232 A.3d 747
Pa. Super. Ct.2020Background
- Bradley entered the public lobby of the Williamsport Police Department and began filming/ live‑streaming with his cellphone. A posted sign in the lobby prohibited recording.
- Corporal McGee, a supervisory officer inside a secure area, observed Bradley filming toward the secure area, told him to stop and to leave, and repeatedly warned that refusal could lead to arrest.
- Bradley refused, asserting a First Amendment right to record police; McGee attempted to seize the phone, there was a brief struggle, and additional officers assisted in placing Bradley under arrest.
- A station video of the incident was admitted at trial. A jury convicted Bradley of defiant trespass (18 Pa.C.S. § 3503(b)(1)); the court sentenced him to probation.
- Bradley appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court arguing (1) the no‑filming condition was unlawful/violated the First Amendment, (2) the statute was unconstitutional as applied, (3) insufficient evidence of mens rea, and (4) erroneous jury instruction about being "disruptive."
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Bradley) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether Commonwealth proved Bradley violated lawful conditions on access to the lobby | The no‑filming restriction was a reasonable time/place/manner rule tied to security/confidentiality and applied to all visitors | The sign/condition unlawfully restricted First Amendment rights and lacked statutory authority | Held: Commonwealth proved violation; the restriction was a reasonable TPM limit and enforceable against Bradley |
| 2. Whether §3503 is unconstitutional as applied by criminalizing Bradley's filming | The statute, as applied, is constitutional because the no‑filming condition is narrowly tailored to significant government interests (safety, confidentiality) | The statute criminalized protected speech; the no‑filming condition was unconstitutional as applied | Held: No; as‑applied challenge fails because the restriction was reasonable and served significant interests |
| 3. Whether evidence was insufficient to prove mens rea for defiant trespass | Repeated oral warnings provided direct notice that Bradley lacked license to remain; his continued filming showed intent | Bradley believed in good faith that recording police was a constitutional right (mistake of law) | Held: Sufficient evidence of mens rea; mistake of law is not a defense |
| 4. Whether court erred by answering jury question using the term "disruptive" | Court’s supplemental answer accurately conveyed that jury must find disturbance/violation of conditions to permit ejection/arrest | The instruction misstated law; ejection/arrest should be for statutory trespass, not mere disruption; relied on White | Held: No reversible error; instruction, read with the full charge, was adequate and non‑prejudicial |
Key Cases Cited
- Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2017) (public has First Amendment right to record police, subject to reasonable time/place/manner limits)
- Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010) (right to videotape police is subject to TPM restrictions narrowly tailored to significant interests)
- Pa. State Ass’n of Jury Comm’rs v. Commonwealth, 64 A.3d 611 (Pa. 2013) (statutes are presumed constitutional; challenger bears heavy burden)
- Commonwealth v. Brown, 26 A.3d 485 (Pa. Super. 2011) (standards for facial and as‑applied constitutional challenges)
- Commonwealth v. White, 492 A.2d 32 (Pa. Super. 1985) (defiant trespass and scope of public invitation/when mere presence is protected)
- Commonwealth v. Namack, 663 A.2d 191 (Pa. Super. 1995) (distinguishes mistake of fact—possible defense—from mistake of law)