YOUNGSTOWN EDUCATION ASSOCIATION OEA/NEA v. BRENDA KIMBLE, et al.
CASE NOS. 16 MA 0013, 16 MA 0014
STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY IN THE COURT OF APPEALS SEVENTH DISTRICT
April 8, 2016
2016-Ohio-1481
Hon. Cheryl L. Waite, Hon. Mary DeGenaro, Hon. Carol Ann Robb
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS:
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee YEA: Atty. Charles W. Oldfield, Atty. Ira J. Mirkin, Green Haines Sgambati Co., L.P.A., City Centre One, Suite 800, 100 Federal Plaza East, Youngstown, Ohio 44503
For Defendant-Appellant Brenda Kimble: Atty. James E. Roberts, Atty. Elizabeth H. Farbman, Atty. Christine Z. Papa, Roth, Blair, Roberts, Strasfeld & Lodge, 100 E. Federal Street, Suite 600, Youngstown, Ohio 44503
For Defendants-Appellants Academic Distress Commission, Brian Benyo, Barbara Brothers, Laura Meeks, and Jennifer Roller: Atty. Mike DeWine, Attorney General of Ohio, Atty. Michael T. Fisher, Assistant Ohio Attorney General, Education Section, 615 West Superior Avenue, 11th Floor, Cleveland, Ohio 44113; Atty. James D. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, Health and Human Services Section, 30 East Broad Street, 16th Floor, Columbus, Ohio 43215
For Carol L. Staten: Carol L. Staten, Pro se, 1870 Selma, Youngstown, OH 44504
WAITE, J.
{¶1} This is a consolidated appeal of a decision granting injunctive and declaratory relief and granting a writ of mandamus. The matter involves the appointment of one of five members of the Academic Distress Commission (“ADC“) for the Youngstown City School District. Appellee Youngstown Education Association (“YEA“) filed an action against Appellant Brenda Kimble (“Kimble“), President of the Youngstown City School District, and against the ADC to prevent Kimble from appointing Dr. Carol Staten (“Staten“) to the ADC, and to prevent the ADC from taking any action until a teacher was appointed to the ADC. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction preventing Kimble from appointing Staten and granted the mandamus action, ordering her to appoint a teacher employed by the school district to the commission within forty-eight hours. The trial court also enjoined the ADC from meeting or taking any action until an appropriate appointment was made.
{¶2} As a preliminary matter, Kimble and ADC attack the YEA‘s standing in this matter, but it is clear that, based on the allegations in the complaint, YEA represents teachers in the Youngstown School District and
{¶3} On appeal, Kimble and ADC argue that the requirements necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction have not been met. The decision to grant a preliminary injunction is reviewed only for abuse of
Facts and Procedural History
{¶4} On December 1, 2015, YEA filed an action against Kimble and Staten seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to prevent Kimble from appointing Staten to the ADC, and for declaratory judgment defining the meaning of the word “teacher” as used in the relevant statute. The YEA asked the trial court to find that Staten‘s appointment was contrary to law pursuant to
{¶5} On December 8, 2015, YEA amended the complaint to add the ADC and its five individual members as defendants and to request a temporary injunction to prevent the ADC and its members from meeting or taking any official action, and seeking to toll the sixty-day period for the ADC to appoint a CEO as required by
{¶6} The matter was referred to a magistrate, and on December 15, 2015, the magistrate issued a decision granting both the preliminary injunction and a writ of mandamus. The ruling enjoined Kimble from appointing Staten or any other person who is not a teacher employed by the school district to the ADC, ordering her to make her appointment within forty-eight hours, enjoining the ADC from taking any action until the proper appointment of the fifth member of ADC was made, and tolling the sixty-day time period for the ADC to appoint a CEO. The case was set for trial on the merits, presumably to determine whether a permanent injunction should issue.
{¶7} Both Kimble and ADC filed objections to the magistrate‘s decision. After a hearing, the court ruled that
{¶8} Both Kimble and the ADC filed timely appeals and this Court ordered an accelerated appellate schedule. Kimble has filed six assignments of error and the
Appellant Kimble‘s Assignment of Error No. One and Appellant ADC‘s Assignment of Error No. One.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT YEA HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT KIMBLE‘S APPOINTMENT TO THE YOUNGSTOWN ACADEMIC DISTRESS COMMISSION.
APPELLEE LACKS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE APPELLANT-COMMISSION‘S ABILITY TO MEET AND ACT.
{¶9} The first assignment of error for both Kimble and the ADC asserts that the YEA lacked standing to bring any of its claims against either party. Kimble filed a
{¶10} A motion to dismiss based on lack of standing does not raise a question of subject matter jurisdiction and cannot be asserted under
{¶11} A
{¶12} A party has standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court if he has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the subject matter of the action. State ex rel. Dallman v. Court of Common Pleas, 35 Ohio St.2d 176, 298 N.E.2d 515 (1973), syllabus. An association such as the YEA has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (1) its members would otherwise
{¶13} The interest at stake in this lawsuit is that
{¶14} It is apparent from this record that if Kimble‘s action wrongfully prevented or excluded a teacher as defined by the YEA from being appointed to the ADC, her actions effectively prevented 100% of the membership of the YEA from appointment to the ADC and from having any practical influence over the operation, management and instructional control of the district.
{¶15} Standing is not an issue that provides a technical rule to prevent aggrieved parties from having their day in court. Moore v. Middletown, 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 67, 2012-Ohio-3897, 975 N.E.2d 977, ¶ 47. “Rather, it is a practical concept designed to insure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented.” Id. citing Fort Trumbull Conservancy, L.L.C. v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 486, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). In this case, the issues are clearly laid out, there is an undeniable and urgent dispute between the parties, and there has been vigorous representation regarding the different points of view in this litigation.
{¶16} The requirements of standing have been met. An individual teacher would have standing to challenge whether Staten is a teacher as defined by
The ADC‘s Assignment of Error No. Two
APPELLEE FAILED TO SUSTAIN ITS BURDEN OF PROOF WITH REGARD TO ITS MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, AND
Kimble‘s Assignments of Error Nos. Two through Six
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING YEA‘S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT YEA IS LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS OF ITS CLAIMS.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT YEA WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE HARM WITHOUT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THIRD PARTIES WILL NOT BE HARMED BY THE REQUESTED INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PUBLIC INTEREST WILL BE SERVED BY THE REQUESTED INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.
{¶17} All of the remaining assignments of error deal with the propriety of issuing the preliminary injunctions. Kimble was enjoined from appointing Staten or any other person who is not a teacher employed by the school district to the ADC. The ADC was enjoined from proceeding with any action pursuant to
{¶18} In seeking a preliminary injunction, the following four factors are relevant: (1) there is a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted, (3) no third parties will be unjustifiably harmed by an injunction, and (4) the public interest will be served by an injunction. Martin v. Lake Mohawk Property Owner‘s Assn., 7th Dist. No. 04-CA-815, 2005-Ohio-7062, ¶ 36, citing Blakeman‘s Valley Office Equip., Inc. v. Bierdman, 152 Ohio App.3d 86, 2003-Ohio-1074, 786 N.E.2d 914, ¶ 19 (7th Dist.).
{¶19} No single factor is determinative. King‘s Welding & Fabricating, Inc. v. King, 7th Dist. No. 05-CA-828, 2006-Ohio-5231, ¶ 13.
{¶20} An appellate court uses an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the decision to grant an injunction by a trial court. Davis v. Domestic Linen Supply Co., 7th Dist. No. 06-MA-87, 2007-Ohio-3498, ¶ 11, citing Collins v. Moran, 7th Dist. No. 02-CA-218, 2004-Ohio-1381. An abuse of discretion is more than an error of judgment; it implies an attitude that is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
1. “Teacher” definition
{¶21} Regarding Kimble‘s injunction, the first factor on review is the likelihood of the YEA‘s success on the merits. The primary issue that needs to be resolved, and the issue before the trial court in declaratory judgment, is whether Staten is a “teacher employed by the school district” pursuant to
“Teacher” means all persons licensed to teach and who are employed in the public schools of this state as instructors, principals, supervisors, superintendents, or in any other educational position for which the state board of education requires licensure under sections 3319.22 to 3319.31 of the Revised Code including persons having a license issued pursuant to sections 3319.22 to 3319.31 of the Revised Code and employed in an educational position, as determined by the state board of education, under programs provided for by federal acts or regulations and financed in whole or in part from federal funds, but for which no licensure requirements for the position can be made under the provisions of such federal acts or regulations.
{¶22} Since the definition of “teacher” found in
{¶23} The YEA argues that “teacher” is undefined in
{¶24} The definition of “teacher” found in
{¶25} In contrast, while
{¶26} Kimble appears to argue that the words “teacher” and “employed” in
{¶27} Kimble takes issue with the modifier “especially children” in the trial court‘s definition, but since the subject matter of this case covers only teachers employed by a public school system rather than a college or adult school system, this verbiage was, at most, a redundancy. While not all Youngstown City school students are minors, it is apparent that the vast majority are children.
{¶28} Because the trial court was correct in using the ordinary and natural meaning of the word “teacher” absent a specific definition to the contrary, there was no abuse of discretion when the trial court determined that the YEA was highly likely to succeed on the merits of the underlying case. In fact, the trial court appears to have de facto ruled in the YEA‘s favor in declaratory judgment in this respect.
{¶29} Kimble also takes issue with the finding that the YEA would suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief. Although this factor was not emphasized by the parties, it is evident from the record and from
{¶30} Kimble next argues that third parties will be harmed by the injunctive relief. The actual factor to be considered is whether third parties will be “unjustifiably” harmed. Blakeman‘s Valley Office Equip., Inc., supra at ¶ 19. Regardless, Kimble argues that Staten will be harmed, but Staten is a party to this case, not a third party. Nor does Kimble cite to any other persons or groups who may be unjustifiably harmed.
{¶31} Finally, Kimble argues that the public interest will not be served by injunctive relief. Kimble argues that the public has a right to have
{¶32} For all the reasons mentioned above, Kimble‘s second through sixth assignments of error have no merit.
2. Tolling the ADC‘s timeline
{¶33} As regards the preliminary injunction against the ADC preventing it from taking action until the appropriate fifth member is appointed by Kimble,
(B)(1) The academic distress commission shall consist of five members as follows:
(a) Three members appointed by the state superintendent, one of whom is a resident in the county in which a majority of the district‘s territory is located;
(b) One member appointed by the president of the district board of education, who shall be a teacher employed by the district;
(c) One member appointed by the mayor of the municipality in which a majority of the district‘s territory is located or, if no such municipality exists, by the
mayor of a municipality selected by the state superintendent in which the district has territory. Appointments to the commission shall be made within thirty days after the district is notified that it is subject to this section. Members of the commission shall serve at the pleasure of their appointing authority. The state superintendent shall designate a chairperson for the commission from among the members appointed by the state superintendent. The chairperson shall call and conduct meetings, set meeting agendas, and serve as a liaison between the commission and the chief executive officer appointed under division (C)(1) of this section. (Emphasis added.)
{¶34} There is no ambiguity in the statute as to the makeup of the ADC: it must include five members, one of whom must be a teacher employed by the district. As earlier stated, YEA‘s likelihood of success on the merits in this regard is clearly established. The ADC cannot meet without five members, and the fifth member is undetermined pending Kimble‘s appointment of an appropriate teacher. As we have earlier discussed, the trial court has de facto resolved the YEA‘s declaratory judgment action in its favor. As the mandamus action was not appealed, Kimble will be required to appoint an appropriate teacher employed by the district as defined by the trial court and affirmed by this Court within forty-eight hours of the resolution of this appeal. The only other point ADC raises under this part of its argument is that the YEA cannot succeed on the merits because it lacks standing. We have already determined that the trial court was correct in holding that the YEA has standing.
{¶35} ADC argues that the YEA failed to show it would suffer irreparable injury in the absence of the injunction. As this argument is substantially the same as Kimble‘s on this issue, for the same reasons, the record reflects that the YEA has shown irreparable injury. It represents the majority of the teachers in the school district and a teacher has a right to be appointed to the ADC. Without injunctive relief, no YEA member will be considered for appointment. Thus, 100% of its membership has been affected by Kimble‘s action. Without an injunction, the commission will meet, a CEO will be appointed, and the school district will be operated by the CEO, all without input from a teacher employed by the district as directed by the statute. The injury is the complete lack of teacher representation during this crucial initial phase of operation of the ADC.
{¶36} ADC also argues that YEA did not show that no third parties would be unjustifiably harmed. ADC relies on the principle of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion to prove this point. ADC argues that this issue was litigated in a recent case filed in Franklin County, Youngstown City School District Board of Education, et al. v. State of Ohio, et al., 15 CVH08-7311, and that since the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas declined to grant the YEA‘s requested relief, the courts in Mahoning County should likewise follow suit.
{¶37} The Franklin County litigation is a challenge to the validity of
{¶38} Finally, ADC states that injunctive relief has caused and will continue to cause unjustifiable harm to the students of the Youngstown School District and is against the public‘s best interests. However, ADC presents little argument on this issue and there are no facts in the record to support this assertion.
{¶39} Based on all the reasons stated above, ADC‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶40} Two parties have appealed the trial court‘s ruling granting preliminary injunctions to the YEA regarding the appointment of a member to the ADC. While Appellants contend the YEA lacks standing, the record demonstrates that the YEA does have a substantial interest in appointment of a teacher to the ADC and that the requirements of standing by an association have been met. Appellants also argue that the requirements for obtaining a preliminary injunction have not been satisfied.
The trial court‘s judgment granting the preliminary injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. This record establishes that all the factors for granting a preliminary injunction have been met and Appellants have not demonstrated any abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court with respect to the definition of “teacher” as used in the statute is affirmed. The stay granted by the trial court to Kimble to appoint an appropriate teacher to the ADC is automatically dissolved and any stay granted the parties by this Court is lifted. As the record shows that the trial court has actually determined the issues in declaratory judgment, its decision to grant a preliminary injunction is affirmed and the matter remanded to the trial court to take any further necessary action pursuant to our Opinion.
DeGenaro, J., concurs.
Robb, J., concurs.