BRETT H. WALKER v. FORD MOTOR CO., ET AL.
No. 100759
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
September 25, 2014
2014-Ohio-4208
Rocco, J., Celebrezze, P.J., and Kilbane, J.
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-10-717986
Kirk R. Henrikson
Shana A. Samson
Matty, Henrikson & Greve
55 Public Square, Suite 1775
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
Timothy J. Krantz
Ford Motor Company
17601 Brookpark Rd.
Brook Park, Ohio 44142
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Shawn M. Acton
Ryan J. Cavanaugh
Brian P. Kelley
Kelley & Ferraro, L.L.P.
2200 Key Tower
127 Public Square
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
Also listed:
ATTORNEY FOR BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
Michael DeWine
Ohio Attorney General
BY: Michael J. Zidar
Assistant Attorney General
615 West Superior Avenue, 11th Floor
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Ford Motor Co. (“Ford“) appeals from a jury verdict finding that plaintiff-appellee Brett Walker (“Walker” or “plaintiff“) is entitled to participate in the Ohio workers’ compensation system for the condition of Hodgkin‘s lymphoma due to his occupational exposure to asbestos while working for Ford. Ford asserts that the trial court failed to properly apply
Procedural History and Facts
{¶2} Walker commenced this action as an appeal, pursuant to
{¶4} For 24 years, from 1973-1997, Walker was employed at Ford‘s foundry (also known as the Cleveland Casting Plant) in Brookpark, Ohio. During 1973-1988, Walker worked primarily as a resinate core machine operator, “making the sand hard” so that metal could be poured on the material when it went into the metal room. As he worked, he would climb on the sides of the machine “to pack the sand down,” surrounded by pipes running to the machines and overhead. From 1989-1997, Walker worked as a core fit assembler, and, from time to time, was loaned out to perform other jobs around the plant. Walker testified that pipes were “all over” the foundry and that he worked around pipes from 6 to 12 hours each day. According to Walker, the pipe covering was,
{¶5} Walker was diagnosed with Hodgkin‘s lymphoma in 2002. He testified that he never smoked, had no family history of lymphoma, and never had the Epstein-Barr virus.
{¶6} In addition to his own testimony, Walker presented the testimony of two expert witnesses, Dr. Laxminarayana Rao and Dr. Bedrossian,1 and introduced records documenting the existence of asbestos-containing materials at the Ford facility. Dr. Rao, a board-certified physician in internal medicine and pulmonary medicine and a NIOSH-certified B-reader, testified primarily regarding Walker‘s asbestosis claim. Dr. Rao testified that he was asked to review a chest x-ray of Walker‘s lung taken in 2002 to determine whether there were signs of fibrotic changes or damage to Walker‘s lung tissue consistent with asbestos-related pulmonary disease. Dr. Rao testified that upon his review of Walker‘s chest x-ray, he observed “mild” scarring of the lung tissue consistent with asbestosis, but did not observe any damage to the pleura, i.e., the membrane covering the lung tissue. Assuming “proper exposure to asbestos,” Dr. Rao testified that he would attribute the scarring he observed on Walker‘s chest x-ray to asbestos exposure. Dr. Rao did not offer any opinions regarding the cause of Walker‘s Hodgkin‘s lymphoma.
{¶8} Dr. Bedrossian explained that lymphoma is a cancer of the lymphatic system and that there are different types of lymphomas, classified, “for therapeutic purposes,” according to the predominant cell type observed when the tumor is viewed under a microscope. He testified that, from a causation standpoint, “a lymphoma is a lymphoma” regardless of the cellular differences between different types of lymphoma and opined that all types of lymphomas can be caused by exposure to asbestos.
{¶9} As to the methodology he used in formulating his opinions, Dr. Bedrossian testified that his opinions were based on his personal knowledge, his education, training, and experience, his review of Walker‘s medical records, occupational history, and the available pathology materials, and his review of the medical literature concerning asbestos and asbestos-related cancers.
{¶12} Based on the “totality” of the medical literature, his personal knowledge and experience, and (1) evidence that Walker had worked in a foundry, had been exposed to asbestos at the foundry, had signs of asbestosis, and had the proper latency period, (2) his assumption that Walker had been exposed to and breathed in a significant amount of
{¶13} At the close of plaintiff‘s case-in-chief, Ford renewed its motion to strike Dr. Bedrossian‘s testimony and moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the medical literature Dr. Bedrossian relied upon in support of his opinions did not indicate a probable causal link between asbestos exposure and Hodgkin‘s lymphoma, and that Walker, therefore, lacked sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably find that his Hodgkin‘s lymphoma was caused by exposure to asbestos during his employment at Ford. After careful consideration, the trial court denied Ford‘s motions.
{¶14} The trial continued. Ford presented the testimony of two expert witnesses in support of its defense: Dr. David Rosenberg, a physician board-certified in internal medicine, pulmonary disease, and occupational medicine and a certified B-reader, and Dr. Russell Harvey, a board-certified pathologist, specializing in pathology of the lungs. These experts disputed plaintiff‘s claim that asbestos exposure can cause Hodgkin‘s lymphoma. They testified that the medical literature supported their contrary opinion that Hodgkin‘s lymphoma was not causally related to asbestos exposure and that they were unable to find a single study that conclusively linked Hodgkin‘s lymphoma to
{¶15} Dr. Rosenberg examined Walker in 2006. He testified that based on his examination and his review of a May 2006 chest x-ray and various CT scans from 2004 and 2006, he detected no restriction or crackles in Walker‘s lungs and saw no evidence of diffuse interstitial fibrosis or pleural plaque formation that would be indicative of asbestosis. Ford also introduced evidence of reports of other chest x-rays and CT scans taken by the Cleveland Clinic during 2001-2004 in connection with Walker‘s diagnosis and treatment, which indicated that Walker‘s lungs were clear and that no significant pulmonary parenchymal abnormalities were observed.
{¶16} At the close of all the evidence, Ford renewed its motion for a directed verdict, arguing, once again, that the available medical literature did not support a causal link between Hodgkin‘s lymphoma and asbestos exposure and that, in the absence of evidence of asbestos bodies in the lung or lymph node tissue, Dr. Bedrossian‘s theory that asbestos traveled into the lymph nodes and caused Walker‘s Hodgkin‘s lymphoma was speculative and did not satisfy Walker‘s burden of proof on causation. Once again, the trial court denied Ford‘s motion.
{¶18} Ford appeals the trial court‘s judgment, presenting four assignments of error for review:
Assignment of Error 1: The trial court abused its discretion in denying Ford‘s motion in limine to exclude the testimony of plaintiff‘s expert, Dr. Carlos Bedrossian, on the ground that said evidence did not comply with
Rule 702 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence .Assignment of Error 2: The trial court erred to the prejudice of Ford in denying Ford‘s motion for directed verdict where plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of proof at trial to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the alleged condition arose out of and in the course of employment or that a proximate causal relationship exists between the employment and the alleged condition.
Assignment of Error 3: The trial court‘s verdict is based upon insufficient evidence.
Assignment of Error 4: The trial court‘s verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Establishing a Right to Participate in the Ohio Workers’ Compensation System — Elements of Plaintiff‘s Claim
{¶19} Pursuant to
{¶20}
a disease contracted in the course of employment, which by its causes and the characteristics of its manifestation or the condition of the employment results in a hazard which distinguishes the employment in character from employment generally, and the employment creates a risk of contracting the disease in greater degree and in a different manner from the public in general.
The Ohio Supreme Court has set forth a three-part test for determining whether a disease qualifies as an occupational disease: (1) the disease was contracted in the course of employment; (2) the disease, by causes and the characteristics of its manifestation or the conditions of the employment, result in a hazard that distinguishes the employment from employment generally, and (3) the employment creates a risk of contracting the disease in a greater degree and in a different manner than in the public generally. State ex rel. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Krise, 42 Ohio St.2d 247, 327 N.E.2d 756 (1975), syllabus. To demonstrate that a disease was “contracted” in the course of employment, a plaintiff must establish a direct and proximate causal relationship between the employment and the plaintiff‘s disease. See Fox v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 162 Ohio St. 569, 125 N.E.2d 1 (1955), paragraph one of the syllabus; Welsh v. Ford Motor Co., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94068, 2011-Ohio-448, ¶ 20.
{¶21} Where, as here, a plaintiff claims that exposure to a toxic substance caused his disease, the plaintiff must establish both general causation — i.e., that the toxic substance is capable of causing the particular disease — and specific causation — i.e., that the plaintiff‘s disease was in fact caused by the toxic substance. Terry v. Caputo, 115 Ohio St.3d 351, 2007-Ohio-5023, 875 N.E.2d 72, ¶ 15. Expert medical testimony is generally necessary to establish both general and specific causation. Valentine v. PPG Industries, Inc., 158 Ohio App.3d 615, 2004-Ohio-4521, 821 N.E.2d 580, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.), aff‘d, 110 Ohio St.3d 42, 2006-Ohio-3561, 850 N.E.2d 683. Thus, because Walker alleges that his Hodgkin‘s lymphoma was caused by his exposure to asbestos at Ford,2 to prevail on his claim of entitlement to participate in the workers’ compensation system based on the condition of Hodgkin‘s lymphoma, Walker was required to present expert medical evidence establishing both that: (1) Hodgkin‘s lymphoma can be caused by exposure to asbestos and (2) his Hodgkin‘s lymphoma was caused by his asbestos exposure at Ford.
Admissibility of Testimony of Dr. Carlos Bedrossian
{¶22} In its first assignment of error, Ford argues that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting Dr. Bedrossian to testify on the issue of causation. Ford asserts that Dr. Bedrossian‘s causation testimony should have been excluded because: (1) Dr. Bedrossian was not qualified, under
{¶23} The determination of the admissibility of expert testimony is within the discretion of the trial court.
A witness may testify as an expert if all of the following apply:
(A) The witness’ testimony either relates to matters beyond the knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons or dispels a misconception common among lay persons;
(B) The witness is qualified as an expert by specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding the subject matter of the testimony;
(C) The witness’ testimony is based on reliable scientific, technical, or other specialized information. * * *
{¶25} Walker, as the party offering the expert, had the burden of establishing the admissibility of Dr. Bedrossian‘s testimony. See, e.g., Marcus v. Rusk Heating & Cooling, Inc., 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2012-03-026, 2013-Ohio-528, ¶ 27 (“the party offering the expert opinion and testimony bears the burden of proof in establishing its admissibility“); State v. Ream, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-12-39, 2013-Ohio-4319, ¶ 82 (“The proponent of the expert testimony has the burden to prove the admissibility of the testimony under
{¶26} “The qualification and reliability requirements of
- The theory upon which the procedure, test, or experiment is based is objectively verifiable or is validly derived from widely accepted knowledge, facts or principles;
- The design of the procedure, test, or experiment reliably implements the theory;
- The particular procedure, test, or experiment was conducted in a way that will yield an accurate result.
{¶28} Miller, supra, and Daubert, supra, further provide that in “evaluating the reliability of scientific evidence, several factors are to be considered“:
- whether the theory or technique has been tested,
- whether it has been subjected to peer review,
- whether there is a known or potential rate of error, and
- whether the methodology has gained general acceptance.
Miller, 80 Ohio St.3d at 611, 687 N.E.2d 735, citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-594. These factors are not a “definitive checklist or test” to be rigidly applied, but rather, are intended to serve as guidelines for the trial court in assessing reliability under
{¶29} In determining whether an expert‘s opinions are reliable under
{¶30} As the Ohio Supreme Court explained in State v. Nemeth, 82 Ohio St.3d 202, 210, 694 N.E.2d 1332, an expert‘s opinion need not be generally accepted in the scientific community to be sufficiently reliable to support a jury finding:
[S]cientific opinions need not enjoy “general acceptance” in the relevant scientific community in order to satisfy the reliability requirement of
Evid.R. 702 . Further, there need not be any agreement in the scientific community regarding the expert‘s actual opinion or conclusion. The credibility of the conclusion and the relative weight it should enjoy are determinations left to the trier of fact. See, e.g., State v. Buell, 22 Ohio St.3d 124, 132-133, 489 N.E.2d 795, 804 (1986). “‘General scientific acceptance’ is a proper condition for taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence. Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless there are other reasons for exclusion.” (Footnote omitted.) State v. Williams, 4 Ohio St.3d at 57, 446 N.E.2d at 447, citing McCormick, Evidence (2 Ed. Cleary Ed. 1972) 491, Section 203.
{¶31} In this case, there is no dispute that Dr. Bedrossian‘s testimony relates to matters beyond the knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons.
{¶32} However, Ford maintains that, notwithstanding his qualifications, Dr. Bedrossian‘s specific opinions in this case exceeded the scope of his expertise. Ford argues that Dr. Bedrossian lacks the “specialized knowledge or experience” necessary to testify, based on his own knowledge, education, and experience, that a causal relationship exists between Hodgkin‘s lymphoma and asbestos exposure. In support of its argument, Ford points out that in 22 years, Dr. Bedrossian has consulted on only two other cases of Hodgkin‘s lymphoma related to asbestos exposure, has not conducted any research or
{¶33} Ford also contends that even if Dr. Bedrossian was qualified to testify regarding causation, his causation testimony should have been excluded because he used “unreliable methods” and lacked a sufficient foundation for his opinions regarding causation. Specifically, Ford asserts that Dr. Bedrossian‘s opinions were unreliable because (1) none of the articles identified by Dr. Bedrossian as supporting his opinions “specifically references a causal connection between asbestos exposure and Hodgkin‘s lymphoma,” (2) none of Walker‘s treating physicians ever made a finding that his Hodgkin‘s lymphoma was asbestos-related, (3) no asbestos bodies were found in the slides of Walker‘s tumor, and (4) the jury determined that there was insufficient evidence to support Walker‘s asbestosis claim. After a full and careful review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Dr. Bedrossian‘s testimony in this case.
{¶34} As noted above, Dr. Bedrossian testified that he had been involved in a dozen prior cases of asbestos-related lymphomas, including two prior cases of
{¶35} With respect to the scientific literature supporting Dr. Bedrossian‘s opinions,6 it is undisputed that none of the studies or texts relied upon by Dr. Bedrossian in support of his opinions establishes a specific link between Hodgkin‘s lymphoma and asbestos. However, we do not believe, as Ford claims, that this is fatal to Dr.
Bedrossian‘s opinions in this case. There is no requirement under{¶36} In this case, Dr. Bedrossian identified several articles and texts within the scientific literature that he interpreted as establishing a link between asbestos exposure and other types of lymphoma. Dr. Bedrossian explained the scientific basis behind his extrapolation of the results of studies involving other types of lymphoma to Hodgkin‘s lymphoma, in part, as follows:
In this particular one [the 1982 article], they did an epidemiological survey and they did the survey in individuals that were exposed to asbestos, and they looked specifically at lymphohematopoietic cancers and they found that between 1977 and 1981, they found 26 cases of large cell lymphoma which is one of the subtypes of malignant lymphoma that I mentioned before.
In this particular instance, most of the lymphomas were in the area surrounding the GI tract so the previous article was in the areas surrounding the lung. And this particular one is in the area surrounding the GI tract. I chose this article to demonstrate that as long as asbestos reaches an area, regardless of where it is, it can cause different types of cancer. In the GI tract, it can cause carcinoma of the stomach, carcinoma of the colon, but it can also cause lymphoma, and this is an example of such occurrence.
{¶37} On cross-examination, he further explained the role the medical literature played in the formulation of his opinions as follows:
I operate in real life, in real time, in a real patient, and my conclusions are in the examination of the evidence of Mr. Walker. * * * I look at the entire evidence, at the clinical records, at the literature, at my own experience, and I draw my conclusions.
* * *
I quoted studies that said there is a weakly-increased risk. I gave you examples of articles where they found lymphomas in the GI tract, in the lung in patients that were — that had occupations similar to Mr. Walker. And I gave you examples of articles where they found asbestos bodies in lymph nodes in the area of the lung where he developed his lymphoma. And I gave you articles where they had a number of lymphomas including all cell types including Hodgkin‘s lymphoma. * * * If I have a cause in front of me and I have absence of Epstein-Barr virus, I have absence of cigarette smoking, I have no other explanation, I have prior cases with connecting asbestos to lymphoma, I could not ignore the evidence and conclude otherwise.
{¶38} Although we agree that certain of the studies Dr. Bedrossian relies upon appear to have a tenuous connection to his causation opinions and note that other studies he relies upon have been described by their authors or others as “controversial” or to demonstrate only a “weakly increased risk” of lymphoma from asbestos exposure, we cannot state that Dr. Bedrossian‘s reliance upon, and extrapolation from, these studies in conjunction with his education and training, his expertise related to asbestos-related diseases and prior personal experience with cases involving asbestos-related lymphoma,
{¶39} Likewise, we find unpersuasive Ford‘s argument that Dr. Bedrossian‘s testimony should have been excluded because none of Walker‘s treating physicians ever made a finding that his Hodgkin‘s lymphoma was asbestos-related. A treating physician‘s job is to treat his or her patient, not to determine the cause of a condition. Accordingly, the fact that none of Walker‘s treating physicians ever stated that Walker‘s Hodgkin‘s lymphoma could have been caused by asbestos exposure does not impact the reliability of Dr. Bedrossian‘s opinions.
{¶40} Similarly, the fact that no asbestos bodies were found in the slides of Walker‘s tumor did not necessitate a finding that Dr. Bedrossian‘s opinions were unreliable. Dr. Bedrossian testified that after asbestos fibers cause damage to cells that begin the cancer process, they migrate elsewhere in the body. He explained that he would not expect to find asbestos fibers in the tumor itself because it is a new growth. In Welsh v. Ford Motor Co., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94068, 2011-Ohio-448, we rejected the argument that the presence of asbestos bodies was a necessary prerequisite to diagnosing asbestos-related colon cancer. Id. at ¶ 35. As in Welsh, Ford failed to
{¶41} Nor does the jury‘s verdict in favor of Ford on the condition of asbestosis warrant the conclusion that there was insufficient evidence that Walker contracted Hodgkin‘s lymphoma as a result of his asbestos exposure at Ford. Dr. Bedrossian testified that asbestosis and Hodgkin‘s lymphoma are separate, independent conditions and that asbestos-related lymphoma can occur in a patient who is exposed to asbestos with or without the development of asbestosis. Once again, Ford did not object to this testimony and did not offer any evidence that an individual could not suffer from an asbestos-related condition in the absence of a finding of asbestosis. To the contrary, Ford‘s expert, Dr. Harley testified that he himself had been involved in cases where patients were diagnosed with asbestos-related cancers but did not have asbestosis.
{¶42} Giving due consideration to the parties’ arguments and following a careful review of the record, we cannot say, based on the record before us — including the aspects of Dr. Bedrossian‘s testimony to which Ford raised no objection — that the trial court abdicated its role as gatekeeper or otherwise abused its discretion in admitting Dr. Bedrossian‘s testimony. Dr. Bedrossian‘s causation opinions were not so fundamentally unsupported that they could not provide assistance to the jury and did not otherwise fail to satisfy the requirements of
Sufficiency of the Evidence
{¶43} In its second and third assignments of error, Ford challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury‘s finding that Walker was entitled to participate in the Ohio workers’ compensation system for the condition of Hodgkin‘s lymphoma. Ford argues that even if Dr. Bedrossian‘s testimony was sufficiently reliable to survive a Daubert challenge, it was insufficient to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a “probability of connection” between asbestos exposure and Hodgkin‘s lymphoma. Ford contends that, given the speculative nature of Dr. Bedrossian‘s causation testimony, the trial court erred in denying its motion for directed verdict. We disagree.
{¶44} A motion for directed verdict tests the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented by a party. We review de novo a trial court‘s ruling on a motion for directed verdict. White v. Leimbach, 131 Ohio St.3d 21, 2011-Ohio-6238, 959 N.E.2d 1033, ¶ 22.
{¶45}
When a motion for a directed verdict has been properly made, and the trial court, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed, finds that upon any determinative issue reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse to such party,
the court shall sustain the motion and direct a verdict for the moving party as to that issue.
{¶46} Likewise, when reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to a jury verdict, the issue is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, the jury‘s verdict “[is] one which could be reasonably reached from the evidence.” Tech. Constr. Specialties v. Cooper, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96021, 2011-Ohio-5252, ¶ 14, citing Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Easley, 90 Ohio App.3d 525, 530, 630 N.E.2d 6 (10th Dist.1993). It is a question of law that “does not require the reviewing court to weigh the evidence or test the credibility of witnesses.” Berry v. Lupica, 196 Ohio App.3d 687, 2011-Ohio-5381, 965 N.E.2d 318, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.).
{¶47} Ford contends that because its experts explained that there was no reliable medical literature supporting a causal relationship between asbestos exposure and Hodgkin‘s lymphoma, Dr. Bedrossian‘s testimony to the contrary was “insufficient to establish more than a mere possibility of cause and effect * * * [to] move beyond the realm of speculation and conjecture,” and that Ford was, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ford also contends that Walker failed to present sufficient evidence of causation because there is “no pathologic proof” of Walker‘s exposure to asbestos and because none of Walker‘s treating physicians at the Cleveland Clinic ever made a finding that his Hodgkin‘s lymphoma was asbestos-related. We addressed these arguments above and continue to find them unpersuasive.
{¶48} Construing the evidence most strongly in favor of Walker, we find that Walker presented sufficient evidence to support the jury‘s verdict that he was entitled to
{¶49} Because reasonable minds could have reached more than one conclusion based on the evidence submitted, Ford was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the trial court properly denied Ford‘s motion for directed verdict. See Hippely v. Lincoln Elec. Holdings, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96439, 2011-Ohio-5274, ¶ 24 (where reasonable minds could reach different conclusions based on the opposing expert opinions presented with regard to the cause of plaintiff‘s disorder, it was not error for the
Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶50} In its final assignment of error, Ford argues that the jury‘s verdict should be vacated and a new trial granted because it was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Ford asserts that Dr. Bedrossian‘s testimony was “intentionally designed” to confuse and mislead the jury, causing the jury to speculate on the issue of causation, and that, in light of the testimony from Ford‘s experts that the medical studies Dr. Bedrossian relied on did not support his opinion, Dr. Bedrossian‘s opinion that asbestos exposure could cause Hodgkin‘s lymphoma was not credible.
{¶51} The “manifest weight of the evidence” involves a party‘s burden of persuasion. Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 19. In Eastley, the Ohio Supreme Court made it clear that the Thompkins standard of review for manifest weight of the evidence applies in civil as well as criminal cases. Id. at ¶ 17. In State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541, the Ohio Supreme Court described manifest weight of the evidence as follows:
Weight of the evidence concerns “the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the jury that the party having the burden of proof will be entitled to their verdict, if, on weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater amount of credible evidence sustains the issue which is to be established before them. Weight is not a question of mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing belief.” (Emphasis omitted.)
Id. at 387, quoting Black‘s Law Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990).
{¶53} In this case, we find that the jury‘s verdict was supported by competent, credible evidence going to all the material elements of Walker‘s claim. As detailed
{¶54} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
KENNETH A. ROCCO, JUDGE
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., and
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR