UNITED STATES of America v. Willie ROBINSON, Jr., Appellant.
No. 23734.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Decided Oct. 31, 1972.
Argued June 1, 1972.
Certiorari Granted March 19, 1973. See 93 S.Ct. 1500.
Also, I agree with the court‘s treatment of Wilson‘s claim that his incarceration at Lewisburg amounts to cruel and unusual punishment, the District Judge having found that Wilson suffered from a mental disease. Unfortunately, the Attorney General‘s discretion to transfer Wilson within the prison system is beyond review in this proceeding, and we have no jurisdiction over the conditions of appellant‘s incarceration, he being physically in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. In these circumstances, Wilson‘s only recourse is a separate habeas corpus petition in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
MCGOWAN, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I concur in the result, and in parts I and III of Judge Bazelon‘s opinion.
Mr. Henry F. Greene, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. Thomas A. Flannery, U. S. Atty. at the time the brief was filed, and John A. Terry and John F. Evans, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee. Messrs. Harold H. Titus, Jr., present U. S. Atty., and Earl J. Silbert, Asst. U. S. Atty., also entered appearances for appellee.
Mr. Scott R. Schoenfeld, Washington, D. C., filed a brief on behalf of Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc. as amicus curiae.
ON REHEARING EN BANC
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and WRIGHT, McGOWAN, TAMM, LEVENTHAL, ROBINSON, MacKINNON, ROBB and WILKEY, Circuit Judges, sitting en banc.
J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Circuit Judge:
This appeal from a jury conviction of federal narcotics offenses1 raises questions under the
I
On April 19, 1968, Officer Richard Jenks of the Metropolitan Police Department stopped a 1965 Cadillac at the intersection of Ninth and U Streets, N.W., for a “routine spot check.” At the time of this stop, Officer Jenks examined not only appellant‘s temporary operator‘s permit and automobile registration card, but also his selective service classification card. Officer Jenks permitted appellant to continue about his business, but only after making notes of the three items. His note taking alerted him to a discrepancy between the “1938” date of birth listed on the temporary operator‘s permit and the “1927” date of birth listed on the selective service classification card. Officer Jenks then went to police traffic records and discovered that the operator‘s permit issued to “Willie Robinson, Jr.,” born in 1927, had been revoked, and that a temporary permit had been issued to a “Willie Robinson,” born in 1938.3 The pictures on the revoked permit and on the application for the temporary permit were of the same person; both were likenesses of the man he had stopped for the routine check on April 19.
On April 23, 1968, while on duty, Officer Jenks observed appellant operating the same vehicle. He stopped appellant, asked him for his permit and registration card and, upon being shown the same permit appellant had exhibited four days earlier, placed appellant under arrest for operating a motor vehicle after revocation of his operator‘s permit and for obtaining a permit by misrepresentation. According to his testimony at the remand hearing, Officer Jenks then advised appellant of his rights and proceeded to search him. Since the arrest was one which involved taking appellant to the station house,4 under Police Department instructions Officer Jenks was required to make a full field search as an incident to the arrest.5 A full field search “is a thorough search of the individual.” Remand transcript at 99. “He examines the contents of all of the pockets in a field type search and in-custody arrest at all times.” Id. at 120. In conducting a full field search, “even though [the officer] may feel something that he believes is not a weapon, he is instructed to take it out.” Id. at 100. The officer is taught “to examine everything he has on him at the field search. Everything that we find in his pockets is examined to find out what exactly it is.” Id. at 104.
Throughout the proceedings in this case, the Government has consistently conceded,8 and indeed there can be no doubt, that in extracting the cigarette package from appellant‘s pocket and opening the package so as to examine its contents, Officer Jenks exceeded the permissible scope of a limited frisk for weapons.9 Moreover, as Officer
II
Ordinarily, a warrant must be obtained by a police officer before he may make a search.12 Searches of both
In exercising this power of review, courts must give particularly careful weight to the fundamental
If Terry left any doubt at all that the scope limitation principle was intended by the Supreme Court to apply to arrest based searches, that doubt was expressly foreclosed by the last of the cases in the Terry-Sibron-Peters trilogy. In Peters v. New York, which is consolidated with Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968), Officer Lasky of the New York City Police Department was off duty at his apartment when he heard a noise at the door. Looking through the peephole into the hall, he saw two men he did not believe to be fellow tenants tip-toeing out of the alcove toward the stairway. Officer Lasky called police headquarters, put on civilian clothes, and armed himself with his service revolver. Believing he had happened upon the two men in the course of an attempted burglary, Officer Lasky opened his door, entered the hallway, and slammed the door loudly behind him. When the door slammed the two men fled down the stairs and Officer Lasky gave chase. When he caught up with Peters on the stairs and questioned him, Peters explained his presence in the building by saying he was visiting a girl friend whose name he chivalrously declined to reveal on the ground that she was a married woman. Officer Lasky then patted Peters down for weapons and discovered a hard object in his pocket. The object did not feel like a gun, but he thought it might be a knife. Officer Lasky removed this object from Peters’ pocket and found it was an opaque envelope containing burglar‘s tools.
Given this factual situation, the Supreme Court held that Officer Lasky legally arrested Peters when he collared him on the stairway and curtailed his freedom of movement. This arrest was found to be valid because made on the basis of probable cause to believe Peters was engaged in criminal activity. At this point, according to the Supreme Court,
“[Officer Lasky] had the authority to search Peters, and the incident search was obviously justified ‘by the need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime.’ * * * Moreover, it was reasonably limited in scope by these purposes. Officer Lasky did not engage in an unrestrained and thoroughgoing examination of Peters and his personal effects. * * *”
392 U.S. at 67. (Emphasis added.) In Peters, then, the Supreme Court applied the scope limitation principle to an arrest based search and found that the search—which took the form of a frisk followed by a further intrusion into the arrestee‘s pockets only after an object possibly a weapon had been felt—was “reasonably limited in scope by [its] purposes” and was not so “unrestrained and thoroughgoing” as to violate the Constitution.
Thus although the consequences of application of the scope limitation principle may differ under varying circumstances, it is clear that all searches, whether or not based upon probable cause, are governed by the rule, and that in determining the constitutionality of any particular search “our inquiry is a dual one—whether the officer‘s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 19-20.
III
What then are the legitimate objectives of an arrest based search of the person? What is it that renders such searches permissible at their inception, and to which the scope of such searches must be tied, if their reasonableness is to be maintained? Though they receive slightly different formulation in various cases, the legitimate objectives of warrantless searches of the person incident to arrest seem to be (1) seizure of fruits, instrumentalities and other evidence of the crime for which the arrest is made in order to prevent its destruction or concealment; and (2) removal of any weapons that the arrestee might seek to use to resist arrest or effect his escape.15 The question
Since fruits, instrumentalities or other evidence of crime concealed on the person of the arrestee may be easily disposed of or destroyed, the arresting officer will often be justified in searching for such evidence without delay. But the scope limitation principle requires that when police search a person incident to arrest, the search must be directed toward finding evidence which the arresting officer has probable cause to believe will be found on the person, and that the search be no more intrusive than necessary to recover such evidence. For most crimes, of course, it is clearly reasonable to assume that the arrestee will be in possession of the fruits, instrumentalities or other evidence of the crime for which the person was arrested. Thus in such situations “the circumstances justifying the arrest are also those furnishing probable cause for the search.” Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47 n. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1979 n. 6, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). For other crimes, however, and more particularly for most traffic offenses,16 no search of the person for evidence may be allowed at all because no evidence exists to be found. Admittedly, appellant‘s offenses in this case—driving after his operator‘s permit had been revoked and obtaining a new permit by misrepresentation—are relatively serious ones on the continuum of traffic infractions. Nonetheless, upon stopping Willie Robinson for the second time and upon receiving for the second time Robinson‘s fraudulently obtained temporary operator‘s permit, Officer Jenks had secured the only evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made which he could possibly have had probable cause to believe was in the arrestee‘s possession.17 No further arrest based search for evidence was therefore reasonable or constitutional.
There is, of course, a second, very important, justification for searches incident to arrest—the interest of government in the safety of its police officers. In Terry v. Ohio, supra, the Supreme Court recognized that when a police officer stops a citizen on the street in the course of a legitimate investigation “there must be a narrowly
Similarly, in Sibron v. New York, supra, another stop-and-frisk case, the Court held that a direct intrusion into the pockets of a narcotics suspect was unreasonable at its inception because the mere association of the suspect with other known narcotics offenders was held not to have given the officer justification for any search whatever. Before conducting a self-protective search for weapons, the Court held, the officer “must be able to point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous.” 392 U.S. at 64. Moreover, the Court in Sibron went further and held that, assuming arguendo that the officer had reason to suspect Sibron was armed, the actual search—a direct intrusion into the suspect‘s pockets rather than a frisk—would still have been constitutionally invalid because “not reasonably limited in scope to the accomplishment of the only goal which might conceivably have justified its inception—the protection of the officer * * *.” Id. at 65.
Thus Terry and Sibron, when read together, stand for the proposition that in the stop-and-frisk situation where, as in the routine traffic arrest, there can be no evidentiary basis for a search, the most intrusive search the Constitution will allow is a limited frisk for weapons, and even then only when the officer reasonably believes himself to be in danger. The Government contends, however, that the standards enunciated in Terry and Sibron are inapplicable to the instant case because the “stops” and “frisks” involved in those decisions were predicated only upon “reasonable suspicion” whereas here, since appellant was arrested on probable cause, a full search was justified. But in focusing on the different quanta of evidence required to justify different degrees of seizures or searches of the person, the Government loses sight of the even more telling distinction between the evidentiary and protective purposes of searches. It is upon this latter distinction that our case hinges.
Because the arrest based searches reviewed and validated by the courts have usually had both evidentiary and protective functions, the casual reader may be given the false impression that these cases stand for the proposition that a lawful arrest will always support a full search of the person. Obviously, when the arrest is made for a crime for which evidence exists, a warrantless intrusion into the pockets of the arrestee to discover such evidence is reasonable under the “search incident” exception. The officer may, of course, also use this reasonable intrusion to look simultaneously for weapons. But in a fact situation such as ours, where the
IV
In determining the extent to which the legitimate governmental interest in insuring the safety of law enforcement officers justifies a search of the person incident to a lawful arrest, a distinction must be drawn between the “routine” traffic arrest—where the officer simply issues a notice of violation and allows the offender to proceed—and the more serious cases in which the officer effects an “in-custody” arrest in order to transport the traffic offender to the stationhouse for booking. Turning first to the “routine” traffic arrest,18 it seems evident that the dangers presented in that situation are to some extent similar to, and certainly no greater than, those presented in the stop-and-frisk situations involved in Terry and Sibron.19 Like the investigatory stop, the routine traffic arrest is merely a brief on-the-street encounter. Moreover, the vast majority of traffic violators are law-abiding citizens. Indeed, “[v]ery few drivers can traverse any appreciable distance without violating some traffic regulation.”20 and as Chief Judge Fuld of the New York Court of Appeals has noted, “A motorist who exceeds the speed limit does not thereby indicate any propensity for violence or iniquity, and the officer who stops the speeder has not even the slightest cause for thinking that he is in danger of being assaulted.” People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98, 101, 281 N.Y.S.2d 789, 792, 228 N.E.2d 783, 786 (1967).21
This is not to say, of course, that a minor traffic stop can never erupt into violence. On the contrary, whenever a police officer confronts a citizen on the street an element of danger is present. But as the stop-and-frisk cases make clear, the mere possibility of danger cannot justify any and
We therefore conclude that the permissible scope of searches incident to routine traffic arrests, where there is no evidentiary basis for a search and where the officer intends simply to issue a notice of violation and to allow the offender to proceed, must be governed by the teaching of the Supreme Court as set forth in Terry and Sibron. Thus the most intrusive search the Constitution will allow in such situations is a limited patdown for weapons, and then only when there exist special facts or circumstances which give the officer reasonable grounds to believe that the person with whom he is dealing is armed and presently dangerous.
As the Government points out, however, the instant case involves not a “routine” traffic arrest, but rather a situation in which the arresting officer was required to take appellant into custody. According to applicable Metropolitan Police Department regulations, “[t]he use of Traffic Violation Notices is a courtesy of long standing and shall be employed whenever possible, consistent with the overall safety of the public.”23 Nevertheless, for certain of
As noted earlier in this opinion, the scope limitation principle of the
The Government contends still further, however, that a frisk does not provide reasonable protection to the officer in the circumstances of an in-custody arrest. We cannot agree. Under the scope limitation principle of the
Turning first to the interests of the individual, we must recognize that the properly conducted frisk which we would permit with any in-custody arrest is far more than a “petty indignity.” On the contrary, “[e]ven a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience.” Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 24-25, 88 S.Ct. at 1882. Thus if we are to strike a reasonable balance under the
Moreover, when viewed from the reverse side of the equation, we are firmly convinced that a carefully conducted frisk offers substantial protection to the officer. In Terry v. Ohio, supra, the Supreme Court adopted the following definition of a frisk:
“‘[T]he officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner‘s body. A thorough search must be made of the prisoner‘s arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and the entire surface of the legs down to the feet.‘”
392 U.S. at 17 n. 13, 88 S.Ct. at 1877 n. 13, quoting Priar & Martin, Searching and Disarming Criminals, 45 J.Crim.L.C. & P.S. 481 (1954). Such a frisk, the Court concluded, is “reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of
The evidence presented at the remand hearing in this case clearly supports this conclusion. Police Sergeant Dennis Donaldson, an instructor at the District of Columbia Police Training Division, testified that in order to protect the arresting officer the standard police practice in the District of Columbia is to conduct a full search of the person whenever an in-custody arrest is made. On cross-examination, however, Sergeant Donaldson admitted that, although the effectiveness of a patdown may vary according to the circumstances, a properly conducted Terry type frisk could uncover virtually every weapon he had ever encountered26 in the course of in-custody searches. Mr. Ronald Newhouser, a recognized expert in clandestine weaponry, 27 also testified for the Government. During the course of his testimony Mr. Newhouser removed from his person 25 concealed weapons that could kill or incapacitate.28 Like Sergeant Donaldson, however, Mr. Newhouser conceded that virtually all of these weapons could be detected in the course of a properly conducted frisk.29
We do not mean to suggest, of course, that a protective frisk removes all conceivable dangers to the officer. There will always be the long shot30 case in the which the arrestee has concealed a novel weapon—perhaps a razor blade shaped like a coin—which a frisk will fail to reveal. But the kind of thoroughgoing search which would offer total protection to the officer could only be accomplished at a complete sacrifice of the arrestee‘s right to privacy. Indeed, as Mr. Newhouser admitted, the only means of eliminating all possible
V
Pressing its argument still further, however, the Government suggests an alternative theory in support of its contention that a full search of the person should be allowed whenever an in-custody arrest is made. When a suspect has been lawfully arrested and “booked” on a criminal charge and is to be placed in stationhouse detention, it is ordinarily reasonable to conduct a search of his person32 in order to prevent introduction of weapons or contraband into the jail facility.33 From this premise the Government argues that, since the suspect will eventually be searched at the stationhouse anyway, a search of this kind might “just as well” be conducted in the field at the time of arrest. Whatever the merits of this argument generally, this court‘s recent en banc decision in United States v. Mills, supra,
In Mills the defendant was arrested for the petty offense of driving with a learner‘s permit while unaccompanied by a licensed driver. Rather than simply issue a notice of violation, the arresting officer elected to make an in-custody arrest. The officer then frisked the defendant and, finding no weapons, called a scout car to transport the defendant to the stationhouse. After arriving at the stationhouse, the defendant was brought to the booking desk. At that point the defendant clearly had the right to post $50 collateral for his offense and, upon doing so, to be released immediately, without any detention or search of his person. Instead of informing him of his right, however, the officers ordered the defendant to remove everything from his pockets. Among his possessions the police discovered 22 capsules of heroin and 33 capsules of cocaine. Under these circumstances, the court held the stationhouse search unconstitutional and therefore reversed the defendant‘s conviction of violations of the federal narcotics laws.
Initially the court noted that there could be no evidentiary basis for this search since the defendant‘s offense was proved completely at the time of arrest. Moreover, the search could not be justified on the basis of protective considerations because the arresting officer had already frisked the defendant for weapons. Thus “[t]he validity of the search,” the court concluded, “must stand or fall on the premise that it was a predetention inventory, undertaken to hold and account for valuable or potentially dangerous personal property—such as rings, belts, watches or jewelry—during the detention of the person arrested.” 153 U.S.App.D.C. at —, 472 F.2d at 1234.
Emphasizing the defendant‘s right to post collateral, the court then stated that, although a search of the person incident to stationhouse detention may be reasonable, “it would be entirely unreasonable to hold that policemen have discretion to detain and therefore thoroughly search petty offenders * * * who may avoid stationhouse detention altogether by posting collateral.” 153 U.S.App.D.C. at —, 472 F.2d at 1240. The court therefore held:
“When a person is charged with a collateral-type petty offense, under which he rightfully has the opportunity to post collateral and avoid further detention, and there is no probable cause to believe he committed a more serious crime, the police may not engage in an inventory search of the offender, or an equivalent direction that he empty his pockets, and seek to support it on the ground of holding him in further confinement, unless at a minimum he was timely notified of his opportunity to post collateral (and thus avoid further detention) and refused or was unable to do so. * * *” 34
As in Mills, we “do not here consider the proper scope of a search that is supported by the premise of forthcoming confinement.” 153 U.S.App.D.C. at —, 472 F.2d at 1234. Although appellant Robinson had no right to post collateral for his offenses, he “was clearly entitled to post either cash or bail bond35 and, upon doing so, to be
VI
The result we reach today, it should be noted, is by no means unique. On the contrary, the vast majority of courts—both state and federal—which have considered the problem hold specifically that, absent “special circumstances,”38 a police officer has no
Perhaps the most forceful statement of the principle applicable here, however, comes from a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. In United States v. Humphrey, 10 Cir., 409 F.2d 1055, 1057-1058 (1969), then Chief Judge Murrah41 wrote for a unanimous panel:
“By its own terms the
Fourth Amendment protects people ‘against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ Thus not all searches run afoul of the constitutional sanction but only those unreasonable in origin or scope. While the evolution of this constitutional standard of reasonableness has varied with our sense of justice, it is certain today that warrantless searches on probable cause are reasonable only when it is unfeasible to obtain a search warrant on proper affidavit * * *. Unless, of course, it is reasonably ‘incident’ to a legal arrest * * *, or can be said to be a mere ‘stop and frisk’ as in Terry v. Ohio, supra and Sibron v. New York * * *. Notably, these exceptionsare not based on anything inherent in the exception itself but result from the inductive case by case application of the constitutional standard of reasonableness. Thus these exceptions are traditionally justified by the need to protect the arresting officers, prevent escape, collect instrumentalities or fruits of the crime (and now evidence, Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967)), and prevent delay which might otherwise permit the criminal to escape or commit his crime. * * * From this rationale it is clear that the scope of a search contemporaneous with a legal arrest must have a reasonable relationship to the protection of the officer or the crime for which the accused was arrested. As stated in Terry v. Ohio, supra 392 U.S. at p. 19, 88 S.Ct. p. 1878, ‘[T]he scope of the search must be “strictly tied to and justified by” the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible‘, i. e. the detention or arrest. * * * If not, the search is unreasonable and violates Fourth Amendment protected interests. * * * We are in complete agreement with the prevailing federal and state authority which condemns the search of persons and automobiles following routine traffic violations. * * *” 42
Nevertheless, the Government contends that most of the courts which have considered the problem of searches incident to mere traffic arrests have failed to distinguish between “routine” arrests
In People v. Marsh, supra, the defendant was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant for a prior speeding violation. The arresting officer immediately searched the defendant and found on his person a sheet of paper implicating him in “the playing of policy.” Noting that the sole legitimate basis for the search was protection of the arresting officer, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that the “custodial” nature of the arrest could not serve to justify a search of the defendant‘s person.
Finally, in People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County [Simon], supra, a police officer on routine patrol duty at night noticed a car “driving without
Moreover, our conclusion as to the meaning of the constitutional safeguard, and its application to arrests for violations of the traffic code, is supported not only by analysis of the Supreme Court opinions and the decisions of a vast majority of other courts, but also by the similar analyses and conclusions which have been reached by scholars who have given careful study to the issues.44 For example, Wayne LaFave, author of the American Bar Foundation volume Arrest (1965), whose long-term study of arrest problems led to his selection by the American Bar Association as reporter to the Committee on the Criminal Trial, noted over 10 years ago that “[a] search of the vehicle and driver incident to an arrest for a traffic violation is a police practice apparently not uncommon throughout the country,” and urged that the courts undertake an exacting and detailed consideration of the problem of “defining the proper scope” of such searches. Note, Search and Seizure—Search Incident to Arrest for Traffic Violation, 1959 Wis.L.Rev. 347, 358. More recently, a writer in the Columbia Law Review found:
“* * * [T]he historical development of incidental personal searches furnishes no support for the validation of searches based solely on the fact of lawful arrest. This point had been overlooked by the early courts, most likely because the fact situations of these early cases were such that under either a categorical or examination-of-the-facts approach, an incidental personal search could be justified. Later courts’ failure to analyze the historical underpinnings of the rule and its careless expression in the early cases on the doctrine have led to a hardening of the categorical approach which only recently has begun to be questioned.
“The need for this reexamination is clear. * * *”
Note, Searches of the Person Incident to Lawful Arrest, 69 Colum.L.Rev. 866, 869-870 (1969). (Footnotes omitted.)
In quite succinct fashion, Judge Nathan R. Sobel of the New York Supreme
The practical effect of the rule urged upon this court by the Government—permitting warrantless “full” searches incident to mere traffic arrests (or for that matter, incident to arrests for status offenses)47—is fearsome to imagine. As Judge Wisdom has written, the danger is “that the lowly offense of a traffic violation—of which all of us have been guilty at one time or another—may be established as the basis for searches circumventing the rights guaranteed by the
VII
In this case, of course, we deal with criminal conduct, and there is a natural aversion to reversing a conviction on procedural grounds, given a jury verdict supported by a strong showing of guilt. It has long been recognized, however, that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear
Reversed.
BAZELON, Chief Judge, concurring specially:
I join in holding that the evidence in question must be excluded, and therefore this case must be remanded for retrial. Since I take a somewhat narrower view of the case than does Judge Wright, in his opinion for a plurality of the Court, I concur separately. I will state my reasons for limiting the issues and for my disagreement with the minority.
First, this is not a typical traffic offense arrest. The crimes for which Robinson was initially arrested carry large maximum penalties,1 and the police regulations reasonably required that Officer Jenks take him into custody and transport him to the stationhouse.2 The Court unanimously agrees that this alone justifies a surface pat down, of the kind described in Terry v. Ohio,3 aimed at discovering indications that the arrestee has articles within his control that could be used to harm someone during the period of custody. The minority would justify this rule by upholding the reasonableness not of the search itself, but of the police “routine protective procedures.” If the pat down is permitted by those “procedures” it would be sustained. I believe that the Supreme
Second, I believe that all the members of the Court are in substantial agreement as to what a police officer must believe before he can remove an object he feels while conducting a surface pat down. Judge Wilkey‘s opinion for the minority approves a routine that allows “some flexibility based on the officer‘s perception of risk.”6 It thus appears that the minority agrees—as I do—with the plurality that an officer may remove an unidentified object from the control of the arrestee if he reasonably believes that his failure to do so would pose a danger to him, the arrestee, or others. Neither Judge Wright‘s nor Judge Wilkey‘s opinion suggests either that the officer must experience the emotional state of fear before he may take such action, or that he may remove anything he feels.
But whether Officer Jenks’ state of mind satisfied this requirement of reasonable belief of danger is unclear, and the Court‘s disagreement about the constitutionality of the instant search appears to stem from different characterizations of the facts. Although the police department instructs its officers that they should conduct a “full search” automatically in such a situation,7 and Officer Jenks testified that he “just searched” Robinson,8 he later added that he “knew [the lump] wasn‘t cigarettes”
This uncertainty need not be resolved. With the crumpled package in the possession of Officer Jenks, he could not have had a reasonable belief that it would be dangerous. There is no claim that the external appearance of the package gave probable cause to believe that Robinson had committed another crime. The minority argues that this action was justifiable because inspection of any “irregular” object, after it has been removed from the arrestee‘s control, serves the “protective purpose” of the search.10 I agree that every part of a protective search, except the physical act of removing an object from the arrestee‘s control, is a search for indicia that a weapon is present. In this sense, a protective search is a search for “evidence“—evidence probative of whether the individual has a weapon on his person. But to define the allowable scope of such a search by reference solely to whether the information sought is sufficiently probative of the existence of weapons would be to render scope limitations meaningless, and to miss the point of the exclusionary rule.
As the Supreme Court has said, there are many motives for police misconduct that the exclusionary rule will not affect.11 The primary deterrable motive
We may debate which of these two types of search is the more intrusive in a given case. If we acknowledge this uncertainty, and then focus our exclusionary rule inquiry on the police motivation to discover contraband, we are not thereby suggesting that we view the purpose of the
Insofar as these two search techniques are alternative means to the common end of protection, the police should be required to use the one less likely to conceal a search forbidden by the
No more is required to dispose of this case. I will, however, briefly indulge my own concern—not about other cases, but about one issue in this case that we may avoid only because we exclude the evidence. Defense counsel has never questioned whether the original “routine spot check” that alerted Officer Jenks to the age discrepancy in Robinson‘s identification was conducted in accordance with minimal constitutional requirements. While counsel did challenge, on disputed testimony, the scope of the subsequent inquiry into Robinson‘s documentary identification, he and the District Court apparently accepted as controlling authority13 the decision of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Mincy v. District of Columbia, 218 A.2d 507 (1966), which held that such stops were not arrests, and thus were within the power of the police despite
This record does not disclose the circumstances surrounding Officer Jenks’ decision to stop Robinson.15 The applicable police regulations, however, may conceivably be interpreted as hints encouraging the use of spot checks to conceal
WILKEY, Circuit Judge, dissenting, with whom concur Circuit Judges TAMM, MacKINNON and ROBB: The search conducted in this case was reasonable in both justification and scope. Before proceeding to a detailed analysis, let us briefly put these two issues in perspective.
A.
With reference to justification for the search, it must be realized at the outset that the frequent use of the terms “traffic violation” or “mere motor vehicle regulation” in the majority opinion serves only to confuse the analysis of what search was proper in this case with what would be proper in the circumstances of a truly “routine” traffic offense—such as running a stop sign, exceeding the speed limit, etc.—which all of us at one time or another may commit. Robinson did not inadvertently slide through a red light or creep above the speed limit; he had had his driver‘s permit revoked, he had obtained a new permit by deliberately falsifying his application, and he was operating a vehicle without a valid permit. One is a statutory offense defined by Congress, the other a violation of a District of Columbia ordinance—both carrying penalties of fines and up to 10 days in jail or up to one year‘s imprisonment.1
Under police regulations Officer Jenks could not permit Robinson to go on his way with a summons, as the ordinary citizen who had been guilty of only a truly routine traffic violation. Officer Jenks was obligated to arrest and take custody of Robinson as he would have a burglar or armed robber caught flagrante delicto.2 Before the officer could take Robinson into custody in his patrol car, he was required by police standard operating procedure to search the man arrested.
B.
So we have here a search justified by a full custodial arrest, not a “stop” for investigation, and a search whose scope is related to the problem of custody, not just a “frisk” for protection while an officer and suspect are conversing on the street.
With reference to scope of the search, let us also realize at the outset that the scope of the search involved here in no way remotely approached the outer limits of permissibility sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio3 for a “frisk” after a “stop.” The contraband heroin was found in the outer pocket of Robinson‘s car coat, not in an area of the body necessitating a highly objectionable invasion of privacy in order to discover it. This is the evidence the majority would order suppressed on the ground the search was unreasonable by
C.
The arrest occurred at 11:10 p. m. in a not too well illuminated residential area in Southeast Washington. After the arrest, in accord with the practice employed in over three thousand prior arrests for such offenses,4 Officer Jenks advised Robinson of his rights and began what is known in standard police parlance as a “field type search” for protective purposes incident to a “full custody arrest.”5 When Officer Jenks placed his hands on appellant‘s chest, he felt something in the outside left breast pocket of Robinson‘s “car coat.” Because the coat was of heavy material, Officer Jenks could not determine either the size or the consistency of the object. In order to find out what the object was, he put his hand in appellant‘s pocket, which was open, and pulled out a “wadded-up” cigarette pack.
One thing was clear, this package did not contain cigarettes; Officer Jenks could feel “objects” inside, he still could not tell what it contained. He then opened the package and discovered that it contained gelatin capsules, later tested to be narcotics. After seeing the capsules, probably containing contraband, he put the package in his own pocket and continued the protective search.
I. A Search Incident to Arrest was Permissible Here
A.
The search conducted in this case must be tested against the long-established doctrine upholding the constitutionality of a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. In a recent treatise, the general rule concerning such searches was aptly stated as follows:
[U]pon a search incident to a lawful arrest the police may search for and seize weapons by which the prisoner may injure the officers or others or effect his escape, incriminating articles connected with the crime as its fruits or the means by which it was committed, also stolen property and other items which it is unlawful for the prisoner to possess, i. e., contraband. In connection with such a search the officers may seize not only evidence tending to establish the crime for which the arrest is made but also evidence of other crimes.6
Such searches incident to arrest are extremely common, outnumbering many-fold searches covered by warrants, a fact which is usually ignored or misstated.7 Probably the practice is “as old as the institution of arrest.”8
B.
The search conducted in this case clearly fits within this general doctrine of search incident to arrest. Without question, this was a valid arrest. It is also clear that the arrest in this case was not a mere pretext for the search.11 Officer Jenks was not a narcotics officer who manufactured a reason for the arrest in order to establish grounds for a warrantless search for suspected contraband. To the contrary, he had a special interest in the exact type of arrest made in this case.12 He was legitimately interested in tracking Robinson down for driving after revocation. Since the arrest originated with this valid purpose, and was legally consummated, the search must be viewed as having been incident to the arrest rather than the reverse.
Further, this search was in fact undertaken with the permissible purpose of protecting both the officer and the prisoner from the potential of violent use of concealed weapons. Officer Jenks testified that he understood that protection was the major reason police standard operating procedures require a search in these circumstances.13 He knew that small deadly weapons could be concealed on Robinson‘s person. Indeed, he vividly recalled an instance in which a fellow officer was cut by a prisoner‘s razor blade which had gone undetected during an arrest.14
Although the record does show that Officer Jenks took steps to “control” the prisoner15 and understood the protective purpose of this routine search, there is no explicit indication that he was ever actually in fear of violence from Robinson. However, a purely subjective test of the presence or absence of personal fear on the part of the arresting officer does not determine the constitutional validity of this search incident to arrest and custody.
It is true that in examining the permissible grounds for a limited search
The training of a police officer, like the training of a soldier, must be designed to maximize simplicity, clarity of instructions, and standardization of procedures. For his own protection the soldier is taught to do things instinctively; he is drilled repeatedly in certain procedures until even in times of great stress he reacts automatically by doing the correct thing. In part, the same is true of the police officer; he is taught certain standardized procedures for his own protection, so that in time of stress he will instinctively take the correct action.18
For a police officer, the “correct action” is designed not only to protect the officer, and other persons, but to prevent unjustifiable intrusions into citizens’ private affairs. While search and seizure cases are frequently viewed as the classical confrontation of the rights of the individual versus the rights of society, I cannot stress this too strongly: The uninstructed individual judgment of each policeman on every situation ad hoc is likely to result in more violations of individual rights than will obedience to carefully prescribed standard procedures.
Indeed, the availability of such standard operating procedures, based on a reasonable general inference, may well be exactly what helped keep fear from interfering with Officer Jenks’ effectiveness. We should not let the fact that an officer was operating in accordance with routine protective procedures, rather than out of personal fear, become the factor determinative of the reasonableness of his actions. To the contrary, this circumstance merely changes the question which faces the court from the reasonableness of the officer‘s suspicions to the reasonableness of the protective routine he followed.
Focusing on the reasonableness of the routine serves the valuable function of providing a more objective standard for judicial review and police guidance. Illusive and unreliable inquiry into the officer‘s emotional state would be avoided. The difficult inquiry into emotions may be necessary in Terry situations where it is the only available test of reasonableness. In contrast, this routine search incident to custodial arrest more nearly resembles the case of an officer acting pursuant to the guidelines set forth in a search warrant. No personal suspicion of the presence of evidence is required of the officer, if he stays within the pre-set limits, in such situations. The prior determination of reasonable
C.
Judge Wright‘s opinion rests on the proposition that, regardless of actual police practice or regulations, any search incident to a “routine traffic arrest” is, absent special circumstances, unreasonable.19 Given the large number of police injuries which have accompanied what at first appeared to be routine automobile stops, I do not accept that proposition.20 Furthermore, although this was a traffic arrest, it was not minor; it was for a serious offense, and the majority opinion at footnote 18 so admits. Aside from these two arguments, more convincingly and to the point, a careful analysis of the possible rationales for a limit on searches incident to minor traffic arrests makes it clear that this particular arrest and search does not fall within any such limited rule.
To brush aside the argument usually first advanced, the fact that most traffic offenses, as is true of this one, have no fruits or instrumentalities justifying an evidentiary search is simply irrelevant. This was not an evidentiary search.21 It cannot therefore be either justified or
Another argument for prohibiting searches incident to traffic arrests is the temptation to use such minor infractions, of which anyone may be guilty at some point, as a pretext for the search which follows. However, unlike speeding, driving after revocation is not the sort of offense which is so common that it could readily serve as a vehicle for pretextual arrest. In addition, as discussed above, there is absolutely no basis for concluding that this arrest was in fact pretextual.
A third argument suggests that since minor traffic arrests are so numerous, accompanying searches would create intense community resentment. If conducted in all such cases, the searches would be viewed as unnecessary harassment. If conducted only in some cases, with the search justified by arrest rather than the grounds outlined in Terry, the searches would probably create a suspicion, whether or not justified, of discriminatory harassment. However, it must once again be remembered that the offense prompting the arrest here, driving after revocation, is not a common or insignificant offense.22 It is a serious crime for which, according to standing police orders, the suspect must be placed
Finally, and most importantly, a rule barring searches in the context of minor traffic offenses essentially rests on the conclusion that no reasonable inference of danger can be drawn in such instances. That is simply not true in this case, and the court‘s entire position, invalidating this protective search, rests on the false premise that there was no reason for protection.
That premise is false for two principal reasons: First, although the nature of the offense here may not in itself demonstrate a propensity to aggressive violence, its seriousness does indicate that the arrestee will have a strong motive to escape from arrest. The Congress provided that driving after revocation can be punished by a fine of as much as $500, a year in jail, or both.24 In addition, the deliberate commission of one such serious offense does reasonably suggest the possibility that the suspect may have other strong reasons for wanting to avoid police custody.
Second, as noted above, a police General Order requires that one suspected of driving after revocation must be placed in full custody arrest and taken to the police station. This procedure, reasonable in itself because of the likelihood that the suspect will not respond to a mere citation, necessarily placed the officer in proximity to his prisoner for a considerable period of time. It must be distinguished from the very brief encounters associated with either a Terry stop or a normal traffic citation. Both
In short, whatever reasons there may be for a rule barring searches incident to minor traffic arrests, those reasons constitute no logical, relevant rationale on which to invalidate a protective search following apprehension for a serious offense, involving custody of a possibly armed prisoner, which we admittedly have here.
II. The Search Was Reasonable in Scope
Having concluded that a protective search was justified under these circumstances, I would also hold that this particular search did not go beyond the permissible scope of an inquiry supported by this justification.
The withdrawal of the cigarette pack from Robinson‘s pocket was clearly permissible. Beginning with the least intrusive step possible, a “pat down” of Robinson‘s outer clothing, Jenks came upon an object which could have been a concealed weapon. Jenks could not tell exactly what the object was. But testimony of a concealed weapons expert at the remand hearing makes it clear that a great many deadly or incapacitating weapons could have been concealed in a pocket the size of Robinson‘s in such a way that the pat down could have discovered their presence but could not have revealed whether they were weapons, or indeed whether they were hard or soft. In an amazingly graphic demonstration the expert showed that he had concealed upon his person twenty-five weapons “that could kill or incapacitate.”25 It should be noted that one of the weapons produced, a .22 pistol
Even after Jenks was able to feel the size and texture of the cigarette pack inside the pocket, his remaining uncertainty was legitimate. He could have squeezed the pack while it was still in Robinson‘s pocket. But all that would have told him was that the “objects” inside were definitely not cigarettes. The possibility remained that they were any number of harmful objects, from small blades to live bullets. That possibility is exactly what the routine protective search procedure was designed to eliminate.
With the question of potential danger unresolved, Officer Jenks’ withdrawal of the package from the pocket was entirely necessary and proper. As previously stated, the tests established under Terry do not necessarily apply here. But both “frisks” and this search incident to arrest share a protective purpose. Since the risk of violence is probably greater in the case of a full custody arrest than it is in the case of a Terry stop, the search here should be allowed to be at least as thorough. So it is significant that Jenks’ action would be permissible even if the standards established in Terry did apply.26
To be safe, the arresting officer must not only discover potential weapons but also confirm the dangerous nature of the weapon and disarm the arrestee. A pat down would be totally worthless if the arresting officer were prohibited from going further once he had discovered the possibility of unknown danger. A requirement of absolute certainty as to the existence and nature of a weapon before
B.
It also follows that the opening and inspection of the cigarette pack was within the permissible scope of a reasonable protective search incident to arrest. It is established that a search can only remain allowable if each part of the procedure is reasonably related in scope to the justification for its initiation.27 This last phase of the search meets that test.
Even when the cigarette pack was visible, the nature of its contents remained unresolved. It could have contained weapons.28 It clearly did not appear to contain cigarettes. Of course, since the package was now in the officer‘s possession, any risk of the prisoner‘s use of a weapon in this package had been eliminated. But further inspection of the package was still justifiable as a protective measure. If the package had contained a razor blade, or live bullets, the officer would have been alerted to search Robinson much more thoroughly since the possibility of there being other weapons concealed on his person would increase.
It is highly important to note at this point that Officer Jenks’ peek into the cigarette pack had the same purpose and function as every other step in the pat down. Initially, when the arrestee stands before the officer, he contains a potential for danger, quantum unknown. The officer‘s prescribed search routine is designed first to discover and then to eliminate that potential for danger. He has the right, unquestioned by the ma-
With the possible exception of confiscation of a discovered weapon, everything the officer does during a pat down is aimed at discovering indicia of potential danger. Jenks’ routine was designed both to neutralize the individual weapons discovered and to obtain their warning that other potential danger might be present. The fact that the potential weapon in the cigarette pack has been removed from the arrestee‘s control simply does not destroy its function, shared with that of additional indicia for which the officer can clearly continue to look, as a clue to further danger.
When Officer Jenks found the cigarette package—which clearly did not contain cigarettes—the basic overall question he had set out to answer was still unresolved, what potential danger did the prisoner in custody represent to Jenks and others? If the cigarette package had appeared to contain cigarettes, on these facts alone in this case, Jenks might have been unjustified in opening the package, his inquiry in this sector would have been satisfactorily resolved.29 But it was certain the package contained something else besides cigarettes, Jenks knew from his training it could have been one of several different type weapons, the potential of danger—the original motivating question of
This action flowed logically and naturally from the whole rationale of a protective search, and was as completely justified as initiating this protective custodial-arrest search originally.
Officer Jenks specifically testified that the nature and scope of his protective searches varied depending on how he perceived the risk.30 When the mysterious package was found, Jenks was conducting a face-to-face search of the type used when less danger is perceived. Discovery of one weapon would very likely have prompted the protective measure of turning Robinson around and placing him with his hands against a wall or the car for a more thorough “pat down” search. Thus, the potential contents of the package were highly relevant to Jenks’ legitimate self-protective purposes. Since the cigarette package gave notice of irregular contents, and could have revealed hidden danger, Jenks’ inspection, and the routine commanding it, should be held to fall fully within the justifiable scope of a protective search.
The routine Officer Jenks followed here allows some flexibility based on the officer‘s perception of risk, and this we should approve. Such procedures may well spare those who legitimately appear harmless from the indignities of as full a search as might be permissible in any given instance. However, that sort of flexibility would be impossible unless the officer‘s routine allows investigation of the unusual and suspicious in order to
III. Conclusion
I reach my conclusions in this case on the basis of several fundamental propositions concerning the application of the exclusionary rule which deserve explanation. Exclusion of admittedly probative evidence represents a sacrifice of the social values of accurate judicial decision-making and punishment of the discovered crimes. This sacrifice is made in order to deter unreasonable intrusions by the police. Any application of the exclusionary rule must necessarily take this conflict of values into account. The offensiveness of the intrusion and the likelihood of its being deterred must be balanced against the sacrifice to truth and law enforcement.31
We should be mindful, therefore, that the case before us involves a type of intrusion
[T]he officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner‘s body. A thorough search must be made of the prisoner‘s arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the feet.32
It is utterly inconceivable to me that Judge Wright can take this as the accepted standard for a permissible “frisk“—but take it they must because this is the Supreme Court‘s standard—and yet hold impermissible Officer Jenks’ search of the contents of the outer pocket of Robinson‘s car coat, a protective search made after arrest by the
If we accept the Terry standard of constitutional “reasonableness” for a “stop and frisk” situation, Judge Wright‘s holding that the step-by-step search after arrest of Robinson‘s open outside breast pocket was unreasonable seems to me logically indefensible. Here
We should also be mindful that the exclusionary rule‘s primary goal, deterrence, will not be well served by the decision that this search was unreasonable. If society highly values the safety of its police officers, they probably and understandably value it even more. Limits to their self-protective routines must, of course, be drawn; but it is one thing to ask the officer to pass up evidence and quite another to ask him, by foregoing a minimally intrusive technique, to expose himself to a greater and very real risk of bodily harm.
Finally, we should be aware that a primary flaw in the development of the exclusionary rule has been a continuing abstraction of analysis which puzzles judges in their chambers and requires a hairline constitutional analysis literally impossible of application by the officer in the field. Many police departments have attempted to deal with this problem by training their officers in a set routine, which has evolved from both court decisions on the limits of allowable search and police experience with (among other things) the risks inherent in different situations. This dissent has stressed that this is a sound approach which will tend to minimize intrusion into individual privacy (much more than would a policy of ad hoc individual judgments espoused by Judge Wright) while maximizing safety for all society.34
The fact that Officer Jenks was following routine police procedure of course does not validate either the decision to search or the scope of the search. The reasonableness of that routine itself
Officer Jenks’ statement that he “just searched him,” which seems highly important to Judge Wright‘s opinion, must be viewed in light of other testimony indicating that the absence of personal fear of danger resulted from the very fact that such protective searches had actually become routine for this officer. The record shows that Officer Jenks knew this search routine was for protective purposes. Viewed in that light, he was not indulging in mere “curiosity” but “routine curiosity with a protective purpose.”
Since the fact of custodial arrest and the protective purpose present here validate the decision to search, the valid scope of the search is the other issue to be considered. The look inside the cigarette pack, commanded by routine, served a protective function which must be weighed against its intrusiveness. Indeed, as emphasized above, Officer Jenks’ peek had the same purpose as every other step in a pat down—discovering indicia of potential danger. Here, as I have set forth the rationale of a constitutionally “reasonable” search, the physical perceptions of the officer, as opposed to his subjective emotional state, become important. He had legitimately come across an unusual and irregular object—the precise nature of
I conclude that the search conducted by Officer Jenks under such a standard operating procedure falls within the permissible scope of any reasonable self-protective search routine.
Robinson‘s conviction should be affirmed.
Notes
The inquiry under [the Fourth Amendment] may differ sharply from the inquiry set up by the categories of [the New York stop-and-frisk statute]. Our constitutional inquiry would not be furthered here by an attempt to pronounce judgment on the words of the statute. We must confine our review instead to the reasonableness of the searches and seizures which underlie these two convictions.
Compare id. at 70-71 (Harlan, J., concurring). Transcript of Proceedings before the Honorable William B. Jones, U. S. District Judge, on remand of Case No. 23,734 (U. S. Court of Appeals), 4 October 1971 (hereafter “Tr.“) at p. 152. The description of the search throughout this opinion is taken generally from Officer Jenks’ testimony at the hearing on remand and from the findings of the District Judge, Tr., pp. 99-100.
See Plurality Opinion at 1098. The standard procedure, followed in this case, was described at the hearing on remand by Sergeant Dennis C. Donaldson, a police instructor, Tr. 99-100.Q Now, directing your attention to the field type search. When is a field search instructed to be conducted by a police officer?
A At any time he makes a full custody arrest. That is where he would arrest a subject and subsequently transport him to a police facility for booking
Q. You are not aware of any police department regulation that prohibits you from putting your fingers inside a man‘s belt or probing in the groin area for weapons like this, are you?
A. I don‘t go into a thorough search in that area.
Q. Do you know of any police department regulation that prohibits you from doing so?
A. No sir.
Q. So you could do exactly that, you could probe and feel into every part of my body where that weapon might be concealed?
A. No, not exactly. That is not fair.
Q. What would prohibit you?
A. I could hide that around my groin where it would be embarrassing to search for it?
Remand Hearing Transcript 41. Tr., pp. 11 and 13.
is made, and this is so only because the existence of probable cause for the arrest of a person normally justifies probable cause to believe that the suspect possesses such items.” Note, Searches of the Person Incident to Lawful Arrest, 69 Colum.L.Rev. 866, 870-871 (1969). (Emphasis in original.) Trial Transcript 6-7 (Officer Jenks testifying):* * * [S]earch incident to arrest is often confused with a search for weapons made in order to protect a police officer. It is not the arrest which gives rise to the need to make a protective search but rather reasonable cause to believe that a suspect is armed. The situations in which a protective search will be permitted are broader than those which will justify a search incident to arrest whereas the scope of a protective search should be more strictly constrained than that of a search incident to arrest. These two standards should operate separately, and indeed the Supreme Court has held that a lawful arrest is not necessary to justify a protective search. What a lawful arrest does justify is the search for fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of the crime for which the arrest
Q. Now, officer, please, state the circumstances under which you saw Mr. Robinson.
A. He was operating a ‘65 Cadillac, D. C. registration, 653013 on U Street at 9th Street, Northwest. I was in a marked patrol car, and we stopped the vehicle for a routine spot check.
Q. For what purpose did you stop Mr. Robinson?
A. Routine spot check, sir. Tr., p. 16.
A part of the program is to make “spot checks” of motorists with a view of [sic] detecting persons operating without a valid driving license. These checks are not in the form of “road blocks” and this memorandum shall not be construed as authorization to conduct “road blocks” for the purpose of examining the credentials of a driver. “Spot checks” shall generally be made in connection with some minor violations or other suspicious circumstance. (Emphasis added.) The problem apparently grows as information moves down through the police bureaucracy. Second District, Metropolitan Police Department Memorandum No. 237, “Traffic Check System to be used by members of the Second District in the prevention of crime,” (December 18, 1969), states in part:
This “Traffic Check” system, along with a more strict enforcement of the Truancy Laws and the Anti-Loitering Regulations, plus the effective use of the new “Stop and Frisk” rules, can be of invaluable aid to us in this field. There is no doubt that excellent results can be obtained if all members make a concerted effort with this traffic check system, using good police judgment and common sense in stopping and checking motorists in our area under suspicious circumstances and/or at late and unusual hours. * * * Members of this command must be tactful and courteous in these contacts and must be prepared to explain to the motorist the reasons for this check. (Emphasis added.) Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
(Emphasis added.) It should also be noted that“The use of Traffic Violation Notices is a courtesy of long standing and shall be employed whenever possible, consistent with the overall safety of the public.
“Only in the more serious or aggravated types of traffic violations, those which indicate a serious disregard for the safety of others, or those in which the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the individuals concerned will, in all probability, ignore the Traffic Violation Notices, should it be necessary to make summary arrest. These include, but are not confined to: ‘Fleeing from the Scene of an Accident‘; ‘Driving under the influence of Intoxicating Liquor or Narcotic Drugs‘; ‘Reckless Driving‘; ‘Operating Without a Permit‘; ‘Operating After Suspension or Revocation of Operator‘s Permit‘; ‘Excessive Speed Cases’ indicating an absolute disregard for the safety of others and any other violations where the officer, after having checked with traffic records, ascertains that the operator is frequently changing his place of residence or employment. In these types of cases and in the interest of public safety, it is not appropriate to permit the offending motorists to continue on to their destinations and summary arrests should be made.
“Summary arrests should also be made for traffic violations when it is known beforehand that there are accumulated against the operator of the vehicle outstanding tickets or warrants which have been ignored, when the operator has been avoiding services of a suspension or revocation notice or when it is known or suspected that he is wanted for a felony or other serious infraction of the law.
“Except as provided in the two preceding paragraphs, whenever the operator of a vehicle is able to produce valid or prima facie credentials as to his or her identity and either lives or works in the District of Columbia, the officer shall issue a Traffic Violation Notice.”
392 U.S. at 23-24, 88 S.Ct. at 1881. Cognizant of all these considerations, the Court in Terry and Sibron made clear that a properly conducted frisk would provide adequate protection to the officer. Tr., p. 61. See Judge Wright‘s footnote 28.“* * * Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties. American criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and every year in this country many law enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are wounded. Virtually all of these deaths and a substantial portion of the injuries are inflicted with guns and knives.
“* * * When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.”
The deterrence theory underlying the Suppression Doctrine, or Exclusionary Rule has a certain appeal in spite of the high price society pays for such a drastic remedy. Notwithstanding its plausibility, many judges and lawyers and some of our most distinguished legal scholars have never quite been able to escape the force of Cardozo‘s statement of the doctrine‘s anomalous result:
The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered. * * *
A room is searched against the law, and the body of a murdered man is found. * * * The privacy of the home has been infringed, and the murderer goes free. People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 23-24, 150 N.E. 585, 587-588 (1926).
* * * * *
Suppressing unchallenged truth has set guilty criminals free but demonstrably has neither deterred deliberate violations of the Fourth Amendment nor decreased those errors in judgment that will inevitably occur given the pressures inherent in police work having to do with serious crimes.
* * * * *
I believe the time has come to re-examine the scope of the exclusionary rule and consider at least some narrowing of its thrust so as to eliminate the anomalies it has produced.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, at 413, 418, 424, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 2013, 2015, 2018, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) (dissenting). What we should do here is to apply existing principles deduced from the decided cases and the fundamental rationale of the Fourth Amendment, leaving to the Chief Justice and his Associate Justices the task of “reexamin[ing] the scope of the Exclusionary Rule.” What we should not do in the face of the Chief Justice‘s and others’ widely expressed dissatisfaction with the broadened scope of the Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule is to narrow further the scope of what is a “reasonable” search and thus augment the impact of the Exclusionary Rule.
(4) Frisk for Dangerous Weapons. A law enforcement officer who has stopped any person pursuant to this section may, if the officer reasonably believes that his safety or the safety of others then present so requires, search for any dangerous weapon by an external patting of such person‘s outer clothing. If in the course of such search he feels an object which he reasonably believes to be a dangerous weapon, he may take such action as is necessary to examine such object. This of course is virtually the Terry standard for a “frisk” after a “stop.” As made clear above, logically one cannot accept the scope of the “frisk” after a “stop” permitted by the Terry standard and reject the scope of the full custodial search for protective purposes after arrest made of Robinson here.
But if the majority wishes to resort to American Law Institute standards to sustain its holding that the cigarette package of heroin capsules should be suppressed as evidence at the trial, I suggest resort to Section 290.2, Determination of Motions to Suppress Evidence of that same ALI Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure:
(2) Determination. A motion to suppress evidence shall be granted only if the court finds that the violation upon which it is based was substantial, or if otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or of this State. In determining whether a violation is substantial the court shall consider all the circumstances, including:
(a) the importance of the particular interest violated;
(b) the extent of deviation from lawful conduct;
(c) the extent to which the violation was willful;
(d) the extent to which privacy was invaded;
(e) the extent to which exclusion will tend to prevent violations of this Code;
(f) whether, but for the violation, the things seized would have been discovered; and
(g) the extent to which the violation prejudiced the moving party‘s ability to support his motion, or to defend himself in the proceeding in which the things seized are sought to be offered in evidence against him.
The inspection of the cigarette package contents from the outer pocket of Robinson‘s car coat could hardly be termed a “substantial” violation, especially when ranged alongside the permissible limits of invasion of privacy set forth by the Supreme Court in Terry. But this question deals with the Exclusionary Rule, and this dissent does not rest on the question of the applicability of the Exclusionary Rule, rather on the premise that by accepted standards the search of Robinson should be held “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.
This branch of the “special circumstances” doctrine is illustrated by this court‘s decision in Brown v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 43, 365 F.2d 976 (1966), in which Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger, writing for a unanimous court, upheld a warrantless search of an automobile subsequent to an arrest of the driver for driving without a tag light and with an expired inspection sticker. The court, however, was careful not to justify the search as an incident to the traffic arrest. Thus the court found that while one police officer was questioning the driver as to his traffic violations a second officer heard over the squad car radio that a robbery had been committed by a person answering the driver‘s general description and driving an automobile similar to the one they had just stopped. After reviewing this evidence, which became available to the officer during the arrest but before the search, the court stated:
“The questions presented on these facts are whether the police had probable cause for arresting Appellant on the robbery charge, whether they did in fact arrest him, and whether the search was therefore permissible as one incident to arrest.”
125 U.S.App.D.C. at 45, 365 F.2d at 978. The court held that the officers had probable cause to arrest the driver for robbery, and that following such arrest it was reasonable to search the automobile for evidence incident to this robbery arrest.
A second type of “special circumstance” upon which courts commonly uphold searches incident to traffic arrests involves those traffic offenses for which evidence may be said to exist. This situation occurs most frequently when the person is arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol or narcotics. See note 16 supra. Similarly, some courts have held that when a car has no license plates, or fictitious plates, and the driver cannot produce proof of ownership, probable cause exists to believe that the car may have been stolen, and the officer may therefore search both car and driver for evidence of ownership and identity. See, e. g., United States v. Jackson, 7 Cir., 429 F.2d 1368 (1970); Welch v. United States, 10 Cir., 361 F.2d 214 (1966); State v. Rys, 186 Neb. 341, 183 N.W.2d 253 (1971); see also People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County [Simon], 101 Cal.Rptr. 837, 842-846, 496 P.2d 1205, 1210-1214 (1972) (en banc). Finally, when the officer reasonably believes the driver or passengers to be armed and dangerous, he may of course frisk, although not search, for weapons, e. g., State v. Curtis, 290 Minn. 429, 190 N.W.2d 631 (1971).
“* * * I would hold that, pretext or no pretext, a lawful arrest of an automobile driver for a traffic offense provides no lawful predicate for the search of the driver or his car—absent special circumstances.
* * * * *
“There is a similarity between the effect of a ‘pretextual arrest’ and the effect of an unlawful arrest, but the two cannot be equated. Proof that a traffic arrest was only a pretext to search for evidence of another offense is significant legally only because it bears on the reasonableness of the search. Search incident to arrest is unreasonable, if there is a lack of relation between the search (or scope of the search) and the offense for which the arrest was made. That lack of relationship exists without regard to the motivative cause of the arrest when, as in this case, an automobile driver is arrested for making the wrong turn but is searched for narcotics.
“In this case one of the agents admitted that he arrested Gonzalez in order to search the automobile for narcotics. More often, the determination of the motivation for an arrest requires some judicial divination of the subjective mind. We will have fewer unconstitutional searches, if the emphasis is on the objective relationship between the nature of the offense and the nature (circumstances) of the search, rather than on the motivative cause of the arrest.”
391 F.2d at 315. Judge Wisdom wrote the Amador-Gonzalez opinion in Jan. 1968. The “stop-and-frisk” cases decided 5 months later add still further authority to his already convincing position.