via Order of Fayette Family Court where the DNA case of A.O. had also been transferred.” “On September 10, 2014, the Fayette Family Court closed the DNA action of both boys by granting joint custody to R.O. and C.O. The children were Ordered to reside with R.O.”
“Although the [guardian ad litem] made a Motion [to Order the Cabinet to pay maintenance fees] on May 14, 2014, the Court declined to issue further Orders on May the 21st, indicating that permanency had been achieved.” Though the Cabinet avers that R.O. is the children’s permanent guardian, it has not identified evidence that the family court held a permanency hearing or discharged the children from the Cabinet’s care. For its part, the family contends that the Order granting R.O. custody “was issued in a DNA review hearing, not in a permanent custody hearing as required” by state law, and that the “order was simply written on the docket sheet. It was not entered on the AOC- DNA-9 Order-Permanent Custody form as required by Rule 22.”
In a supplemental memo and at oral argument, the Cabinet contended that the children must be in R.O.’s permanent custody because the family court closed the case. According to the Cabinet, if we find the children remain in state custody, it will create an “indeterminate legal purgatory” for children not in permanent custody, but also without an open family court case. But under Kentucky law, there is nothing indeterminate about the children’s status: foster children remain in the Cabinet’s custody until formally discharged by court order. The Cabinet also suggested that requiring strict adherence to state law elevates form over substance. We are unpersuaded. Requiring the Cabinet to abide by proper procedures promotes important interests—namely, certainty about the custody status of foster children.
Thus, on remand the district court should determine whether the family court affirmatively discharged the children from the Cabinet’s custody. If the court finds no affirmative discharge, then the children remain the Cabinet’s responsibility.
2. Foster Family Home
The Cabinet must provide maintenance payments only if “the child has been placed in a foster family home or child-care institution.” 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(2)(C). The Act defines “foster family home” to mean a “home for children which is licensed by the State in which it is situated or has been approved , by the agency of such State having responsibility for licensing homes of this type, as meeting the standards establishеd for such licensing.” Id. § 672(c) (emphasis added).
The Act contemplates two categories of foster families. The first category includes licensed foster parents, who usually care for unrelated foster children. To become licensed, prospective foster parents must satisfy certain safety standards, which include passing a background check and submitting to a home evaluation. Id. § 671(a)(20). The state also establishes non-safety standards, id. § 671(a)(10), which in Kentucky include mandatory periodic training.
The second category consists of approved foster homes, which typically care for a relative child. Reflecting Congress’s preference that children live with family members, id. § 671(a)(19), the Act allows states to place children with unlicensed relatives. To obtain approval, the home must “meet[] the standards established for such licensing.” § 672(c). Each state may waive non-safety standards on a case-by-case basis for children in relative foster family homes. Id. § 671(a)(10)(D). Furthermore, the Act requires states to give preference to adult relative caregivers only when the relative caregiver meets the relevant safety standards. Id. § 671(a)(19).
Here, the parties stipulated to the following:
“[Thе mother] stipulated to dependency of A.O. on December 13, 2012 in the private petition in Clark County and to neglect of D.O. in April of 2013 in the Fayette County Family Court DNA proceeding. Accordingly, A.O. was initially placed with the person who made the petition, a non-relative placement, and D.O. was initially placed in foster care.”
“R.O. is the maternal great aunt of the children. She is a para-educator (teacher’s assistant) for Fayette County public schools. CHFS conducted a standard home evaluation and criminal background check on R.O. and eventually both children were placed in her home by Court Order.”
The family argues that the Cabinet approved R.O. to be a foster parent. Prior to placement, the Cabinet verified that R.O. met relevant non-safety standards by conducting a home evaluation and a background check. After determining that her home was safe, the family court moved the children from another foster provider to her care. R.O. therefore argues that the Cabinet “approved” her as a foster parent for the children.
Kentucky offers several arguments in response. Kentucky distinguishеs between “foster care” and “kinship care.” According to Kentucky, “foster care” refers to licensed foster family homes. “Kinship care,” by contrast, refers to relative caregivers. Although the Cabinet must remit maintenance payments to foster parents, the Cabinet need only pay kinship care providers “[t]o the extent funds are available.” Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 605.120(5) (West 2016). Due to inadequate appropriations, Kentucky ceased funding its kinship care program.
To the extent the Cabinet’s failure to make maintenance payments turns on the distinction betwеen relative and non-relative foster care providers, it plainly violates federal law. In Miller v. Youakim , 440 U.S. 125 (1979), Illinois placed two children with their older sister, Linda Youakim, and her husband. Id . at 130. “The Department investigated the Youakim home and approved it as meeting the licensing standards established for unrelated foster family homes . . . .” Id . Yet, “[d]espite this approval, the State refused to make Foster Care payments on behalf of the children because they were related to Linda Youakim.” The Court reviewed the definition of “foster family home.” Id . at 130–31. After noting that the statute “dеfines this phrase in sweeping language,” the Court found that “Congress manifestly did not limit the term to encompass only the homes of nonrelated caretakers. Rather, any home that a State approves as meeting its licensing standards falls within the ambit of this definitional provision.” at 135.
Though Congress changed aspects of the Act over the ensuing years, it has not added any provision distinguishing relative and non-relative foster care providers. Nor has it modified the definition of “foster family home” that the Court interpreted in Youakim . Compare id . (defining “foster family home” under prior version of the Act), with 42 U.S.C. § 672(c). Thus, if Kentucky is denying benefits because the aunt is related to the children, it is violating federal law.
Second, Kentucky notes that the Act makes kinship guardianship assistance optional: [A]t the option of the State, [the plan] provides for the State to enter into kinship guardianship assistance agreements to provide kinship guardianship assistance payments on behalf of children to grandparents and other relatives who have assumed legal guardianship of the children for whom they have cared as foster parents and for whom they have committеd to care on a permanent basis, as provided in section 673(d) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(28). Under § 673(d), states may provide kinship guardianship assistance on behalf of children who previously resided “for at least 6 consecutive months in the home of the prospective relative guardian” and for whom the prospective guardian committed to caring on a permanent basis. Id . § 673(d)(3)(A). But kinship guardianship assistance applies only when the relative becomes the child’s permanent guardian, not while the child is in temporary status. As noted above, it is unclear whether R.O. is the childrеn’s permanent guardian, or whether the placement is temporary. If R.O. has temporary custody of the children, then the Cabinet’s argument about kinship guardianship assistance is irrelevant.
Accordingly, because the Cabinet “conducted a standard home evaluation and criminal background check on R.O.” prior to delivering the children to her care, she is an approved foster care provider.
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s decision is reversed. Upon remand, the district court shall determine whether the Cabinet maintains responsibility fоr the children’s “placement and care.” If the Kentucky court discharged the children from the Cabinet’s custody, then the district court should dismiss the case. If not, then the district court shall award foster care maintenance payments. [2]
Notes
[1]
The relevant provision of the Medicaid Act mandates that “a State plan for medical assistance must
provide for payment of the hospital services . . . through the use of rates . . . which the State finds . . . are reasonable
and adequate.”
Wilder
,
[2] Because we resolve this appeal on statutory grounds, we need not address the family’s constitutional arguments.