UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Ryan P. COLLINS, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Nos. 15-3263/3309
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued: April 28, 2016, Decided and Filed: June 29, 2016
386
B. Evidentiary Rulings
Brown also contends that the district court erred by admitting the “drug ledger” into evidence at trial and excluding evidence of his Michigan medical marijuana license. Because the drug ledger was discovered during the search of Brown‘s residence, and we hold that this evidence should have been suppressed, we need not decide whether admitting the drug ledger into evidence was proper. The same goes for the district court‘s decision to exclude Brown‘s medical marijuana license: the license was relevant to the possession with intent to distribute marijuana charges, which rested on—and only on—evidence recovered during the illegal search. We thus do not reach the district court‘s evidentiary rulings.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court‘s denial of Brown‘s motion to suppress, VACATE his convictions for possession with intent to distribute marijuana, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possession of a firearm after a previous conviction of a felony offense, and REMAND for a new trial.
Before: GUY, BATCHELDER, and COOK, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
RALPH B. GUY, JR., Circuit Judge.
The government appeals defendant‘s concurrent five-year sentences for receiving and distributing child pornography,
I.
Investigators used peer-to-peer software to download child pornography from de
Defendant‘s calculated sentencing guidelines range was 262 to 327 months, above the statutory twenty-year maximum for his offenses. See
Over the government‘s objection, the district judge considered the jury poll as “one factor” in fashioning defendant‘s sentence, noting that it “reflect[s]... how off the mark the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are.” After discussing numerous sentencing factors under
II.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion, giving “due deference to the district court‘s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). A district court abuses its discretion in the sentencing context if it “commit[s] a significant procedural error,” id. “selects a sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, fails to consider relevant sentencing factors, or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor,” United States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508, 520 (6th Cir. 2008).
Because the government did not object to defendant‘s sentence on grounds that the district court inadequately considered deterrence under
III.
The propriety of jury polling in imposing a sentence is an issue of first impression. In United States v. Martin, we commented in passing on the same judge‘s use of results of prior jury polls as an “academic exercise” which he believed provided “some suggestion” that the defendant deserved a below-guidelines sentence. 390 Fed.Appx. 533, 535 (6th Cir. 2010). We questioned whether jury polling provided “meaningful data with which to assess the suitability of the applicable Guidelines” given that a jury lacks “the tools necessary for the sentencing decision,” i.e., “the punishment selected by Congress and congressional policy concerns, the Guidelines adopted by the Sentencing Commission and the applicable range, and the information in the [presentence report].” Id. at
The government first contends that the district judge‘s reliance on the jury poll impermissibly conflates the distinct roles of judge and jury. The United States Supreme Court has expressed concern over the commingling of the judge‘s sentence-crafting function and the jury‘s fact-finding function. Stating that such intermingling “invites them [jurors] to ponder matters that are not within their province,” the Court concluded that “[i]nformation regarding the consequences of a verdict is... irrelevant to the jury‘s task.” Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579, 114 S.Ct. 2419, 129 L.Ed.2d 459 (1994). However, because the district judge conducted the poll after the jury reached a verdict, it did not implicate the concerns raised by the Court in Shannon and by Courts of Appeals elsewhere. See, e.g., United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 159-61 (2d Cir. 2009) (a defendant has no right to inform the jury of an applicable mandatory minimum sentence); United States v. Mayo, 34 F.3d 1068, 1994 WL 419581, *1 (6th Cir. 1994) (Table) (“the well-established principle is that the jury should not be informed of the defendant‘s potential punishment“). Accordingly, the district judge‘s use of a jury poll as one factor in formulating defendant‘s sentence did not conflate the respective duties of judge and jury.
The government also argues that the jury poll was an “impermissible factor[]” for the district judge to consider in crafting an appropriate sentence. Conatser, 514 F.3d at 520. We again disagree. Federal law provides nearly unfettered scope as to the sources from which a district judge may draw in determining a sentence.
District courts also have the authority to “reject the Guidelines sentencing ranges based on articulated policy disagreements in a range of contexts.” United States v. Kamper, 748 F.3d 728, 741 (6th Cir. 2014). Indeed, we have suggested the plausibility of rejecting guidelines ranges in child pornography cases based on policy disagreements. See United States v. Bistline (Bistline I), 665 F.3d 758, 762-64 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding that the district court “did not seriously attempt to refute” the judgments underlying the guidelines).
When establishing the Sentencing Commission, Congress directed it to take “the community view of the gravity of the offense” into account when crafting appropriate criminal sanctions.
Though we reiterate that juries lack “the tools necessary for the sentencing decision,” Martin, 390 Fed.Appx. at 538, they can provide insight into the community‘s view of the gravity of an offense. See Gwin, supra at 193-94; see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 615-16, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) (BREYER, J., concurring) (jurors “reflect more accurately the composition and experiences of the community as a whole” and are “better able to determine in the particular case the need for retribution“) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The jury did not determine or impose defendant‘s sentence. Rather, the district judge—who does possess the necessary tools for the sentencing decision—was at all times interposed between the jurors’ views of an appropriate sentence and the sentencing guidelines’
Moreover, we find that the district judge otherwise properly carried out his sentencing function, and that the resulting downward variance was not unreasonable. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 53 (upholding a variance where the district judge “correctly calculated the applicable Guidelines range, allowed both parties to present arguments as to what they believed the appropriate sentence should be, considered all of the § 3553(a) factors, and thoroughly documented his reasoning“); see also United States v. Madden, 515 F.3d 601, 610 (6th Cir. 2008) (district courts “may exercise discretion in determining how much explanation is necessary“). The district judge noted the applicable guidelines range of 262 to 327 months. He cited defendant‘s lack of prior convictions, absence of alcohol or drug abuse, possession of a college degree, regular employment, close family ties, and financial responsibility as considerations favoring a lighter sentence.
As to the
We are satisfied with the district court‘s discussion of the sentencing factors in granting defendant a downward variance. Compare Bistline I, 665 F.3d at 765-67 (finding a variance unreasonable where the district court made no genuine effort to discuss the
AFFIRMED.
RALPH B. GUY, JR.
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE