Kansas City Premier Apartments, Inc. v. Missouri Real Estate Commission
344 S.W.3d 160
| Mo. | 2011Background
- KCPA operated to assist landlords by listing properties and directing renter referrals, using rental advisors who earned fees from property owners.
- KCPA did not hold Missouri real estate licenses, while the Missouri Real Estate Commission alleged unlawful real estate activity under ch. 339 and sought an injunction.
- Trial court enjoined KCPA from referring prospects and from any act requiring licensure; declaratory judgment was denied.
- KCPA argued § 339.010.7 exempted its activities as ‘retained to manage real property,’ but the court found the exemption inapplicable because KCPA’s activities exceeded the listed permissible functions.
- The Missouri Supreme Court reviewed constitutionality challenges to § 339.010.1 and § 339.010.7, including free-speech, equal-protection, vagueness, and special-law arguments.
- The court affirmed the injunction and held the statutory framework constitutional, with divisional opinions noted by dissents.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 339.010.7 exemptions apply to KCPA | KCPA contends it is retained to manage real property and fits § 339.010.7(5). | Commission argues KCPA exceeds exemptions by providing non-exempt services. | Exemption not applicable; activities exceed § 339.010.7(5). |
| Constitutionality of § 339.010.1 and § 339.010.7 under US Constitution | KCPA asserts compelled licensing and speech restrictions violate free speech. | State asserts regulation protects public from fraud; licensing is constitutional. | Constitutional; intermediate scrutiny applied; provisions upheld. |
| Application of Central Hudson test to commercial speech | KCPA speech is truthful commercial information; regulation chills speech unnecessarily. | Licensing substantiates a substantial public interest and directly advances it. | Regulation passes Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny. |
| Equal protection concerns of exemptions | exemptions impermissibly discriminate against unlicensed speakers. | Exemptions have rational bases tied to categories with legitimate public-policy aims. | Rational-basis review sustained; exemptions upheld. |
| Vagueness and due process challenges | Terms like 'real estate brokerage' are vague and fail due process. | Statutory terms have ordinary meanings and sufficient notice. | Statutes are not void for vagueness. |
Key Cases Cited
- Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976) (standard of review for trial court judgments)
- Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (U.S. Supreme Court 1980) (test for commercial speech regulation)
- Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (U.S. Supreme Court 1978) (commercial solicitation regulatory authority)
- Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (U.S. Supreme Court 1976) (regulation of professional speech and public interest)
- Miller Nationwide Real Estate Corp. v. Sikeston Motel Corp., 418 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1967) (legislative purpose to protect public from fraud and incompetence)
- In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (U.S. Supreme Court 1982) (prohibition of misleading advertising; limits of regulating speech)
- Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (U.S. Supreme Court 1993) (intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech regulation)
- In re Brasch, 332 S.W.3d 115 (Mo. banc 2011) (de novo review of constitutional challenges to statutes)
- Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (U.S. Supreme Court 2011) (content-based and speaker-based restrictions require heightened scrutiny)