Kansas v. Kansas, 136 S. Ct. 633

Background

Sidney Gleason and brothers Reginald and Jonathan Carr were convicted of multiple capital offenses in Kansas; juries returned death sentences after penalty-phase proceedings.
Gleason participated in a robbery-conspiracy and aided in murders of two co-conspirators; the Carrs committed the Wichita Massacre—abduction, sexual assaults, robberies, and execution-style killings of five victims, one of whom survived and testified at trial.
The Kansas Supreme Court vacated the death sentences, holding (1) penalty instructions failed to tell jurors that mitigating circumstances need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the Carrs’ joint sentencing violated the Eighth Amendment right to individualized capital sentencing.
The State sought certiorari; the U.S. Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the Eighth Amendment required the specific burden-of-proof instruction and whether joint sentencing violated the Eighth Amendment.
The Supreme Court reversed the Kansas Supreme Court, holding (1) the Eighth Amendment does not require an instruction that mitigating factors need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) joint penalty-phase proceedings did not, under these facts, render sentencing fundamentally unfair.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Eighth Amendment requires instruction that mitigating circumstances need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt	Kansas Supreme Court / defendants: omission created reasonable likelihood jurors thought mitigation had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, blocking consideration of mitigating evidence	State: instructions distinguished aggravators (proved beyond reasonable doubt) from mitigating factors ("found to exist") so no constitutional ambiguity; no federal rule requires that specific wording	No. Court held Eighth Amendment does not require that instruction; overall instructions did not create a reasonable likelihood jurors misapplied burden of proof
Whether joint penalty-phase (no severance) violated Eighth Amendment individualized-sentencing requirement for the Carrs	Carrs/Kansas Supreme Court: joint sentencing prevented individualized consideration; cross-evidence and family association prejudiced each brother	State: limiting and defendant-specific instructions were given; joint proceedings can be permissible and often preferable; joinder did not render sentencing fundamentally unfair	No. Court held joint sentencing was not a federal Eighth Amendment violation here and presumption jurors followed limiting instructions stands
Whether the Kansas decisions rested on adequate and independent state grounds, barring U.S. Supreme Court review	Respondents: argued state-law grounds (Kleypas/Scott) controlled, so federal review improper	Petitioners/State: Kansas decisions relied on federal Eighth Amendment principles, so this Court has jurisdiction	Court found Kansas rulings rested on federal constitutional grounds and declined the adequate-independent-state-grounds defense
Whether admission of out-of-court police-report testimonial statements at penalty phase required Confrontation Clause review	Carrs cautioned that such statements were problematic and should be omitted on remand	United States / State: issue not granted certiorari for review here; any error would be harmless	Court declined to review Confrontation Clause issue; commented cross-examination would have had no effect on sentences

Key Cases Cited

Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (2006) (state court reliance on federal precedent does not bar Supreme Court review)
Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 (1998) (no requirement that States provide express guidance on mitigation concept)
Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000) (States are not required to structure jury consideration of mitigating evidence in a particular way)
Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990) (constitutional error from jury instruction requires reasonable likelihood instruction prevented consideration of relevant evidence)
Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994) (due process, not Eighth Amendment, governs admission of unduly prejudicial evidence at capital sentencing)
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (limits on unduly prejudicial victim-impact evidence relate to fundamental fairness)
Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212 (2006) (review of aggravator/mitigator weighing and harmless-error principles)
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (codefendant confession exception to presumption that jurors follow limiting instructions)
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) (declined to extend Bruton exception; presumption jurors follow limiting instructions)
Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (1993) (limiting instructions often suffice to cure joinder prejudice)
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (capital sentencing must avoid arbitrary imposition; discussing joint proceedings implications)
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (harmless-error analysis for Confrontation Clause violations)