Fort Bend County v. Davis
139 S. Ct. 1843
| SCOTUS | 2019Background
- Davis (employee) filed an EEOC charge in 2011 alleging sexual harassment and retaliation; while the charge was pending she was fired after missing work for a church event.
- Davis attempted to indicate "religion" on an intake questionnaire but did not amend the formal EEOC charge to allege religion discrimination.
- After receiving a right-to-sue notice, Davis sued Fort Bend County in federal court asserting religion-based discrimination and retaliation.
- Years of litigation left only the religion claim; Fort Bend then moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing Davis had not satisfied Title VII’s charge-filing requirement for a religion claim.
- The District Court granted dismissal treating the EEOC-charge requirement as jurisdictional; the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding the requirement nonjurisdictional and forfeitable when not timely raised.
- The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit: Title VII’s charge-filing requirement is a mandatory claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional bar.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is Title VII’s EEOC charge-filing precondition jurisdictional? | Davis: Failure to label "religion" on the formal charge should not defeat suit at this late stage; defendant forfeited the defense. | Fort Bend: Charge-filing is jurisdictional and can be raised at any time to defeat federal jurisdiction. | The charge-filing requirement is nonjurisdictional; it is a mandatory claim-processing rule subject to forfeiture if not timely raised. |
| Whether charge intake questionnaire showing "religion" suffices to preserve a religion claim | Davis: The intake questionnaire and worksharing relay to EEOC put defendant on notice of religion claim. | Fort Bend: Only the formal charge matters; intake notes did not amend the charge to allege religion discrimination. | Court did not decide specific sufficiency here; it resolved only that the filing requirement is nonjurisdictional, leaving timeliness/notice issues to be handled under regular claim-processing principles. |
| Whether statutory placement or purpose makes the requirement jurisdictional | Davis: Title VII’s structure and purposes do not transform the procedural requirement into jurisdictional text. | Fort Bend: The charging language in the same subchapter as jurisdictional grant makes it jurisdictional to effect congressional objectives. | Court: Placement and congressional objectives do not make a procedural precondition jurisdictional; Congress must clearly state if it wants a rule to be jurisdictional. |
| Consequences for late assertion of charge-filing defect | Davis: Late assertion by defendant should be forfeited after prolonged litigation and appeals. | Fort Bend: Jurisdictional defects never forfeit and can be raised at any stage. | Court: Because the rule is nonjurisdictional, defendants may forfeit the defense by untimely assertion; courts treat it as a claim-processing rule. |
Key Cases Cited
- Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (clarifies distinction between jurisdictional rules and claim-processing rules)
- Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12 (mandatory claim-processing rules can be forfeited if not timely raised)
- Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (statutory element (15-employee threshold) is not jurisdictional when separate from jurisdictional grant)
- Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (procedural preconditions to suit treated as nonjurisdictional)
- Union Pacific R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers, 558 U.S. 67 (distinguishing jurisdictional requirements tied to statutory adjudicatory schemes)
- Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (Title VII filing-time requirement characterized as nonjurisdictional)
- Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134 (subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time; distinguishes from forfeitable rules)
- Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145 (urges careful use of "jurisdictional" and defers to Congress to make a rule jurisdictional)