In the matter of the mental commitment of E.J.W.: Waukesha County, Petitioner-Respondent, v. E.J.W., Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.
CASE NO.: 2020AP370
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
November 23, 2021
2021 WI 85 | 399 Wis. 2d 471 | 966 N.W.2d 590
Paul Bugenhagen, Jr.
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS Reported at 395 Wis. 2d 295, 953 N.W.2d 122 (2020 - unpublished). ORAL ARGUMENT: September 9, 2021. SOURCE OF APPEAL: Circuit Court, Waukesha County. JUSTICES:
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs filed by Lauren J. Breckenfelder, assistant state public defender. There was an oral argument by Lauren J. Breckenfelder.
For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief filed by Zachary M. Bosch, assistant corporation counsel. There was an oral argument by Zachary M. Bosch.
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports.
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Reversed.
¶1 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. The petitioner, E.J.W., seeks review of an unpublished, authored decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court‘s order extending his involuntary commitment.1 He argues that the circuit court incorrectly determined that his jury trial demand was untimely.
¶2 Pursuant to
¶3 We conclude that E.J.W.‘s jury demand was timely.
¶4 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
I
¶5 E.J.W. was initially committed on April 15, 2014, for a period of six months. The circuit court determined that he was mentally ill, dangerous, and a proper subject for treatment. Shortly before the expiration of the initial commitment, the circuit court extended E.J.W.‘s commitment for a period of 12 months, and his commitment was subsequently extended four additional times.
¶6 On February 7, 2019, Waukesha County (the County) filed a petition to again extend E.J.W.‘s commitment, which was set to expire on March 12, 2019. A notice sent to E.J.W. and to the Office of the State Public Defender indicated that the final extension hearing was scheduled for March 5, 2019, at 1:15 p.m.
¶7 The March 5 hearing did not proceed as scheduled. Instead, at the hearing E.J.W. stated that his appointed attorney was unprepared and had never called him. E.J.W. requested that his counsel withdraw from representation and that the court appoint him new counsel. The circuit court granted E.J.W.‘s request for new counsel and adjourned the hearing until March 12, 2019, at 1:15 p.m.
¶8 Additionally at the March 5 hearing, the County raised the fact that E.J.W. had not filed a jury demand and asked the circuit court to make a finding that E.J.W., by the failure to file such a demand, had waived his right to a jury trial. The County noted that E.J.W. was aware of the jury demand procedure because he had made a jury demand in one of his previous commitments. It further argued that although E.J.W. was unable to connect with his lawyer, E.J.W. did not comply with his obligation to keep his contact information updated, which caused his attorney to have the wrong phone number. In response to the County‘s argument, E.J.W. orally demanded a jury trial. After hearing
¶9 The public defender‘s office appointed new counsel for E.J.W. on March 7, 2019, and one day later, the newly appointed counsel filed a written jury demand. On March 11, 2019, the circuit court denied E.J.W.‘s demand for a jury trial in a brief order. It reasoned: “The demand for a Jury Trial is hereby denied pursuant to
¶10 At the March 12, 2019 final hearing, the circuit court reiterated its ruling from the prior day. It stated, “Regarding the time set for hearing, the Court does find that the date was set as a week ago and that is the time that triggers that 48-hour notice.” The circuit court explained:
To find otherwise is going to cause an absurdity in the statutes. It would allow someone to come in, ask for new counsel, send a letter saying I‘m sick, I can‘t make it there today. I need to have some more time to come and have the hearing and another hearing would get set for the convenience of an individual and it would reset the clock. The Court finds that that would be an absurd way for us to handle it because there would be no reason to have the time limit of 48 hours before the final hearing.
¶11 Ultimately, E.J.W. reached an agreement with the County to waive the hearing and accept an eight-month extension of his commitment. When questioned by the circuit court, E.J.W. explained that he was entering this agreement “because I am going to lose no matter what.” The circuit court subsequently extended E.J.W.‘s commitment for the agreed-upon eight months.
¶12 E.J.W. appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court. Waukesha County v. E.J.W., No. 2020AP370, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2020). The court of appeals relied on Marathon County v. R.J.O., 2020 WI App 20, ¶41, 392 Wis. 2d 157, 943 N.W.2d 898, which had recently addressed the issue before the court in this case. E.J.W., No. 2020AP370, ¶¶9-10. It rejected E.J.W.‘s challenge consistent with the R.J.O. court‘s determination that
II
¶13 We must determine first whether E.J.W.‘s challenge to his recommitment is moot. Mootness presents a question of law we review independently of the determinations of the circuit court and court of appeals. Marathon County v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶16, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901.
¶14 This case additionally requires us to interpret and apply
III
¶15 We begin by briefly addressing the threshold question of whether this appeal is moot. Subsequently, we address whether E.J.W.‘s jury demand was timely pursuant to
¶16 Generally, appellate courts decline to reach moot issues. Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶12, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509. “An issue is moot when its resolution will have no practical effect on the underlying controversy.” PRN Assocs. LLC v. DOA, 2009 WI 53, ¶25, 317 Wis. 2d 656, 766 N.W.2d 559. If all issues are moot, an appeal should be dismissed. J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶12.
¶17 The County argues that this case is moot. It contends that the subject commitment order is long expired, and two subsequent extension orders have been entered by the circuit court since its expiration. See id., ¶14 (“An appeal of an expired commitment order is moot.“).
¶18 E.J.W. responds that the case is not moot because of the collateral consequences that outlast the commitment order itself. He specifically cites the restriction on his right to possess a firearm, potential liability for the costs of his care, the loss of legal rights, and the restriction of his employment options. If the case is moot, E.J.W. further argues that several recognized exceptions to mootness apply and that the court should nevertheless address the merits of his contentions.
¶19 This court may decide to address an otherwise moot issue if the issue (1) is of great public importance; (2) involves the constitutionality of a statute; (3) occurs so frequently that a definitive decision is necessary to guide circuit courts; (4) is likely to arise again and a decision of the court would alleviate uncertainty; or (5) will likely be repeated, but evades appellate review because the appellate review process cannot be completed or even undertaken in time to have a practical effect on the parties. Id., ¶12; Winnebago County v. Christopher S., 2016 WI 1, ¶32, 366 Wis. 2d 1, 878 N.W.2d 109.
¶20 Assuming without deciding that this case is moot, applicable mootness exceptions indicate that we should address the merits.2 First, this case presents an issue that is of great public importance, particularly to members of the public subject to commitments. Second, the issue is capable of repetition yet evades review due to the short timelines that attend
(citing Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶80, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607) (concluding that an otherwise moot issue should be addressed due to its likelihood of evading appellate review where “the order[s] appealed from will have expired before an appeal is completed“). Accordingly, mootness does not serve as an obstacle to our review of the merits of the issue raised in E.J.W.‘s petition for review.
B
¶21 Having determined that at least one exception to mootness applies, we turn next to address the merits of E.J.W.‘s argument.
¶22
¶23 Section 51.20(11)(a) provides in relevant part:4
If before involuntary commitment a jury is demanded by the individual against whom a petition has been filed under sub. (1) or by the individual‘s counsel if the individual does not object, the court shall direct that a jury of 6 people be selected to determine if the allegations specified in sub. (1)(a) or (ar) are true. A jury trial is deemed waived unless demanded at least 48 hours in advance of the time set for final hearing, if notice of that time has been previously provided to the subject individual or his or her counsel.
¶24 Our analysis in this case centers on the meaning of the statutory phrase, “time set for final hearing.”5 E.J.W. argues that the adjournment of a final hearing resets the 48-hour deadline for filing a jury demand. In other words, he contends that the phrase “time set for final hearing” does not mean “first time set for the final hearing” and that the March 12 date was a “time set for final hearing” just as much as the March 5 date was.
¶25 On the other hand, the County asserts that 1:15 p.m. on March 5 was the only “time set for final hearing” to which the statute refers. It contends that once 48 hours before that time passed without a jury demand, no rescheduled hearing date could “revive” E.J.W.‘s waived right to a jury trial. In the County‘s view, E.J.W. is asking the court to rewrite “time set for final hearing” as “time the final hearing is held.” The County further argues that E.J.W.‘s interpretation creates an opportunity for manipulation and delay of final hearings, which would cause the County to have to reschedule witnesses on short notice.6
¶27 “Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning.” Id. We also interpret statutory
language “in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.” Id., ¶46.
¶28 At first blush, both parties’ interpretations may appear reasonable, but guided by the above principles, we agree with E.J.W.‘s reading of the statute. Beginning with an examination of the language of
¶29 E.J.W.‘s interpretation also fits in with the context of
before the March 12 time set for hearing, the circuit court and County likewise received at least 48 hours’ notice. There is no additional hardship placed on the circuit court and no prejudice to the County in accepting the jury demand for the rescheduled hearing because in both cases the minimum advance notice they would receive is exactly the same.
¶30 Further, E.J.W.‘s reading is more in line with the larger context of
¶31 As such,
¶33 The County‘s concerns about potential manipulation do not alter our conclusion. Specifically, the County argues that E.J.W.‘s position would allow individuals to manipulate timelines and delay final hearings, risking the unavailability of witnesses at hearings that are rescheduled on short notice.
¶34 However, the County‘s argument ignores the fact that any adjournment request must go through the circuit court. See
Wis. 2d 709, 616 N.W.2d 126; see also State ex rel. Collins v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 153 Wis. 2d 477, 483, 451 N.W.2d 429 (1990) (“Circuit courts possess inherent discretionary authority to control their dockets with economy of time and effort.“).
¶35 When faced with a motion for adjournment, the circuit court may evaluate the circumstances under which an adjournment is sought and make its own determination as to whether a person subject to commitment is attempting to manipulate the system and, if so, it may deny the motion. If witnesses are scheduled to come in on a certain day and a jury demand has not been filed, the circuit court has discretion to deny the adjournment and proceed in the name of convenience to the County and its witnesses. In other words, if the County is prejudiced by an adjournment, it is free to argue that on a case by case basis.8
¶36 Thus, we conclude that E.J.W.‘s jury demand was timely.
¶37 We recognize that our conclusion is at odds with the court of appeals’ determination in R.J.O., 392 Wis. 2d 157. In R.J.O., the court of appeals addressed a similar situation where a scheduled final hearing was adjourned and rescheduled. No jury demand was filed at least 48 hours prior to the first time set for the final hearing, but counsel filed two jury demands at least 48 hours before the time set for the rescheduled hearing. Id., ¶¶39-40.
¶38 The court of appeals rejected R.J.O.‘s argument that her jury demands were timely. It concluded that
¶39 In sum, we conclude that E.J.W.‘s jury demand was timely.
¶40 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.10
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is reversed.
In the matter of the mental commitment of E.J.W.: Waukesha County, Petitioner-Respondent, v. E.J.W., Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.
No. 2020AP370.akz
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
¶41 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J. (dissenting). The majority in this case has replaced a clear jury waiver standard in chapter 51 commitment proceedings with a
¶42 In February and March 2019, E.J.W. was subject to a mental health recommitment proceeding under
I
¶43 Before discussing the merits, it‘s worth noting what is not disputed in this case. First, neither E.J.W. nor the majority dispute that E.J.W. was mentally ill at the time of the recommitment hearing in March 2019. Outside E.J.W.‘s right to a jury, no one disputes that he was a proper subject for commitment under chapter 51. See Langlade Cnty. v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶29, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277 (citing
court having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, unless reversed or annulled in some proper proceeding, is not open to contradiction or impeachment, in respect of its validity, verity, or binding effect . . . .“). Qualification for commitment under chapter 51 could have been challenged by E.J.W. at the circuit and appellate court levels, but E.J.W. chose not to pursue that claim. There is no indication under law or fact that E.J.W. was improperly placed into compelled mental health treatment.
¶44 Second, this case does not present claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.1 The majority accurately cites the allegations E.J.W. made at the final hearing scheduled for March 5, 2019. E.J.W. alleged that he gave his attorney his phone number and the attorney “never called [him] and [E.J.W. and his attorney] never prepped.” According to E.J.W., his attorney was “unprepared for court.”
¶45 Such allegations, and their potential implication for fundamental fairness, due process, and E.J.W.‘s right to counsel, have no relevance to the issues in this case. E.J.W. has not presented a legal claim that his counsel was incompetent or constitutionally deficient. Further, E.J.W.‘s counsel has never been given the opportunity to respond and defend his professional performance; there was never a need for the County
to investigate and produce evidence contradicting E.J.W.‘s allegations.
¶46 Third, this case does not involve a legal challenge to the chapter 51 jury demand deadline established under
¶47 Thus, the only question under
II
¶48 There is no dispute that the County and circuit court provided E.J.W. and his attorney several notices of the recommitment hearing date and time. On February 7, 2019, the circuit court notified E.J.W. in a letter that his extension of commitment hearing was scheduled for “Tuesday, March 5, 2019 at 1:15 p.m.” The next day, on February 8, 2019, the circuit court issued an order appointing E.J.W.‘s counsel. The order again stated that the hearing was set for March 5, 2019, at 1:15 p.m. Finally, on February 18, 2019, 15 days prior to the final hearing, both E.J.W. and the Office of the State Public Defender were provided a list of witnesses the County intended to call. The notice also stated that the recommitment hearing would take place “on Tuesday, March 5, 2019.”
¶49 It is apparent that the defense was made well aware of the date and time of final hearing. Predictably, the circuit court opened E.J.W.‘s recommitment proceedings at or around 1:15 p.m. on March 5, 2019.
¶50 Under
¶51 “[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute. If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry. Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning.” State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citations and quotations omitted). In addition, “statutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.” Id., ¶46.
¶52
¶53 Simply because, in its discretion, the circuit court allowed E.J.W.‘s counsel to withdraw and provided E.J.W. with additional time to consult with his new attorney, does not mean that E.J.W.‘s waiver did not take place on March 3. See State v. Robinson, 145 Wis. 2d 273, 278, 426 N.W.2d 606 (1988) (“The question of whether an appointed counsel should be relieved and another appointed in his place is a matter of trial court discretion.“);
¶54 The majority asserts that requiring E.J.W. to submit a jury demand 48 hours prior to the time set for final hearing imputes the additional statutory language: “48 hours in advance of the first time set for final hearing.” See majority op., ¶2. In this case, the addition of “first” would be entirely unnecessary. It is undisputed that the circuit court set March 5, 2019, at 1:15 p.m. as the time of the final hearing, E.J.W. did not file a jury demand ahead of that deadline, and court was called on March 5, 2019, only to have E.J.W. request an adjournment. The deadline passed, and E.J.W.‘s jury right was permanently waived. Further,
¶55 More significantly, the legislature intentionally chose “the time set” for hearing as the statutory deadline, not the hearing itself. In numerous other statutory contexts, the legislature has chosen to set jury demand deadlines based on the occurrence of an event or hearing. See
¶56 The plain reading of
¶57 The requirement that individuals file a jury demand 48 hours prior to the scheduled time of final hearing, not merely by requesting an adjournment, M.J.S., No. 2021AP105, ¶2, by lodging an oral motion at the hearing to replace appointed counsel, or by flagrant absenteeism, R.J.O., 392 Wis. 2d 157, ¶7, provided consistency and predictability to all those involved. It allowed circuit courts to adequately schedule and manage resources, confident that a final jury demand deadline meant a final demand deadline. And the standard provided both the government and individuals potentially subject to commitment with a clear and final deadline. Furthermore, the standard ensured that chapter 51 proceedings were handled quickly and efficiently. Given the “significant liberty interest” at play in chapter 51 proceedings, the swift disposition of chapter 51 proceedings ultimately inured to the benefit of the individuals potentially subject to commitment. Marathon Cnty. v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶28, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901; see Jefferson Cnty. v. S.M.S., No. 2020AP814, unpublished slip op., ¶11 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2021) (citing Dodge Cnty. v. Ryan E.M., 2002 WI App 71, 252 Wis. 2d 490, 642 N.W.2d 592) (“The reason for strict time limits is to protect the significant liberty interests at stake when an individual is detained for mental health treatment.“).
¶58 The majority‘s decision now leaves chapter 51 proceedings in uncharted waters. It holds that, despite E.J.W.‘s right to a jury trial having been “deemed waived” on March 3, his jury trial rights were revived through an adjournment on March 5. Neither E.J.W. nor the majority dispute that if the recommitment hearing had been completed on March 5, 2019, as intended, E.J.W. would have had no right to a jury. Just as Schrödinger‘s cat was both alive and dead, when court was called on March 5, 2019, E.J.W.‘s right to jury trial was at the same time viable and waived. It was waived under the plain text of
¶59 Yet “waiver,” under the plain language of
¶60 This legal reality only emphasizes the error of the majority‘s decision. If an individual subject to chapter 51 commitment hearings lets the 48-hour deadline expire, but he for some reason wishes to re-exercise his right to a jury, he can do so by obtaining an adjournment. The majority suggests that abuse will be easy to police because the circuit court can deny adjournment requests that are made to “manipulate the system.” But this theory implicitly assumes that most requests for adjournment or for attorney substitution will be facially inadequate. What is a circuit court to do if the individual subject to the chapter 51 proceedings asserts that he cannot attend the hearing due to mental health concerns and requests a short adjournment? What if there is a breakdown of the attorney-client relationship, potentially begun by an individual not calling his attorney for weeks at a time? What if the individual‘s attorney states that he needs to be more fully prepared and discuss significant legal issues with his client? All these events can realistically occur and, if need be, can be utilized to revive a jury trial right that already has been “deemed waived.”
¶61 In the past, while there were limits to adjournments in chapter 51 proceedings, the consequences for giving the parties a little more time was minimal. See
¶62 When drafting
¶63 The majority mentions statutory context. It cites a perceived purpose in chapter 51 proceedings to “offer procedural and substantive protections to the person subject to commitment.” Majority op., ¶31. However, laws often exhibit more than one purpose. See, e.g., Shands v. Castrovinci, 115 Wis. 2d 352, 357-59, 340 N.W.2d 506 (1983) (describing five purposes of a tenant-landlord law); Force ex rel. Welcenbach v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 82, ¶57, 356 Wis. 2d 582, 850 N.W.2d 866 (stating that Wisconsin‘s wrongful death statute has two purposes). Like legislative history, considerations of purpose, even if it is in some ways tied to statutory text, may have “a tendency to become . . . an exercise in looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (quotations omitted); see also Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987) (“But no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs. Deciding what competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the very essence of legislative choice . . . .“).
¶64 Of course, the driving purpose of commitment is to provide needed medical help to the “mentally ill . . . drug dependent [and] developmentally disabled.”
¶65 Further,
¶66 These “strict procedural guidelines” vindicate the personal liberties of individuals by ensuring an expedited adjudication process; individuals are confined pending adjudication for as little time as possible. Milwaukee Cnty. v. Louise M., 205 Wis. 2d 162, 171, 555 N.W.2d 807 (1996). The sound and efficient administration of justice is a clear purpose of chapter 51. The majority, by rejecting a clear jury demand deadline, and thereby inviting delays and potential abuse, has undermined this purpose.
¶67 Ultimately, while “[a] plain meaning, text-based approach to statutory interpretation certainly does not prohibit the interpretation of a statute in light of its textually manifest scope, context, or purpose,” devised purpose cannot “subordinate[] the statutory text.” Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶49 n.8. “If [the] process of analysis yields a plain, clear statutory meaning, . . . the statute is applied according to this ascertainment of its meaning.” Id., ¶46.
III
¶68 E.J.W. was provided a deadline to file a jury demand. Under
¶69 In this decision, the majority has replaced a rational and clear deadline with a loose and ever shifting rule. This will reduce predictability for all those involved, and, likely, it will reduce the quality of judicial administration in our circuit courts. Because the majority‘s decision is not supported by the plain text of
¶70 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this dissent.
Notes
If before involuntary commitment a jury is demanded by the individual against whom a petition has been filed under sub. (1) or by the individual‘s counsel if the individual does not object, the court shall direct that a jury of 6 people be selected to determine if the allegations specified in sub. (1)(a) or (ar) are true. A jury trial is deemed waived unless demanded at least 48 hours in advance of the time set for final hearing, if notice of that time has been previously provided to the subject individual or his or her counsel. If a jury trial demand is filed within 5 days of detention, the final hearing shall be held within 14 days of detention. If a jury trial demand is filed later than 5 days after detention, the final
hearing shall be held within 14 days of the date of demand. If an inmate of a state prison, county jail or house of correction demands a jury trial within 5 days after the probable cause hearing, the final hearing shall be held within 28 days of the probable cause hearing. If an inmate of a state prison, county jail or house of correction demands a jury trial later than 5 days after the probable cause hearing, the final hearing shall be held within 28 days of the date of demand. The majority implies in a footnote that the monetary costs and administrative challenges of a jury trial are “speculative.” Majority op., ¶35 n.8. Circuit court judges, balancing at times extraordinary caseloads, and chapter 51 practitioners may disagree with that contention. To the extent the majority implies that keeping individuals detained without formal adjudication for multiple weeks is inconsequential, respectfully, the majority should consider its own statements on the liberty interests implicated in chapter 51 proceedings. See id., ¶25 n.6, ¶30 (noting the “important liberty interests at stake” (quoting Langlade Cnty. v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶43, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277)).