United States of America v. Marcus Anthony Mattox
No. 20-3065
No. 20-3133
United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit
Filed: March 4, 2022
Submitted: December 17, 2021
GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.
Marcus Mattox was convicted of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon in violation of
I.
On September 22, 2018, police officers responded to a 911 call about gunshots at an apartment complex in St. Paul, Minnesota. The officers followed a fresh blood trail and found a loaded Desert Eagle .50-caliber semi-automatic pistol with blood on it and the hammer cocked back in the firing position. The officers learned that a man had been shot in his face and right foot and had been taken to the hospital.
An officer went to the emergency room at the hospital and entered the man‘s room. The man‘s bloody clothes were on the floor, and at the officer‘s request, a nurse took the identification from the clothes. The identification showed the defendant‘s name, Marcus Mattox. The officer took the clothes, and the next day, an officer went to the hospital and executed a warrant for a DNA swab from Mattox and asked him some questions for a few minutes. Mattox admitted that he was at the scene of the crime and stated that he did not know who shot him. He declined to answer more questions.
A federal grand jury indicted Mattox on one count of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. See
At trial, the jury heard expert testimony that the Desert Eagle handgun found in the parking lot was manufactured in Israel. The jury convicted Mattox of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced Mattox to 106 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release. It applied a four-level enhancement for use or possession of a firearm “in connection with another felony offense,” see
II.
We begin with Mattox‘s challenge to the district court‘s denial of his suppression motions. “In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court‘s findings of fact for clear error, giving due weight to the inferences
A.
We first consider whether Mattox‘s clothing was taken in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment permits an officer to seize an object without a warrant under the plain-view doctrine if “(1) the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed, (2) the object‘s incriminating character is immediately apparent, and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object itself.” United States v. Vinson, 805 F.3d 1150, 1152 (8th Cir. 2015). Mattox does not dispute that the second and third conditions are met here. But he argues that the first condition is not met because the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights by entering his hospital room.
We disagree. Whether the police violated Mattox‘s Fourth Amendment rights by entering the hospital room depends on whether Mattox had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the hospital room. See United States v. Long, 797 F.3d 558, 564 (8th Cir. 2015). Our determination of whether an individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy may be informed by state law. See, e.g., Rambo, 789 F.2d at 1295-96. True, as Mattox points out, overnight guests in homes and hotel rooms have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97 (1990); United States v. Conner, 127 F.3d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1997). But that is because hosting overnight guests in homes “is a longstanding social custom that serves functions recognized as valuable by society.” Olson, 495 U.S. at 98. Being admitted to the hospital for a gunshot wound does not serve the same valuable societal function. In fact, police in Minnesota are expected to show up to hospitals to investigate a gunshot-wound victim like Mattox because Minnesota law requires
We conclude that Mattox did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his hospital room and thus the officer did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights by entering the room. Because the officer lawfully entered his hospital room and his clothes were in plain view, Mattox‘s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.
B.
Next, we consider whether Mattox‘s statements to the police while in the hospital were voluntary. Mattox does not argue that a custodial interrogation occurred. A statement made outside of a custodial interrogation may be suppressed if it is not made voluntarily. See United States v. Brave Heart, 397 F.3d 1035, 1040 (8th Cir. 2005). “A statement is involuntary when it was extracted by threats, violence, or express or implied promises sufficient to overbear the defendant‘s will and critically impair his capacity for self-determination.” Vega, 676 F.3d at 718. “We determine if a defendant‘s will has been overborne by examining the totality of
Mattox argues that the statements were involuntary because he was in the hospital recovering from gunshot wounds, he had taken pain medication, the police executed a warrant to obtain a DNA sample, and he was not read Miranda rights. We disagree. The totality of the circumstances shows that law enforcement did not overbear Mattox‘s will. See Brave Heart, 397 F.3d at 1040. Being on pain medication does not show that a defendant‘s will has been overborne if there is evidence that the patient answered “reasonably” and understood what was occurring. See United States v. Annis, 446 F.3d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 2006). The court noted that the officer testified “that Mattox answered questions in an appropriate context and manner; Mattox spoke in a normal cadence and pace; Mattox did not slur his words; and that [the officer] was able to totally understand Mattox‘s answers.” Mattox also refused to answer some of the officer‘s questions, which suggests that the pain medication did not impair his ability to resist police pressure. See Brave Heart, 397 F.3d at 1040. The court also found “that there is nothing in the present record to indicate that [the police officers] employed any strong-arm tactics, deceptive strategems or other coercive acts . . . and made no threats or promises while talking to Mattox.” The interview lasted only a few minutes and Miranda warnings were not required because Mattox was not in custody. See United States v. New, 491 F.3d 369, 374 (8th Cir. 2007). After considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Mattox‘s statements were voluntary.
III.
Next, Mattox challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that the gun had been in or affected interstate commerce. “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
To show a violation of
IV.
Mattox also challenges the application of a four-level sentencing enhancement for “us[ing] or possess[ing] any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense,” here, aggravated assault. See
“In applying
Here, the presentence investigation report recommended applying the enhancement based on
A valid claim of self-defense requires the existence of four elements:
(1) the absence of aggression or provocation on the part of the defendant; (2) the defendant‘s actual and honest belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm; (3) the existence of
reasonable grounds for that belief; and (4) the absence of a reasonable possibility of retreat to avoid the danger.
State v. Radke, 821 N.W.2d 316, 324 (Minn. 2012).
The district court did not clearly err in finding that Mattox did not act in self-defense. Although it did not specify which element of self-defense was lacking, the district court concluded that “the evidence clearly shows that that four-level enhancement should be imposed, given the facts that were established at trial.” At trial, the Government presented video surveillance footage of the parking-lot encounter between Mattox and two individuals. The video shows Mattox exit the apartment building, approach a male and a female at the back of an SUV in the parking lot, draw a firearm, and take a shooting stance. After Mattox drew his gun, the male also took a shooting stance and appeared to shoot at Mattox. Mattox never denied during his testimony that he was the first one to appear ready to shoot. Rather, he testified that he raised his cell phone clip to make it look like a gun after the two individuals allegedly said, “There he is. Kill him! Kill him!” From the facts established at trial through Mattox‘s testimony and the video of the incident, we infer that the district court found one or more of the first three elements of the self-defense affirmative defense, each of which rests on the truthfulness of Mattox‘s testimony, not satisfied. This finding was not clear error because the district court apparently found Mattox‘s version of what happened not credible. See United States v. Mitchell, 2 F.4th 786, 789 (8th Cir. 2021) (stating that a district court‘s credibility determinations “are virtually unreviewable on appeal“). Thus, we conclude that the Government has met its burden to negate Mattox‘s defense and that the district court did not clearly err by applying the four-level enhancement.
V.
Lastly, the Government challenges the district court‘s determination that Mattox does not qualify as an armed career criminal. We review de novo whether a
The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) establishes a minimum sentence for a defendant who has three prior convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug offense “committed on occasions different from one another.”
Here, the Government presented evidence of three prior Minnesota convictions: (1) a second-degree assault conviction from 2012, (2) a domestic assault conviction from 2015, and (3) a fifth-degree assault conviction from 2015. The only information that the Government provided about the 2015 convictions was the charging document, which included the counts and the statement of probable cause detailing what happened based on the officers’ accounts and witness statements. The district court needed to determine whether the domestic assault and fifth-degree assault convictions occurred on different occasions. In making its determination, it considered witness statements from the probable-cause portion of the criminal complaint and ultimately concluded that the domestic assault and fifth-degree assault convictions did not occur on different occasions.
On appeal, Mattox argues that we may affirm on the alternative ground that the district court cannot consider any information besides the elements of the offense of conviction and that the elements themselves are insufficient to prove that he committed the crimes on different occasions.2 See United States v. Baez, 983 F.3d 1029, 1041 (8th Cir. 2020) (“[W]e can affirm the district court‘s judgment on any
We conclude, however, that we need not reach either question. Cf. Levering v. United States, 890 F.3d 738, 741 n.2 (8th Cir. 2018) (refraining from deciding whether “a sentencing court deciding the occasions-different question is limited to consulting judicial records of the type described in Shepard“). Even assuming that Shepard permits the district court to consider the probable-cause section of the complaint and that the district court can consider nonelemental facts,3 the district court did not err in determining that Mattox did not commit the crimes on different occasions.
In making this determination, the sentencing court must consider “(1) the time lapse between offenses, (2) the physical distance between their occurrence, and (3) their lack of overall substantive continuity, a factor that is often demonstrated in the violent-felony context by different victims or different aggressions.” United States v. Pledge, 821 F.3d 1035, 1038 (8th Cir. 2016). “The first factor is the most important consideration.” Id.
As the Government itself notes, the probable-cause section of the complaint indicates that Mattox assaulted his girlfriend, R.R.O., in her apartment, she escaped and ran to a different apartment down the hall, and Mattox chased after her. First,
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
GRUENDER
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE