First Choice Chiropractic, LLC v. Mike DeWine, 969 F.3d 675

In 2019 Ohio enacted Ohio Rev. Code § 1349.05 forbidding health-care practitioners and their agents from directly contacting (in person, by phone, or by electronic means) parties, victims, or witnesses of a motor-vehicle accident or crime until 30 days after the incident; communications to obtain employment during that 30-day window must be sent by U.S. mail.
Plaintiffs are chiropractors and a referral service that rely on prompt direct contact with recent accident victims; they sued seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging First Amendment and Equal Protection violations.
The district court denied a preliminary injunction and later entered final judgment for defendants; the plaintiffs appealed and the appeals were consolidated.
Defendants (Ohio) argued the statute is a time-limited, content-neutral restriction on direct solicitation intended to protect victims’ privacy and is consonant with precedent.
The Sixth Circuit construed the statute to apply only to direct solicitations during the 30-day period (not to bar all non-mail solicitations at all times) and applied Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Statutory scope	§1349.05 bars all non-mail solicitation at all times	Statute bans only direct non-mail solicitation during first 30 days	Court adopts defendant's narrower construction: only direct contact within 30 days is restricted
First Amendment — commercial speech	The ban on direct solicitations and speaker-based targeting violates commercial-speech protections	The restriction is time-limited, targets intrusive direct solicitations, and advances a substantial interest	Court upheld statute under Central Hudson: protects commercial speech; gov’t interest substantial; statute directly advances interest and is narrowly tailored
Equal Protection	Singling out health-care practitioners (not all professions) is arbitrary and unequal	Distinction is relevant because health-care providers commonly rely on direct solicitation; similarly regulated professions exist; classification permissible	Court rejects equal-protection challenge, applying intermediate scrutiny and finding the classification sufficiently related to the statutory purpose

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (commercial-speech four-part test)
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (upholding 30-day ban on lawyer solicitations to protect victims’ privacy)
Capobianco v. Summers, 377 F.3d 559 (6th Cir.) (upholding Tennessee restriction on chiropractors soliciting accident victims)
Chambers v. Stengel, 256 F.3d 397 (6th Cir.) (upholding statute criminalizing attorneys’ solicitation of accident victims within 30 days)
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (addressing heightened review language for content- and speaker-based commercial-speech restrictions)
Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (recognizing First Amendment protection for truthful commercial speech)
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (lesser protection for some in-person commercial solicitation)
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (narrow-tailoring standard for speech restrictions)