228 So. 3d 535
Fla.2017Background
- Carpenter (28) exchanged sexually explicit messages with an undercover officer posing as a 14‑year‑old and was arrested when he arrived to meet the decoy; officers seized his cell phone incident to arrest.
- Officers transported the phone to a forensic technician and searched its contents without a warrant; sexually explicit messages and photos were recovered.
- Carpenter moved to suppress the phone evidence, relying on Smallwood II (Florida Supreme Court later holding warrantless phone searches unconstitutional).
- At the time of the search officers relied on Smallwood I (First DCA), which had upheld warrantless cell‑phone searches but had certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court (i.e., it was nonfinal and expressly subject to review).
- The trial court granted suppression; the First DCA reversed under Davis v. United States (good‑faith exception to exclusionary rule when officers reasonably rely on binding precedent). This Court granted review.
Issues
| Issue | Carpenter's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the good‑faith exception bars suppression of evidence from a warrantless search of Carpenter’s cell phone | Exclusion required because the relied‑on precedent (Smallwood I) was nonfinal and the law on phone searches was unsettled | Good‑faith exception applies under Davis because officers relied on controlling appellate precedent (Smallwood I) | Good‑faith exception does not apply; officers relied on nonfinal, pipeline precedent and should have obtained a warrant |
| Whether a district court opinion that is certified for review is sufficiently "binding precedent" for Davis analysis | Not binding for good‑faith reliance when the opinion on its face shows it is under active review | Decision is binding under Pardo (district court opinions are law of Florida unless overruled) | A certified, nonfinal district‑court opinion is not the sort of longstanding, well‑settled precedent contemplated by Davis for invoking the good‑faith exception |
| Whether deterrence/ societal costs favor exclusion here | Suppression will deter warrantless searches in unsettled areas and promote obtaining warrants | Suppression would penalize conscientious officers who follow existing appellate precedent | Deterrence favors suppression because allowing reliance on unsettled pipeline decisions would undermine the exclusionary rule in developing areas of law |
| Treatment of conflicting district‑court authority (e.g., Willis) | Willis reached the right result but used different reasoning | Willis supported admissibility based on Pardo binding effect | Quashed First DCA; disapproved Willis to extent its reasoning conflicts with this opinion (though Willis’s result was correct) |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) (good‑faith exception applies when police reasonably rely on binding judicial precedent)
- Smallwood v. State (Smallwood II), 113 So.3d 724 (Fla. 2013) (Florida Supreme Court held warrantless cell‑phone searches unconstitutional)
- Smallwood v. State (Smallwood I), 61 So.3d 448 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (First DCA allowed warrantless phone searches and certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court)
- Willis v. State, 148 So.3d 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (Second DCA found good‑faith exception inapplicable; expressed doubts about Pardo’s role in Fourth Amendment context)
- New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (historic bright‑line rule permitting vehicle searches incident to arrest)
- Arizona v. Gant, 566 U.S. 332 (2009) (limited Belton’s reach regarding vehicle searches incident to arrest)
- Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (recognized special privacy concerns for cell phones and emphasized warrant requirement)
- Pardo v. State, 596 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1992) (district court of appeal decisions are the law of Florida unless overruled by the Supreme Court)
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (origin of the good‑faith exception to the exclusionary rule)