819 F.3d 1037
7th Cir.2016Background
- On Sept. 5, 2007, Donovan Burris shot Kamal Rashada during an argument at an apartment; Kamal was paralyzed. Burris claimed the shooting was accidental; the Rashada family testified Burris pointed and fired at close range.
- Burris was charged with first-degree reckless injury (requiring utter disregard for human life) and being a felon in possession of a firearm; the jury was instructed on first- and second-degree reckless injury.
- During deliberations the jury asked whether it could consider "facts and circumstances after the shooting" in determining "utter disregard." The trial judge, over Burris’s objection, gave a supplemental instruction quoting language from State v. Jensen that said after-the-fact conduct "does not operate to preclude a finding of utter disregard," and that the element is measured objectively by what a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have known.
- The jury convicted Burris of first-degree reckless injury and unlawful possession. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, holding the supplemental instruction misled the jury; the Wisconsin Supreme Court reinstated the conviction, finding the instruction potentially ambiguous but not reasonably likely to have caused the jury to ignore after-the-fact evidence.
- Burris sought federal habeas relief arguing the state supplemental instruction was ambiguous and likely caused the jury to give little or no weight to after-the-fact remorse/evasion evidence; the district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law.
Issues
| Issue | Burris’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the supplemental instruction was ambiguous and reasonably likely to make the jury ignore after-the-fact conduct when assessing "utter disregard for human life" | Instruction implied after-the-fact remorse/evasion could be discounted or ignored, depriving Burris of consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence | Instruction was legally accurate, quoted state precedent, and even if ambiguous it did not create a reasonable likelihood the jury ignored the evidence | Court held instruction at most involved state-law error; not reasonably likely to have misled jury in a constitutional sense; habeas relief denied |
| Whether the instruction shifted burden of proof on mens rea element | Burris asserted instruction reduced weight of after-the-fact evidence and thus eased prosecution’s burden | State argued assigning less weight to a category of evidence is not a burden-shift and might even help defendant | Court held instruction did not shift burden of proof; no due process violation on that ground |
| Whether exclusion or devaluing of after-the-fact evidence violated the right to present a complete defense | Burris argued jury was effectively precluded from considering defense-relevant after-the-fact evidence | State argued evidence was admitted and only the jury’s consideration was implicated—Supreme Court precedent does not extend a right to guarantee how jury weighs evidence | Court held right to present a defense does not require that the jury give particular weight to evidence; no constitutional violation shown |
| Whether federal habeas relief is available for allegedly erroneous state-law jury instructions | Burris urged habeas review because instruction was ambiguous and had constitutional effects | State argued instructional errors of state law do not suffice for federal habeas absent a showing of constitutional error reasonably likely to have affected jury | Court applied AEDPA deference and held Wisconsin Supreme Court reasonably applied federal law; habeas relief denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179 (2009) (habeas review of jury instructions requires assessing whether instruction so infected trial as to violate due process and must be considered in context)
- Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) (state-law instructional errors generally do not form basis for federal habeas relief)
- Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990) (an instruction that reasonably likely prevents jury consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence can violate due process)
- Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333 (1993) (limitations on extending right to present defense; state-law instructional errors insufficient for federal habeas)
- Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996) (exclusion of a line of evidence may affect prosecution’s proof, but evidentiary rules with that effect do not automatically implicate due process)