United States v. Ryan Collins
828 F.3d 386
6th Cir.2016Background
- Defendant was convicted by a jury of receiving/distributing and possessing child pornography after investigators downloaded illicit files from his computer; trial testimony included custodial statements he later recanted.
- The district court calculated a Guidelines range of 262–327 months, exceeding the statutory maximums, but statutory mandatory minimums required at least five years’ imprisonment.
- After the verdict, the sentencing judge polled the jurors about an appropriate sentence; juror recommendations ranged 0–60 months with a mean of 14.5 months and median of 8 months.
- The district judge considered the jurors’ post-verdict recommendations as one factor among many and varied downward to impose concurrent five-year mandatory minimum terms.
- The government appealed, arguing (1) the judge improperly relied on the jury poll and (2) the judge failed to adequately consider deterrence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a district judge may consider a post-verdict jury sentencing poll when fashioning a sentence | Gov: Considering a jury poll impermissibly mixes jury and judge roles and is an improper sentencing factor | Def: Jury poll is permissible as one of many informational sources reflecting community views | Court: Permissible here; poll was considered only as one factor and did not usurp judicial sentencing function |
| Whether reliance on the jury poll made the sentence substantively unreasonable | Gov: Using the poll produced an unreasonable downward variance | Def: The judge independently weighed § 3553(a) factors and appropriately varied | Court: Sentence not substantively unreasonable; judge adequately considered § 3553(a) factors |
| Whether the court committed procedural error by considering an impermissible factor | Gov: Juror recommendations are impermissible information | Def: 18 U.S.C. § 3661 allows broad information and judge did not treat poll as controlling | Court: Not an impermissible factor under these circumstances; judge remained between jurors’ views and sentencing decision |
| Whether the district judge failed to consider deterrence sufficiently (plain-error review) | Gov: Judge did not adequately consider deterrence, so variance was unjustified | Def: Judge explained why deterrence and public protection were not major factors | Court: Under plain-error review, judge provided sufficient explanation regarding deterrence |
Key Cases Cited
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (upholding reasonableness review and district court’s discretion to vary)
- United States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2008) (abuse-of-discretion standards for sentencing; impermissible factors doctrine)
- Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573 (1994) (jury inquiry about consequences of verdict may intrude on jury role)
- United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (district courts may consider broad information in sentencing)
- Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (appellate review requires only sufficient explanation of sentencing rationale)
- United States v. Bistline, 665 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2012) (reviewing reasonableness of variances in child pornography cases)
- United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (plain-error standard for unpreserved sentencing objections)
