Griffin, Richard Dale, PD-0150-21

Background

Appellant Richard Griffin was convicted of continuous trafficking of persons for driving a high‑school‑aged victim to his home, karate studio, and travel trailer on multiple occasions to engage in sex with him.
The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on its prior decision in Ritz v. State, holding that merely transporting a minor to the place where sex occurred can satisfy the statute’s definition of “traffic.”
The trafficking statute defines “traffic” to include “transport, entice, recruit, harbor, provide, or otherwise obtain another person by any means,” which the court of appeals read broadly.
The dissent (Keller, J., joined by Walker, J.) warns that construing (a)(7) and the statutory "traffic" definition expansively would subsume ordinary child‑sex offenses (indecency, sexual assault) into trafficking, raising punishment exposure.
The dissent argues the statutory scheme better supports a construction requiring at least two actors (a trafficker and a separate sexual actor), avoiding redundancy and absurd results.
Relief proposed: grant review to resolve statutory scope; if trafficking does not apply, reform conviction to appropriate lesser‑included offense and remand for punishment.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does driving/transporting a minor to a location where sexual conduct occurs satisfy “traffic” under the trafficking statute?	Yes — transport alone can satisfy the statute (as the court of appeals and Ritz held).	No — treating mere transport as trafficking is overbroad and not what the legislature intended.	Court of appeals construed transport broadly and affirmed; the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals declined review (dissent would grant).
Can §20A.02(a)(7) apply when the defendant is the sole perpetrator of the sexual acts?	Yes — a single actor who obtains or transports a child may be prosecuted as a trafficker.	No — the statute should be read to require at least two actors (trafficker + sexual actor); otherwise it collapses other offenses into trafficking.	Court of appeals allowed sole‑perpetrator trafficking; CCA majority refused review; dissent rejects that reading.
Does a broad reading of “traffic” render traditional child‑sex offenses redundant and expand punishment ranges improperly?	Applying trafficking to these facts is lawful and does not contravene legislative intent.	Broad construction would subsume indecency/sexual‑assault statutes and let the State obtain first‑degree punishments without proving the narrower statutory elements.	Dissent finds redundancy and improper expansion likely; CCA declined to resolve.
If conduct does not constitute trafficking, what remedy?	State sought trafficking conviction and punishment under trafficking statutes.	If trafficking is improper, conviction should be reformed to the appropriate lesser‑included offense and remanded for punishment.	Dissent endorses reformation and remand; CCA did not grant review to implement that relief.

Key Cases Cited

Ritz v. State, 533 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (discussing scope of trafficking and containing Keller, P.J., dissent addressing these issues)
Ritz v. State, 481 S.W.3d 383 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015) (appellate construction treating transport as sufficient to prove trafficking)
Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (court may avoid statutory constructions producing absurd results)
Lothrop v. State, 372 S.W.3d 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (avoid interpretations that render statutory provisions redundant)
Ex parte Perry, 483 S.W.3d 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (principles about focusing on pled statutory language for constitutional challenges vs. full text for statutory meaning)
Thornton v. State, 425 S.W.3d 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (reformation to lesser‑included offense and remand for punishment)