*1 MONTANA v. EGELHOFF No. 95-566. Argued March 1996 Decided June *2 opin- an delivered and Court judgment J., Scalia, announced JJ., Kennedy Thomas, joined. J., Rehnquist, C. which ion, in 56. p. post, judgment, concurring opinion J., Ginsburg, filed Souter, and Stevens, in which opinion, dissenting J., O’Connor, filed opinion, dissenting J., Souter, filed 61. p. post, JJ., Breyer, joined, J., Stevens, opinion, dissenting Breyer, J., filed 73. p. post, 79. p. post, joined, Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General of argued Montana, petitioner. the cause for With him on the briefs were Pam- Pela Collins, Assistant Attorney Clay General, Smith, R. Phillips. and Carter G.
Miguel A. argued Estrada for cause the United States urging amicus curiae reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor Days, Acting General Attorney Assistant Keeney, General Deputy Solicitor Dreeben, General Nina Goodman.
Ann argued C. German the cause respondent. With her on Amy the brief was N. Guth.* *3 announced judgment of the Court and
Justice Scalia opinion, delivered an in which The Chief Justice, Justice and Justice join. Kennedy, Thomas We consider in this case whether the Due Process Clause is violated Montana Code Annotated §45-2-203, which provides, part, in relevant intoxication “may *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were for the filed State of et Hawaii al. by Margery Bronster, S. Attorney Hawaii, of General and Michaels, Steven S. Deputy General, Attorney and the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Bruce M. Botelho Alaska, of Grant Arizona, of Woods Winston Bryant Arkansas, of Gale A. Colorado, Norton of M. Jane of Brady Delaware, J. Carla Stovall of Kansas, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. Missouri, Nixon of Don Stenberg Nebraska, of Frankie Sue Nevada, Del Papa of Tom Udall of Mexico, New Betty D. Montgomery Ohio, of W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Corbett, Thomas Jr., W. of Pennsylvania, Charles Molony Con- don of Carolina, South Dan Texas, Morales of McGraw, Jr., Darrell V. Virginia, West Togafau Malaetasi Samoa, American and Richard Weil of the Northern Islands; Mariana for the American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities et al. by Philip Allen Teir; Lacovara and Robert and for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson.
Diane Marie Amann and Barbara E. Bergman filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging affirmance. existence determining in consideration into taken I criminal] offense.” of [a element is an mental of a region Yaak m the out camping while 1992, July In made mushrooms, respondent to pick
northwestern who Christenson, and John Pavola Roberta with friends sold three 12, the July Sunday, On same. doing were rest and spent collected had they mushrooms party aat private and in bars drinking, evening and day the party left they 9 p.m., after time Some Montana. Troy, wagon. station Galaxy Ford Christenson’s seen continued, respondent binge apparently drinking aor hill aon “sitting recalled 9:20 p.m. beer buying with forth” back Velvet Black a bottle passing bank (1995). 2dP. Mont. Christenson. Lincoln officers night, midnight about At re- responding department, sheriff’s Montana, County, Christenson’s discovered driver, drunk a possible ports In 2. S. Highway U. along ain ditch stuck wagon station dead each Christenson, Pavola were seat front re- lay car rear In head. to the gunshot a single blood-alcohol His obscenities. and yelling alive spondent, *4 theOn later. hour one over .36 percent measured content .38- respondent’s lay pedal, brake near car, floor empty two and rounds loaded four with handgun, caliber hands. his on residue had gunshot respondent casings; of deliberate counts two with charged was Respondent as “purposely” law defined a crime homicide, being. human another death causing “knowingly” or the jury A (1995). portion §45-5-102 Ann. Code Mont. acts person “[a] here, instructed uncontested charge, con- engage object his conscious it is when purposely “[a] result,” such cause or to nature duct conduct of his aware ishe when knowingly acts person consti- his conduct circumstances under aware he is when tutes a crime; or, when he is aware there high exists the probability that his conduct will cause specific result.” App. to Pet. for Cert. Respondent’s 28a-29a. defense at trial was that an person unidentified fourth must have committed the murders; his own extreme he intoxication, claimed, had rendered physically him incapable of commit- ting the murders, and accounted for inability his to recall the night events July Although 12. respondent was allowed make this use of the evidence that he was intoxi- jury cated, the pursuant was instructed, to Mont. Code Ann. §45-2-203 (1995), that it could respondent’s not consider “intoxicated condition in determining ... the existence of a mental state which is an element of the App. offense.” jury Pet. for Cert. 29a. respondent The guilty found both counts, and the years’ court sentenced him to 84 imprisonment. (1) Supreme Court of Montana reversed. It reasoned respondent process right “had a due present and have jury
considered
all relevant evidence to rebut the
State’s evidence on all elements of
charged,”
the offense
(2)
Mont.,
at
2d,
P.
at
that evidence of re-
spondent’s voluntary “clear[ly]
. . . relevant
to the issue
[respondent]
of whether
knowingly
acted
purposely,” id.,
§
at 122,
2d,
P.
at
265. Because 45-2-203
prevented
jury
considering
that evidence with re-
gard to that issue, the court concluded that the State had
part
been “relieved of
prove
its burden
beyond
a reason-
every
able doubt
necessary
fact
to constitute the crime
charged,” id.,
900 P. 2d, at
respondent
266, and that
had therefore
process.
been
granted
denied
We
certio-
(1995).
rari.
HH The cornerstone of Supreme the Montana judg- Court s proposition ment was the that the guar- Due *5 Clause Process antees light present defendant the to and have considered 42 evi- State’s rebut to evidence relevant jury “all
by the Mont., at charged.” 272 offense of the all elements on dence added). does Respondent (emphasis 266 2d, at P. acknowledges that rule; he categorical this defend not viewed been not “has evidence relevant present right to conces- wise is a That 31. Respondent Brief absolute.” guar- Clause Due Process that proposition sion, since simply is evidence relevant all right to introduce antees have not does “The accused said: weAs indefensible. incompetent, is that [evidence] offer to right unfettered an rules standard under inadmissible otherwise privileged, (1988). S.U. Illinois, 484 Taylor v. evidence.” of account excluded example, be may, for evidence Relevant require- procedural comply with failure a defendant’s of (1991). S. Lucas, U. Michigan v. ments. constitu- unquestionably familiar any number And of rele- exclusion authorize also evidentiary rules tional Montana) (and Rule example, Federal For evidence. vant may be relevant, evidence “Although provides: Evidence outweighed substantially is value probative if its excluded issues, or of the confusion prejudice, unfair danger of by the delay, undue by considerations jury, or misleading the evi- cumulative presentation or needless time, waste Rule Fed. added.) Hearsay rules, see (Emphasis dence.” testimony introduction similarly prohibit Evid. insuffi- is deemed relevant, unquestionably though which, right to intro- say course, Of ciently reliable.1 abso enjoy not does “a defendant agrees O’Connor Justice 62, and defense,” post, to his relevant evidence to present right lute above. mentioned rules evidentiary validity dispute does because like these is Rule however, Montana’s contends, She allow would of evidence category aon exclusion a blanket “places Ibid, (emphasis element.” mental-state offense’s negate accused well; what evidence “category” is a hearsay added). Of course cate particular in mind apparently O’Connor Justice That fact. particular prove tending relates gory make it should why understand hard distinction, it is but indeed
43 duce relevant evidence is not absolute say is not to that the places Due Process Clause upon no limits restriction of that right. say But it is to that the asserting defendant such a limit must heavy sustain the usual burden that a due claim entails:
“[Preventing dealing with crime is much more the business of the States than is of it the Federal Gov- ernment, and lightly ... we should not construe the so upon Constitution as to intrude the administration of justice by the Among individual things, States. other normally it is power ‘within the regulate State to procedures under which its laws are carried out,’ . . . regard in subject its decision this proscrip- tion under the Due Process Clause unless ‘it offends justice principle some so in rooted the traditions and people conscience of our as to be ranked as fundamen- ” tal.’ York, Patterson v. New U. S. 201-202 (1977)(citations omitted). (1996) Cooper also
See Oklahoma, v. 517 U. S. test); (applying Patterson Lonberger, Marshall v. 459 U. S. (1983) (“[T]he 422, 438, 6n. Due Process Clause does not permit engage finely federal courts in a tuned review rules”). of the wisdom of evidentiary Respondent’s task, then, is to establish right that a defendant’s to have a jury evidence consider of his intoxication in deter mining possesses requisite whether he mental state is a principle justice.” “fundamental primary guide Our determining principle whether question practice. is, fundamental of course, historical a difference. So as the long category excluded evidence is selected on a basis that good policy traditional support, ought be valid. We do not entirely understand Justice O’Connor’s argument that the §45-2-203 vice of is that it excludes “essential to the accused’s defense,” post,' 64; post, at see also at 72. Evidence of intoxication “essential,” is not always any more than hearsay always evidence is “nonessential.” (1992). Here S.U. California, Medina Eng- By laws support. little respondent gives no have “shall defendant intoxicated Hale, the wrote land, shall madness, but voluntary contracted by this privilege right senses.” in his were if he judgment same *7 According Black- *32-*33. Crown the of Pleas Hale, 1 M. suffering of those condemnation law’s the Coke, and stone citing Blackstone, still: harsher was dementia from affectata ag- an “as intoxication viewed law the that explained Coke, any for excuse an as than rather offence, the of gravation Blackstone, Commentaries W. misbehaviour.”
criminal be- a defense as inebriation rejection of stern This *25-*26. American law well. early American of a fixture came wrote: Hale of edition the of editors be never can early case, anin said was “Drunkenness, it offence: palliate an excuse ground to aas received philoso- speculative opinion of merely the aof dictum obiter the counsel, or of argument pher, long established and ais sound it judge, but single single perhaps from policy, judicial maxim au- noif other But found. be cannot dissenting voice of our decisions adduced, the uniform thority could govern- establishment first from Courts own law common part of now it constitute would ment, n. 3. *32, supra, at Hale, land.” Blackstone from passages foregoing citing opinion an In exclusion objection rejected an Story Justice Hale, follows: intoxication to remember I ever time, first “This crime one the commission contended, been vice, gross is a Drunkenness another. for excuse an crime; ais laws our some contemplation being its so far studies, my earlier learned I aggravation an it is rather murder, excuse in law malignity.” of its United States v. Cornell, 25 F. Cas. (No. 14,868)(CC 1820). 650, 657-658 R. I.
The historical record does not leave room for the view that rejection common law’s of intoxication as an “excuse” or “justification” for crime would permit nonetheless the de- fendant to show that prevented requisite mens rea. Hale, Coke, and Blackstone were say familiar, to the least, concept with the of mens rea, and acknowledged “deprive[s] drunkenness men of the use of reason,” 1 supra, Hale, at *32; see also supra, Blackstone, at *25. It is inconceivable they did not realize that an offender’s might impair drunkenness his ability to form requisite intent; and inconceivable that their failure to note this mas- exception sive general from the disregard rule of of intoxica- tion oversight. was an Hale’s statement that a drunken of- fender shall have judgment the same if “as he were in his *8 right senses” must be understood as precluding a defendant arguing from that, because of his intoxication, he could not have possessed the required mens rea to commit the crime. And the same must be said of the exemplar of the common- law by rule cited both Hale and see Blackstone, 1 Hale, supra, at *32; supra, Blackstone, at *26, w, n. which is Ser- jeant argument Pollard’s to King’s Reniger Bench in Fogossa, 1 1, Plowd. Eng. (1550): 19, Rep. 75 31 1, “[I]f a person that is drunk kills another, this Felony, shall be and he hanged shall be yet it, and he did it through Ignorance, for when he was drunk he had no Understanding nor Mem- ory; but Ignorance inasmuch as that was by occasioned his own Folly, Act and might and he have avoided it, he shall not be privileged thereby.” added.) (Emphasis See also Bev- erley’s Case, 4 Rep. Co. 123b, Eng. 125a, Rep. 76 1118, 1123 (K. 1603) B. (“although he who is drunk, is for the time non compos yet mentis, his drunkenness does not extenuate his act or offence, nor turn added) (foot- his avail” (emphasis omitted)). note
46 lengthy common-law of a extensive
Against this
available
argument
the best
him,
against
decidedly
tradition
conceded
and
amicus
his
made
one
is the
respondent
century, courts
19th
course
Over
State:
traditional
law’s
common
exception
an
out
carved
offender,
drunken
condemnation
across-the-board
when
a defendant’s
jury to consider
allowing a
needed
mental
possessed
he
assessing whether
requir
one
crime was
where
charged,
crime
commit
rule
this new
emergence of
“specific intent.”
ing a
Hol-
Justice
case, in
English
1819
an
traced
often
voluntary drunk
“though
held
reported to
royd is
yet
crime,
commission
excuse
cannot
enness
is,
question
the material
murder,
charge of
aon
where,
only
sudden
with
done
premeditated
act
whether
[is]
being intoxicated
party
fact
impulse, the
and
heat
1 W.
consideration.”
into
taken
to be
proper
circumstance
King v. Grind
(citing
*8
Misdemeanors
Russell, Crimes
MS).
exception was
This
1819,
Assizes
Sum.
ley, Worcester
Criminal
Hall, Intoxication
however,
root,”
take
“slow
even
Rev.
Harv. L.
Responsibility,
Carroll, King v.
case
Indeed,
England.
(N. P.),
Park
Justice
Rep.
Eng.
P.& Car.
in Grind-
opinion”
his
“retracted
Holroyd had
claimed
not law.”
case is
doubt
is no
“there
ley,
said
Supreme Court
the Missouri
as 1858
country, as late
In
this:
categorically
speak as
could
man mad-
forethought in a
*9
and
deliberation
look for
“To
de-
drunkenness
vain, for
is
by intoxication
dened
or
greater
ato
deliberating faculties
him
prived
him
relieve
is to
deprivation
extent; and if
less
majority of
great
it,
to diminish
responsibility
all
however
This
unpunished.
gowill
committed
crimes
maxims,
to its
law;
common
doctrine
sound
wisdom
upon true
obviously are
they
based
47
policy, we must adhere.” State v. Cross,
“
‘The
intoxication of one who
provo-
without
cation commits a homicide, although amounting to a
frenzy,
although
is,
the intoxication amounts to a
frenzy,
does
excuse him from the same construction
of his conduct, and the
legal
same
upon
inferences
question
premeditation
and intent, as affecting the
grade of his crime,
applicable
which are
person
to a
entirely sober.”’
(1878).
State Tatro,
v.
Vt.
See also Harris v. United States, 8 App. D.
20,C.
26-30
(1896); Flanigan
People,
v.
(1881);
N.
Y.
559-560
Commonwealth v. Hawkins,
(1855);
48 Amendment Fourteenth when the assuming that Thus, even longer was no defends now adopted rule might be called what only off cuts applied, this generally re- burden State. in favor argument a fortiori common-law” “new show respondent upon
mains question may considered intoxication rule—that Fourteenth time at the deeply rooted so intent —was since) deeply rooted (or so become perhaps Amendment Amendment principle fundamental to be enshrined. the uniform Instead made. been showing has That rule that expect for we would acceptance continuing fully find we status, principle” enjoys “fundamental “new adopted the never either States one-fifth recently abandoned or here issue rule common-law” (1996) (finding 348 U. S. Oklahoma, 517 Cooper v. it.2 Cf. pedi- having no common-law rule ain violation only four recently, very adopted, whatever, and gree (1987) 236 228, U. S. Ohio, 480 States). v. also Martin Ramos, State 2 v. Arizona, see are States Montana, those Besides jury precluding (1982) statute (upholding 119, 121 2d 6, P. 4, 648 Ariz. 133 defend whether determining purposes for of intoxication consideration 1995-1996) (Supp. § 13-503 Ann. Stat. Rev. Ariz. “knowingly”); ant acted requisite act criminal any defense “is not (voluntary 134-137, 717 State, 290 Ark. 130, White v. Arkansas, mind”); see §5-2-207 Ann. Code (1986) Ark. (interpreting 784, 786-788 W. 2d S. (1986) (interpret State, 649, 651 A. 519 2d Delaware, Wyant v. (1993)); see State, 258 Foster v. (1995)); see Georgia, 11, §421 Ann., Tit. Del. Code ing Ga. Code (1988) (interpreting 188, 194-196 E. 2d 742-745, S. 736, 374 Ga. Hawaii, see Haw. (1989); S. 1085 denied, U. 490 (1992)), cert. §Ann. 16-3-4 248, 2d Souza, Haw. 246, 813 P. §702-230(2) (1993), State 72 v. Stat. Rev. Lanier v. see constitutional); Mississippi, 702-230(2) (§ (1991) § 562.076 Stat. Rev. Missouri, Mo. see (1988); State, 473, 478-479 2d 533 So. constitutional), (§ 562.076 Erwin, 482 W. S. 2d (1994), State 848 v. Vaughn, v. Carolina, see (1993); South S. 826 denied, U. cert. Texas, see Haw (1977); and 328, 330-331 124-126, E. 2d 232 S. C.S. 1980) (interpreting (Tex. Crim. App. State, S. W. 2d kins (1974)). §8.04 Ann. Code Penal Tex. *11 (“We are aware that all but two of the States . . . have abandoned the common-law rule .... But question remains whether [two] those States are violation of Constitution”).
It is not surprising many States have held fast to or resurrected the common-law rule prohibiting consideration intoxication in the determination of rea, mens because that rule has justification3 considerable —which alone casts upon doubt proposition opposite rule is a “fundamental principle.” large A number of crimes, es- pecially violent crimes, are committed intoxicated offend- ers; put modern studies high numbers as as half of all homicides, example. for g., See, e. Special Third Report to the U. Congress S. on Alcoholand Health from Secretary of Health, Education, and (1978); Welfare 64 Note, Alcohol Abuse and the Law, 94 (1981). Harv. L. Rev. 1660, 1681-1682 Disallowing consideration of voluntary intoxication has the dissent, In his Justice Souter acknowledges that there bemay valid policy reasons supporting the law, some of which were brought forward by States that appeared amici, see post, at 77-78 (citing Brief for State of Hawaii et al. as Amici Curiae 16). He refuses to consider the adequacy reasons, those however, because they were not brought forward by Montana’s lawyers. We do not know why the constitutional ity of Montana’s enactment should be subject to the condition subsequent that its lawyers be able to guess a policy justification that satisfies this Court. Whatever they guess ofwill course not necessarily be the real reason the Montana Legislature adopted the provision; lawyers Montana’s speculate must that, about just we must. Our standard formulation has been: “Where . . . there are plausible reasons for [the legislature’s] action, our inquiry is at an end.” Railroad Fritz, Retirement Bd. v. U. S. (1980). Justice Souter would change that to: “Where there are plausible reasons that counsel for the party supporting the legis lation have mentioned.” Or perhaps is: “Where there plausible are rea sons that counsel (or for State) Government have mentioned” —so that in this ease Hawaii’s amicus brief would count if a Hawaiian statute were at issue. Either way, it is strange for the constitutionality of a state law to depend upon whether the lawyers (or hired the State elected by its people) to defend the law happen hit the right boxes on our bingo card of acceptable policy justifications. com- acts unlawful all punishment increasing effect irre- drunkenness thereby deters state,
mitted aas serves also rule drunk. while behavior sponsible incapable prove who those ensuring that deterrent, specific voluntarily intoxicated while impulses controlling violent imple- comports with rule finally,the And prison. go to voluntar- who one perception society’s moral ments for the responsible should faculties own his impaired ily 2d State, 356 So. g., McDaniel See, e. consequences. *12 1978).4 (Miss. 1160-1161 laws for justification more times, even in modern is, There stud recent Some to be. used there than §45-2-203 as such drunkenness between the, connection that suggest ies that is, pharmacological as cultural much as crime —that them makes alcohol simply because violent are drunks their' with behaving in accord they are because way, but that Collins, e.g., See, are violent. drunks that belief learned Alcohol Clarify the Frameworks Explanatory Suggested Drug Prob. Contemp. Relationship, 15 Use/Violence Am. Barleycorn, John Powers The Critchlow, (1988); only adds 1986). This (July 754-755 Psychologist intoxicated that view traditional to the support additional that suggests exoneration, but deserving of is not criminal intoxi belief learned same possess juries —who claim accept the quick to too offender—will cated requisite forming the incapable biologically defendant with agreement complete arewe analysis, this from appears As regarding judgment legislative a “embodies §45-2-203 concurrence respon criminally held may be individuals under circumstances “ ‘ex- statute agree We also at 57. actions,” post, their for sible in rea mens from intoxication subject tractjs] entire implemented, bemay ” judgment this believe We 58. at post, quiry,’ substan amending legitimacy achieved, equal with effect this evi excluding simply crime, byor each requirements tive simply statute evidentiary as an We address trial. dence it. analyze chose Court Supreme howis because mens rea. Treating the matter as one of excluding mislead ing evidence therefore makes some sense.5 In every sum, not widespread experiment with proce- dural rule favorable to criminal defendants establishes a fun- damental principle justice. Although the rule allowing a jury to consider evidence of a defendant’s voluntary intoxi- cation where relevant to mens rea gained has considerable acceptance, it is of too recent vintage, and has not received sufficiently uniform permanent allegiance, to qualify as fundamental, especially displaces since it a lengthy common- law tradition which supported remains justifica- valid today.6 tions
Ill Supreme Court of Montana’s conclusion that Mont. § (1995) Code Ann. 45-2-203 violates the Due Process Clause purported to rest on two lines of jurisprudence. our First,
5 These many valid policy reasons for excluding evidence of voluntary intoxication refute Justice O’Connor’s § claim that 45-2-203 no pur pose other than to improve the State’s likelihood of winning conviction, post, 66-67, see 72-73. Such claim is no more accurate applied *13 this provision than it would have been applied to the New York law in York, v. Patterson New 432 U. S. placed which upon the defend ant the burden of proving the affirmative of defense extreme emotional disturbance. We upheld that New law, York even though we found it “very likely true that fewer convictions of murder would occur if New York were to required negative the affirmative defense at issue here.” Id., at Here, Patterson, 209. as in any increase in the chance of obtaining a conviction is merely consequence of pursuing legitimate penological goals. 6Justice O’Connor maintains that “to determine whether a fundamen tal of principle justice has here, been violated we cannot consider only the historical disallowance of evidence, intoxication but must also consider the ‘fundamental principle’ that a defendant has a right to a fair opportunity put to forward his Post, defense.” at 71. What Justice O’Connor overlooks, however, is that the historical disallowance of evi dence sheds upon light what our society has understood “fair oppor tunity put to forward [a] defense.” That “fundamental principle” has demonstrably not included the to right introduce intoxication evidence. the requires Clause Process Due the view its derived in statement relevant all of admission “[t]he (1973),that S. Mississippi, 410 U. Chambers is, in due to trial criminal ain accused anof right against defend opportunity a fair right essence, this heavily on relies Respondent accusations.” State’s Brief principle,” “the Chambers he terms statement, which 30. Respondent
for [certain] of exclusion “the Chambers in heldWe permit refusal State’s coupled with evidence, critical trial him denied McDonald, cross-examine [petitioner] standards fundamental and traditional with accord in continued, however: We 302. S., at 410 U. process.” princi- newno establish we judgment, reaching this “In signal holding our does Nor law. constitutional ples traditionally accorded respect in any diminution implementation and establishment States Rather, procedures. rules trial criminal own their circum- under simply that quite facts hold we court trial rulings of case stances of 302-303 Id., at fair trial.” a Chambers deprived added). (emphasis case- highly exercise an was words, Chambers other In by the rulings two were issue At correction. error specific Cham- denial trial: murder Chambers’ court trial McDonald, one witness adverse an treat motion
bers’
Chambers
murder
to the
confessed
had
who
exclusion, on
confession;
retracted
later
but
trial,
would
who
witnesses
testimony of three
grounds,
hearsay
held We
to them.
confessed
had
McDonald
testify because
the former
erroneous,
rulings were
these
both
297-298,
*14
id., at
adverse,
simply was
testimony
McDonald’s
originally
“were
statements
because
second
circumstances
under
trial
at
offered
subsequently
made
reliability,” id.,
their
assurance
considerable
provided
at 300, and were “well within the basic rationale of the ex-
ception for
against
declarations
interest,” id., at 302. Thus,
the holding of Chambers—if one can be discerned from such
a fact-intensive
certainly
case—is
not that a defendant is
denied “a
opportunity
fair
against
defend
the State’s ac-
cusations” whenever “critical evidence”
favorable
him is
excluded, but rather that
evidentiary
erroneous
rulings can,
in combination, rise to the level of a
violation.
Respondent cites our decision in Crane v. Kentucky, 476
U. S. 683
as evidence that his
version
“Cham-
bers principle” governs
jurisprudence.
our
highlights
He
statements in Crane to the effect that “an
compo-
essential
procedural
nent of
fairness is an opportunity to be heard,”
effectively
would
“if
denied
permit-
State were
ted
competent,
to exclude
reliable evidence . . . when such
evidence is central to the defendant’s claim of innocence.”
Id., at 690; Brief for Respondent 31.
very
But the
next
(which
sentence
opinion
of that
omits)
respondent
makes
perfectly clear that we were
setting
forth an absolute
entitlement to introduce crucial, relevant evidence: “In the
absence
any valid
justification,
exclusion of
kind of exculpatory
deprives
evidence
a defendant of the
right
basic
prosecutor’s
have the
case encounter and sur-
vive meaningful
crucible of
testing.”
adversarial
(internal
U.
added)
S., (emphasis
690-691
quotation marks
omitted). Our holding that the exclusion of certain evidence
in that case violated the defendant’s
rights
constitutional
theory
rested not on a
“competent,
all
reliable evidence”
must be admitted, but rather
ground
on the
that the Su-
preme Court
Kentucky’s
sole rationale for the exclu-
(that
sion
the evidence
“did
credibility
relate
the confession,” Crane v. Commonwealth,
54 Su by Montana the invoked cases our of line second The In re discussion. less even requires opinion Court’s
preme proposition (1970), the announced 358, 364 S. Winship, U. 397 beyond a reason proof requires Clause Process Due the that charged the necessary constitute every fact of doubt able 510, 524 S. Montana, U. 442 Sandstrom crime, and shifts which jury instruction corollary, that established element requisite aon proof of burden the defendant the sim decisions These process. violates state mental court the Montana because, here implicated not ply are §45-2- under not shifted” “[t]he burden recognized, itself judge trial 266. 2d, at P. Mont., at 272 203. bur the of Montana “[t]he State that jury the instructed beyond a reason Defendant the guilt of the proving den person “[a] 27a, and Cert. Pet. toApp. doubt,” able or purposely if he homicide of deliberate offense the commits id., being,” human another death the knowingly causes evidence produce State the failure Thus, at 28a. acquit resulted would mental respondent’s attribut presumably was occur did acquittal That tal. Montana, Supreme Court by the fact, noted able to which evidence considerable introduced “pur acted respondent concluded might have jury 2d, P. at Mont., “knowingly.” posely” that, sev testified himself respondent example, For 265. handgun to his given had murders, he before hours eral compartment glove put it in her to asked Pavola re had he That 1123. Tr. Ibid.; car. Christenson’s he used before compartment glove gun from the trieve object” to “conscious his it was strong was execution-style man as was crimes; charged commit each head into fired was single shot ner victim. point, directly on Sandstrom Recognizing §45-2-203 aas described of Montana Supreme Court burden-shifting, statute. than burden-reducing, rather Mont., at 122-123, 124,900 2d, P. at 265,266. This obviously suggest not meant to that the formally statute reduced proof burden of to clear and convincing, or to a mere *16 preponderance; there utterly is no basis for that, neither in the text of the law jury nor in the given. instruction that was What the evidently court meant is that, excluding sig a nificant line of might evidence that rea, refute mens the stat ute made it easier for the State to meet requirement the proving beyond mens rea a reasonable doubt—reduced the burden in the making sense of the burden easier to bear. any But evidentiary rule can have that effect. “Reducing” the State’s burden in this manner not is unconstitutional, un less the rule of evidence itself violates a princi fundamental ple (which, not). fairness as discussed, this one does We “rejected] have the view anything in the Due Process Clause bars making States from changes in their criminal law that have the effect of making it prosecu easier for the tion to obtain convictions.” Pennsylvania, McMillan v. (1986). U. 79, S. 89, n. 5
Finally, may we upon comment the Supreme Court’s citation of following the passage in Martin Ohio, v. 480 U. S. 228 upholding a case a placed state law that on the defendant the proving burden of by pre- self-defense a ponderance the evidence: quite
“It be would jury different if had been in- structed that self-defense evidence could not be consid- in determining ered whether there was a reasonable doubt about case, State’s i. e., that self-defense evi- put dence must be purposes aside for all unless it satis- preponderance fied the standard. an Such instruction would relieve the State of its plainly burden and run [In re] afoul Winship’s mandate. The instructions in adequate this case . .. convey are jury to the that all of the including evidence, going the evidence self- defense, must be deciding considered in whether there was a reasonable doubt sufficiency about the 233- at Id., crime.” elements proof State’s omitted). (citation pas- This 2d, at 265. P. 122-123,900 Mont., also assertion g., as ways various explained sage can —e. evidence self-defense jury consider have right to vol- evidence jury consider have (unlike right proposition intoxication) fundamental, untary explanation only But support. may record historical Kokkonen given one purposes present needed (1994): is to the “It S.U. Co., Ins. Guardian Life must we dicta, that their than rather cases, our holdings of Process Due means dictum Martin If the attend.” ele- bearing relevant all requires Clause we *17 decisions the admissible, be crime aof ments incorrect. be toit show discussed
[*] * * mistake, insanity, rea, reus, mens of actus doctrines “The tools historically provided have duress and justification, between the tension of adjustment shifting constantly for religious, changing and law criminal of evolving aims of man. nature of the views medical philosophical, moral, thought to be always been adjustment of process This U. S. Texas, 392 Powell the States.” province Montana people The opinion). (1968) (plurality 535-536 disallow- era, earlier of an rule to resurrect decided defend- when voluntary intoxication ing consideration Process Due Nothing in issue. at is mind state ant’s judgment so, doing them prevents Clause contrary must Court Supreme reversed. ordered. so It is judgment. in the concurring Ginsburg, Justice of character- question on a case divides Court The §45-2-203 Ann. Code Mont. law, State’s ization. prescribes voluntary “may not be taken into consideration determining the existence of a mental state which is [a an element criminal] offense.” For measure- against ment federal restraints on state action, how should type we §45-2-203 that prescription? If is simply a rule designed keep out “relevant, exculpatory evidence,” Jus- post, maintains, at 67, Montana’s law offends tice O’Connor process. due If it is, instead, a redefinition of the mental- state element of offense, on the other hand, Justice O’Connor’s concern “would not be issue,” at post, “[a] for legislature certainly has the author- ity identify the elements of the offenses wishes pun- post, ish,” at 64, exclude evidence irrelevant to the crime it has defined. (rule
Beneath the labels excluding evidence or redefinition offense) lies the question: essential Can a State, with- out offense to the Federal Constitution, make judgment people two equally are culpable where one commits an act stone sober, and the other engages in the same conduct after his intoxication has reduced capacity his self-control? For the reasons that follow, I categor- resist §45-2-203 izing as merely an evidentiary prescription, but join the judgment Court’s refusing to condemn the Montana statute as an unconstitutional enactment.
Section 45-2-203 does appear portion in the of Mon- *18 tana’s Code containing (Title evidentiary 26), rules the ex- pected placement provision of regulating solely the admis- sibility of evidence at trial. Instead, Montana’s intoxication appears statute (“Crimes”), Title 45 part as of a chapter entitled Principles “General of Liability.” Mont. Code Ann., (1995). Tit. 45, ch. 2 No less adjacent than provisions governing §45-2-203 duress entrapment, and embodies a legislative judgment regarding the circumstances under may individuals criminally held responsible for their actions.
58 amici, 45-2-203 “extracts] § its As urged mens intoxication voluntary of subject entire rendering 2, thereby Petitioner for Brief Reply rea inquiry,” irrelevant logically voluntary Thus, in prosecution state. mental the requisite proof not prove need the State homicide, deliberate for the death cause[d] knowingly or “purposely defendant in a §45-5-102(a) purely Ann. Code another,” Mont. conviction, the prosecution To obtain sense.
subjective death caused (1) defendant only must prove (2) the- or purpose, knowledge actual with another otherwise would circumstances “under killed defendant defendant’s] [the for’ ‘but or purpose knowledge establish for Alliance American for Brief intoxication.” Curiae 6. Amici as et al. Responsibilities Rights as States for United Brief 35-36; for Petitioner Brief also does §45-2-203 Accordingly, Curiae 10-12. Amicus mental- [the] to prove burden the prosecution’s “lighte[n] doubt,” as Justice a reasonable beyond element post, at applicability 64, “[t]he suggests, O’Connor been dependent always ... standard reasonable-doubt Patterson v. is charged,” offense defines how a (1977). 12n. York, S. 432 U. New rea, 45-2- mens § redefining a measure Comprehended wide enjoy States shoal. no constitutional 203 encounters see, offenses, criminal elements in defining latitude Patterson, (1987); Ohio, U. S. g., Martin e. v. extent “the determining when 201-202, particularly S., at U. convic- abe prerequisite should moral culpability to which (1968) Texas, 392 U. S. crime,” Powell aof tion define power a State’s When J., concurring). (Black, Clause, Process Due under challenged conduct criminal some principle “offends law whether only we inquire of our peo- conscience traditions in the so rooted justice Patterson, S.,U. as fundamental.” ranked to be ple mens . omitted). Defining marks (internal quotation *19 rea to eliminate the value of exculpatory voluntary intoxica- tion does not offend a “fundamental principle justice,” given lengthy common-law tradition, and the adherence of a significant minority the States to that position today. ante, post, at 43-49; see also at 73 (Souter, J., dissent- (“[A] ing) somay define the mental element anof of- fense that evidence of a defendant’s voluntary intoxication at the time of commission does not have exculpatory relevance and, to that extent, may excluded without raising any issue of due process.”).
Other state courts have upheld statutes
§
similar to 45-2-
203, not
as
simply
evidentiary rules, but as legislative re
definitions of the mental-state element. See State v. Souza,
ter province instruct courts to treat a sober person and a intoxicated voluntarily person equally responsible conduct —to place volun- tarily intoxicated person on a level with a sober person— then the Montana law is no less tenable under the Federal
60 significant difference no laws, with are the than
Constitution Supreme The Montana States.1 upheld in sister wording, in States; it other the courts disagree with not did Court princi with the analysis line in undertake simply did not a constitu capable of plainly enactments legislative ple that construc given that ordinarily should construction tional Coast Corp. Florida v. DeBartolo J. Gulf Edward tion. See (1988); 568,575 S. Council, U. 485 Trades Building Constr. & 2dP. Lilburn, 265 Mont. State (1994). strikes sum, in judgment, Supreme Court’s Montana
The infir- constitutional displays no text whose statute down analysis forced its considered court Montana mity. If the say this Court for proper it precedent,2 Court’s voluntarily to treat authority Breyer States’ questions 1Justice actions. their culpable equally defendants- sober intoxicated con 79-80, legislature why a moreover, at post, asks, He at 80. post, See in an by individuals committed crime incidence high with cerned and several course choose would condition alcohol-impaired sensible, suggests, he be more It would taken. have States other at post, purpose,” knowledge, [with] voluntary “equate individuals when requirement rea mens with entirely dispensing thus It does substance. judgment-impairing of a influence under act catchall such resisted have however, States strange, to me seem one sweeping, less instead, a measure enacted, approach so as mental culpable “define[s] but requirement, rea mens retains at 75 post, See relevance.” exculpatory no voluntary intoxication give unaware “a jury me clear at all isNor dissenting). J., (Souter, example in the purpose” knowledge infer likely would of intoxication J. fiction, see in only Breyer at 79. post, .It provides, Justice (1983) published (originally Mitty Walter Life Secret Thurber, The people well, sober life real sadly, in but, 1939), Yorker Neiu The road. to the attention pay failing or otherwise daydreaming while drive argument. oral curiae, suggested so States, as amicus United question to the really got never (“[T]he court State Arg. Oral Tr. of law, because in the change a [substantive] been there of whether barred one, it was had been there extent that, it [assumed] (1970)].”). S. 358 U. Winship, re [In what prescriptions federal law leaves to the States,3 and thereby dispel confusion to which may we have contributed, and attendant state-court misperception. Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Stevens, Jus- Breyer
tice Souter, and Justice join, dissenting.
The Montana Supreme Court unanimously held that Mont. *21 §45-2-203 (1995) Code Ann. process. violates due agree. I Our cases establish that process due sets an outer limit on the restrictions may that placed be on a ability defendant’s to raise effective defense to the State’s accusations. impede Here, to ability defendant’s to throw doubt on the State’s case, Montana has jury’s removed from the con- category sideration a of evidence relevant to determination of mental state where that mental state is an essential ele- ment of the offense proved that must beyond a reasonable doubt. Because this disallowance eliminates evidence with might the defense negate an essential element, the State’s burden prove to its case is made correspondingly justification easier. The for this disallowance is the State’s desire to increase the likelihood of conviction of a certain class of might defendants who prove otherwise be able to they that satisfy did not requisite a element of the offense.. my In view, the statute’s effect on the criminal proceeding violates process. due
I This Court’s cases establish that placed limitations on the ability accused’s present a fair complete defense can, in some circumstances, enough be severe proc- to violate due right ess. “The of an accused ain proc- criminal trial to due is, ess in essence, right to a opportunity fair to defend against the State’s accusations.” Mississippi, Chambers v. (1973). 410 U. 284, S. Applying precedent, our the Mon- 3As the United observed, States is generally within the States’ domain “to determine what are the elements of criminal responsibility.” Id., at 19-20. evidence keeping held Supreme Court
tana relevant was such where jury, away from state, violated mental requisite establishment 272 Mont. defense, present right to pursuant instruction 2dP. 2d, P. id,., at error, harmless § 45-2-203 conclusion, Court’s Supreme Montana rejecting In 266. familiar “any number emphasizes plurality ex- permit evidentiary rules” constitutional unquestionably true It is 42. Ante, at evidence. relevant clusion evi- present right absolute enjoy an does defendant Kentucky, 476 Crane defense. his relevant dence eviden- “familiar” (1986). none But 683,690-691 S.U. stat- does. Montana’s operates tiary rules category of evidence aon exclusion a blanket places ute mental-state offense’s negate the accused allow would face in the prosecution, frees doing, it soIn element. reasonable beyond prove having to evidence, such re- possessed *22 nevertheless defendant that doubt effects combination this view, my In state. mental quired process. due violates opportu- a fair requires process due that proposition The new. not prosecution a criminal a defense present nity to S. 467 U. Trombetta, v. 690; id., at California prevented been had defendant Chambers, (1984). In wit- presenting from witness cross-examining a Mississippi’s operation by behalf own his on nesses appli- held The Court hearsay rules. “voucher” aof defendant deprived evidentiary rules of these cation affecting directly rights “[Wjhere constitutional trial. fair hearsay rule implicated, are guilt ascertainment jus- ends mechanistically defeat applied may be characterization plurality’s 302. S., at U. tice.” can- ante, at correction,” error “case-specific Chambers of state enforcement prohibition aas force its diminish justification, sufficient lead, without evidentiary rules guilt establishment of by suppression of evidence sup- porting the defendant’s case.
In Crane, a trial court had held that the defendant could
not introduce testimony bearing on the circumstances of his
grounds
confession, on the
that this information
only
bore
on the “voluntariness” of the confession, a matter already
resolved. We
held
keeping
such critical information
jury
from the
“deprived
exclusion
petitioner of his fun-
damental
right
constitutional
ato fair opportunity
present
a defense.”
In
Texas,
These together, cases, taken simple illuminate principle: Due demands criminal defendant afforded opportunity a fair against defend the State’s accusations. *23 Meaningful adversarial testing of the requires State’s case that the prevented defendant not be raising an effective defense, which must right include present the to relevant, probative evidence. right To be present sure, the evi- dence is not example, limitless; for permit it does not the defendant to any introduce and all evidence he believes does it nor supra, at Crane, favor, his
might work
privileges,
testimonial
of
operation
the
invalidate
generally
“an
Nevertheless,
21.
supra,
n.
at
Texas,
Washington v.
opportunity
anis
fairness
procedural
of
component
essential
if the
empty one
anbe
would
opportunity
That
heard.
to be
evi-
reliable
competent,
to exclude
permitted
were
State
Crane,
defense.
accused’s
to the
essential
is
that
dence”
omitted).
fore-
45-2-203
(citations
Section
supra,
defense
effective
ability to raise
defendant’s
the
stalls
type of
aof
presentation
the
exclusion
a blanket
placing
crime, and
the
of
element
negates an
directly
that
prove
burden
prosecution’s
the
lightens
doing
it
so,
doubt.
beyond a reasonable
element
mental-state
analy
the
important to
is
effect
latter
This
au
the
certainly has
legislature
stateA
former.
the
sis
it wishes
offenses
the
elements
identify the
thority to
the
has
a defendant
written,
are
laws
its
once
but
punish,
beyond a reasonable
prove
insist
right to
McMillan
charged. See
offense
anof
every element
doubt
Newv.
(1986);Patterson
79, 85
S.U.
Pennsylvania,
(“The applicability
(1977)
211, n.
S.U.
York, 432
de
always been
has
however,
standard,
reasonable-doubt
charged”).
is
offense
defines
a State
on how
pendent
con
against
accused
protects
Clause
Process
“[T]he Due
every
doubt
beyond a reasonable
proof
upon
except
viction
is
he
with
crime
necessary
constitute
fact
(1970); Patter
S. U.
Winship, 397
re
In
charged.”
Legislature
Montana
Because
210.
supra, at
son,
only if
homicide”
“deliberate
commits
person
specified
another
death
causes
knowingly
or
“purposely
he
45-5-102(1)(a)
§ Ann.
Code
being,” Mont.
human
mental
such
existence
prove
must
prosecution
shown
the defendant
is, unless
That
convict.
order
guilty
knowingly, he
purposely
acted
Supreme
homicide.
deliberate
offense
legislature’s
with
inconsistent
found
Court
*24
requirement of the mental state of “purposely” or “know-
ingly”
prevent
the jury from considering evidence of vol-
untary intoxication, where that category of evidence was
relevant to establishment of that mental-state element. 272
Mont., at 122-123,
subjective mental-state prosecution element, the must work to overcome whatever doubts the defense has raised about the existence required mental state. On the other if hand, may defendant not introduce evidence might create doubt in the factfinder’s mind as to whether that ele- ment was prosecution met, the will job find its so much the subjective easier. A mental state is generally proved only circumstantially. If jury may not consider the defendant’s evidence of his mental state, jury may impute to the defendant the culpability of a mental state he did not possess.
In Martin v. Ohio,
ability make to the of placement The proof. State's the on doubt reasonable con- not be should defenses affirmative for proof of burden of- the of elements negate to evidence of use the with fused charged. fense justifica- any valid of absence the “In noted: Crane [circum- exculpatory evidence of kind of exclusion tion, right the basic of deprives a defendant confession] of stances cru- the survive and encounter case prosecutor’s the to have 690- S., at U. testing.” 476 adversarial meaningful cible had omitted). here State The marks (internal quotation purpose knowledge or defendant’s the proof substantial prevailed well might homicides, committing these the defendant’s consider to permitted jury been the had even case prosecution’s Crane, inas But intoxication. testing meaningful adversarial insulated been cate- critical necessity face removal scale-tipping evidence. defense gory of prosecution caution Crane’s ignores plurality The em- Crane it invokes Rather, full test. to a put be must limited can of relevant “introduction phasize by Montana.” has been reason, Valid’ for enunciates Court to this brief State’s The 53. at Ante, volun- related risks the well-known Due to single reason: his use a defendant’s prevent it seeks intoxication, tary Brief exculpation. for basis voluntary own ensure tois interest its is, That 17-19. Petitioner for mental-state required lacked who a defendant even con- nevertheless guilty therefore element—and —is 49- ante, elaborates, plurality offense. victed excul- preclude wish might why reasons on these but intoxication, basis pation deterrence concomitant punishment reasons—increased imple- drunk, while acts unlawful commit who those for be- who those perception society’s moral mentation explain consequences merely bear should drunk come — purpose State’s trying to improve its likelihood of win- ning convictions. The justification final proffered by the plurality on Montana’sbehalf is that Montana’s rule perhaps prevents juries, might who otherwise be misled, from being quick “too accept the claim that [drunk] defendant was biologically incapable of forming the requisite mens rea,” ante, at 50-51. proffered But this justification is inconsist- § ent with exception 45-2-203’s persons who are involun- tarily intoxicated. That exception plain makes that Mon- tana does not consider intoxication evidence misleading—but rather considers it relevant —for the determination a per- son’s capacity to form requisite *26 mental state. A placement State’s of a significant limitation right on the to against defend the State’s accusations “requires that the competing interest be closely examined.” Chambers, 410 S.,U. at 295. Montana specified has that prove guilt, the State must establish that the defendant acted purposely or knowingly, but prohibited category a of defendants from effectively disputing guilt through presentation of evidence relevant to that essential element. And the evidence in- is disputably relevant: The Supreme Court held that evidence of intoxication is relevant proof of mental state, 272 Mont., at 122-123, 900 P. 2d, at 265, and furthermore, §45-2-203’s exception for involuntary intoxication shows legislature the does consider intoxication relevant to mental state. Montana has barred the defendant’s use of a category of relevant, exculpatory evidence for express the purpose of improving the State’s likelihood of winning a con- against viction type certain of defendant. The plurality’s observation that all evidentiary rules that exclude exculpa- tory evidence reduce the State’s burden prove its case, ante, at 55, is point. beside the The purpose of the famil- iar evidentiary rules is not to alleviate the State’s burden, but rather to vindicate some goal other or g., value—e. to en- sure the reliability and competency of evidence or to encour- age effective communications within certain relationships. and when prosecution, help the may not may or rules Such incidentally. While only so help, do
they do changes . that . . making “ba[r] States not does obtain prosecution for making it easier the effect atS.,U. Pennsylvania, McMillan convictions,” pur- sole evidentiary whose rule added), an (emphasis 5n. distorts conviction likelihood State’s to boost is pose S., at U. Washington, 388 Cf. adversary process. result). Chambers Unlike concurring in (Harlan, J., evi- claimed least State where Washington, its justify does unreliable, Montana at issue dence unrelia- evidence such grounds rule purpose sole The irrelevant. privileged, cumulative, ble, jury’s consideration keep from is to disallowance case helps the defendant’s evidence category of case. government’s weakens var- precedents this Court’s aside brushes plurality more I would afford dicta. irrelevant, bound, iously fact ac- than law case in our enunciated principles weight to me that today. It seems opinion plurality’s corded crime elements determine may first defense accused’s thwart then punish, and wishes prove would very disallowing the categorically *27 innocent. him
II argument important an raise however, does, plurality law, at common disallowance, validity: statute’s for defendant’s a where voluntary intoxication consideration per- was disallowance Because issue. of mind state disallowance argues, its plurality law, at common mitted a “fundamental violation to a amount cannot by at 43-51. Ante, justice.” principle century, common- 19th shift its until From intoxication use could defendant prevailed rule law it must offense, or, an justification or excuse state. requisite mental of a establishment to rebut assumed, law was “Early indifferent to the defence of drunkenness because the of criminal theory was then too liability crude and too to admit of undeveloped But with exceptions.... refinement in the of criminal theory ... a liability modifica- tion of the old rule on rigid the defence of drunkenness was to be expected.” of the Singh, Defense of History Drunken- ness in Criminal Law, 49 English L. (1933) Rev. Q. (footnote omitted). As the concedes, plurality that signifi- cant modification took in the 19th place century. Courts ac- the fundamental knowledged of a incompatibility particular mental-state requirement hand, the one and the disallow- ance of consideration of evidence that defeat establish- might ment of that mental state on the In other. the slow progress of the typical law, common courts began recognize evidence of admissible for the properly pur- whether pose ascertaining defendant had met the re- element quired mental-state of the offense charged.
This
courts
recognition,
believed, was consistent with the
common-law rule that
intoxication did not
excuse
commission of a crime; rather, an element of the crime, the
mental state, was
requisite
not satisfied and therefore the
crime had not been committed. As one influential mid-19th
case
century
“Drunkenness is
explained:
no excuse for crime;
in that class
yet,
of crimes and offences which depend upon
or the
guilty
coolness and
knowledge,
deliberation with
shall have been
they
their
perpetrated,
constitute
commission . . .
should be submitted
[drunkenness]
to the
consideration of the
for, where the crime
Jury”;
required
mental state, “it is
particular
to show
proper
any
condition
that is
person
adverse to the
exercise
proper
of the
mind”
order
rebut” the
“[t]o
mental state or “to
Pigman
enable the
Jury
judge
matter.”
v.
rightly
State,
70 a crime whether question the to a view with admissible is case, such in state], [mental As committed; ....
been proving in that possible it is offense, of the essence the of was offense no that prove to go far you intoxication committed”). subjective where agreed that country the across Courts the proved, be to crime the of element anwas state
mental intoxica- to by reference show, to permitted be must defense commented court One element. that absence the tion, appli- universally to “incontrovertible seemed it that are crime the essence nature the “where cable” condition state peculiar the upon depend to law made act the reference with time the mind criminal’s the consid- for the subject proper may abe done, drunkenness but offence the mitigate or excuse not jury, eration Robinson, People v. committed.” to show 1855). Swan also (N. Sup. Ct. Y. Crim. 2 Park. Donovan, 61 (1843); v. 136, 141-142 Tenn. 23 State, v. (1883);Mooney v. 206-207 206, N. W. 370-371, Iowa Ind. State, (1859); Aszman Ala. State, 33 cases). (1890)(citing E.N. rec- Supreme Court reasoning, Montana similar With pursuant jury instruction aof incompatibility ognized the decision legislature’s with conjunction §45-2-203 “knowingly” for “purposely” state mental require relevant held It homicide. deliberate a defendant Unless state. mental requisite formation possessed doubt reasonable beyond a proved Elim- offense. commit did state, he mental requisite precludes defense category of critical aof ination ele- mental-state rebutting the effectively from defendant shielding the State simultaneously while ment, face mental requisite proving effort adversarial effect It was evidence. negating Court Supreme persuaded was unconstitutional. disallowance *29 “ The Due protects Process Clause ‘principle^] those of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our ” people toas be ranked as fundamental.’ Patterson v. New (citations York, omitted). S., 432 U. at 202 At the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the common-law rule on consideration of intoxication evidence was in flux. The plurality argues rejection of the historical rule in the century 19th simply does not establish that the “'new common-law’” rule is principle procedure of “deeply so rooted” as to be ranked Ante, “fundamental.” at 46-48. But to determine whether a principle justice fundamental of has been violated here, we only cannot consider the historical disallowance of intoxication evidence, but must also consider principle” the “fundamental that a right defendant has a a fair opportunity put forward his defense, in adversarial testing prove where the must the elements of the of- beyond fense concepts reasonable doubt. As of mens rea proof developed, burden principles these came into conflict, shift century common law in the 19th reflects.
Ill judgment Ginsburg concurs Court’s based Justice § on her determination 45-2-203 amounts to a redefini- tion of the offense renders intoxi- proof requisite cation irrelevant mental state. The emphasizes enjoy concurrence that States wide latitude in defining “[c]om- elements crimes concludes that, prehended §45-2-203 redefining a measure rea, mens encounters no constitutional Ante, shoal.” at 58. legislature
A certainly possesses authority define the punish. offenses it wishes to If the Montana Legislature chose to redefine this offense so as to alter the requisite mental-state element, the problem presented in this case would not be at issue. is,
There however, no indication that such “redefinition” reading occurred. Ginsburg’s law Justice Supreme by Montana given with plainly inconsistent uphold basis valid provide a cannot therefore Court, accept course, bound are, “We operation. §45-2-203’s court highest by the [state] law interpretation *30 Hortonville 1 v. No. Dist. School Joint Hortonville State.” Groppi v. Wis (1976);accord, 488 U. S. Assn., 426 Ed. Pictures (1971); Kingsley Int’l S. 400 U. consin, (1959). S. 360 U. Y.,N. Univ. Regents Corp. v. of evidence held Supreme Court Montana The state. requisite mental the relevant up the summing inAnd 265. 2d, at P. 122, 900 Mont., at explains that concurrence Nelson’s holding, Justice court’s §45- chooses, statutes may the enact legislature the while burden the lessens . . . impermissibly “effectively and 2-203 an essential doubt beyond a reasonable prove State of the element— mental charged offense of the element —the very considering the jury from the statutorily precluding had State the them that might convince evidence The at 268. 2d, P. Id., at element.” proven that consist read cannot decision Supreme Court’s offense. of the “redefinition” ently awith within justice is management of criminal Because 201-202, supra, at Patterson, States, province author- States’ interfere properly reluctant is Court invali- must Nevertheless, the Court ity matters. in these process. requirements of violate rules that those date State’s acknowledges a reduction plurality un- exculpatory evidence through disallowance burden Ante, at of fairness. principle if it violates constitutional Mon- present here. a violation such I believe 55. voluntary-intoxication consideration disallowance tana’s exculpa- relevant, category of too critical removes prohibiting the adversarial from tory evidence per- argument making an essential from defendant suppression. its benefit prosecution to mitting the of conviction likelihood to increase purpose is Montana’s of a certain class of defendants, who might otherwise be able prove they did not satisfy requisite element of offense. The historical fact that this disallowance once ex- isted at common law is not sufficient to save the statute today. I would affirm judgment of the Montana Su- preme Court.
Justice Souter, dissenting.
I have no doubt that a may so define the mental element of an offense that evidence of a defendant’s volun- tary intoxication at the time of commission does not have exculpatory relevance and, to that may extent, be excluded raising any without issue process. of due I would have thought (Mont. the statute at issue § here Code Ann. 45-2- (1995)) implicitly had accomplished such a redefinition, but I read opinion Supreme Court of Montana as *31 indicating that it had no such effect, and I am bound the state court’s statement of its domestic law.
Even on assumption the that Montana’s definitions of the purposeful and knowing culpable mental states were un- touched §45-2-203, so that voluntary intoxication re- mains relevant to each, is not foregone conclusion that preclude our cases the State from declaring such intoxication evidence inadmissible. A may State typically exclude even exculpatory relevant and presents evidence if it justi- a valid (or doing fication for not) so. may There may be a valid justification support to a State’s decision to exclude, rather than render irrelevant, evidence of a voluntary defendant’s intoxication. Montana has not endeavored, however, to ad- argument vance an to that effect. Rather, the State ef- fectively restricted itself to advancing undoubtedly sound defining reasons for the mental state element so as to make voluntary generally (though irrelevant its own Supreme Court has apparently legislature said the failed to that) do and to demonstrating that evidence of in- toxication (a was irrelevant at common law goes fact that process answering the due way, to the all way, but
part opin- Supreme Court State the read I short, In objection). statu- the leave would interpretation barring one as ion offer failure State’s constitutional, while tory scheme us leaves evidence excluding relevant justification reason valid may abe there whether discern unable appears Court Supreme as statute support the the Court’s respectfully dissent therefore I it. view judgment.
I
convincingly demonstrates
opinion
plurality
Clause
Process
Due
Amendment’s
Fourteenth
when
then
itas
law
common
1868,
in
the Constitution
added
voluntary intoxication
notion
rejected
either
stood
a state
in
at best
or was
43-45,
ante, at
exculpatory,
might be
J.,
68-71
ante, at
also
(O’Connor,
issue.
on that
of flux
rule
that Montana’s
show
enough to
dissenting). That
is inadmissible
voluntary intoxication
“ ‘so
principle
no
contravenes
culpable mental
issue
people,’”
our
conscience
traditions
in
rooted
ante,
fundamental,’”
ranked
to be
“‘as
they stood
U. S.
York, Newv.
Patterson
(quoting
enquiry.
end
(1977)).
is not
But
Ullman, 367
Poe v.
opinion
dissenting
Harlan’s
Justice
“tradition”
teaches
U. S.
historical
thing.”1 What
living
a“is
tethered
arewe
concept
“the
with
inconsistent
out as
rule
does
practice
*32
S. U.
Connecticut, 302
v.
liberty,” Palko
of ordered
country,
struck
balance
is
I speak
of which
balance
“The
it
which
from
traditions
are
teaches
history
what
regard
having
tradition
That
it broke.
which
from
traditions
as the
well
developed
departs
radically
which
this Court
decision
A
thing.
living
a
has survived
on what
builds
survive,
decision
a
while
long
could
area,
substitute,
in this
as a
serve
could
formula
No
sound.
to be
likely
(Harlan,
S., at 542
Ullman,
U.
v.
Poe
restraint.”
judgment
dissenting).
J.,
(1937),
pass
must still
muster as rational
today’s
in
world.
Cf. Medina v.
(1992)
California, (O’Con-
U. S. 437, 454
nor,
concurring
J.,
judgment)
in
(although
pedi-
“historical
gree
give
can
procedural
practice a presumption of consti-
tutionality ...,
the presumption
surely
rebuttable”).
must
be
In this case, the
step
second
enquiry
leads
precedent
to line of
discussed Justice O’Connor’s
dissent, ante, at 61-68, involving
right
present
a de
g.,
fense. See, e. Washington Texas,
(1967)
388 U. 14, 22
S.
(a State cannot arbitrarily bar
categories
“whole
of defense
witnesses from testifying”);
(Harlan,
id., at 25
J., concurring
result) (State
may not “recogniz[e][testimony as] relevant
competent [but]
ba[r]
arbitrarily
its use
the defend
ant”); Chambers v. Mississippi,
(1973)(de
II Given the foregoing line of authority, Montana had at least way give one effect to judgment its that defendants should permitted to use evidence of their voluntary intoxica- tion to proof defeat culpable mental state, perhaps second. First, it could culpable defined mental state so give as to voluntary intoxication exculpatory no relevance. While the Due Process requires Clause government prove the every existence of element of the beyond offense a reasonable doubt, In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 364 fairly within broad limits the definition of those elements is up to the State. We thus noted in Patterson v. New York,
76 guaran “due various the that 12, n. 211, S., at U.
432 legislative in the defined as law upon the dependent are tees of enumeration legislature’s the particularly branches,” (“[T]he Process Due 210 id., at see offense, anof elements the reason beyond prove prosecution the requires Clause of definition the included the elements all of doubt able also charged”). See is defendant of offense (“[I]n (1986) de 85 79, S.U. 477 Pennsylvania, v. McMillan reasonable beyond a proved must facts termining what of elements definition legislature’s state doubt 228, S.U. 480 Ohio, v. Martin dispositive”); usually is offense (same). (1987) 233 reason constitutional apparent no find therefore IWhile voluntary intoxi of evidence render not could why Montana “knowledge” redefining by irrelevant as excludable cation element state mental they.apply “purpose,” and provision other making some offenses, or substantive its to conclude free I am believe not do state,2 I mental law state view Our here. so done court, see highest State’s interpretation by its limited v. (1992);Murdock 377, 381 S.U. Paul, 505 St. v.V.A.R. square the able amI 590Wall. Memphis, 20 position with case in this opinion Supreme Court’s State United by the (and supported here State advanced legislature curiae), Montana’s amicus States when states- mental culpable definition changed the 260, 2dP. 122, 900 Mont. 272 §45-2-203. See enacted intoxication] [of evidence such (“It (1995) clear know acted Egelhoff whether issue relevant was 263-265 at 2d, P. 119-122, id., purposely”); ingly and §45-2-203 claim Egelhoff’s disputing (noting ato relevant facts consideration jury’s removes (“The (1991) 2d P. Souza, Haw. crimes element rea mens to redefine entitled legislature mind”). negate voluntary intoxication exclude *34 determination of mental state, an essential element of the offense). possible
A second (although by certain) no means option may open. also be Even under a definition of the mental state element that would treat evidence of intoxi- cation as relevant exculpatory, the exclusion of such evi- typically dence permissible long so presents as a State “‘valid’ reason,” ante, at 66 (O’Connor, dissenting), to J., justify keeping it out. Chambers precedent and its line of certainly recognize that may such evidence properly often be excluded. See supra, Chambers, plural- 295. As the ity notes, ante, at (ad- 42, Federal Rules of Evidence 403 dressing prejudice, confusion, misleading jury, waste of etc.) time, (hearsay) and 802 provide examples two of an adequate reason for excluding relevant evidence.
Hence, I do not rule out possibility justifying of exclu- sion relevant intoxication evidence a case like this. At may least, there beyond be reasons those actually ad- vanced might Montana that have induced a reject State to prior freely its law admitting intoxication going evidence to mental state. Montana)
A State (though not necessarily might, for exam- ple, argue admitting intoxication evidence on the issue culpable (as mental state but not on incapacity defense widely which it is assumed to be generally excludable irrelevant3) would be irrational capacity since obey both the law purpose accomplish a criminal presup- result pose ability. volitional (“A § See Model Penal per- Code 4.01 son is responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of 3See American Institute, Law 2.08(4) Model § Penal Code deems intoxication relevant for this purpose only where reason “pathological intoxication” an “actor at the time of his conduct lacks sub stantial capacity ... to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.” The Model Penal Code further defines “pathological intoxication” as “in toxication grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of intoxicant, to which the actor does not know Id., §2.08(5)(c). he susceptible.” he lacks defect disease mental a result conduct such re- conduct his conform ... capacity substantial pur- (“A §2.02(2)(a)(i) acts person law”) and
quirements offense anof element a material respect with posely conduct engage in object to conscious his it is ... when result”). apart quite And such cause toor nature might think irrationality, a State any technical culpable mental question admitting case) given in a jury (when issue awas each capacity but *35 for Brief juror confusion. risk high a too raise would (“[U]se [in- 16 Curiae Amici al. et Hawaii potential unacceptable risk runs toxication] evidence to] [will confusion lead by defendants manipulation appreciate that adequately may not juries, who not state, of mental question for be used tois excuse”). Reed Thomas While showing an purposes for like “learning think suggested that reportedly Powell thing that one about to think you learn lawyer when thing other thinking about without another connected Metaphors, Teachout, Sentimental to,” connected it is its that argue might (1986),a State 537, 545 L. Rev. UCLA jurors its assumption that on structured should law facility.4 this from suffer not typically will no such made that Montana fact apart Quite at all not am however, I here, justification arguments justify- any than further go arguments would why such sure concept this that acknowledged Powell *36 only but where external circumstances would purpose establish or knowledge in the absence intoxication, see ante, at 58 J., concurring), is a statute (Ginsburg, guilt that turns or upon innocence not state of upon mind, but irrelevant ex- ternal circumstances. An intoxicated stopped driver at an intersection who unknowingly pedestrian accelerated into a likely would guilty, be found jury a unaware of intoxica- tion likely would knowledge infer purpose. or An identi- cally intoxicated racing driver along highway who unknow- ingly sideswiped another car likely would be found innocent, jury for a unaware of likely intoxication would negli- infer gence. Why legislature would a want to write a statute that 5Cf. Island, Rock A. & L. R. v. Co. States, United 254 U. S. (1920) (“Men must turn square corners when they deal with the Government”). im- life sentence distinction, upon such
draws wanted the legislature If turn? death, may prisonment, and purpose, knowledge, intoxication, equate instead so, says that plainly a statute write would why in dra- affect, that would manner roundabout in a so doing con- deeds, and minds, whose those ways, different matically question reserve would I identical? seem sequences con- exceed might statute a hypothetical such or not whether S. Pennsylvania, 477 U. v. McMillan Cf. limits. stitutional York, S. 432 U. New v. Patterson (1986); 79, 85-86 (1975). 698-699 Wilbur, S.U. Mullaney (1977); notes Teachout Sabine’s Professor A Comment entitled essay his described explicitly in a (1966), but Politics,” Q. Sci. Pol. Approach “Pragmatic wrote: letter about think can you think you “If to other is hitched thing about thinking without things to, then hitched it is things mind.” legal you Rev., at L. UCLA Metaphors, Teachout, Sentimental Quoted 17. n. ing (the redefinition of mental above). states option first I do not why understand they would justify the State in cutting the conceptual corner5 leaving the definitions of culpable mental states untouched but excluding evidence relevant proof. Absent a convincing argument for cutting that corner, Chambers and the like constrain us to hold the current Montana statute unconstitutional. I therefore respectfully dissent. Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens joins, dissenting. join I Justice O’Connor’s dissent. As the says, dissent and as Justice agrees, Souter Supreme Court did not understand Montana’s statute to have redefined the mental element of deliberate my homicide. In view, how- ever, this circumstance is simply happenstance or a tech- nical matter deprives us of power uphold statute. To have read the differently statute treat —to as if it had redefined the mental produce element—would anomalous results. A statute that makes voluntary intoxi- legal cation equivalent purpose or knowledge