Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions
137 S. Ct. 1562
| SCOTUS | 2017Background
- Petitioner Juan Esquivel‑Quintana, a Mexican national and U.S. lawful permanent resident, pleaded no contest in California to unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor more than three years younger than the perpetrator (Cal. Penal Code §261.5(c)); California defines "minor" as under 18.
- DHS initiated removal proceedings because the conviction was treated as an "aggravated felony" under the INA: §1101(a)(43)(A) ("sexual abuse of a minor") and §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (grounds for removal).
- An IJ and the Board concluded the California conviction was an aggravated felony; the Sixth Circuit denied review, deferring to the Board.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a statutory‑rape conviction based solely on participants’ ages (here, consensual sex between a 21‑year‑old and a 17‑year‑old) categorically qualifies as "sexual abuse of a minor" under the INA.
- Applying the categorical approach (compare state statute’s minimum conduct to the generic federal definition), the Court examined statutory text, dictionaries, related federal statutes, and state laws to determine the generic age covered by "sexual abuse of a minor."
Issues
| Issue | Esquivel‑Quintana's Argument | Sessions (Gov't) Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a state statutory‑rape conviction based solely on ages (here, victim 17, actor 21) is an INA "sexual abuse of a minor" aggravated felony | The generic federal meaning of "sexual abuse of a minor" in the statutory‑rape context requires victim <16, so CA §261.5(c) (victim up to 17) does not categorically qualify | "Sexual abuse of a minor" covers sexual activity directed at persons under 18; Congress’ use of "minor" and some dictionary definitions support an <18 generic | The generic definition, for statutory‑rape offenses based solely on ages, requires the victim be under 16; CA statute (covers 17‑year‑old victims) is not categorically an aggravated felony |
| Whether the Board’s contrary interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference (or ambiguity resolved by rule of lenity) | Any ambiguity should be resolved for the defendant under the rule of lenity | Agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute should get Chevron deference | No deference applied because the statute, read in context, unambiguously forecloses the Board’s interpretation; neither Chevron nor lenity is needed |
| Whether the generic offense includes a uniform required age differential between actor and victim | Not necessary to decide here; petitioner emphasizes California’s higher age of consent is dispositive | Government points to many state laws that impose age differentials and to definitions implying <18 | Court did not decide whether a uniform age differential is required; held only that victims >=16 (but <18) are outside the generic statutory‑rape‑based definition absent special relationship |
| Whether related statutes and state laws support a 16‑year generic age of consent | — | Government relied on broader dictionary definitions and variable state laws | Court relied on contemporaneous dictionaries, 18 U.S.C. §2243’s 1996 amendment, and that a majority of states set age of consent at 16 to conclude 16 is the generic age in this context |
Key Cases Cited
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (explains categorical approach for INA aggravated‑felony analysis)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (presumption that conviction rests on the least of the acts criminalized)
- Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (use of a generic, uniform definition for predicate offenses)
- Gonzales v. Duenas‑Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (application of the categorical approach in immigration context)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (start with ordinary meaning when statute lacks definition)
- Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478 (2012) (categorical approach applied to INA crimes)
- Carachuri‑Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010) (discussion of "aggravated" modifier and statutory context)