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Minnesota v. Olson
495 U.S. 91
SCOTUS
1990
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*1 OLSON MINNESOTA 18, 1990 April February 1990 Decided Argued 88-1916. No. *2 White, J., opinion delivered Court, Brennan, in which Marshall, Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, JJ., joined. and Stevens, J., post, p. 101, Kennedy, J., post, p. 102, and filed concurring opinions. Rehnquist, J., Blackmun, J., C. and dissented. argued

Anne E. petitioner. Peek the cause for With her on the briefs Humphrey Attorney were Hubert H. III, Gen- eral of Minnesota, and Thomas L. Johnson.

Stephen argued J. Marzen the cause for the United States urging as amicus curiae reversal. With him on the brief were Attorney Solicitor Starr, General Assistant General Deputy Bryson. Dennis, and Solicitor General by appointment Bruder, Glenn P. of Court, U. S. argued respondent.* 989, cause *A brief of amici urging curiae reversal was filed for the State of Connecticut et al. Kelly, John J. Attorney Chief State’s Connecticut, III, M. Oberly Charles Attorney Delaware, Linley Pearson, General of E. Attorney Indiana, General of T. Stephan, Attorney Robert General of Kan- sas, Cowan, Frederic Attorney J. Kentucky, General of Frank Kelley, J. Attorney Michigan, Moore, General of Attorney Mike General of Missis- sippi, Webster, William Attorney L. Missouri, Arnold, General of John P. Attorney General of Hampshire, Perretti, Jr., New Peter N. Attorney Jersey, Stratton, General New Hal Attorney Mexico, General of New Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney Carolina, General of North T. Travis Med- lock, Attorney Carolina, General Roger of South Tellinghuisen, A. Attor- ney Dakota, General of Dam, South R. Paul Attorney Van General of Utah, Jeffrey Amestoy, L. Attorney Vermont, General Mary Terry, Sue Attorney Virginia, Joseph General of Meyer, B. Attorney Wyo- General of ming, Early, James B. Special Attorney Assistant Minnesota, General of George Webster, Yelverton, D. Jack E. Gregory and U. Evans. opinion the Court. delivered White Justice nonconsensual warrantless, amade police case in this The an Olson was respondent Robert entry where house into a is whether The issue him. guest overnight arrested and rights. holdWe Amendment Fourth Olson’s arrest violated did. that it

I July 1987, lone Saturday, Shortly on a.m. before Minneapolis, gasoline station gunman Amoco robbed police manager. A fatally the station shot and Minnesota, suspected report dispatcher officer heard partner immedi- drove officer Joseph Ecker. *3 that arriving same time the at about ately home, Ecker’s to took Oldsmobile The driver arrived. an Oldsmobile ato and came spun of control out the car action, and evasive later who was Ecker, foot. car on stop. men fled the Two shortly in- captured thereafter gunman, was the as identified escaped. man The second home. his side police a sack found Oldsmobile, abandoned the Inside cer- They title a weapon. found also money murder and the a secured out as crossed Olson Rob name the with tificate 3151Johnson Roger R. Olson to a party, addressed a letter Olson receipt to Rob out made videotape rental a Street, and a that police verified days The earlier. two and dated Street. Johnson 3151 at lived Olson Robert identifying July Sunday, 19, a woman morning, next The a police said that and Murphy the called Dianna herself gas in which car drove by of Rob name man planning to was Rob that and scene left killer station called woman same noon, About bus. town leave a said that and phone number, and gave again, her address women, two other and a Maria had told Rob man named rob- Amoco in the the driver he was Julie, and Louanne mother Julie’s was that Louanne bery. stated The caller The Northeast. 2406 Fillmore at lived women the two po- phone sent call second detective-in-charge took who and Julie. check out Louanne 2406 Fillmore to to officers lice dwelling a they police determined that arrived When daughter Bergstrom Julie duplex and her Louanne and that spoke to upper Police were not home. unit but in the lived in the lived who Niederhoffer, mother, Helen Louanne’s stay- been had that a Rob Olson She confirmed lower unit. promised to ing upstairs unit. She then was not but p.m., pickup police At returned. when Olson call the “probable bulletin,” was issued cause arrest order, or away stay police instructed The were arrest. Olson’s duplex. from the police p.m., approximately called Niederhoffer 2:45

At detective-in-charge in- returned. The and said had Olson go police and surround the house structed officers headquarters telephoned told her from then Julie it. He The detective heard a the house. out of should come Rob say, that Rob I Julie stated “tell them left.” male voice po- whereupon p.m. ordered the the detective at left, seeking permission and the house. Without lice to enter upper unit and weapons entered drawn, with hiding an hour after respondent Less than in a found closet. po- inculpatory respondent statement made arrest, headquarters. lice hearing County Hennepin and denied held trial court *4 App. suppress 3-13.

respondent’s his statement. motion trial, at Olson’s into evidence admitted was The statement first-degree murder, one count of on convicted and he was robbery, counts of second- and three of armed three counts Supreme appeal, Court degree the Minnesota On assault. (1989). re- The court ruled that 2d 92 436 N. W. reversed. Bergstrom home to in the spondent interest a sufficient had that the legality there, arrest challenge of his warrantless the exigent circum- illegal no there were because arrest was respondent’s entry,1 that justify and a warrantless stances 1 illegal, arrest the respondent’s made of a warrant the absence Because police the that determination trial court’s review the did not court

95 been illegality by and should that tainted was statement was of the statement admission suppressed.2 the Because reversed court doubt, the beyond reasonable harmless not trial.3 for a new remanded and conviction Olson’s 493 U. S. certiorari, petition for granted State’s the We (1989), affirm. now 806 I I (1980), 573 445 S. York, U. Payton Newv. in held

It was without house his arrested suspect not be should that a probable to arrest though cause is there warrant, even arrest per- protect the not to was decision purpose theof The him. entry in the from protect home suspect but to the son this probable In finding cause. magistrate’s aof absence arrest warrantless Olson’s that held below case, the court the with connection a sufficient illegal he had because was chal- The State householder. like premises to be treated lenges conclusion. that 347 U. S. States, 389 v. United in Katz the decision Since protec- “capacity claim that

(1967), the law been it has upon depends whether . . . Amendment Fourth tion of ahas Amendment protection the person claims who place.” privacy invaded in expectation of legitimate (1978). subjective A 143 128, S. 439 U. Illinois, v. Rakas “ society that legitimate is ‘one if it privacy is expectation of Hence, judge the we 2d, at 95. W. 436 N. arrest. for the cause probable probable cause. was that there assumption on case respondent’s illegal, that, if the arrest was argued had not State The Id., 98. at illegality. by tainted not nevertheless was statement State Court, for the this counsel before argument Likewise, oral at fruit of not the statement any claim disavowed expressly sponte sua raise therefore not 4-5. We will Arg. Tr. of Oral arrest. case. ante, of this facts Harris, to the p. York New applicability claims respondent’s remand on court the trial left court at the Fillmore present persons evidence —statements other after obtained by Ecker a statement the arrest time of suppressed been also have statement —should respondent’s him showed *5 illegal arrest. fruit 96 id., 143-144, “reasonable,”’” to recognize prepared

is supra, Katz, J., concurring). (Harlan, at 361 12, quoting n. to the relationship premises that Olson’s argues The State determine in its view 12 which factors satisfy not does it from the fact Aside a “home.”4 is dwelling whether one’s must be that a place premise the mistaken on is based expectation legitimate have a for one to in order “home” com- needlessly is test there,5 proposed the State’s privacy conclude, do, as we to than need no farther go We plex. to show enough is alone overnight guest as an status Olson’s are: The 12 factors dwelling; in the property rights has some the visitor lessor of marriage to the owner or related blood or visitor is dwelling; door; name on the dwelling or has his mail at the visitor receives key dwelling; has a to the the visitor presence in the dwell- regular or continuous maintains a the visitor sleeping regularly; there ing, especially dwelling, either mone- upkeep of the to the visitor contributes otherwise; tarily or length of dwelling a substantial present has been at the the visitor arrest; prior time dwelling; possessions in the or stores his clothes other the visitor particu- use of a granted by the owner exclusive has been the visitor dwelling; lar area of the dwelling; persons from right to exclude other the visitor has is dwelling the owner remain in the when visitor is allowed to absent; and pri- his develop and maintain precautions has taken

the visitor dwelling. 21. vacy in the Brief for Petitioner temporary “home,” course, respondent’s 2406 Fillmore need not be Of privacy otherwise, expectation of enjoy him a reasonable order for or places,” Katz v. protects people, not Fourth Amendment “[T]he there. sanctuary for citi States, (1967), provides 389 U. S. United Id., privacy. at 359. they legitimate expectation zens wherever expectation telephone in a complain because he had such Mr. Katz could purposes. Amendment booth, Fourth not because it was his “home” for privacy one-night as a Similarly, expectation of if Olson had a reasonable upper whether or not his warrantless seizure was unreasonable guest, at 2406 Fillmore was home. unit

97 society that privacy in home the expectation of an he had that recognize reasonable. as prepared to is Supreme the facts Court, by Minnesota recognized the As 362 States, v. United in Jones to those are similar case of this ain arrested (1960). was the defendant Jones, In 257 U. S. warrant of a search during execution apartment the friend’s by supported as not challenge the warrant sought to and probable cause. belonged to a apartment the that

“[Jones] testified and a day it,of given him the use had Evans, who friend, the on himself [Jones] had admitted key, which with [Jones] testified cross-examination On arrest. of the apartment, his that the at shirt a suit he had that nothing use of for paid the he that elsewhere, was home friend,’ it ‘asa him use let had apartment, Evans the night,’ the that at ‘maybe a slept there had he Philadelphia away in been had Evans the search time of days.” 259.6 Id., at five for about challenge search the could that Jones ruled The Court premises,” [the] “legitimately on was apartment he because premises” [the] “legitimately on Although at 267. id., at S.,U. broad, too as rejected Rakas in standard factual explicitly reaffirmed Rakas Court 142-148, holding in Jones: that the in Jones conclusion question do not “We personal his a violation case suffered in that

defendant question was search rights if Amendment Fourth . . . unlawful. merely for the stands facts itson that Jones think “We le-a person can proposition that unremarkable own place than other in a interest gally sufficient days before home several at Eeker’s staying been Olson, who had Bergstroms’ floor robbery on night of robbery, spent him the with clothes change of He permission. home, their with duplex. protects him the Fourth Amendment from

home so that governmental place.” unreasonable intrusion into that S., at 141-142. 439 U. recognized overnight guest, that,

Rakas thus Jones just legitimately premises. than on the was much more relied on the State this case The distinctions between *7 legally empha- are not determinative. The State Jones duplex sizes in this case Olsonwas never left alone in the given key, apartment in or a whereas Jones the owner of the away key and Jones had a with which he could come go and and exclude admit others. These differences are cru- argued, disturbing holding it is in in cial, because not pointed away, Jones, the Court out that while his host was complete apartment Jones had dominion and control over the and could exclude Rakas, others from it. at 149. S.,U. do not Rakas, however, We understand to hold that an over- night guest legitimate expectation pri- can a never have of vacy except away key, when his host is and he has a or that only present may overnight guest when those facts are as- proposition,” per- id., sert the “unremarkable at 142, that a may place son have a sufficient in interest a other than his place home enable him in to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. overnight guest legitimate expecta- that an

To hold has a privacy merely recognizes in tion of his host’s home the ev- eryday expectations privacy Staying of that we all share. overnight longstanding in another’s home is a social custom recognized by society. that serves functions as valuable We stay strange city in others’ homes when we travel ato for pleasure, parents, business or when we visit our children, or town, more distant relatives out of when we are in between jobs or homes, or when we house-sit for a friend. We will all guests many be hosts and we will all be in times our lives. perspective, society recognizes From either we think that houseguest legitimate expectation privacy that a has a in of his host’s home. guest’s perspective, overnight he in seeks shelter

From the pri- precisely provides it him with home because another’s vacy, possessions place not be he and his will dis- where anyone in- host and those his host allows turbed but his asleep are side. are at our most vulnerable when we We safety security or our own because we cannot monitor although may belongings. that, reason we our It is this places, sleep spend day public when we cannot in our all in place sleep, private own we seek out another home Society of a room, it be a hotel or home friend. whether expects privacy places in a as much these tele- at least phone temporarily private place momentary whose booth—“a expectations recog- occupants’ are freedom from intrusion (Harlan, S., J., 389 U. at 361 reasonable,” Katz, nized as concurring). guest has a host who has ultimate control

That the legitimate guest having is not inconsistent with house houseguest expectation privacy. is there with the *8 permission willing to share his house and host, of his who is guest. unlikely guest privacy It is that the will with his when the to area of the house; be confined a restricted away asleep, guest or will have a measure of con- host is the premises. may The host admit or exclude from trol over the unlikely prefers, it is that he will admit the house as he but guest the over the to or meet with someone who wants see houseguests objection guest. hand, of the other few the On they guests are without visit while will invite others to them authority consulting latter, their who have the hosts; but guest, despite be ac- of the will often to exclude the wishes likely commodating. point more than is that hosts will guests, privacy respect of who are en- interests their not despite legitimate expectation privacy of the fact titled to a premises legal they in and do not have no interest may may legal authority who or not to determine power to admit If untrammeled enter the household. protection, to Fourth Amendment and exclude were essential par- living temporarily daughter in home of her an adult privacy expectation legitimate because of have no would ents parents’ subject right to her be admit or exclude would her veto. Berg- privacy respondent’s expectation in

Because recog- “understandings that are rooted in home was strom society,” supra, permitted 12, at n. Rakas, nized and protection respondent legitimate, claim the can it was Amendment. the Fourth

I I I Payton no occasionto con- York, In New the Court dangerous emergency described situation, or sider the sort of justify ‘exigent circumstances,’ that would in our cases as purpose entry arrest of either a home for into warrantless requires us to deter- This case S., at 583. search,” or U. Supreme in correct Court was the Minnesota mine whether justi- exigent holding no circumstances that there were entry make the arrest. into the house to the warrantless fied essentially applied Supreme the cor- Court The Minnesota exigent determining circumstances in whether rect standard that “a intrusion The court observed warrantless existed. fleeing justified by pursuit may felon, of a or imminent hot be [v. Wisconsin], 466 U. S. evidence, Welsh destruction suspect’s escape, [(1984)], prevent or the risk need or the persons danger or to other inside or outside to the appar- dwelling.” 97. The court also 2d, 436 N. W. pursuit ently thought there must be that in the absence of hot probable that one or more cause believe at least entry present justifying were and that as- other factors *9 danger, gravity sessing the crime and likeli- of of the risk Apply- suspect considered. is armed should be hood that the exigent ing that the state court determined standard, this did not exist. circumstances fact-specificappli- disagree this not inclined to with

areWe legal pointed proper out standard. The court cation respondent although grave “was involved, crime was that thought to the driver of murderer be but known not to be already police getaway re- ibid., and that the car,” police weapon, ibid. “The knew murder covered the upstairs suspect in the du- were with the Louanne and Julie danger suggestion plex them. Three or four of to no with squads Minneapolis the house. time surrounded going suspect Sunday.... p.m., evident the It was was 3 would have been If came out of the house he nowhere. he apprehended.” promptly the state Ibid. We do not disturb up exigent judgment not add that these facts do court’s circumstances.

IV judgment of the Minnesota Su- affirm the We therefore preme Court.

It is so ordered. Rehnquist Blackmun and Justice Justice Chief dissent. Stevens, concurring.

Justice opinion, join I add this caveat entire I the Court’s While standing respondent’s concerning II in Part the discussion grounds. challenge If on federal constitutional his arrest standing as a matter of not have concludedthat he did we had pre- question would then have been law, the federal simply have dis- should be whether this Court sented would power prevent appeal. state no For we have missed questions allowing litigants even to raise federal courts from standing they though a federal have to do so would not Secretary Joseph Maryland H. State court. See (1984) (concurring 970-971 467 U. S. Co., Munson opinion). my opinion that the Court kind of that buttress

Questions many grants in which state courts in far too cases review rights protected their own citi- the constitutional enlarge Notwithstanding its decision to the Court’s zens. *10 Michigan judgments, power v. see state-court own to review (1983), Long, that this I convinced remain 463 U. S. generally sparingly. power Delaware be used See should (1986) opin- (dissenting 689-708 Arsdall, Van U. S. ion). Only should the volun- case Court the most unusual upon imposed opinion has standards a state court teer its high. that are too officials its own law enforcement Kennedy, concurring. Justice paragraphs interpret III of Part as deference I the last two exigent application circumstances to a state court’s not as an endorsement case, of this test to the facts application particular under- the standard. With that opinion standing, join I of the Court.

Case Details

Case Name: Minnesota v. Olson
Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States
Date Published: Apr 18, 1990
Citation: 495 U.S. 91
Docket Number: 88-1916
Court Abbreviation: SCOTUS
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