*1 v. BELTON NEW YORK July 1, 1981 27, 1981 Decided Argued April 80-328. No. J., Burger, C. Court, in which opinion J., delivered Stewart, J., Rehnquist, joined. JJ., RehNQuist, and Powell, Blackmun, and concurring statement, post, p. Stevens, J., filed a filed a statement 463. concurring judgment, post, p. post, p. Brennan, J., dissenting J., post, p. opinions, Marshall, J., White, filed in which *2 joined. Harvey argued petitioner. R. for With
James the cause him on the brief Michael Tantillo. was R. Cambria, Jr., argued
Paul J. the cause and filed a brief for respondent. the Frey argued Solicitor General the cause for
Deputy him urging United States as curiae reversal. With amicus McCree, Acting on the brief were Solicitor General Assistant Attorney Keeney, Elliott Schulderr* General and the opinion delivered the Court. Stewart
Justice to subjected occupant the of an automobilе is When constitutionally permissible lawful custodial does the passenger to his include the scope a search incident riding? he was compartment of the automobile in which in the question present That is the at issue case.
I York a New April 9, Trooper Douglas Nicot, On York on the New policeman driving State an unmarked car traveling at passed automobile Thruway, by another the gave chase, overtook speed. an excessive rate of Nicot to the pull its to it over speeding and ordered driver vehicle, the car, There were four men in stop. of the road and side in this Belton, respondent case. Roger of whom was one auto license and asked to see thе driver’s policeman none of the men and discovered registration, mobile owner. Meanwhile, or the vehicle was related owned on burnt marihuana and seen had smelled policeman Ennis, Jr., Sims, Bruce filed a brief Emery, Charles S. and J. * Richard urging curiae Union et al. as amici American Civil Liberties for the affirmance. floor of the car an envelope “Supergold” marked that he with
associated He marihuana. therefore directed the men get out placed of the car, and them under arrest for the possession unlawful patted marihuana. He each of down “split the men them into four up separate areas of the Thruway at this time so not be in touch physical would ing area of each He then picked up envelope other.” “Supergold” marked and found contained marihuana. giving warnings After the arrestees the required Miranda Arizona, policeman state searched each passenger compartment one of them. He then searched of the car. On the back seat he a black leather found jacket belonging unzipped pockets Belton. He one of the jacket Placing jacket and discovered cocaine. *3 nearby his he the four to police drove arrestees automobile, station. of possession for criminal subsequently
Belton was indicted In court the the trial he moved that a controlled substance. pocket be trooper jacket had seized from the cocaine Belton then The court the motion. suppressed. denied preserved to but his pleaded guilty offense, a lesser included of the been seized in violation claim that the cocaine had See Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Lefkowitz Newsome, of the New Appellate 420 The Division U. S. 283. constitutionality of the Supreme upheld York Court seizure, reasoning that defendant search and “[o]nce the officer was validly possession marihuana, arrested for area for other contra- justified in the immediate searching 922, 2d S. 2d 926. 201, 416 N. Y. App. 198, band.” 68 Div. that Appeals reversed, holding New York Court of The zippered pockets of an unacces- warrantless search “[a] incident to a jacket may upheld not be as a search sible longer any danger no that where there is lawful might gain access to the article.” or a confederate arrestee 420, judges E. 2d 421. Two dis- 449, Y. 2d N. 447, 60 N. conducted “search was They pointed sented. out that by arresting peace process a lone officer who was in the speed- had stopped whom in a four unknown individuals he containing an ing by apparently car owned none of them and suspects quantity uncertain of a controlled substance. gave were the side of car as the officer standing attempting quick suspicions check to confirm his before Id., . transport police heаdquarters them to . . con- granted
N. E. 424. certiorari to consider the 2d, at We stitutionally of a in circumstances permissible scope search such as these. U. 1109. S.
II jurisprudence It Amendment principle is a first of Fourth unless first may that not conduct a search probable there is cause magistrate convince a neutral that “the so. that recognized, do Court has This however, exemption make sometimes exigencies the situation” McDonald v. requirement “imperative.” the warrant from States, Specifically, United a lawful California, Chimel v. held in con- justifies which arrest creates a situation custodial arrested a warrant of the temporaneous search without surrounding area. Such searches immediately and of the the need “to because of long been considered valid have might seek use any weapons arrestee] remove [the *4 to the need escape” or effect his and to resist arrest in order Id., of at or destruction evidence. concealment prevent 763. principle emphasized in Chimel opinion
The Court’s
Ohio, 392
Terry
1, 19,
in
v.
U. S.
said
the Court had
as
that,
'strictly
justi-
tied to and
be
search must
of
scope
[a]
“[t]he
per-
rendered
initiation
which
circumstances
by’ the
fied
California, supra,
762.
in
Quoted
missible.”
justification”
found “ample
in Chimel
Court
Thus while
from within which
“the area
[an arrestee]
for a search
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence,”
“no
fоund
comparable justification ...
for rou-
tinely searching any room other than
which an arrest
or, for that
for
matter,
searching through all the
occurs—
desk
drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself.”
Although the principle that limits a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest may be clearly stated enough, courts have discovered the principle difficult to apply in specific cases. Yet, as one commentator pointed has out, pro- tection of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments “can only be police realized if the are acting under a set of rules in most which, instances, possible makes it to reach a correct determination beforehand toas whether invasion of pri- vacy justified is in the interest of law enforcement.” LaFave, “Case-By-Case Adjudication” versus “Standardized Proce- dures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 S. Ct. Rev.
This is because
“Fourth Amendment given doctrine, force and effect the exclusionary rule, primarily regulate intended to police in their day-to-day activities and thus ought expressed in terms that readily are applicable by in the context of the law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily A engaged. highly sophis- ticated set of rules, qualified by of ifs, all sorts ands, and buts and requiring the drawing subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile of lawyers minds and judges eagerly feed, thеy but may be 'literally impossible application ” by the Id., officer field.’ at 141. In short, single familiar “[a] standard is guide essential police officers, who have expertise limited time reflect on and balance the social and individual interests in volved in the specific circumstances confront.” Dun away New York, 213-214.
459 Robinson, in United States v. 414 that, So it was straightforward rule, easily to a applied, the Court hewed enforced: the case of lawful custodial predictably a and “[I]n person exception full of the arrest a search Fourth but is requirement Amendment, of the the warrant Id., search under that Amendment.” also a 'reasonable’ holding, rejected suggestion In so in each case the of whether or litigated “there must be issue of present supporting not there one the reasons the au- thority for of the incident to arrest.” a search a lawful Ibid. litigated straightforward emerged
But no
rule
from the
has
question
here —the
respecting
question
cases
involved
of an automobile
proper scope
of a search of the interior
occupants.
lawful custodial
of its
incident
a
conflicting views
difficulty courts have
is reflected in the
in the
problem
judges
York
who dealt with
New
a small
look at even
is confirmed
a
present case, and
courts
in
the narrow class of cases which
sample drawn from
incident
search
in the course
whether,
have decided
automobile,
occupants
of an
custodial arrest
the lawful
after the arrestees
inside
automobile
may search
in cases such
hand,
On the one
decisions
longer
no
it.
are
Sanders,
1980);
(CA8
1309
631 F. 2d
as United States
v.
United
Dixon,
(CA9 1977);
F.
919
States v.
558
2d
United
Frick,
upheld
(CA5 1973),
F. 2d 666
have
such
States v.
incident
to lawful arrests. On
as
searches
warrantless
Benson,
United States
631 F.
such as
v.
in cases
other hand,
Rigales,
2d
States
F.
(CA8 1980), and United
v.
2d 1336
cir-
comparable
factual
1980),
searches,
such
(CA5
constitutionally invalid.1
held
have been
cumstances,
apply
court will
know how a
person cannot
When a
g., Hinkel
e.
disarray. Compare,
in similar
The state-court
cases are
State,
Ulesky
Anchorage,
(Alaska
1980),
379 So.
settled factual that situation, know the of his nor scope cannot constitutional protection, authority. policeman scope can a know the of his While the Chimel arrest case established that a search incident may stray beyond not the area within the immediate control of the courts have no workable definition of arrestee, found within the control of the arrestee” when “the area immediate the of an automobile and arguably that area includes interior reading Our of the cases occupant. the arrestee is its recent relatively that articles inside the suggests generalization the compartment of an auto- compass passenger narrow within inevitably, if generally, mobile are in fact even grab might reach in ordеr into which an arrestee “the area Chimel, S., at 763. evidentiary 395 U. weapon or a ite[m].” category of cases rule this In order to establish the workable the of the limits of we Chimel’s requires, read definition generalization. that may light in of area that be searched has made a law- policeman we hold that when Accordingly, automobile,2 he occupant of an arrest of the ful custodial that search incident of contemporaneous may, as of that automobile.3 passenger compartment the police may the also conclusion that It follows from this the found within of containers the contents examine is compartment passenger if the for passenger compartment, in it be will containers so also arrestee, reach of the within Robinson, Draper supra; United States his reach.4 within questioned not been validity arrest of Belton has of the custodial (concurring 414 U. S. v. Florida in this case. Cf. Gustafson opinion). meaning the of today than determine holding does no more Our problematic It no context. particular and principles in this Chimel’s in the case principles established way fundamental the alters arrests. incident to lawful custodial scope searches regarding the basic of object. holding any object capable another denotes here “Container” consoles, glove compartments, or other open or includes closed It thus сompartment, as passenger as well anywhere within receptacles located States,
v. United
307. Such a container
may,
course, be searched whether
open
or
since the
closed,
justification for the search is not
that
the arrestee has no
privacy
interest
but
container,
lawful custodial
justifies
infringement
any privacy
interest
arrestee
have.
while the Court
in Chimel
Thus,
held
police
could not search all the drawers in an arrestee’s
house simply
because the
him
had arrested
at home,
the Court noted that
within
drawers
an arrestee’s reach could
be searched because of
danger
their
might pose
contents
*7
police.
to the
It is of true, course, that these will containers sometimes be such that weapon could hold neither nor a evidence of the criminal conduct for suspect which the was arrested. However, in United Robinson, States rejected the Court argument that such a “crumpled up' container —there a cigarette package” during a search of Robinson in- —located to his cident arrest could not be authority searched: “The search the incident to a lawful custodial while arrest, upon based the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does depend not on what a court later decide prob- was the ability in particular a arrest situation weapons that or evi- dence would in upon fact be found the person of suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect on probable based cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that in- being lawful, trusion a search incident to the requires justification.” no additional S.,U. at 235.
The New York of Appeals Court upon relied United States Chadwick, U. S. 1, Arkansas v. Sanders, in concluding that search and seizure present in the were constitutionally case invalid.5 But neither of those luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and holding the like. Our encompasses passenger compartment the interior of the of an automobile and does not encompass the trunk. theory It seems to have been the Appeals of the Court of that present search and seizure in the case could not have been incident to the arguably lawful cases involved valid search incident custodial the Court out the Chadwick pointed arrest. As in “Here case: the search was conducted more than an hour gained control of the foot- agents after federal exclusive long respondents securely custody; locker and after were in to the the search therefore cannot be viewed as incidental justified by any arrest or as other 433 U. at exigency.” S., stated explicitly the Sanders case, And of of constitutionality that not “consider the searches did luggage possessor. g., incident to the arrest of e. See, Robinson, United 414 U. The (1973). States v. State suitcase searchеd argued respondent’s has was inci- appears bag to his and it that the was not within dent his ‘immediate control’ at the time the search.” 442 S., of of (The suitcase in was the trunk question n. 11. supra.) the taxicab. See n.
Ill subject questioned respondent It is not that the charge possessing on marihuana. a lawful custodial arrest immediately jacket respondent’s The search followed passenger inside the upon jacket was located arrest. *8 been compartment respondent of the car in which had thus just jacket before he was arrested. was. passenger concluded was “within the within the area which we have of the meaning control” within the arrestee’s immediate was a jacket, therefоre, Chimel case.6 The search arrest, Nicot, by very searching respondent’s Trooper because act of respondent’s jacket seizing pocket, gained and the contents of its 447, 451, 2d 407 2d control” of them. 50 N. Y. N. E. “exclusive theory this search seizure incident to a lawful But under fallacious no or valid; by seizing on the custodial arrest would ever be an article even person, his arrestee’s an officer said have reduced that article to “exclusive control.” case, disposition of the there no need to con Because of this is here permissible the search and seizure were under the so-called sider whether and it did search incident a lawful custodial Accord- Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. violate the ingly, judgment is reversed. ordered.
It is so concurring. Justice Rehnquist, is majority of the Court apparent Because it that a and Ohio, (1961), unwilling Mapp to overrule to consider necessary because the Court does not find ante, case, of this disposition exception” “automobile its ante, p. California, Robbins v. 462-463, at n. see the Court. I J., join opinion (Rehnquist, dissenting), concurring judgment. in the Justice Stevens, in Robbins dissenting opinion in my For the stated reasons Brennan, I ante, agree with Justice California, p. 444, and Blackmun, Justice Justice White, Marshall, Justice Rehnquist be decided should that these two cases Justice agree Justice, I with The Chief in the and also way, same Blackmun, Powell, Justice Stewart, Justice Justice Rehnquist be reversed. judgment this should Justice joins, Marshall Justice Brennan, with whom Justice dissenting. this Court California, (1969), S. 752
In Chimel v. 395 U. conflicting precedent analyzed years more than carefully in- scope of warrantless searches governing permissible back today turns its The Court cident to custodial arrest. arbitrary formulating of that product analysis, on the of auto- occupants to “recent” applicable “bright-fine” rule justi- underlying policy fails to reflect Chimel’s mobiles that intact, see the Court claims leave fications. While abandonment ante, unwarranted 3,1 fear n. *9 Maroney, 399 U. S. Carroll 42; v. exception.” Chambers v. “automobile States, United U. S. 132. 267
464 principles underlying decision a wholesale signal from our carefully developed
retreat search-incident-to-arrest I analysis. dissent.
I It long principle has been a fundamental of Fourth Amend analysis exceptions requirement ment the warrant narrowly Sanders, are to be v. 442 S. construed. Arkansas U. Arizona, 753, Mincey 385, 759-760 v. 437 393- (1979); U. S. (1978); Coolidge 394 Hampshire, 443, v. New 403 S. 454- U. Louisiana, (1971); 455 Vale v. 399 S. Katz (1970); U. 34 30, States, 347, v. United 389 357 v. (1967); U. S. Jones United States, 357 S. 493, (1958). U. 499 Predicated on the Fourth Amendment’s purpose “shield[ing] essential the citizen from privacy,” unwarranted intrusions into his v. Jones States, supra, United 498, principle this with it carries two corollaries. for a search to be First, valid under the “ Fourth ‘strictly Amendment, justified must to and tied by’ the circumstances which permissi rendered its initiation Terry Ohio, ble.” v. 1, 392 (1968), quoting U. S. 19 Warden Hayden, v. 387 S. 294, U. 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring). California, See Chimel v. supra, at 762; Cupp Murphy, 412 291, (1973). Second, 295 in determining whether grant an exсeption to the warrant courts requirement, carefully should consider the facts and circumstances of each seizure, search and on focusing the reasons supporting the ex ception rather on bright-line than general appli rule of York, cation. See Sibron v. New (1968); U. S. States, Preston v. United (1964).1 The Chimel exception to the warrant requirement was de- signed principal with two concerns mind: safety arresting officer and preservation of easily concealed or destructible evidence. Recognizing that a suspect might have Importing As we noted in Go-Bart Co. States, United 282 U. S. (1931): “There is no formula for the determination of reasonableness. Each case is be decided on own fаcts and circumstances.”
465 of or contraband at the time weapons access declared: Court for the arrest- it is reasonable made,
"When an is to re- in order ing person officer to search the arrested use in any might seek to weapons move that latter escape. Otherwise, or his order resist arrest effect the arrest endangered, officer’s well be safety might addition, entirely In is reasonable itself frustrated. it officer for and seize evi- arresting for the to search prevent on the in order to its person dence arrestee’s And or the area into which concealment destruction. a or grab weapon reach in order might arrestee like evidentiary course, governed items a must, S., rule.” 395 IT. at 762-763. narrowly standard was tailored to address concerns: effected permits police
these officers who have custodial arrest to conduct “of the ar- a warrantless search restee’s and the his control’— area 'within immediate construing phrase to mean the from area within which might possession he gain weapon of a or evi destructible Id., dence.” places spatial at 763. It thus a temporal and a limitation on arrest, excusing compliance searches incident to “ requirement only with the warrant ‘is when the search sub stantially contemporaneous with the confined arrest and is ” to the vicinity Shipley immediate v. Cali arrest.’ fornia, 818, California, 395 U. S. 819 v. (1969), quoting Stoner 376 483, (1964). Chadwick, U. S. See United States v. Dyke Taylor Mfg. 14-15 (1977); Implement v. Co., States, 391 U. 220 (1968); Preston v. United supra, 367; United Edwards, States v. S. 800, 415 U. (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting).2 When arrest has been “ custody, 'Once an accused is under arrest and in then search made ” place, warrant, simply at another without a not incident to the arrest.’ Maroney, (1970), Chambers quoting 399 U. S. Preston v. United States, S., 376 U. at 367. safely custody,
consummated and the arrestee taken into justifications underlying exception Chimel's to the limited requirement apply: point warrant cease to at that there is possibility no weapons the arrestee could reach or con California, traband. See Chimel supra, at 764. “ In attempt 'single, to formulate a familiar standard . .. *11 guide police officers, who have limited time and ex- pertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual specific interests involved in the they circumstances con- ” ante, quoting York, at 458, Dunaway v. New front/ S. 200, (1979), 213-214 today disregards the Court these principles, and adopts instead a fiction —that the interior of a car is always within the immediate control of an arrestee who recently has been in the car. The Court holds: thus a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest
“[W]hen occupant of automobile, he may, as a contem- poraneous incident of passenger search the compartment of that automobile . . . may also [and] examine the contents of containers found within the compartment Ante, passenger . . . at 460.
In so holding, ignores the precedent Court both and principle and fails to achieve objective police officers providing with a more workable standard for determining permis- scope sible of searches incident to arrest.
II As the facts of this case make clear, today sub- stantially expands the permissible scope of searches incident to arrest permitting officers to search areas and con- tainers the arrestee could possibly reach at the time of arrest. These facts demonstrate that at the time Belton and his three companions were placed under custodial arrest— which had been removed from car, patted after down, and separated of them could have reached the —none jackets that had been left on the back seat of the car. The
New York Court of Appeals described sequence of events as follows:
“On April 9, 1978, defendant and three companions were traveling on the New York State Thruway in On- tario County when their car was stopped by a State trooper for speeding. Upon approaching the vehicle, officer smelled the distinct odor of marihuana emanating from within and observed on the floor an envelope which recognized he as type that is.commonly used to sell the substance. At that point the officer ordered the occu- pants out of the vehicle, patted each down, removed the envelope from the floor and ascertained that it contained a small amount of marihuana. the marihuana was found, individuals,
“After still standing outside car, were placed under arrest. The then re-entered vehicle, officer searched the passenger compartment and seized the cigarette marihuana butts lying the ashtrays. He also through the pockets *12 rifled jackets on the hack Upon seat. of five opening zip- the pered pocket of them, one of he discovered a small amount of cocaine and defendant’s identification.” N. Y. 2d 447, 449, 407 N. E. 420, 2d 421 (1980) (empha- sis added).3
Concluding that a “warrantless search of the zippered pockets of an jacket unaccessible may not be upheld as a search incident a lawful arrest where there is no longer any dan- ger that the arrestee or a might gain access the confederate ibid, article,” (emphasis added), the court further stated:
“One searches the record in vain for support dis- senter’s claim that at the time the arrest —the point from which the predicate for the warrantless search is measured —'the jackets were within reach of the four sus- 3See also 50 2d, N. Y. 454, 2, at n. 407 N. 2d, E. 423, at 2;n. Tr. of Arg. 4-5; Oral App. A-36. con- reduced to exclusive yet not been
pects and had ” 2d, E. Id., 2, 407 N. at 452, at trol of the officer.’ n. id., (dis- 454, 2d, N. E. аt at quoting n. senting opinion). search constitutionality of the warrantless
By approving dangerous precedent in this the Court carves case, out Disre- underlying Chimel. justified by the concerns search principle scope “that of a warrantless garding the excepts the must commensurate with the rationale that Murphy, requirement,” Cupp from the warrant search officers grants police the Court for the first time S., cir- authority under to conduct a warrantless “area” search “might cumstances where there is no chance that the arrestee gain possession weapon of a or destructible evidence.” S., approach Chimel v. at 763. California, 395 U. Under today, presumably taken the result would be the same even companions if Officer Nicot had handcuffed Belton and his in if patrol car before them under and even placing his search had extended to or other luggage locked inaccessi- ble containers located the back seat of car. expansion analyti
This of the Chimel both exception is every cally unsound and inconsistent with significant search- incident-to-arrest case we have decided in which the issue was lawfully whether the could conduct a warrantless search See, g., of the area the arrestee. surrounding e. United States Chadwick, S., (search 433 U. at 15 of footlocker “conducted agents more than an hour after federal gained exсlusive long control the footlocker and after respondents were securely custody” not incident to arrest); Coolidge v. New *13 Hampshire, S., 456-457, (search 403 U. at and n. 11 of car driveway not incident to arrest in house); Chambers v. Maro ney, (warrantless 399 S. 47 42, (1970) U. search of car invalid once placed police arrestee has been custody); Vale v. Lou isiana, S., 399 35 (area U. at of immediate control does not extend to inside of suspect house when is arrested on front Dyke Taylor step); Implement v. Mfg. Co., S., 391 at U. 220 (search of car after occupant placed in custody and taken to courthouse not valid as incident to arrest); Preston v. United States, 376 U. at S., (search of car not valid as inсident to arrest: although suspects were in car when arrested, were in custody at station when car was searched). These cases demonstrate the crucial question under Chimel is not whether the arrestee could ever have reached the area that was searched, but whether he could have reached it at the time of arrest and search. If not, the officer’sfailure to obtain a may warrant not be By excused.4 disregarding this settled doctrine, great does a disservice decisis, to stare but to the policies underlying the Fourth Amendment as well.
The Court justify seeks to its departure from the principles underlying proclaiming the need for a new “bright- line” rule to guide the officer in the field. pointed As we out in Mincey Arizona, S.,U. at however, “the mere fact law enforcement be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.” Moreover, the Court’s attempt to forge a “bright-line” rule fails on its own terms. While the distinc- “interior/trunk” tion may provide a workable guide in certain routine cases— for example, where the officer arrests the driver of a car and then immediately searches the seats and floor—in the long I run, suspect it will create far problems more than it solves. The Court’s new approach leaves open too many questions and, more important, provides the police and the courts with too few tools with which to find the answers.
Thus, althоugh the Court concludes that a warrantless search of a car may take place even though the suspect was “4 ‘We cannot be true to [the Fourth Amendment] excuse absence of a search warrant without a showing by those who seek exemp tion from the constitutional mandate that exigencies of the situation ” make that imperative.’ course Chimel v. California, S., quoting McDonald States, United 335 U. (1948). *14 long after how not indicate car, it does the outside arrested validly conducted. be may search arrest suspect’s the if arrest be valid to incident search a warrantless Would Thirty car? left his suspect minutes after the five conducted suspect the whether Does it matter Three hours? minutеs? is search car when the to the proximity in close standing is prob- formed police the whether it matter Does conducted? his car? left suspect or after the before to arrest cause able necessarily limited to today the rule announced why And is of a walking out is seen suspect if a cars? What searches formed outside, in from police, peering where the house being committed? was a crime to cause believe probable house the suspect and enter then police the Could to- assuming Even to arrest? incident to conduct a search cars—an of the “interior” of day’s is to searches rule limited “in- by meant logic assumption not demanded —what the compartments, glove locked it include terior”? Does under the floorboards? or the area panels, interior of door hatchbacks, wagons and for station special necessary rules Are through the reached compartment luggage where the the might separate glass panel taxicabs, or where interior, Are the rest of car? compartment from the the driver’s large enough are may be searched those that containers that new does object”? another Or the “capable holding to be if hold any container, even it “could neither apply rule for which the criminal conduct weapon nor evidence the ante, 4, with 460-461, at n. suspect Compare arrested”? antе, at 461. an- police any “bright-line” does not give Court questions. important,
swers to More because these underlying justifications Court’s rule abandons new seeking to Chimel, guidance no offers officer As we warned in Chimel: work out these answers for himself. sug- “No consideration relevant Fourth Amendment al- of rational once the search is point limitation, gests go beyond from lowed to area which arrested might obtain weapons or evidentiary items.” 395 U. S., *15 766. See also Mincey Arizona, supra, By at fail- ing heed this warning, the Court has undermined rather than furthered goal of consistent law enforcement: it has failed to offer principles to guide police and the courts in their application of the new rule to nonroutine situations.
The standard announced in Chimel is not nearly as diffi cult to apply as the Court suggests. To the contrary, I con tinue to believe that provides a sound, workable rule for determining the constitutionality of a warrantless search incident to arrest. Under Chimel, searches incident to arrest may be conducted without a warrant only if limited to the person of the arrestee, see United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 (1973), or to the area within the arrestee’s “imme diate control.” While it may be difficult in some cases to measure the exact scope of the arrestee’s immediate control, relevant factors would surely include the relative number of police officers and arresteеs, the manner of restraint placed on the arrestee, and the ability of the gain arrestee to access particular to a area or container.5 Certainly there will be some close cases, but when in doubt the police always can turn to the rationale underlying Chimel —the need to prevent the arrestee from reaching weapons or contraband —before 5The Court sets up a strawman when it claims that under approach “exclusive control” by taken the Court Appeals, of “no search or seizure incident to a lawful custodial arrest would ever valid; by seizing an article even on the person, arrestee’s officer be said to ” have reduced that article his ‘exclusive Ante, control.’ 461-462, n. 5. If a officer could obtain exclusive control of by an article simply holding it in hand, his I would certainly agree with the Court. But as recognized we in United States v. Chadwick, 433 14-15 (1977), exclusive control means more than It that. means sufficient control such significant there is no risk that the arrestee or his “might confederates gain possession weapon aof or destructible evidence.” Chimel v. Cali fornia, 395 S.,U. at 763. The issue of exclusive presents control ques a tion fact to be decided under the circumstances of each case, just as the New York Appeals Court of has decided it here. rationale based on that A rule judgment.
exercising their the rule announced guidаnce than more provide should rule, it would Court’s unlike the today. Moreover, Amendment. the Fourth be faithful joins, Marshall Justice with whom Justice White, dissenting. held that a it was California, ante, p. 420,
In Robbins v. be searched car could not in the trunk container wrapped could be trunk itself though even without warrant cause probable because there was a warrant searched without cause probable though there the car and even to search This was because container as well. to search the *16 container. respect with privacy interest in separate incident to the arrest now holds as The Court automobile, interior any other in an driver or locked or therein, found whether the cаr container and also searched even absent be not seized but not, or evidence of crime to believe that contraband probable cause containers, or other luggage, briefcases, be found. will As one to extreme extension of and this seems to me an Robbins I if the decision in which cannot subscribe. Even Chadwick, 433 had been otherwise and United States v. U. Sanders, (1979), and S. 753 (1977), Arkansas v. could not overruled, found in the trunk a car luggage been it contained probable without cause believe be searched Here, luggage, briefcases, or searches of contraband evidence. interior of an auto authorized other containers are any suspicion whatsoever that contain the absence legitimate This in which the have a interest. anything today exhibits, and, more caution than the Court calls for I respect, dissent. with