847 F.3d 374
6th Cir.2017Background
- Two young boys were removed from their mother and placed in foster care; their maternal aunt R.O. obtained custody and the family court closed the case in 2014 with the boys residing with R.O.
- R.O. sought foster care maintenance payments from Kentucky’s Cabinet for Health and Family Services; the family court declined to rule, stating permanency had been achieved.
- R.O. sued in state court claiming the federal Child Welfare Act (Title IV‑E) requires maintenance payments; the Cabinet removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss or for summary judgment.
- The district court granted judgment for the Cabinet, holding (1) the Act creates no privately enforceable right, (2) the family lacked a property interest, and (3) Kentucky’s distinction between kinship and licensed foster care was rational.
- The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding the Act creates an individual right to foster care maintenance payments enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and remanded for factual determinations whether the children remained in the Cabinet’s custody and whether R.O. was an approved foster family home.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Child Welfare Act (42 U.S.C. § 672(a)) creates a private right to foster care maintenance payments | The Act mandates payments "on behalf of each child" and lists covered expenses, so it creates an individually enforceable monetary entitlement | § 672(a) is a funding condition describing when states may obtain federal matching funds, not a rights‑creating provision | The Act confers an individually enforceable right to payments (§ 672(a) is rights‑creating and mandatory) |
| Whether that private right is enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 | R.O. argued § 1983 is available because the Act provides no adequate federal mechanism for individual enforcement | Kentucky argued Congress intended enforcement via the Secretary’s plan review and administrative processes, not § 1983 | § 1983 is available; the Act’s federal enforcement mechanisms are programmatic and do not foreclose private § 1983 suits |
| Whether the children remained in state custody after the family court closed the case | R.O. argued the Cabinet retained custody absent an affirmative discharge by the state court | Cabinet argued the court’s closure and custody order placed children with R.O. and ended state responsibility | Remand for district court to determine under Kentucky law whether the family court affirmatively discharged the Cabinet; if not, payments are owed |
| Whether R.O. qualified as a "foster family home" under the Act | R.O. contended Cabinet conducted home evaluation and background check and thus approved her home as meeting licensing standards | Cabinet argued kinship care is distinct from licensed foster care and payments to kinship providers are discretionary under state law | The court held R.O. is an approved foster provider as federal law covers licensed or approved (including relative) homes; state kinship funding limits cannot negate federal entitlement |
Key Cases Cited
- Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (establishes § 1983 may enforce federal statutory rights)
- Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (clarifies rights‑creating language required for § 1983 enforcement)
- Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (three‑factor test for when statutes create enforceable individual rights)
- Harris v. Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456 (6th Cir.) (Medicaid provision created an individually enforceable right)
- Barry v. Lyon, 834 F.3d 706 (6th Cir.) (SNAP statutory language created enforceable individual right)
- Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498 (Medicaid private right recognized despite state rate‑setting discretion)
- Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125 (Title IV‑E covers approved relative homes; states may not deny payments solely because caregiver is related)
- Midwest Foster Care & Adoption Ass’n v. Kincade, 712 F.3d 1190 (8th Cir.) (construed § 672 as conditions for federal reimbursement)
- Cal. State Foster Parent Ass’n v. Wagner, 624 F.3d 974 (9th Cir.) (deference to reasonable state rate‑setting methodology)
