UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. IVAN CRUZ-RIVERA, Defendant, Appellant. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. CARLOS JIMENEZ, Defendant, Appellant.
No. 19-1465, No. 19-1509
United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
September 15, 2021
Before Howard, Chief Judge, Thompson, Circuit Judge, and Katzmann,* Judge.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS [Hon. Timothy S. Hillman, U.S. District Judge]
Jamesa J. Drake, with whom Drake Law LLC was on brief, for appellant Jimenez.
Andrew C. Noll, Criminal Division, Appellate Section, U.S. Department of Justice, with whom Robert A. Zink, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Michelle L. Dineen Jerrett and Donald C. Lockhart, Assistant United States Attorneys, Brian C. Rabbitt, Acting Assistant Attorney General, and Andrew E. Lelling, United States Attorney, were on brief, for appellee.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
The facts are largely undisputed. “We rehearse the facts as found by the district court (explicitly or implicitly) at the suppression hearing, consistent with record support.” United States v. Arnott, 758 F.3d 40, 41 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Gonzalez, 609 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 2010)). On October 4, 2013, the DEA‘s Central Massachusetts Federal Drug Task Force set up a surveillance of a controlled purchase by a confidential
Earlier on October 4, a confidential source working with the Task Force visited Gutierrez‘s garage bay seeking to purchase heroin. Gutierrez told the source that he did not have heroin but would a short time later. The confidential source left the garage. Task Force agents then witnessed Gutierrez wave a gray Lexus with a New Jersey license plate into the Union Street garages. The men spent nearly two hours at the garage, and left shortly after 2:00 p.m. During this time, several other cars came and went from the Union Street garages. Upon exiting the Union Street garages, Gutierrez directed the gray Lexus towards the highway. The confidential source then returned to the garage, where Gutierrez sold him over 125 grams of heroin in exchange for $7,500.
An officer on the surveillance team, Massachusetts State
B. Proceedings
In June 2016, Cruz-Rivera and Jimenez were charged by a grand jury each of one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute heroin, in violation of
II. DISCUSSION
We have jurisdiction under
A. Suppression Ruling
First, defendants challenge the district court‘s pre-trial rulings denying their motions to suppress evidence. Specifically, they challenge the admission of evidence collected as a result of the search of the car -- the bundled cash and cell phones -- and challenge the admission of their statements during the traffic stop into evidence. When reviewing a suppression ruling, the district court‘s findings of fact are reviewed for
1. Evidence Seized During the Traffic Stop
a. The district court ruling.
The district court, relying on Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), concluded that the traffic stop was lawful in
The automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment‘s warrant requirement permits officers to “seize and search an automobile prior to obtaining a warrant where they have probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband.” United States v. Silva, 742 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2014) (first citing Robinson v. Cook, 706 F.3d 25, 31-32 (1st Cir. 2013); and then citing Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 563-64 (1999)). Police have probable cause to search “where the known fаcts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696; United States v. Azor, 881 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2017). “Probable cause exists when ‘the facts and circumstances as to which police have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that evidence of a crime will be found.‘” Silva, 742 F.3d at 7 (quoting Robinson, 706 F.3d at 32). Search of a motor vehicle requires “particular facts indicating that, at the time of search, the vehicle or a container within it carried contraband, evidence of crime, or other seizable matter.” United States v. Infante-Ruiz, 13 F.3d 498, 502 (1st Cir. 1994).
A temporary detention of an individual during a traffic stop by police constitutes a seizure to which the protections of the Fourth Amendment apply. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)
Reasonable suspicion or probable cause may be based on the collective knowledge of several officers. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 231-32 (1985); United States v. Barnes, 506 F.3d 58, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2007). In such cases, we “look to the collective information known to the law enforcement officers participating in the investigation rather than isolat[ing] the information known by the individual arresting officer.” Azor, 881 F.3d at 8 (citing Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 772 n.5 (1983); United States v. Fiasconaro, 315 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 2002)); Barnes, 506 F.3d at 62.
c. Analysis.
Both Cruz-Rivera and Jimenez argue that the district court‘s conclusion that probable cause supported the traffic stop, search, and detention of defendants was erroneous, viewed either through Trooper DiCrescenzo‘s own reasonable suspicion during the traffic stop or when considered in conjunction with the collective
First, defendants’ argument that it is important to consider the differences between the “walled-off” stop here and a traffic stop that begins without an “investigatory motive,” is unavailing. Under our case law, as defendants acknowledge, “[a]n officer can stop a car if he sees a driver commit a traffic offense, even if the stop is just an excuse to investigate something else.” McGregor, 650 F.3d at 820 (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 810); see also id. at 822 (“[C]ourts do not ‘plumb[ ]’ an officer‘s ‘actual
Regardless of the collective knowledge of all officers involved, Trooper DiCrescenzo alone had reasonable suspicion of a drug offense from the outset of the traffic stop because Trooper Vitale specifically told him that the vehicle came from Leominster and likely had been involved in a drug transaction. Trooper DiCrescenzo‘s knowledge of this information was relevant to his assessment of the traffic stop and his investigation therefrom. His training and experience in narcotics investigations and in detecting indicators of criminal activity informed his judgments, and, as noted, we give weight to them accordingly. See Ruidíaz, 529 F.3d at 29. While every case turns on its own facts, we are informed by our decisions which have identified factual elements similar to those present here in affirming reasonable suspicion determinations. As has been noted, Trooper DiCrescenzo knew that defendants were travelling on a known drug-trafficking thoroughfare and were coming from a drug distribution area. Upon approaching the vehicle, Trooper DiCrescenzo witnessed both
Next, Trooper DiCrescenzo‘s further investigations ripened his reasonable suspicion into probablе cause. See Martinez-Molina, 64 F.3d at 726 (“[P]robable cause is a fluid concept -- turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts.“) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)). Trooper DiCrescenzo‘s reasonable suspicion prompted him to pursue questioning that would allow him “to investigate potential narcotics trafficking.” In questioning Cruz-Rivera, Trooper DiCrescenzo again heard that defendants had travelled only to Lawrence and was shown the black bag in the car; however, that bag revealed not the $1,000 that Cruz-Rivera stated was present in the vehicle, but “obviously tens of thousands of dollars” in bundles secured with elastic bands that based on his training and experience Trooper DiCrescenzo associated with narcotics trafficking. Taking a reasonable and lawful measure to protect himself from possible harm, Trooper DiCrescenzo moved Cruz-Rivera to the side when he obscured his view into the bag. See United States v. Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 1998) (officers “must be permitted to take measures . . . they believe reasonably necessary to protect themselves from harm, or to safeguard thе security of others“). Indeed, looking at the totality of the
Defendants’ attempts to exрlain away Trooper DiCrescenzo‘s basis for his reasonable suspicion and later probable cause are unsuccessful. First, as we have noted, reasonable suspicion is considered based on the totality of the circumstances presented to a law enforcement officer, Harris, 568 U.S. at 244, with measurable deference given to the officer‘s view of the situation, Ruidíaz, 529 F.3d at 29. This includes his knowledge of the vehicle based on statements made directly to him
In short, we affirm the district court‘s decision not to suppress evidence that resulted from the search of the vehicle because we conclude that the officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop and that reasonable suspicion
ripened into probable cause based on additional investigation. We find no reason to reach the applicability of the collective knowledge doctrine.2. Statements Made During the Traffic Stop
Defendants also argue that, because the stop exceeded a routine traffic stop, the questioning by Trooper DiCrescenzo was a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. They contend that their statements (including Jimenez‘s consent to the search of the vehicle and subsequently obtained evidence) made during the traffic stop should have been suppressed because Trooper DiCrescenzo did not administer Miranda warnings to either defendant.
Noting that “defendants argue that Trooper DiCrescenzo‘s roadside conduct was a de facto arrest thus requiring the trooper to provide them with Miranda warnings[,]” the district court did not make an explicit ruling on whether those warnings were required. Observing that a Terry stop can “morph into ‘custody’ for Miranda purposes,” and setting forth the factors that a court must consider to determine whether there was “restraint on freedom of movement associated with the formal arrest,” the court stated that “regardless of what the defendants said or did during the stop, Trooper DiCrescenzo was going to search the motor vehicle. His plan has no bearing on the question of whethеr the defendants were in custody.” In the district court‘s view, there was
We conclude that Miranda warnings were not required. Incriminating statements obtained during a custodial interrogation, where “a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way,” must be excluded from criminal prosecutions unless a defendant has waived the
In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984), the Supreme Court ruled that Miranda warnings are not required in “ordinary” traffic stops. However, as we have had occasion to observe, “[n]otably, despite its holding that, generally, law enforcement officers are not required to give Miranda warnings at traffic stops, the [Berkemer] Court established no categorical rule. Indeed, it held that Miranda warnings would be required ‘as soon as a suspect‘s freedom of action is curtailed to ‘a degree associated with formal arrest.‘‘” Campbell, 741 F.3d at 266 (emphasis in original) (first quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440, and then quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam)). Our task here is, as was set forth in Campbell, “to determine whether thе facts of a specific case indicate a situation more akin to a routine traffic stop, at which Miranda warnings are not required,” or indicate that detention has
The need for a Miranda warning turns on whether defendants here were in custody, but that determination is a two-step process. See, e.g., Melo, 954 F.3d at 339 (observing that the “inquiry into ‘whether an individual‘s freedom of movement was curtailed, however, is simply the first step in the analysis, not the last,‘” and “[o]nce we complete the freedom-of-movement step, we must still ask ‘the additional question whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.‘” (quoting Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012))).
For the first step, to “ascertain whether . . . a ‘reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave[,]‘” Howes, 565 U.S. at 509 (alteration in original) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)), we look to a number of factors “relevant to this aspect of our custody analysis,” Melo, 954 F.3d at 340. These include “whether the suspeсt was questioned in familiar or at least neutral surroundings, the number of law enforcement officers present at the scene, the degree of physical restraint placed upon the suspect, and the duration and character of the
We turn to the application of the custodial factors. As to the first factor in our freedom of movement analysis — whether the questioning took place in familiar or at least neutral surroundings — we note that here it was Route 84. On this record, it seems clear that these surroundings were not familiar to the out-of-state defendants. Our case law often describes highways and roadsides as neutral. See, e.g., Jones, 187 F.3d at 218 (“Although the location apparently was not familiar to [the defendant] and the area was not well-lit, a public highway is a neutral setting that police officers are not in a position to dominate as they are, for example, an interrogation room at a jailhouse.“); Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 421 (“[T]he typical traffic stop is conducted in public, and the atmosphere surrounding it is substantially less ‘police dominated’ than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda and subsequent cases in which Miranda has been applied.“). However, that a highway is not per se police-dominated in the same way that the interrogation room in a station house is does not mean that it is per se neutral.
With respect to the second factor — the number of officers — under our case law, the presence here was not excessive. For the relevant time frame, defendants were questioned by one officer, Trooper DiCrescenzo, although briefly aided by another translating officer via telephone. See, e.g., Campbell, 741 F.3d at 267 (finding four or five police officers questioning three defendants not to be a custodial interrogation); United States v. Crooker, 688 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2012) (determining a suspect was not in custody when “no more than two agents were in direct conversation” with the suspect at one time).
Regаrding the third factor, the degree of physical restraint placed on the suspects, we note that after Trooper DiCrescenzo had finished questioning Jimenez, he placed Jimenez in the back seat of his cruiser, informing him that he was not under arrest but was being placed in the vehicle for his safety (and also for the trooper‘s). The result was that Jimenez was physically locked in the back of the trooper‘s cruiser and unable to let himself out, and Cruz-Rivera, deprived of his driver, was thereby impacted. While Jimenez was in the back of the cruiser, Trooper DiCrescenzo questioned Cruz-Rivera and continued his investigation. Notably, because Jimenez‘s statements were made prior to being placed in the patrol car, his physical restraint is
As for the final factor — the duration and character of interrogation — the duration was not excessive under our case law. See, e.g., United States v. Hughes, 640 F.3d 428, 437 (1stCir. 2011) (characterizing a ninety-minute interview as “relatively short“)). The questioning was complete just over a half-hour after the initiation of the stop (regardless of the longer duration of the stop in its entirety). Further, Trooper DiCrescenzo‘s questioning lasted only a few minutes for each defendant. There is no testimony suggesting the trooper was hostile or made shows of force during the stop. In sum, “[t]here is no indication that the stop lasted for an inappropriately long period of time or that the officers acted with hostility toward the defendants.” Campbell, 741 F.3d at 267.
Although we have just surveyed the various custodial factors, we need not tote up how defendants fare as to them. In this case, we need not resolve the first step question of whether defendants’ freedom-of-movement was curtailed, because even assuming arguendo that it was, we conclude that defendants do not prevail with respect to the requisite second step of the custody analysis. “[A] suspect‘s lack of freedom to go away does not necessarily mean that questioning is custodial interrogation for purposes of Miranda.” United States v. Ellison, 632 F.3d 727, 729 (1st Cir. 2010). As we have noted, “whether an individual‘s freedom of movement was curtailed” is just “the first step in the analysis, not the last.” Melo, 954 F.3d at 339 (quoting Howes, 565 U.S. at 509). We still need to turn to “the additional question whether the relevant environment presents the same
Bearing all of this in mind, the stop here, “given the facts as found by the district court, ‘lacked the coercive element necessary to convert it into something more draconian,’ based on the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Fornia-Castillo, 408 F.3d 52, 65 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Lee, 317 F.3d at 32). In this regard, we are informed by comparing the
B. Cross-Examination
Next, Cruz-Rivera argues that the district court impermissibly limited questioning of Gutierrez in violation of the Confrontation Clause by not allowing full cross-examination on Gutierrez‘s discussions with the government regarding his plea deal and sentencing for two other federal drug offenses. During Gutierrez‘s cross-examination by Cruz-Rivera, the district court sustained objections by the government to limit questioning about Gutierrez‘s plea deal and cooperation agreements for two other drug offenses, so as to avoid him possibly recounting what his
“[W]e consider de novo whether the strictures of the Confrontation Clause have been met.” United States v. Diaz, 670 F.3d 332, 344 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Vega Molina, 407 F.3d 511, 522 (1st Cir. 2005)). Where there has been no violation of the Confrontation Clause, we review limitations placed on cross-examinаtion for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Jimenez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d 7, 21 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Martinez-Vives, 475 F.3d 48, 53 (1st Cir. 2007)). The Sixth Amendment‘s Confrontation Clause protects the right of defendants “to cross-examine witnesses who testify against them,” United States v. Casey, 825 F.3d 1, 23-24 (1st Cir. 2016), within reasonable limits to avoid “harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant,” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). A violation of the Confrontation Clause exists where a jury “might have received a significantly different
We conclude that the district court did not err in limiting cross-examination to avoid Gutierrez testifying about the contents of the sentencing guidelines or his out-of-court conversations and to prevent potential juror confusion. See Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994) (“providing jurors sentencing information . . . creates a strong possibility of confusion” because the jury has “no sentencing function“). The district court‘s concern regаrding the potential for juror confusion did not constitute an abuse of discretion. In fact, the court allowed Cruz-Rivera‘s questions on Gutierrez‘s possible bias because of his lower sentence through cooperation with the government. Defense counsel was still able to elicit Gutierrez‘s testimony about his understanding that his cooperation with investigators could result in a reduced sentence for his drug-trafficking offenses. Furthermore, in closing argument, Cruz-Rivera argued that the jury should not find Gutierrez‘s testimony credible, in part, because he knew that his cooperation with the government would result in him getting a lesser sentence. Thus, there was no harm to Cruz-Rivera because Gutierrez‘s potential
We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court‘s limitation on Gutierrez‘s cross-examination by defendants.
C. Closing Argument
Third, Cruz-Rivera argues that the prosecutor in closing argument improperly made statements that referred to facts not in evidence. According to Cruz-Rivera, the prosecutor made four erroneous statements to which he objected: (1) in describing Gutierrez‘s testimony, the prosecutor referred to a location associated with drug-dealing when Gutierrez‘s testimony indicated that the location named referred to an individual, (2) in using an audiovisual aide, the prosecution added a written caption to video evidence, (3) the prosecutor suggested the jury should interpret
In making closing arguments, a prosecutor “cannot refer to facts not in evidence,” but may “ask jurors to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.” United States v. Ponzo, 853 F.3d 558, 583 (1st Cir. 2017) (first citing United States v. Auch, 187 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 1999); then quoting United States v. Meadows, 571 F.3d 131, 145 (1st Cir. 2009)). Where a timely objection is lodged to a statement made by the government in closing argument, “[w]e review de novo whether the challenged portion of the government‘s closing argument was improper and, if so, whether it was harmful.” United States v. Gonzalez-Perez, 778 F.3d 3, 19 (1st Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Appolon, 695 F.3d 44, 66 (1st Cir. 2012)). That is to say, “we may reverse [the] convictions on the basis of the prosecutor‘s remarks only if they were ‘both inappropriate and
First, while Cruz-Rivera identifies four statements by the prosecutor that he claims introduced facts not in evidence, we disagree with those characterizations. As to the first statement, regarding Gutierrez‘s reference to “Centro,” which he claimed was a nickname for a person based on where that individual lived, the prosecutor‘s statement that Gutierrez “was talking about centro, not the center translation, but centro, a location, a place for drug dealing, а person,” was a summary of Gutierrez‘s testimony that was not clearly incorrect in a way that rises to the level of introducing facts not in evidence. Similarly, the caption on the
As to the prosecutor‘s suggestion to the jury that it interpret Gutierrez‘s testimony regarding “the truck from there” as a reference to drugs coming from Puerto Rico, this was not a statement of facts not in evidence, or a statement of fact at all. Rather, the prosecutor was asking the jury to make an inference based on the evidence that was presented. This was not an error. See Ponzo, 853 F.3d at 583.
Finally, the prosecutor‘s contention that the jury should conclude that Gutierrez and defendants had not left the garage as Cruz-Rivera claimed based on the surveillance team‘s observations comes closest to introducing facts not in evidence. While the government‘s evidence ambiguously identified the presence of two trucks at the Union Street garages during the surveillance, the government addressed this confusion through additional questioning of the testifying officers to clarify that the surveillance team confirmed that the second truck spotted was not Gutierrez‘s as Cruz-Rivera claimed. Thus, even this statement is not clearly a misstatement of the facts in evidence. In any event, this one arguable misstatement was isolated, the district court instructed the jury that closing arguments were not evidence, and the statement was far from so poisoning the well as to warrant a new trial. See Joyner, 191 F.3d at 54. Because the statement
D. District Court‘s Response to the Jury
Next, Jimenez argues that the district court incorrectly instructed the jury in response to a question asked during deliberations. After initially being instructed on the elements of conspiracy of and possession with intent to distribute at least one hundred grams of heroin, the jury asked two questions regarding conspiracy. Relevant here is the second question:
If you are aware that money confiscated during a traffic stop is illegal drug money, and you participate in the attempted retrieval of the сonfiscated money, are you a willful participant in the conspiracy agreement?
In response, the district court instructed the jurors:
[I]t‘s going to be very frustrating, and I apologize, but what I‘m going to ask you to do -- well, first of all, the answer is it depends, okay. And that is not the answer that I think you wanted to hear, but it depends upon a bunch of things. It depends upon the facts as you have found them and taking these facts and applying them to the instructions on -- that I gave you on the crime of conspiracy.
Okay. Now, I wish I could be more specific than that, but I can‘t because the instructions are an accurate recitation of the law, and you have to take those instructions and apply them to the facts as you find them to be.
Both before and after the district court answered the jurors’ question, Jimenez objected and noted that his position was that “No” was the appropriate answer. On appeal, Jimenez argues that the answer of “it depends” was legally incorrect because it either
When evaluating preserved challenges, we consider de novo whether the district court misstated the law and review for abuse of discretion whether the district court adequately explained the law. United States v. Monteiro, 871 F.3d 99, 114 (1st Cir. 2017); United States v. Symonevich, 688 F.3d 12, 24 (1st Cir. 2012).
We conclude that the district court did not misstate the law because the jury‘s question was inherently fact-bound. See United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 11 (1st Cir. 2009) (“Determining the contours of the conspiracy ordinarily is a factual matter entrusted largely to the jury.“). An answer that waded into the facts would have impermissibly intruded on the jury‘s “constitutional responsibility” “to determine the facts” and “to apply the law to those facts.” United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 514 (1995). The district court sufficiently explained to the jury that a finding of conspiracy depends on its factual findings and did not abuse its discretion in answering the jury‘s question. Rather, the district court correctly “exercise[d] caution” when answering a question that may have been dispositive to the jury‘s decision. United States v. Roberson,459 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we find no merit in the claim that the district court‘s response to the jury warrants disturbing the convictions.
E. Jimenez‘s Sentence
Finally, Jimenez argues that the district court erred in applying the mandatory minimum sentence under
Jimenez‘s argument cannot overcome binding precedent. In United States v. Collazo-Aponte, we held that drug quantity is not “an element of the offense to which the mens rea requirements should apply.” 281 F.3d 320, 326 (1st Cir. 2002). Instead,
(dictum); United States v. Villarce, 323 F.3d 435, 438-39 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Carrera, 259 F.3d 818, 830 (7th Cir. 2001); Sheppard, 219 F.3d at 768 n.2; United States v. Collazo, 984 F.3d 1308, 1326-29 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc); United States v. Briseno, 163 F. App‘x 658, 665-66 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished); United States v. Sanders, 668 F.3d 1298, 1310 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); United States v. Branham, 515 F.3d 1268, 1275-76 (D.C. Cir. 2008). We conclude that the holding of Collazo-Aponte, that “the government [must] prove only that the offense ‘involved’ a particular type and quantity of [a proscribed] drug, not that the defendant knew that he was distributing that particular drug type and quantity,” controls our review of convictions on three drug-trafficking counts. 281 F.3d at 326.4 We affirm the district court‘s application of the mandatory sentencing guidelines on that basis.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.
Notes
[a]t the time that the Lexus was stopped, the DEA had been involved in investigation spanning over seventeen months during which six controlled purchases of heroin had taken place from an individual whom the task force believed was being supplied by Gutierrez, from the Union Street address. The CS [confidential source] went to that address and attempted to purchase 125 grams of heroin. Gutierrez told the CS that he was expecting a delivery by 1:30 p.m. The Task Force observed him on his cellphone giving directions, and shortly thereafter surveillance saw the Lexus enter the garages and leave 2 hours later. When the CS returned to the garage shortly after the Lexus left, he bought heroin and was told by Gutierrez that the marks on his face were from the mask that he was wearing while he proсessed the heroin. These facts provide ample probable cause for the stop and search.