Fedora v. MSPB
15-3039
| Fed. Cir. | Jul 20, 2017Background
- Laurence M. Fedora appealed the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) final decision to the Federal Circuit but filed his petition after the 60‑day deadline in 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A).
- The panel held § 7703(b)(1)(A)’s 60‑day appeal period is jurisdictional and denied Fedora’s late filing; Judge Plager dissented at the panel stage.
- Fedora petitioned for rehearing en banc; the court invited supplemental briefing after the Supreme Court’s decision in Perry v. MSPB and accepted Fedora’s waiver of discrimination claims to resolve a jurisdictional concern.
- The en banc petition was denied; Judges Wallach and Plager dissented from the denial, arguing the court should revisit whether § 7703(b)(1)(A) is jurisdictional.
- The dissenters argue the panel relied too narrowly on Bowles v. Russell and failed to apply the broader Irwin/Henderson framework assessing whether a deadline rebuts the presumption of equitable tolling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 7703(b)(1)(A)’s 60‑day filing deadline is jurisdictional | Fedora: Deadline is non‑jurisdictional; equitable tolling may apply; Bowles does not control here | MSPB/USPS: Deadline is jurisdictional under Bowles; court lacks power to toll | Panel/en banc denial: Court treated the deadline as jurisdictional and denied rehearing en banc (dissent argues otherwise) |
| Whether Bowles controls appeals from administrative tribunals to Article III courts | Fedora: Bowles is not dispositive for agency→court appeals; Irwin/Henderson framework should govern | Respondents: Bowles governs appeal periods to Article III courts and supports jurisdictional characterization | Dissent: Bowles was applied too narrowly; the question is sufficiently debatable to warrant en banc review (court denied rehearing) |
| Proper analytical framework for deciding jurisdictional vs. claims‑processing | Fedora: Apply Irwin presumption of equitable tolling and consider text, context, history, and Congressional intent | Respondents: Rely on precedent treating the 60‑day rule as jurisdictional (Monzo, Oja) | Dissent: Court should use Irwin/Henderson/Reed Elsevier multifactor analysis and revisit Monzo/Oja; en banc review refused |
Key Cases Cited
- Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007) (holding timely filing of an appeal between courts is "mandatory and jurisdictional")
- Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990) (presumption of equitable tolling applies to suits against the Government)
- Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011) (Bowles concerned court‑to‑court appeals; courts should look for clear congressional intent before treating a rule as jurisdictional)
- Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010) (analyze text, context, and historical treatment when deciding jurisdictional character)
- Monzo v. Department of Transportation, 735 F.2d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (earlier Federal Circuit decision treating the predecessor filing deadline as jurisdictional)
- Oja v. Department of the Army, 405 F.3d 1349 (2005) (Federal Circuit reaffirming jurisdictional nature of § 7703(b)(1)(A))
- Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986) (granting equitable tolling for an administrative review deadline)
- John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130 (2008) (consideration of historical treatment can rebut presumption of equitable tolling)
- Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (distinguishing jurisdictional rules from claim‑processing rules using statutory text and context)
- Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998) (precedent remains binding until Supreme Court revisits it)
