Gilmore v. Taylor

v. TAYLOR GILMORE 7, 1993 2, 1993 June Argued March No. 91-1738. Decided Wilson, Mark E. Illinois, Attorney Assistant General of the cause for him on the briefs argued With petitioner. Burris, were Roland W. B. Rosalyn General, Attorney Madsen, Marcia and Terence M. General, Solicitor Kaplan, Zick, General. Friedl, and Steven J. Attorneys Assistant L. Marshall, Court, of the C. Lawrence by appointment him on With the cause respondent. argued Jr., Robert TRoy Englert, Agostinelli, the brief were P. O’Neill.* Timothy of the delivered the opinion Rehnquist Justice

Chief Court.† convicted of murder by Kevin

Respondent and sentenced imprisonment. Illinois jury years’ final, he sought conviction and sentence became After his on that the jury federal habeas relief the ground the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due at his trial violated given for the Cir- Process The Court of Seventh Appeals Clause. Fal- of its recent decision in cuit relief on basis granted Lane, coner which held that 905 F. 2d on murder and voluntary Illinois pattern were because allowed a they unconstitutional a murder whether to return verdict without considering a state that would the defendant mental possessed support verdict We conclude voluntary-manslaughter instead. Falconer was not dictated by rule announced and is therefore “new” within the prior precedent meaning Lane, (1989). Teague 489 U. S. Accordingly, Falconer rule habeas the basis for federal provide relief in case. respondent’s one became

Early morning September respondent involved in with his former and wife her live-in dispute Scheidegger *Kent S. and Charles L. Hobson filed a brief for Crimi- Foundation as amicus curiae Legal nal urging Justice reversal. amici curiae urging Briefs affirmance were for filed the American by Larry Yackle, Shapiro, W.

Civil Steven R. Leslie Liberties Union et al. Harris, Powell, Grossman; Harvey John A A and and Nicholas deB. George Leighton George N. by Katzenbach et al. H. Kendall. and †JusTiCE Souter all but footnote 3 of this joins opinion. arrangements for boyfriend, Siniscalehi, over custodial Scott daughter. adults, three A fracas ensued between his respondent times during seven stabbed Siniscalehi which hunting wounds, died from these Siniscalehi knife. with morning. respondent at his home later was arrested and charged Stat., Respondent Rev. ch. murder. 111. was ¶ took the stand and admitted At he trial, 9-1 acting killing he under a sudden was Siniscalehi, but claimed passion provoked and there- Siniscalehi, and intense voluntary only guilty offense the lesser included fore manslaughter. ¶ evidence, the the close of all the 9-2. At support- judge was sufficient evidence trial found that there require ing respondent’s passion” in- defense to “heat of manslaughter, instructed struction on as follows: prove charge murder,

“To sustain the State must following propositions: performed acts That the Defendant which “First: Siniscalehi; the death of Scott caused he the Defendant did so intended “Second: That when great bodily harm or he Siniscalehi; to kill or do to Scott great bodily knew that act cause death or his would knew that his acts Siniscalehi; harm to or he cre- Scott strong great bodily probability ated or death harm committing Siniscalehi; to Scott or he was offense of home invasion. you your

“If find from of all the evidence consideration proved propositions that each one of these has been be- yond you doubt, a reasonable should find the Defendant guilty. your you

“If find from of all the evidence consideration any propositions proved these one of has not been beyond you doubt, a reasonable find Defend- should guilty. ant not voluntary manslaughter, the charge

“To sustain propositions: following prove must evidence performed which the acts Defendant That the “First: Siniscalchi; and of Scott the death caused intended did so he Defendant That when the “Second: bodily Siniscalchi; or he great to Scott harm do to kill or [sic] death or bodily great acts would that such knew acts cre- such or he knew that Siniscalchi; harm Scott bodily great strong probability harm death or ated Siniscalchi; to Scott he acted did so the Defendant That when

“Third: resulting passion, seri- from intense a sudden and under provocation another. ous you your of all evidence consideration find from

“If proved be- has propositions been one these each you yond find Defendant doubt, should a reasonable guilty. your you of all the evidence find from consideration

“If proved any propositions has not been one these you find the Defend- should doubt, a reasonable guilty. not ant charged previously, Defendant is voluntary

“As stated committing man- of murder and the offense guilty, you you must slaughter. Defendant If find the guilty offense; but not On the both. him either find you you guilty, can hand, if find the Defendant other App. or both offenses.” him not on either find 128-131. virtually identi- after, modeled were

These instructions pattern jury instructions on murder and the Illinois to, cal formally adopted manslaughter, which were §§7.02 Jury Instructions —Criminal 1981, Illinois Pattern (2d 1981), judges Illinois had ed. but which relied and 7.04 on the State the definitions murder 1961,when enacted since voluntary manslaughter governed until Murder-Voluntary of Burdens in Man- Haddad, Allocation 338

slaughter Approach, An Defense Cases: Affirmative 59 Chi.- (1982).1 Respondent object Kent L. Rev. 23 did not The returned a verdict on the mur- instructions. charge, respondent years’ der was sentenced imprisonment.

Respondent unsuccessfully challenged his conviction on petition appeal, postconviction then filed a for state relief. petition. Circuit dismissed the The Court But while re spondent’s pending, appeal Supreme the Illinois Court pattern invalidated the Illinois on instructions murder voluntary manslaughter. People Reddick, Ill. 2d (1988). According Supreme 184, E. 2d 141 to the N. placed Court, under Illinois law, the instructions should have prosecution disproving on the the burden of a rea possessed mitigating sonable doubt defendant Respondent Id., 197, 2d, mental state. 526 N. E. at 146. sought advantage appeal, to take of Reddick on but the Appeals postconviction Court the denial of affirmed relief ground on Reddick did not involve constitutional type only support grant error, the of error that would People Taylor, App. relief. 538, 181 Ill. 3d 536 E. 2d N. (1989). Supreme respond Illinois Court denied request appeal. ent’s leave

Having respondent sought exhausted state remedies, his attacking ground federal relief, habeas his conviction on the given that the proc- his trial violated due days Appeals Eleven later, ess. for the Sev- enth Circuit held as much in Lane, Falconer v. 905 F. 2d 1129 (1990). The defect identified the Falconer court was quite different from identified Reddick: Because the 1, Effective July 1987, voluntary manslaughter the offense of was re second-degree classified as proof murder and the burden of as to the exist ence a mitigating placed expressly mental state was on the defendant. Ill. Stat., ¶ Rev. ch. 9-2 pattern jury The Illinois were accordingly. rewritten Jury Illinois Pattern Instructions —Crimi (3d 1993). §7.02B nal Supp. ed. voluntary-manslaughter preceded murder that it the direct but did not expressly instructions, the de- if it found murder conviction a could not return state, possible was a mental mitigating fendant possessed with- murder a was of find that defendant a for voluntary- to a whether he was entitled considering out even 2d, 1136. “Ex- at instead. 905 F. conviction held, scale,” the Seventh Circuit on this misdirection plicit Id., of due guarantee process.” the constitutional “violates the Court conclusion, Appeals In reaching at 1137. 414 U.S. v. Naughten, reliance on Cupp principal placed (1973). con- State proceeding, federal habeas At respondent’s trial at given respondent’s ceded Falconer, argued but under were unconstitutional the meaning “new” within in Falconer.was rule announced (1989), and could therefore Lane, 489 U. S. 288 v. Teague The District habeas relief. for federal not form the basis 954 F. 2d reversed. but Court Appeals agreed, now thought Seventh Circuit Although Falconer within “too to have compelled general was Cupp 2d, 452, it concluded Teague,” 954 F. at meaning v. (1990), 494 U. S. 370 Connecticut v. Boyde California, “spe- were Johnson, S. 73 (plurality opinion), 460 U. in Fal- result reached to have cific enough compelled” the Court coner, 2d, Accordingly, Appeals 954 F. not “new” announced in held that rule Falconer did Teague and that therefore meaning Teague, within of Falconer in respond- not bar the retroactive application Id., certiorari, 506 U. S. 814 ent’s case. at 453. We granted and now reverse. and its retroactivity Teague under prog- Falconer Subject us in this case. is the before eny only question a after defend- two narrow case that decided exceptions, and sentence become final may provide ant’s conviction if the basis federal habeas relief it announces “new Collins, rule.” Graham (1993); 466-467 Black, 222, 227 (1992); Teague, supra, Stringer 305-311 we have vari (plurality opinion). Though offered ous of what rule, formulations constitutes new “mean put a decision announces new ingfully majority cases, not dictated rule was by ‘“if result at precedent existing ’” Butler the time the became defendant’s conviction final.” McKellar, 412 407, 494 (quoting Penry Lyn v. U. S. v. augh, 302, 492 in turn quoting Teague, U. S. 314 also Graham, at 301 supra, see (emphasis original)); Smith, 467; 497 supra, Sawyer v. U. S. 234 (1990); Parks, 494 Penry Lynaugh, 484, 488 (1990); v. v. Saffle 302, 329 492 U. “The rule’ vali S. ‘new ... principle dates reasonable, good-faith existing prec interpretations state edents made U. by courts,” S., 494 and thus effectuates the States’ interest in the of criminal con finality victions and fosters between federal and state comity courts.

We our with begin the actual flaw found analysis by Falconer court in the challenged instructions. It was they that somehow lessened the State’s burden of proof In below that re by eases such as constitutionally required Winship, 358 (1970); nor was (The affirmatively misstated state law. applicable Court of in no way relied Reddick, upon People Appeals v. supra, which the Illinois Supreme Court had held subsequently subject application only. People Flowers, prospective (1990).) 2d 218, Ill. 2d N. E. Rather, the flaw the Falconer court was that when the jury by identified instructions were read consecutively, with elements of set murder forth before the elements of man slaughter, a could conclude juror the defendant was guilty of murder after the elements of applying that offense without on continuing to decide whether the elements of vol untary also were so out, made as to justify a verdict on returning that lesser offense instead. process, the concluding violated due that this defect

In Naughten, supra. Cupp That relied on court Falconer challenge process instruction due ease involved presumed truth, which the to tell the are that witnesses shifting the burden effect of claimed had the defendant explicitly proof had been Because on his innocence. presumption of as innocence on the defendant’s instructed guilt proving a reason as State’s burden well to a did not amount that the instruction we held doubt, able atS., violation. See U. constitutional unlikely Cupp progenitor an- of the rule think We Cir- a view now shared Seventh Falconer, nounced in Winship following Cupp in line estab- The cases cuit. prove guilt beyond a doubt must reasonable lish States charged, every respect element of the offense but proving they place on defendants the burden U. S. 228 Ohio, See Martin v. affirmative defenses. (1977). (1987); 432 U. 197 York, Patterson New v. proposition argues support the that these later cases State instructing respect any with error committed the State’s defense, to affirmative which does not lessen every Winship proving of the offense burden in element wholly charged one of state doubt, reasonable Engle Isaac, and n. 21 119-121, law. Cf. U. S. (1982) (challenge instructions correctness self-defense relief). provides under state law no basis for federal habeas say We need not other than address this contention crystal cases like Patterson and Martin make it clear that Cupp compel does not the result in Falconer. reached present Appeals

In its decision in the case, offered two additional cases dictate which believed did Boyde supra. result in Falconer. The first is v. California, reviewing There, we clarified the standard for on federal ha- ambiguous jury impermissibly beas a claim that jury’s “constitutionally restricted the consideration of rele- Although Boyde vant evidence.” 494 U. at S., was de- respondent’s became cided after conviction and sentence change favoring it did work a in the law criminal final, may Teague defendants, and therefore be considered our (1993). analysis. Fretwell, 364, 373 Lockhart v. 506 U. S. Boyde respect capital case, was a Nevertheless, Eighth requires a held Amendment which we have that the factfinding greater degree accuracy than would be noncapital Collins, true case. See Herrera v. U. S. (1980). (1993); Alabama, Beck v. 447 U. S. 625 Out possi capital context, side of the we have never said that the bility jury misapplying gives of a state law rise to federal contrary, constitutional To the held that in error. we have that contain structions errors of state law not form the McGuire, basis for federal habeas relief. Estelle Boyde, under the rel- Moreover, the standard fashioned inquiry evant is “whether there is a reasonable likelihood applied challenged way that the has instruction in a prevents constitutionally the consideration of relevant Boyde, petitioner In S., evidence.” at 380. ar- gued trial court’s instruction on California’s “catch- determining all” factor for whether a defendant should be jury’s sentenced to death restricted the consideration of cer- mitigating Eighth “[t]he tain evidence. Since Amendment requires give that the be able to effect consider and mitigating all id., relevant evidence,” 377-378, this evi- plainly constitutionally dence was case, relevant. In this petitioner argues challenged contrast, that the prevented jury considering from affirma- evidence of his noncapital tive defense. But in a ease such as this there is counterpart Eighth no to the Amendment’s doctrine of “con- stitutionally capital relevant evidence” cases. Appeals plurality opinion of also relied on the (1983). Johnson, Connecticut v. 460 73 That U. S. case question

dealt with the whether an instruction that violates process due under Montana, Sandstrom v. 442 U. S. 510

343 analysis. But in subject (1979), to harmless-error be plurality discussed question, deciding this course of on discussion it is this error, and nature of Sandstrom is a Appeals Sandstrom below. of relied the Court which simply an instruc- Winship; held that lineal descendant process due presumption fact violates tion which creates proving all its burden of the State of if it relieves beyond charged doubt. a reasonable of the offense elements plurality’s discussion Appeals read the Johnson The Court process principle” that establishing “due as of Sandstrom ig- they “the if lead unconstitutional are finding exculpatory the defendant evidence nore at 453 2d, 954 F. doubt.” a reasonable murder added). can Johnson (emphasis nor But neither Sandstrom beyond Winship. can The most that far be stretched given respondent’s trial is that of the instructions be said evi- they to consider would fail a risk that created respect to defense, with to an affirmative that related dence apply. process guarantee Winship’s does due which supra. supra; York, v. New Patterson Ohio, Martin v. related) (but separate he Respondent rationale offers compels supported by and also the Sev our cases claims is ruling viz., in Falconer: enth Circuit’s his fundamental given trial interfered his previously present stated that “the have a defense. We meaningful guarantees defendants ‘a criminal Constitution ” present complete opportunity Crane v. Ken defense.’ (1986) (quoting tucky, Trom 476 690 U. S. California (1984)). But the cases which we betta, 485 U. S. principle the exclusion of evi dealt with have invoked Kentucky, supra; g., v. Mis dence, see, e. Crane v. Chambers testimony sissippi, defense U. S. or (1972) (per g., Texas, e. 409 U. S. witnesses, see, Webbv. curiam); Washington None Texas, ability imposed on a defendant’s them involved restrictions Drawing present cases, an affirmative on these defense. in- defense that argues right present respondent con- and that it, to have the consider jury cludes from on which state law prevent jury fusing due defense therefore violate an affirmative considering our would an of eases reading But such expansive process.2 McGuire, reaffirmed in Estelle v. of the make a rule nullity of state law generally that instructional errors supra, And the level relief. form the basis federal habeas cases this line of which invokes at generality respondent for pur- far too to provide any meaningful guidance is great Parks, S., 494 U. Teague our inquiry. poses Saffle with the Seventh reasons, disagree For the we foregoing foreordained and that our precedent Circuit respondent the rule an- Falconer, hold that result and therefore nounced in Falconer is meaning Teague.3 “new” within States, 409 United Respondent relies on Cool v. also curiam). challenge process instruc a due an (per That case involved testimony it defense unless believed disregard tion should Relying on testimony true. In beyond a doubt that the reasonable Texas, Winship, (1970), Washington S. 14 and 388 U. re 397 U. S. 358 required of the defendant’s we held reversal instruction and “place[d] improper burden on defense conviction because guilt beyond despite its failure to find to convict allow[ed] turn, This, in we S., emphasized, 409 U. at 102-103. reasonable doubt.” prove Winship’s guilt must be State contravened command S., progeny is a yond a U. 104. Cool reasonable doubt. 409 Teague Winship, predicate under for the rule provides therefore no announced Falconer. 3Strongly fortifying this is the instructions conclusion the fact after, virtually unconstitutional were modeled deemed Falconer to, pattern identical the Illinois on murder and manslaughter, formally adopted years which were in 1981—five before re As spondent’s judges trial —but on Illinois had relied since 1961. which stated, purpose Teague’s principle we have rule” is “vali “new to. reasonable, interpretations existing precedents good-faith made date McKellar, 407, 414 state Butler v. ex courts.” practice istence of state period years such an institutionalized over a rule falls into is whether be decided to All that remains rule be exceptions, which new Teague’s under one of ex- The first review. given collateral effect on retroactive “plac[e] certain kinds ception applies to those rules power private conduct primary, individual Teague authority proscribe.” v. law-making criminal (internal quotation opinion) (plurality at 307 S., 489 U. Lane, omitted). clearly inapplicable here, exception is This marks not “decriminal- does in Falconer the rule announced since supra, Parks, at 495. any of conduct. See class ize” Saffle applica- exception Teague’s permits retroactive second “ implicating procedure’ criminal rules of ‘watershed tion of pro- accuracy of the criminal fairness and the fundamental 311). Teague, supra, (quoting ceeding.” U. at 495 S., Although inapplicable. the Falconer exception is also This jury might con- have been expressed concern that court say its question, we cannot the instructions fused requiring ‘observ- holding of rules into that “small core falls concept implicit procedures are that... ance of those liberty.’” S., at 478 Collins, Graham of ordered (internal quotation supra, (quoting Teague, marks at 311 omitted)).4 within in Falconer is “new” the rule announced

Because Teague’s meaning Teague not into one fall does provide exceptions, for federal habeas cannot the basis existing interpretations given of the of the reasonableness strong evidence precedent by state courts. the instructional defect Blackmon dissent would elevate Justice on murder and pattern Illinois contained violation, merely level of a federal constitutional Teagues, ex to one so as to come within second but fundamental different constitu ception. by combining reaches this result several He laws, right against post ex principles prohibition tional facto —the trial, unrecognizable remain constitu fair and the silent —into tional stew. judgment respondent’s

relief in of the Court of case. The Appeals is therefore

Reversed. O’Connor, Justice with whom Justice White joins, in the concurring judgment.

Kevin admitted that he had killed Scott Sinisealchi. “act[ed] however, He that he had under a sudden contended, passion resulting provocation by and intense from serious Tay [Sinisealchi].” ¶ Stat., Rev. 9-2 If eh. to be believed, lor’s account is under law of the then, Illinois, State of he is not but of murder rather of manslaughter. Taylor trial, At took the Ibid. stand and only to the He asked admitted two elements of murder. that jury consider his state of mind he acted when and convict voluntary manslaughter, acquitting him him of of murder. put Taylor jury to Illinois law is that this a choice: clear only manslaughter could be or convicted murder —not of Taylor produced Indeed, both. because sufficient evidence passion, required to raise the of sudden Illinois law defense negate Taylor’s beyond the State to defense reasonable People 184, doubt. 123 526 Reddick, v. Ill. 2d N. E. 2d (1988). jury 141, 146 a result, As should have been permitted Taylor to convict if there so murder was much possibility Taylor’s manslaughter as a reasonable that de fense had merit. Ibid. (1990),

In Lane, Falconer v. 2d F. Court Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held instructions simi- given Taylor’s comport lar to those trial with did not Illi- ambiguous Taylor’s nois law and were In at best. case, according Appeals, ambiguity to the Court resulted in a reasonable likelihood that the misunderstood those Taylor guilty instructions, and that once it found of the two (to admitted), Taylor elements of murder which had simply stopped deliberating considering possibil- without ity Taylor guilty only manslaughter. was 954 F. 2d concluded words, In other court never consid- that the likelihood a reasonable

there was even passion, of sudden provoked defense Taylor’s ered evidence was sufficient there the trial court thought though though and even reach the jury the issue to defense for of the its absence the burden of proving bore State due held, proc- violated This, the court doubt. reasonable at 450. Id., ess. deci that our however, understood

The Court of Appeals, (1989) Lane, (plurality opin v. 489 U. S. sion in Teague on habeas corpus. of new rules announcement bars the ion), examined our Accordingly, precedents at 451. 2d, 954 F. our “dictated” by was whether its decision determine our court construed cases In so decisions. prior doing, 494 U. Connecticut California, Boyde as Johnson, opinion), compel S. 73 (plurality case used its that the instructions conclusion ling It therefore at 452-453. 2d, due 954 F. process. violated that a writ “new” and ordered its rule was not held within 120 unless retried issue corpus habeas at 453. days. Id., that the rule majority

I agree today to debate among was at susceptible announced least Appeals McKellar, 407, 494 S. See Butler U. jurists. reasonable v. a Teague that under reason, For that I agree on court cannot issue a writ of habeas based corpus federal In so deciding, instructions here. dispute the ambiguous the merits of the I would not reach out to decide however, I as the Court construe our eases so rule, narrowly nor would reason, For that I write does. separately. reviewing

Prior we the standard for Boyde, phrased instructions in a all of which were variety ways, not Maryland, 367, consistent. Mills v. Compare (constitutional a error occurs when there is “substan tial the instructions consideration probability” precluded with v. Mon evidence), relevant Sandstrom constitutionally tana, 442 U. (1979) (constitutional error S. occurs when “could have concluded” that the in jurors reasonably structions created a on an element of presumption guilt Boyde, crime). In we clarified that when the claim is “instruction is and therefore single jury ambiguous subject to an erroneous interpretation,” proper inquiry is “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied instruction challenged way prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.” S., at notes, U. 380. As the we the more chose Boyde restrictive case, and, standard in that as a result, itself Boyde did not Court, state a new rule. The however, finds Ante, because it inapplicable at case. capital It is true that we clarified the for standard reviewing jury Boyde in a case, but did capital purport limit of that standard to application eases, nor have capital McGuire, Estelle we so limited In it. 62 (1991), example, Court reviewed an state-law in- ambiguous struction in a I noncapital case. Although disagreed the Court’s conclusion the effect of that regarding ambiguous see id., at 76-80 (O’Connor, instruction, J., concurring part I dissenting agreed with the part), standard it “ used in its reaching conclusion: ‘whether there is a reason- able likelihood that has in- applied challenged Id., struction in a that violates the way* Constitution.” Boyde supra). California, 72 (quoting It is clear that the Boyde “reasonable likelihood” standard of applies noncapi- tal cases.

Although Court’s opinion today be read as im- might plying erroneous may never rise give to constitutional error outside of ante, cases, capital such an implication would misconstrue our precedent. When the Court states that “instructions that contain errors of state law not form may the basis for federal habeas relief,” ibid, supra), Estelle McGuire, (citing it must mean that a mere error of law, state one that does not rise to the level on federal not be corrected violation, may

a constitutional however, instructions, state-law erroneous Some habeas. for relief, basis hence form the due process violate may McGuire, the In a majority case. noncapital even ain at instruction erroneous that the found particular Court violation, but rise to a constitutional give issue did not belies the instruction scrutinized very fact can violate due erroneous assertion that any cases. only capital process Amendment’s require held Eighth

We have not give to consider and effect be allowed jury ment that g., e. cases, see, in capital all evidence relevant mitigating Boyde, supra, we Nevertheless, cases. to noncapital applies create “con amendments that other constitutional have held must be able to relevant evidence” stitutionally g., Arkansas, (1987) e. Rock 44, 51 U. See, consider. trial (“The behalf at a criminal on one’s own testify Dela Constitution”); has sources several provisions Arsdall, ware v. Van 678-679 (Rehn oppor J.) (“[T]he guarantees Clause Confrontation quist, tunity (internal for effective cross-examination” quotation omitted)). relevant “constitutionally The category marks not limited to cases. capital evidence” is is whether case, In this application question Boyde is a new rule. It “reasonable likelihood” standard supra, ante, at Nor is the 341-342; not. at ques- be tion whether so erroneous under to rise constitutional violation. state law as to the level g., McGuire, e. See, It is to me that they may. clear id., at S., J., concurring U. 72; part (O’Connor, is whether reasonable ju- dissenting part). question rists could over whether erroneous disagree particular we created a instruction issue here —which assume rea- sonable likelihood not consider af- did defense it determined two elements of firmative once murder were established —violated the Constitution.

350 provide do not answer that question.

Our cases a clear to process, requires prove every Due course, of that the State beyond element of a criminal offense a reasonable doubt. In (1970). Winship, straightforward prop re 397 U. S. 358 This spawned corollary among osition has a number rules, of them evidentiary presump “us[e] the rule that the not State jury charge relieving tions in a have effect of persuasion beyond State its burden of a reasonable doubt every element of essential a crime.” Francis v. Franklin, Accord, Clark, U. S. Rose v. (1986); Johnson, Connecticut v. atS., 84-85 (plurality opinion); supra, Sandstrom, at 521-523. The Appeals Court of extended these cases—which themselves “logical Winship, supra, are the Rose, extension” see step standing at 580—one It read them further. as proposition any instruction that leads “the ignore exculpatory finding evidence in the defendant beyond process; of murder a reasonable doubt” violates due disregarded meaningless as the distinction between ele ments of the offense and affirmative 2d, defenses. 954 F. at 453. opinions (1987),

Our Ohio, Martin U. S. 228 and York, Patterson New 432 S. 197 however, U. make clear that at least in some circumstances the distinction is meaningless. not In Patterson, we held that Due Proc- require prove ess Clause did the State to the absence affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance place doubt; reasonable the State instead could proving burden the defense on the Id., at defendant. 210. holding supra, We rejected reaffirmed this in Martin, petitioner’s requiring prove claim that her self-defense preponderance petitioner of the evidence shifted to disproving burden of the elements of the Id., crime. at 233- (Although Martin was decided after convic- holding, Boyde’s, tion became final, its like was not a new rule.) in at least and Patterson Martin ease differs from

This only production ways. the burden had First, two produced persuasion; sufficient he once not the burden jury, go re the State was issue for the evidence beyond prove a reason defense quired the absence of his to 2d, E. Reddick, 2d, at 526 N. Ill. doubt. See able Taylor’s not concern the does contention Second, at 146. jury proof; argues did that the of he burdens of allocation say I Nevertheless, cannot at defense all. not consider his prior compel the Court the rule articulated our cases that very con Appeals. and Patterson the Martin least, At Appeals promulgated here rule the Court of firm that the goes said the Constitution we hitherto have what requires. finality purpose Teague promote state- is to

The judgments. “reasonable, a court makes a state court When they precedents exist interpretatio[n]” of as good-faith our over- should not be time decision, at the decision at 413- Butler, 494 S., turned on habeas review. U. federal Appeals’ constitu- merits of the Court 414. Whatever the holding, us, before the Illinois an issue is not tional concluding in that the error courts were not unreasonable was not error. constitutional pro- required of sudden and is not to allow the defense State passion free to it while all, State is allow voked prove supra; requiring Patter- Martin, to it. defendant supra. begrudging applica- a son, It is not or unreasonable jury principles to tion of these hold that a likelihood will not create reasonable consider defense do not violate Constitution. conclusively question do

Because our cases not resolve process give whether violates due an instruction is to reasonably likely considering prevent an from hybrid such defense, affirmative or defense as the State of permits, Illinois on re- resolution the issue habeas would quire promulgate us to I Court, new rule. Like the be- of Teague’s not within either this rule does fall

lieve that rules on ha of new to nonretroactive exceptions application “ less conduct, much ‘pri rule does not any beas. The place conduct[,] beyond the power individual mary, private e. Teague, authority criminal law-making proscrib States, S., v. United (quoting Mackey U. at 311 part (Harlan, J., judgments concurring embody rule “proce does the part)). Nor dissenting of an conviction which the likelihood accurate without dure] . above, As noted S., U. diminished seriously State to provide the Constitution does require de a rule once such a murder; that, defense affirmative must not prevent fense the instructions is provided, of absolute “a far from the kind considering cry from it is in the fairness that is implicit fundamental prerequisite (internal Id., at 314 liberty. quotation of ordered concept omitted). marks is not com-

The the Court of Appeals promulgated rule of the nor it fall within one two does pelled by precedent, I with the Court that therefore Teague agree exceptions. in of in rule this ease. Appeals the Court erred that applying I do because could however, not Court’s join opinion, view) that be read as Court (wrongly, my suggesting rule, in this a new only decision case Appeals’ applied but I would reserve that question also incorrect one. until we address it on direct review. with Blackmun,

Justice whom Justice Stevens joins, dissenting. today holds it cannot decide whether Kevin

Taylor has suffered a denial of due because process, Teague Lane, 489 U. S. 288 and its progeny preclude or rule announcement of a new habeas on federal application The Court as it concludes, further must in order to corpus. avoid reaching merits, that neither exception Teague’s of a ante, new rule proscription applies case. Teague exception permits retroactive The second “ impli- procedure’ application of criminal rules of ‘watershed accuracy criminal cating of the fairness the fundamental (1990) (quot- proceeding,” Parks, Saffle 311). fully am Teague, I ing Court, Unlike the atS., exception apply persuaded There- in this case. that this does assuming, argmndo, majority is correct that the even fore, concluding Taylor announce “new asks this Court to application Teague preclude the retroactive does not rule,” rule. existing Taylor argues that the criminal law substantive alleged must be law offense at the time of a defendant’s governs that he is that offense. I believe the trial of principle he asserts is a fundamental and that correct judgment the Court I therefore would affirm one. Appeals. I for the “murder” Scott At the time that tried voluntary man- law murder and Siniscalchi, Illinois defined slaughter albeit two elements distinct crimes, as two had a defendant crime, To be either common. (2) intended to caused the death victim, have bodily great The distinc- kill harm to the victim.1 or cause and murder tion between time of offense was that defendant who acted passion resulting either “under a sudden and intense from honest) (but provocation,” or under serious an unreasonable deadly justified prevent force was to the defend- belief bodily great guilty harm, imminent death or was ant’s own voluntary manslaughter guilty of but not of murder. 111. ¶ Stat., Rev. ch. 9-2 In other under Illi- words, person nois law at the time of a who offense, killed 1The intent element -would also be if the defendant knew satisfied his great bodily acts would cause or a death strong probability create of or harm, if attempting or the had been committing defendant or a forcible 9-1(2) (3) (1985). felony Stat., at the time. See Ill. Rev. ch. ¶¶ was innocent circumstances of provocation under specific of murder. trial, the found

At the of Taylor’s presiding judge close voluntary of manslaughter evidence support sufficient Illi- to under had instruction require jury been presented that he would therefore determined nois law. The judge existed “let the . whether that provocation decide . . Jury one or exist 96. No has chal- App. here did not here.” on Yet did judge the finding presiding lenged appeal. an affirmative the not explain provocation the the Instead, after about telling defense to murder. (intent and the death), elements of murder causation two “If from consideration all you your stated: find judge one has been evidence that each of these propositions proved find the Defendant doubt, reasonable should you to instruct Id., at 129. The went on the jury guilty.” judge he voluntary manslaughter that a is when person guilty killed individual state requisite has while possessing acts “the of the he under a sud- mind, and at time killing den and intense from serious resulting proyoeatin passion is conduct suffi- by the deceased. provocation [sic] Serious cient excite an intense reasonable passion person.” at 130. instruction Id., Finally, gave following judge in an the relation between attempt explain apparent murder and the voluntary manslaughter charges:

“As Defendant previously, charged stated the offense murder and man- committing If must slaughter. you find Defendant you guilty, offense; find not both. him either but On guilty if hand, you you other find Defendant guilty, Id., can him not on either offenses.” find or both at 131.

Even the these have prosecutor thought failed inform the relation between offenses Id., of murder and under Illinois law. at 98- in- include judge that the suggested He accordingly 99. claim could Taylor’s provocation that explaining struction charge. the murder defense to a complete constitute serve he had raised this indicated that Id., at 99. The prosecutor create just knowingly “I don’t want because possibility the sug- Id., declined judge at The trial here.” error “We’re concern: to the prosecutor’s and responded gestion doing ignorance.” it out it we’re doing knowingly; not Ibid. that it had found announced deliberations, jury

After verdict It then returned a signed of murder. Taylor guilty Id., 137. The never jury at to that effect. form unsigned returned charge mentioned Id., for that offense. forms and not-guilty both guilty at 139-140.

II ais “reason is unconstitutional if there A instruction jury has that challenged likelihood applied able consideration con that in a way prevents instruction California, Boyde relevant evidence.” v. stitutionally (1990).2 why detail below greater I 370, 380 explain killed under a defendant that demonstrates testimony in murder relevant evidence is constitutionally provocation is whether however, A question, trial in Illinois. threshold created a reasonable like in this case jury’s such would not consider provocation lihood evidence. that a one to contest proposition

No appears not understand from the would lay people of murder if concluded that it should find to the judge explained acted under he provocation. ante, Boyde might be standard implies, The Court McGuire, citation of Estelle capital cases. The Court’s confined Estelle however, implication, because belies that 502 U. S. Boyde McGuire reaffirmed capital case. standard and was itself not ante, (O’Connor, J., concurring judgment). See also or man- of either murder it could convict Taylor that jury In instruct- (or not both. 131. App. but neither), slaughter offenses, of both guilty could not be found Taylor that ing in defendant, fact, failed to that the however, explain judge in- offenses. He failed the elements of both satisfy could of volun- indeed whenever the elements that the jury form are (intent, causation, and provocation) manslaughter tary causation) (intent are and elements of murder satisfied, course, clarify of he therefore did And, satisfied as well. over murder must choose manslaughter that the jury out. both offenses are made of event that elements voluntary manslaughter murder and The relation between a complicated at the time of offense was Illinois of manslaughter one. Provocation was both a component this idea convey defense to easy way and a murder. murder, is to that to find a defendant guilty explain (1) (2) there that was intent, find there was must there no The prose- and was causation, provocation. had to pro- to the that he have cutor explained judge might id., at vide such an instruction under Illinois law. See to list was did, however, judge actually simply What tell the murder, offense, the elements of each starting both, one not of it could convict but Taylor only In the room, to deliberate. deliberation and send had sheets of each which jurors provided four paper,3 The sheets re- indicated, for signatures. spaces jurors’ of the offense of Guilty murder,” verdicts spectively, “Not murder,” of the offense of offense Guilty “Not “Guilty offense of and of the “Guilty Voluntary Manslaughter,” id., 135,137, order. Voluntary Manslaughter,” 139-140. The neither nor the not- jurors signed guilty verdict forms manslaughter. guilty regarding This is almost because the instruction for murder certainly invasion, Two additional sheets referred to the crime of home for which however, was conviction, tried and convicted. This longer is no issue this case. forms the verdict for manslaughter, the instruction

preceded manslaughter, forms for the verdict murder preceded found Taylor had they guilty that once understood the jurors in- with the judge’s not, could consistent murder, they There him of manslaughter. find structions, received, need, they under no therefore never Taylor’s jury provocation. consider defense complete made out a knew that provocation murder. the instructions “violated

The itself concedes State mur to find the jury state law by permitting Brief for his affirmative defense.” without considering der unanimous Illinois Supreme According Petitioner in another given same Court evaluating if the that, jury assure essentially case: “These a defendant of convict them, the cannot possibly follows . Reddick, 184, 123 2d v. Ill. People manslaughter.” voluntary con Circuit 141, 145 526 Seventh N. E. 2d 194, or de either State clearly matter how cluded: “No 'manslaughter of the the existence mitigating fense proved ver a murder nevertheless return could defenses,’ Falconer as given.” with the murder instruction dict line (1990). Because of the Lane, 1129, jury’s 905 F. 2d 1136 v. a fundamental depri suffered respondent Taylor ignorance, diminished of his rights seriously vation constitutional an accurate the likelihood of conviction.

Ill To an instruction why understand that prevents from evidence violates Constitu- considering provocation the criminal tion, examine necessary operation free society. law conduct of citizens regulating below, As the instructions in this case in effect explained ex post facto law, created an diminished the likelihood of an conviction, and to a accurate his deprived Taylor fair trial.

A consistently re- that the has held Constitution This Court provide con- quires to its citizens of what notice a State subject penalties and of what to criminal will them duct penalties 423, Florida, Miller 482 U. S. are. See those against prohibition (explaining the constitutional § 1); § post 3, 10, cl. Const., I, 9, Art. cl. laws, ex U. S. facto (1925) (same); Buckley Ohio, 167, 269 U. S. Beazell v. (1976) (explaining process the due Valeo, U. S. requirement notice that their conduct that defendants be on law); City Columbia, 378 the criminal Bouie v. violates (1964) (same). People their can conform con- only they if can know to the dictates of the criminal law duct say their conduct. criminal law has to about what warning imperative. Proper is a constitutional through Taylor that Illinois, statutes, its criminal warned against the actions, trial, his were law. Illi- as conceded did not warn him that murder and nois, however, interchangeable equiva- manslaughter would or be treated as voluntary lent offenses. A convicted of man- defendant slaughter, example, incarcerated for short a could be as years, imprisoned term as 4 and could for a maximum be years. A murderer, contrast, term of 15 convicted in could imprisoned years up be for no to a maxi- fewer than 20 and years, aggravating mum of 40 absent factors. 111.Rev. 1005-8-1(1) W-2(e), Stat., eh. and Under Illinois law at the time of then, the offense that acts, voluntary manslaughter he claims he not committed— —was nearly treated as an offense of the same seriousness as mur- presence provocation der.4 in Nevertheless, evidence, of 4This voluntary distinction between murder and hardly is a recent presence innovation the criminal “[T]he law. or absence of passion of provocation been, heat on sudden almost from the —has inception homicide, single of the common important law of most factor an adequate explanation read without a murder instruction murder and treats affirmative defense provocation offenses. Because as equivalent voluntary manslaughter case, in this was undisputedly present evidence provocation to murder as a defense failure to its operation explain an ex post to the application amounted to facto law. murder man to the relation between

A useful analogy is between case the relation murder this slaughter In criminal law. murder elsewhere self-defense is affirmative defense States in which self-defense those not that the prose does murder, require Constitution a reasonable doubt. self-defense cution disprove (1987). This Ohio, 480 U. S. 228, 233, 234 e. Martin g., See, bur elements of an offense heavy only impose is because Ibid. its as an status Despite the State. upon den proof is converts what defense, however, self-defense affirmative words, In other into homicide. justifiable otherwise murder self-defense, guilty kills in instead being who person of no offense murder, all. of self-defense how It is to see the context easy fundamentally instruction of an affirmative-defense omission the following due Consider process. denies defendant is presumed As citizen who example. hypothetical Parker, see Atkins know the 472 U. S. law, her Doe to kill Smith when he threatens Jane chooses John or the correct theory substantial harm on bodily death, she is murder under state law. Doe has committing on the her state rely representation legislature her conduct is If the were to her legal. State then try for murder and not her permit plead self-defense, of this vio- representation undoubtedly State’s breach would late of fundamental principles fairness. determining degree culpability attaching the to an homi- unlawful Wilbur, Mullaney (1975). cide.” 421 U. S. Taylor sympathize Kevin with

It more difficult be le- hypothetical Doe acted Doe, because Jane than concededly are Taylor all crimes gally not. did Not it will treat equal, and if Illinois announces however, manslaughter, voluntary seriously then more than murder rely when he on that announcement has a punishable engage as less in conduct a decision makes Mullaney Wilbur, 421 U. This serious crime. said: potential of the differ- in terms “Indeed, when viewed liberty personal to each attendant ence in restrictions of and man- the distinction ... between murder conviction, slaughter may greater importance the differ- than be many guilt lesser crimes.” ence or innocence between By equating voluntary manslaughter with murder and thereby, applying post effect, an ex murder law facto likely highly Taylor, case made it in this return an murder conviction. would inaccurate Tay- explained Illinois law the time above,

As under presence provocation reduced murder to offense, lor’s voluntary manslaughter. that state defined

This meant law category voluntary manslaughter of murder to exclude person who was and therefore considered a volun- Any tary manslaughter pro- be of murder. also to innocent likelihood of a murder conviction cedure increased the despite presence decreasing provocation, thus also manslaughter conviction, was therefore a likelihood of procedure con- the likelihood an accurate diminished jury. procedure viction in this ease Because considering prevented from even manslaughter option, severely diminished the likelihood of McKellar, an accurate conviction. Butler v. given

407, 416 ease The instructions essen- of guilty person ensured tially of murder. convicted, wrongly, be would the above, set forth example the hypothetical Returning case in Jane Doe’s instruction a self-defense omission the jury of murder by causing definition distort would A that definition. in within self-defense killings to include like a who self-defense, however, person who kills person kill a of murder under state is not guilty under provocation, prescribed to the penalties therefore subject law and is the omission results from conviction that Any for murder. case of therefore, defense is of a affirmative state-law self-defense, inaccurate in the case of provocation conviction. is asserted by Taylor the right suggests State in Beck v. Ala- this Court

the same as that recognized 17. In Brief for Petitioner See bama, 447 U. S. is entitled to that a defendant this held Beck, capital Court is evidence in instruction if there included offense a lesser left such an instruction. We open the record to support context. Beck noncapital whether applies question because here asserts that U. n. The State S., 638, in the rejected have such many Courts Appeals do the same with respect could context, noncapital 17, and n. 7. claim. Brief for Petitioner This assertion is without merit. entitles certain defend- claims,

Like the Beck right Taylor less drastic alternatives ants to have consider is between This, however, similarity murder. where Beck, two In concern and rea- rights ends. Court’s included offense instruction was son for lesser required their reasonable-doubt instruction. ignore jurors might offense,’” Where the defendant of some “‘plainly guilty atS., States, U. Keeble v. United quoting there is a risk that original), (emphasis absent a lesser included offense will instruction, jurors convict a defendant of him murder, capital thereby exposing they want to set penalty, do not because to the death provide a lesser failure to words, the person In other free. prob- capital ais in the context instruction included offense jurors will choose only we fear extent that to the lem nullify instruction. disregard their reasonable-doubt or to opposite just the Taylor’s the the concern case, In —that thereby convict the and jurors their instructions follow will they ignorant of the fact are murder because defendant voluntary man- to provocation the offense reduces voluntary proper man- slaughter. to include a The failure literally slaughter the definition distorts instruction by extending it to include murder jury. misinforming thereby the

and and its Beck to extend we would choose or not Whether noncapital defendant presumption nullification to right at bearing outcome of this case. on the has no jurors upon premised faith- the notion issue here is one they fully their instructions. to be understand follow what noncapital capital clearly operates premise and in the This S. Marsh, 481 U. Richardson v. alike. See contexts ' B judge ease Through in this then, the trial instructions, his Taylor thereby applied post law to murder an ex facto But the trial of murder. as to definition misled the rights. judge constitutional also violated another considering Taylor’s jurors judge prevented from When Taylor judge deprived provocation his defense, his right to a Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Sixth fair trial. to the Constitu-

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments right guarantee every criminal remain tion defendant right pre- precedents explained that have this silent. Our calling from the defendant as a witness cludes State prosecution. e.g., Neville, 459 South Dakota v. See, (1983) (the Fifth Amendment viola- U. “classic own his the defendant testify consists requiring tion” (1964) (the Four- 378 U. S. trial); Hogan, Malloy criminal incorporates Due Process Clause teenth Amendment States). remain silent against right Amendment Fifth ato convic- necessary all evidence must The State provide not to testify. if the defendant chooses tion witness and took the Taylor gave important up toso avail evidently He did his crime. testify about stand law. Illinois defense provided by of the himself provocation into his former that he broke admitted under oath Sinis- stabbed Scott intentionally fatally home and wife’s that he had testified, however, He also ealchi. 80-81. App. In its Id., closing the victim. 76-81. been provoked to find therefore asked defense argument, when he and intense passion had acted under sudden he of murder. was not guilty and therefore killed Sinisealchi Id., at 112-121. he told effectively the instructed the jurors,

When judge Absent testimony. to disregard Taylor’s provocation them evidence be- testimony, course, the most important had when deliberated was that Taylor the jurors they fore that his actions vio- had sworn to them taken the stand and the statute. As far as the murder lated both elements had confessed to the crime of murder tell, could jurors Taylor court. in open to murder. plead never indicated desire to

Taylor guilty Indeed, tended to show that he testimony he offered Yet trial failed to follow was innocent of murder. the judge to so testify. statute that had very By prompted transformed testi- doing, judge effectively exculpatory to defendant mony into murder. When a plea to he intentionally offense, an has a constitu- pleads guilty to tional be informed of his consequences about right Johnson, (1984); 467 U. plea. Mabry S. Marshall v. Lonberger, Taylor, of his testi- however, never apprised consequences affirmatively mony. unknow- misled into he was Instead, confessing ingly he was inno- to a crime of which he claimed thereby judge’s vitiated erroneous instructions cent. by right guaranteed the Sixth fair him trial, to a Amendments. and Fourteenth

IV adequate instruc of an affirmative-defense The omission profound of a defendant’s consti constitutes a violation tion rights. post ex It misinforms law, tutional creates facto governing legal principles, and denies as precise “Although right to a fair defendant his trial. Teague] exception [the be difficult second contours Wainwright, usually cited Gideon v. discern, we have right (1963),holding has that a defendant be represented of counsel all criminal trials for serious coming exception.” type rule within the fenses, to illustrate right to an Parks, S., at 495. The Saf U. fle jurors instruction that can understand affirmative-defense support there is evidence to an affirmative defense when pro accuracy significant as to the fairness and a criminal ceeding as is critical in a to counsel. It is indeed takes the stand and one, like where the defendant ease prove of murder order his af concedes elements firmative defense. Taylor requested

Kevin has not rule that would unrea stumbling sonably place path blocks of law enforce nor he ment, has asked this to announce a rule that is only marginally underlying related fair to the to a trial. contrary, On the he has asked that he be convicted of volun tary manslaughter voluntary manslaughter, if he spared he be if he sentence murder is innocent judge effectively and murder, that his instruct the disregard exculpatory part testimony of his attend If murder. a conviction for ensure which would to that only denied fair trial.5 he is asks, what he is denied he judgment affirm the dissent and would I respectfully of Appeals. the Court 4, ante, Chief Justice The Court’s footnote added opinion circulated, hardly acknowledgment, dissenting deserves

after justice thought let alone comment. I had that this was a court of and that country expect genuine a criminal defendant in this could to receive a analysis of the constitutional issues his case rather than dismissive conclusory rhetoric with which Kevin is here treated. I ad my here to derided “constitutional stew.”

Case Details

Case Name: Gilmore v. Taylor

Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States

Date Published: Jun 7, 1993

Citation: 508 U.S. 333

Docket Number: 91-1738

Court Abbreviation: SCOTUS