Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 966 N.W.2d 590

E.J.W. was under multiple prior involuntary commitments; Waukesha County filed to extend his commitment on Feb 7, 2019, with a final hearing noticed for March 5, 2019 at 1:15 p.m.
At the March 5 hearing E.J.W. moved to replace counsel; the court granted the motion and adjourned the final hearing to March 12, 2019 at 1:15 p.m.
E.J.W. had not filed a written jury demand 48 hours before the originally scheduled March 5 time; after new counsel was appointed (Mar. 7) a written jury demand was filed (Mar. 8), more than 48 hours before the rescheduled March 12 date.
The circuit court denied the jury demand as untimely (because no demand had been filed before the March 5 time set); the court of appeals affirmed relying on Marathon Cnty. v. R.J.O.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded the demand was timely as to the rescheduled hearing, overruled the R.J.O. reasoning on that point, applied mootness exceptions to reach the merits, and reversed the court of appeals.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (E.J.W.)	Defendant's Argument (County)	Held
Mootness of appeal	Collateral consequences and exceptions justify review	Commitment expired; appeal moot	Court assumed mootness but found exceptions (public importance, capable of repetition yet evading review) permitted review
Whether a jury demand must be filed 48 hrs before the first time set for final hearing or before any rescheduled time set	48-hour deadline runs to the time set for the (rescheduled) final hearing; adjournment creates a new “time set,” so a timely demand before the rescheduled date is effective	"Time set for final hearing" means the originally set time; failure to demand 48 hours before that time permanently waives the jury right	Held that when a final hearing is rescheduled, § 51.20(11)(a) permits a jury demand filed up to 48 hours before the rescheduled time; E.J.W.’s demand was timely
Precedential effect of court of appeals decision in R.J.O.	R.J.O. was wrongly decided insofar as it read "time set" to mean only the first set date	Rely on R.J.O.’s plain-text reading to affirm waiver	Overruled paragraphs 38–41 of R.J.O.; rejected the view that only the first scheduled time counts

Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (2004) (text-based statutory interpretation principles)
S.B. v. Racine County, 138 Wis. 2d 409, 406 N.W.2d 408 (1987) (chapter 51 confers right to jury trial)
G.O.T. v. Rock County, 151 Wis. 2d 629, 445 N.W.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1989) (commitment may be extended to accommodate jury demand)
Marathon County v. D.K., 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901 (2020) (mootness standard and appellate review principles in ch. 51 cases)
Portage County v. J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509 (2019) (mootness and when exceptions do not apply)
Langlade County v. D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277 (2020) (liberty interests and procedural protections in ch. 51)
Marathon County v. R.J.O., 392 Wis. 2d 157, 943 N.W.2d 898 (Ct. App. 2020) (court of appeals holding that "time set" meant the first scheduled time; majority here overruled that portion)