Minnesota v. Murphy

MURPHY MINNESOTA February 22, 1984 12, 1983 Decided Argued October No. 82-827. White, J., delivered opinion Court, in J., which C. Burger, and Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, O’Connor, JJ., and joined. Mar- J., shall, dissenting filed opinion, in STEVENS, J., joined which all Part but II-A which J., joined, post, p. 441. Brennan, Lynn

Robert H. argued cause for petitioner. With Bergstrom. him on the brief was Vernon E.

David A. Strauss the cause argued for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief Attorney Solicitor General Lee, Assistant were General Deputy Jensen, Frey. Solicitor General argued filed a brief cause and Mark S. Wernick respondent.* opinion the Court. delivered the

Justice White probation, Murphy, respondent who was on case, In this pro- during meeting with his admissions made Fifth and issue before us is whether officer. bation prohibit evi- introduction into Amendments Fourteenth subsequent Murphy’s the admissions dence of prosecution.

I questioned Minne- was twice Marshall teenage concerning rape apolis police murder of a brought. girl. charges In in connection were-then No arising prosecution out of sexual conduct for criminal awith pleaded guilty Murphy to a reduced incident, an unrelated prison imprisonment. charge sentenced to a He was of false years’ suspended, three was months, which term of 16 Murphy’s probation required, probation. of The terms pro- participate among things, in a treatment that he other report pro- Alpha gram House, offenders for sexual probation truthful with the directed, and be officer as bation comply with these condi- Failure to officer “in all matters.” Murphy result in his return to informed, could tions, hearing. App. sentencing probation revocation court for Pet. for Cert. C-38—C-35. ap- probation

Murphy at her office officer met with his probation proximately continued with- and his month, once a July the officer learned that he 1981, when out incident until probation program. offi- The the treatment had abandoned Joyce by Sheryl filed of amicus curiae urging affirmance was *A brief Lawyers. Defense Lowenthal for the National Association Criminal Schmidt, Inbau, Wayne E. W. Fred of amici curiae was filed A brief Police, P. Manak for the International Association of Chiefs and James Inc., et al.

cer then Murphy wrote to and informed him that failure to up meeting set would “result in request an immediate for a warrant.” Id., at meeting C-35. At a July, in late the offi- agreed cer not to seek probation revocation of nonpartici- pation in program the treatment Murphy since employed doing well in other areas. September Alpha 1981, an House counselor informed probation during officer that, course treatment, Murphy had rape admitted to a and murder in 1974. After superior, discussions with her the officer determined that the police should have this information.1 then She wrote to Mur- phy and him asked to contact her to plan discuss a treatment for the remainder probationary of his period.2 Although she did not police contact the meeting, before the officerknew in advance report any she would incriminat- ing statements.

Upon receipt of the letter, arranged to meet with officer in September her office on 28, 1981. opened The officer meeting by telling Murphy about information she had Alpha received from the House counselor parties stipulated in the trial court Alpha House was covered by federal statutes providing confidentiality patient records federally drug assisted and alcohol rehabilitation programs, 21 U. S. C. §1175 and 42 S. §4582, U. C. regulations adopted pursuant thereto, 2pt. CFR Although Alpha House legiti counselor mately informed Murphy’s probation officer of his incriminating admis sions, we assume, deciding, without the that counselor could pro not have vided the police. information to the id., 2.39(a), §§ 2.63; Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. assume, We well, as probation that the officer could not have made the counselor’s information available for use in a prosecu tion. 2.39(d) § 42 See CFR (1982);Tr. of Arg. Oral 6-7. 2It is unclear probation whether the officer could have Murphy ordered pursue additional treatment as a probation. condition of App. to Pet. for Cert. Widseth). C-14 (testimony of Mara But there is no evidence that she used treatment as a subterfuge or that her purpose sole towas obtain for police. statements the Under our case, view of the such a purpose would change not the Infra, result. 428, at 424 his evinced information this that expressing her belief

and angry about Murphy became treatment. for need continued and confidences a breach to be he considered what probation lawyer.”3 calling The a like Murphy “felt he that stated that deal have replied that officer primary their moment, the office; for the problem outside Mur- that crimes relationship the between the was concern inci- the and Alpha counselor House the phy had admitted imprisonment. false his conviction led to that dent false Murphy the meeting, denied During course committed he had charge, that admitted imprisonment persuade the attempted to and rape murder, unnecessary sev- because treatment further officer prior explained crimes. extenuating circumstances eral Murphy that meeting, told the officer of the conclusion At the authorities relay duty information had a she Murphy left the then in. encouraged himself to turn him probation officer Murphy days called later, Two office. sur- not to counsel had been advised he her told procured the then police. officer The himself render judge who from order and detention an arrest issuance charge. imprisonment false sentenced had an constitute did not Murphy’s statement concluded court The trial his real “[Wlhatever self-incrimination: against privilege invocation testi officer’s by the persuaded been, arewe may have intent any attorney] an talk to [to desire [the] express did mony App. confidentiality.” the breach civil suit for than other context reach did not Supreme Minnesota B-13 —B-14. Pet. for Cert. trial court’s question no reason see although we and, question, this unnec consideration further makes case analysis of the finding, our factual interrogation during custodial lawyer Although request essary. self-incrimination, v. Fare to invoke is sufficient custody, infra, (1979), Murphy 707, 709 C., 442 U. S. Michael meet at the attorney present an right to have federal no had and he 1982); People v. (CA2 382, 390 F. 2d Rea, States ing. See aff’d, (1968), 767, 769 2d N. Y. S. 163, 165, 295 2d W., App. Div. Ronald Gwinn, - W. Va. Hughes (1969); E. 2d 882 N. Y. 2d N. 5, 7 2dE. 290 S. -, -,

425 On grand October 29, jury 1981, a state returned an indict- charging Murphy ment first-degree murder.

Murphy sought suppress testimony concerning his con- ground fession on the that it was obtained violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court found custody” that he was not “in at the time of the statement and that the confession compelled was neither involuntary nor despite warnings the absence of required similar by to those (1966). Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed on grounds. federal constitutional 324 N. W. 2d 340 Although recognizing that the privilege generally self-executing, is not notwithstanding concluded that, custody the lack of in the Murphy’s usual sense, privilege failure to claim the when questioned “[bjecause was not fatal to his claim compulsory meeting, nature of the [Murphy] because respond under court order truthfully agent’s ques- to his agent tions, and because the had substantial reason to believe [Murphy’s] likely answers incriminating.” were to be Id., at 344. agent the court’s view, “the should have [Murphy] warned compelled self- questioned incrimination before she him and . . . her failure already do so, when she had report decided to his answers police, [Murphy’s] bars use of confession this trial.” Ibid. granted

We certiorari among to resolve a conflict state and concerning federal courts whether a statement made probationer prior warnings officer without subsequent admissible in a proceeding. 459 U. S. (1983).4 1145 We now reverse. 4Compare, g., e. Steele, United States v. Supp. 1385, 419 F. 1386-1387 (WD People Garcia, 1976); Pa. v. 9, 240 Cal. App. 12-13, 2d 49 Rptr. Cal. 146, (1966); Lekas, State v. 148 201 579, Kan. 582-584, 11, 442 P. 2d g., e. (1968), with, United Miller, States v. (CA10 643 F. 2d 715

1981); Holmes, States F. 2d (CA8), denied, cert. (1979); U. S. 873 State, Nettles (Fla. So. 2d App. 1971);

1—II—l that no provides in relevant Amendment, part, a wit- case to fee in any be compelled “shall person prohi- held that this been long It has himself.” ness against testify against to refuse a person not only permits bition also defendant, but in he trial which is himself at a criminal him in put official questions not to answer him “privileges informal, or criminal, formal civil or other proceeding, any in future criminal him incriminate might the answers where Turley, (1973). 70, 77 414 U. S. v. proceedings.” Lefkowitz In proceedings, all such may rightfully the privilege by protected

“a witness least until he is protected unless and answer refuse to and evidence compelled of his answers use against criminal case any subsequent therefrom in derived if . such protection, . . Absent is a defendant. which he are his answers answer, compelled he is nevertheless prosecution.” in a later criminal him inadmissible omitted). Id., at 78 (citations his con- reason of by this protection

A does not lose defendant impris- defendant notwithstanding crime; of a viction time he makes at the oned or on probation inad- are they are compelled those statements statements, if than that other for a crime trial subsequent missible Palmigiano, Baxter v. has been convicted. which case is whether (1976). in this The issue 308, 425 U. S. enjoyed right the Fifth Amendment at his trial into evidence by violated admission pro- him to his made statements of the prior another crime officer. bation State 513, (1974); State, 213, E. 2d App. 205 S. 131 Ga. Connell v. People (Iowa 1979); App. Hartman, 639, N. 2d 643-644 W. 802-804, 2d 421 N. Y. S.

Parker, 101 Misc. 2d A general We note obligation first that the appear and an- questions truthfully swer did Murphy’s not in itself convert voluntary otherwise compelled statements into ones. respect, Murphy position was in no better than the ordi- nary grand witness at jury a trial or before a subpoe- who is naed, sworn obligated to tell the truth, and answer pain contempt, unless he invokes the and shows that he faces a realistic threat of self-incrimination. The of answers compelled such a put witness to to him are not meaning

within the ofthe Fifth Amendment unless required the witness is to answer over his valid claim of the privilege. reasonably This much is clear from our cases. long

As this acknowledged: Court has [Fifth] “The speaks compulsion. of It does preclude testifying a voluntarily witness from in mat- may ters which incriminate him. If, he de- therefore, protection privilege, sires the of the he must claim it or he will not ‘compelled’ be considered to have been within meaning the of the Amendment.” United States v. (1943)(footnote omitted). Monia, 317 U. 424, S. 427 principle applied This involving variety been has in cases a investigations. criminal and noncriminal g., e. See, United v. (1970); States Rogers Kordel, 397 U. 1, S. 7-10 v. United (1951); States, 340 U. 367, S. 370-371 United States ex rel. Vajtauer Immigration, v. Commissioner 273 103, U. S. 112-113 together, These cases, taken “stand proposition ordinary that, if case, a witness under com pulsion testify claiming makes disclosures instead of privilege, government ‘compelled’ has not him incrimi nate himself.” v. Garner States, United U. 648, S. (footnote (1976) omitted). Witnesses who failed claim the privilege were once said to have it, “waived” but have re we cently “vague this abandoned term,” Green v. States, United an individual (1957), clear “made 184, 191 355 U. S. may making a know- privilege without benefit lose supra, States, v. intelligent United Garner ing waiver.” 654, at n. suggested that the in dicta

Although sometimes we have govern- way where might give in situations usual rule requested believe reason “substantial ment has incriminating,” v. United Roberts likely to be are disclosures adopted the (1980), never have we 552, U. S. States, 445 by notice “put the Government must a witness view that only he alone privilege” when formally availing of the himself tendency of the reasonably aware “is concurring). It J., n.* questions.” at Id., (Brennan, does not “[t]he recognized Constitution long has been questions,” States United asking criminative forbid dissenting), (Frankfurter, noth- J., supra, Monia, incriminating nature suggests prior ing cases in our priv- timely theof assertion question, itself, excuses aof Mandujano, 425 U. S. ilege. g., States e. See, (1976) opinion). (plurality If a witness —even ques- testify compulsion general one under —answers reasonably ex- government should and the both he tion that only whether need ask Court pect him, the to incriminate meaning “compelled” within particular was disclosure Amendment. the Fifth perhaps supra, first case Kordel, States compulsion make under

squarely a witness to hold timely manner, privilege in a assert the must disclosures interrogatories answering submitted illustrative. corporate corporation, against in case a civil

Government contemplated action criminal notified been had officer who against securing helpful in leads supplied and evidence him relationship Although be- conviction. his indictment “[w]ithout clear actions civil and tween Amend- officer] invoked have [the could question con- The Court do so. he did not privilege,” id., at ment any “[h]is time at failure hesitation without cluded assert the privilege constitutional position leaves him in no complain now compelled that he was give testimony against (footnote omitted). himself.” Id., at 10

B Thus is that a witness confronted with that the government reasonably should expect to elicit ordinarily evidence must privilege assert the rather than an swer if he desires incriminate himself. If he asserts privilege, “may he required not be question to answer a if there is some believing rational basis for that it will incrimi nate him, at least without being at that time assured that nei ther it may nor its fruits be used him” in subsequent proceeding. criminal (1975) Meyers, Maness v. 419 U. S. 449, 473 result) concurring J., in (emphasis origi in (White, nal). But if he chooses to answer, his choice is considered voluntary to be since was free to claim the penalty would suffer no as the result of his decision to do so. As Supreme the Minnesota recognized, Court applica general tion of this inappropriate rule is in certain well- defined situations. In each of those situations, however, some identifiable factor deny “was held to the individual a ‘free deny, choice to admit, to or to refuse to answer.’” Garner v. supra, United States, (quoting Lisenba v. (1941)). California, 314 U. S. 219, 241 Because we conclude present no such factor here, we hold that the Minne Supreme sota excluding erred officer’s testimony. A exception well-known general rule addresses the problem of confessions suspects obtained police from cus- tody.5 only Not interrogation is custodial ordinarily con- emphasize We Murphy was not under arrest and that he was free to leave at the end of meeting. the A different question pre would be sented if he had by been interviewed officer being while held police custody by or police themselves in a setting. custodial potentially “acutely aware of by are who officers ducted sought,” v. Garner incriminatory disclosures of the nature set- custodial also the 657, but S., at 424 U. States, United pressures “inherently compelling thought contain ting to resist will individual’s undermine work which do otherwise not speak he would compel where him See S., at U. Arizona, 384 freely.” v. Miranda so (1973). 246-247 218, 412 U. S. Bustamonte, v. Schneckloth compulsion iso- . . . caused overbearing dissipate “the To custody,” v. Wash- States police suspect in lation of ington, (1977), Miranda n. 187, 431 U. S. obtained statements of

required the exclusion suspect fails interrogation unless during custodial suitably being privilege after claim consequences of right silent remain of his warned 475-477. 467-469, S., 384 U. it. assert his failure of extraordinary consistently that this however, held, haveWe inher- of the apply the context outside safeguard not “does de- interrogations was for which ently custodial coercive supra, at 560. States, signed.” v. United Roberts Murphy recognized that Supreme Court The Minnesota incriminating admis- custody” made his when he “in subject restrictive number of to a sure, to be was, He sions. aspects he would life, of his governing various conditions custody” purposes habeas federal for regarded “in as Cunningham, U. S. corpus. See Jones broadly defined custody has been context But Hensley 243; id., at purposes writ, to effectuate (1973), and cus- Municipal 345, 349-351 411 U. S. Court, v. tody narrowly circum- more purposes has been Miranda (1977) 429 U. S. Oregon Mathiason, scribed. appropriate in curiam). standard the narrower (per Under “in it is context, clear Miranda protection receiving since custody” purposes Miranda “ move- freedom restraint or arrest no ‘formal there was Cali- arrest.” degree a formal associated ment’ v. Beheler, 463 (1983) U. S. fornia 1121, 1125 (per curiam) (quoting Oregon v. supra, 495). Mathiason, Notwithstanding the inapplicability of Miranda, the Min- Supreme nesota Court held probation that the officer’sfailure to inform of the Fifth barred use his confession at trial. Four factors have been ad- support vanced in of this conclusion, but we find them, alone or in combination, insufficient to Murphy’s excuse failure to claim privilege timely in a manner. probation

First, the compel officer could Murphy’s attend- ance and truthful answers. Supreme The Minnesota explain failed to how this transformed a routine interview into inherently an setting. coercive In our view, this factor subjected Murphy to intimidating less pressure than is im- posed grand jury witnesses, who are sworn to tell the placed truth and in setting conducive to truthtelling. Al- though warnings in both might contexts dissipate serve to “any possible coercion or resulting unfairness from a witness’ misimpression that he must truthfully answer questions even incriminating] aspects,” United States Washington, v. 431 U. S., at 188, we have never they held that must be given grand jury witnesses, id., at 186, and we decline to require them here totality since the of the circumstances is not such as probationer’s to overbear Rogers free will. Richmond, 365 U. S. 534, 544

Second, the consciously officer sought incrimi- nating evidence. already explained We have that this factor give does not rise to a self-executing privilege, supra, at pause 428, only we emphasize here police officers questioning persons suspected of consciously crimes often seek incriminating statements. The mere fact that an in- vestigation has suspect focused on a trigger does not the need warnings Miranda settings, noncustodial Beckwith United States, 425 (1976), U. S. 341 and the offi- knowledge cer’s and intent bearing have no on the outcome of this case. prior crimi about expect Murphy did Third, attending the before counsel seek could conduct

nal probation that is probation such nature meeting. But topics range of a wide on questioned expect to be should ers Moreover, criminality. past relating their to treatment to discuss need suggested a which letter, officer’s have would excused, already been Murphy had which from informa new that to conclude probationer reasonable led a Murphy’s situ any event, her attention. come had tion facing that from indistinguishable regard in this was ation settings and noncustodial questioned are suspects who scope in anof unaware are who jury witnesses grand potential defendants. they considered are vestigation that or 188-189; Beck supra, at Washington, States See supra, 346-348. States, v. United with or against abuse guard no observers were there Fourth, suspect is a when true bewill often Again, this trickery. warnings no interrogation, where noncustodial subjected to probation of- allege that not Murphy does required. are for further need with concerned legitimately not ficer would her actions that conclude cannot we treatment, and state- his that believe probationer to a reasonable led have probationer can- A confidential. remain would her ments “is probation officer his fact ignorance pretend greater or lesser a allied, is such as officer, and peace C., v. Michael peace Fare officers.” fellow his extent, with Chavez-Salido, (1979). Cabell See S. U. implied express or some Absent S.U. charged knowl- may contrary, be also he to the promise report duty bound probation officer edge “the atten- his comes when by [probationer] wrongdoing him- [probationer] from by communication if even tion, fact supra, at 720. C., v. Michael Fare self.” being surprise informed expressed no apparently police, available made would statements any misled suggests that strongly moreover, confidential. remain statements expectation that App. to Pet. for Cert. (testimony C-21 Widseth); of Mara id., at C-28 (testimony of Murphy). Marshall Even cursory comparison interrogation custodial probation interviews inaptness reveals the of the Minnesota Supreme analogy Court’s to Miranda. Custodial arrest is convey said to suspect message that he has no choice but to submit to the officers’will and to confess. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 456-457. unlikely It is that a arranged interview, by appointment mutually at a convenient give time, would rise to a impression. similar Moreover, custodial arrest thrusts an individual into “an un- atmosphere” familiar interrogation or “an environment . . . purpose created for no subjugate other than to the individual to the will of his examiner.” Id., at Many psy- chological ploys discussed capitalize in Miranda on the sus- pect’s unfamiliarity with the officers and the environment. Murphy’s regular meetings probation with his officer should have served to familiarize him with her and her officeand to insulate him psychological from might intimidation that over- bear his desire to privilege. claim the Finally, the coercion inherent in interrogation custodial large derives in measure interrogator’s from an insinuations interrogation that the will continue until a confession is obtained. Id., at 468. Since Murphy physically was not restrained and could have left the any compulsion office, might he have felt possibility from the terminating that meeting the would have led revocation of probation comparable was not pressure suspect aon painfully who is aware literally that he escape per- cannot sistent interrogator.6 custodial

6Neither the trial court nor the Minnesota Supreme Court found that Murphy believed his that could have been revoked for leaving meeting the or that he remained in the office for this reason. Since the meeting was scheduled at mutually convenient time and was arranged pursuant to a request that did not include any threat, unlikely that Murphy believed that terminating meeting the jeopardized have his probationary status. the ben- Murphy claim cannot therefore, conclude, We Fifth the general rule that the exception to the first efit self-executing. not privilege is Amendment when claimed privilege must general rule inappli deemed been also has is threatened self-incrimination penalized privilege is theof the assertion where cases cable . . . silent, and to remain “foreclos[e] choice a free as to so testimony.” v. United Garner compe[l] . . . proba revocation Because atS.,U. States, untruthful was if he threatened tion in compelled to make argues officer, privilege. claiming the instead criminating disclosures find it un we force, without is not Although contention this examination. on close persuasive only State “penalty” cases, so-called each of In sought testify, also but appear and compelled individual an privilege Amendment forgo him to induce “capable of sanctions or other impose economic threatening to forbids.” which forcing self-incrimination Cunningham, S.U. Lefkowitz witnesses’ attempt override cases, most ruled the Court unsuccessful, proved prior good threat. its constitutionally make could State v.Men Sanitation 79-84; Turley, S., 414 U. Lefkowitz (1968); 283-284 280, S. 392 U. Sanitation, Commissioner (1968). These 273, S. 392 U. Broderick, v. Gardner impose may substan- not “a State clear make cases exercise to elects a witness penalties because tial against testimony give right to Amendment Occa- supra, Cunningham, v. himself.” Lefkowitz pressure to the succumbed individual sionally, however, an privilege, disclosed and assert upon failed placed him, sought to later the State which incriminating information, Garrity Newv. prosecution. in criminal a against him use Jersey, the Court (1967), case, a such 493 U. S. 385

435 held that an individual discharge threatened with from em- ployment exercising for privilege by had not waived it responding questions standing rather than right on his remain Id., silent. at 498-499. punishment

The threat of privilege reliance on the distinguishes cases of this sort ordinary from the case merely which a required witness is appear give testi- mony. A may require probationer State a appear discuss matters that probationary affect his status; such a requirement, give without more, does not rise to a self- executing privilege. may The result ques- be different if the put probationer, tions proba- however relevant to his tionary status, call for answers that would incriminate him in pending prosecution. or later criminal There is thus a sub- stantial in our concluding basis cases for if the State, expressly either implication, or asserts that invocation of privilege would lead to probation, revocation of it would have penalty created the classic situation, the failure to as- privilege sert the would be probationer’s excused, and the compelled answers would be deemed and inadmissible in a prosecution.7 criminal 7 The situation would be different if questions put probationer to were relevant to his probationary posed status and no realistic threat of incrimination in a separate proceeding. If, example, a resi dential imposed restriction were as a condition of probation, it ap pear unlikely that a violation of that condition would a criminal be act. Hence, a claim of the Fifth privilege in response to questions relating to a residential condition could validly rest ground on the might answer be used probationer incriminate if the was tried for another Neither, crime. in our view, would privilege be available on ground answering such might reveal a violation of the requirement residential and result in the probation. termination of Al though a proceeding revocation comport must requirements due process, it is not a criminal proceeding. Gagnon Scarpelli, U. S. (1973); States Johnson, 455 F. 2d (CA5), denied, cert. S.U. as Just there is right no to a

jury trial before may revoked, neither is compelled self-incrimination probationer. available It follows that whether or not the question answer to a about a requirement residential probation con- Murphy’s inquire whether must so we Even testimony give appear and him to merely required ditions or whether probationary status his relevant matters about mak- between required to choose him and they further went conditional jeopardizing his incriminating and ing statements Min- that conclude we remaining Because by liberty silent. step, impermissible extra, attempt take did nesota privilege was Amendment Fifth Murphy’s that hold we self-executing. that Murphy informed was already indicated, have

weAs all in probation officer his truthful required to be of in revocation result so could do failure that matters Supreme Court opinion the Minnesota of probation. its conclusion case, but indeed this clear made adequate give failure probation officer’s that the incriminating statements of warnings use barred ground refusal on the not rest trial did justified revo- have would information furnish im- recognized that Although court probation. of cation exercise penalty a valid posing a claim of valid be no revocation, can there by the threat compelled in revoca- can be used sought information ground on proceedings.

tion answers validly insist may moreover, a State indicate, cases Our probation its sensibly administer hence incriminating questions even used may not be answers required recognizes that long as system, as of incrimination. the threat eliminates thus proceeding in a criminal immunity as a result “right to circumstances, probationer’s such Under v. Com Men Sanitation stake,” at not be testimony would compelled Cunningham, v. (1968); see 280, 284 Sanitation, 392 U. S. Lefkowitz missioner of Turley, U. S. v. (1977); 801, 805-806 S. Lefkowitz U. nothing (1968), and 273, 278 Broderick, U. S. v. (1973); Gardner revoking probation from prevent State Constitution in the Federal or condition express an that violated to answer a refusal to be of factors of a number as “one silence probationer’s using the from other conditions deciding whether of fact” finder considered Cunningham, supra, violated. have been Lefkowitz 308, 317-318 Palmigiano, U. S. Baxter n. 5. See

437 privilege could impermissibly foreclose a free choice to re- main silent, N. W. 2d, at purport 342-343, it did not to find probation that Minnesota’s revocation statute had such an effect. The court relied instead on the Murphy fact that legal was compulsion under meeting attend the and to truthfully answer questions probation of a officer who anticipated incriminating answers. Id., at 344. Such com- pulsion, however, is indistinguishable from any that felt required witness iswho appear give testimony, and, as already we have made clear, it is insufficient to excuse Murphy’s failure to privilege exercise the timely in a manner.

The state attempt court did not precise to define the con- Murphy’s tours of obligation respond questions. On Murphy’s probation its face, proscribed only condition false nothing statements; said about his freedom to decline to an- particular swer certainly sugges- contained no tion that his waiving conditional on his his respect with to further criminal prosecution. point “At this history virtually our every schoolboy is concept, familiar with the if language, not the [Fifth Amendment].” Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 439 Murphy, although Yet right he had a to do so, see (Minn. State v. Austin, 295 N. 2d 1980), W. did not seek clarification of the condition. Without the benefit of an authoritative state-court construction of the condition, are we hesitant to read into requirement the truthfulness an obligation additional Murphy that raising legit- refi'ain from objections imate furnishing might information that lead to his conviction for another crime. employ subjective

Whether we objective or an test, there no reasonable basis concluding that Minnesota at- tempted impermissible attach an penalty to the exercise of privilege self-incrimination. There is no direct Murphy evidence that confessed because he feared that his probation would be if revoked he remained silent. Unlike police Garrity officers in Jersey, v. New S.U. during crucial expressly informed Murphy (1967), assertion an probation officer meeting his penalty. And imposition of a in the result privilege compunction about no apparently felt Murphy fact the adamantly charge which imprisonment denying false rape mur- admitting before convicted had been did revocation “threat” suggests strongly der resistance. overwhelm might belief did harbor If privilege, that exercising Fifth Amendment the for revoked have decisions Our reasonable. have been would belief carry constitutionally out could the State that clear made of the legitimate exercise the probation for revoke a threat surprising, then, that is not privilege. It Amendment Fifth suggested any has officer nor state court the state neither sub- the State Court, in this in its brief Indeed, otherwise. proba- revoke legally not, could not, it would that mits calling information for refusing answer for tion proceedings. separate criminal in incriminate that Tr. of Oral also and n. 36-39, Petitioner Brief Arg. 10-14. 7-8, accurately sum- statute, which revocation Minnesota’s App. to Pet. probation, see Murphy’s notice in marized appears “[w]hen it revocation authorizes C-34, Cert. C-33— of his any conditions the has violated defendant which guilty of misconduct been has probation or otherwise Minn. sentence.” imposing or execution warrants this under automatic is not § Revocation 609.14 Stat. revocation, a desires probation officer if provision. Even State, hearing, v. Pearson afforded must probationer (1976); 492-493 490, N. 2d 241 W. 289-290, 287, Minn. 386-387, Young, Minn. Halverson rel. ex State find (1967), must court 2d N. W. the violation specific condition, he violated for confinement need and that inexcusable, or intentional Austin, favoring probation. State policies outweighs the supra, at 250. We have not any been advised of case which attempted Minnesota has to revoke merely probationer because a refused to make nonimmunized disclo- concerning sures his own criminal light conduct; and, of our proscribing decisions penalties threats of for the exercise of rights, Murphy Amendment reasonably could not have feared that the privilege assertion of the would have led to revocation.

Accordingly, we cannot conclude that was de- claiming terred from privilege by reasonably perceived threat of revocation. exception

A third general requirement timely of a assertion of the Fifth privilege, closely related penalty exception, developed has been in the context of occupational the federal gamblers. and excise taxes on recognition pervasive regulation gambling activities claiming fact that in lieu of filing a return would tend to incriminate, the Court has held privilege may be exercised failing to file. Marchetti v. United (1968); States, 390 U. S. 39 Grosso v. (1968). United States, 390 U. S. 62 Mackey also v. (1971). United States, 401 U. S. 667 “[MJaking privilege a claim of when the disclosures were requested, i. e., when the returns were due, would have identified the gambler. claimant as a The Court there forgave fore requirement the usual that the claim of privilege presented be for evaluation in favor of a ‘claim’ particular gambler silence. ... If a would not have by filing incriminated himself the privi tax returns, the lege justify would not a failure to file.” Garner v. United States, 424 S.,U. at 658-659, n. 11. taxpayer But, while a who privilege claims the instead of fil-

ing gambling necessarily tax returns identifies himself aas gambler, probationer a confronted ques- 440 claiming effectively problem no ordinarily have will

tions ex- There requested. are disclosures time at privilege requirement that forgive the reason no therefore, ists, timely manner.8 ain evaluation presented be claim H-1HH t—i in- Murphy revealed summary, since in conclude, We asserting Fifth his timely instead criminating information compelled not were disclosures privilege, Amendment in- compelled to been had not he Because incriminations. successfully invoke not could himself, criminate volunteered information prevent the privilege a criminal against in him being used from officer prosecution. Supreme Court Minnesota judgment

Reversed. a requires (1971), States, U. S. Mackey United Nothing recog before arose case, which In that conclusion. different re filed a taxpayer returns, tax gambling file not to a nized income prosecution ain criminal evidence as introduced turn to have disclosures considered the Court majority of A evasion. tax id., at opinion); (plurality id., at 672 incriminations, compelled been J., (Douglas, id., at 713 judgment); concurring in J., (Brennan, 704-705 because use their against immunized not taxpayer dissenting), but the S., at U. effect. retroactive given not were Grosso Marchetti judg concurring J., (Harlan, id., 700-701 opinion); (plurality have been would disclosures taxpayer’s assuming that ment). Even does retroactively, “[i]t and Grosso Marchetti applied if we had excluded use immunized would taxpayer necessarily that follow when returns tax gambling made disclosures States, 424 Garner all.” file at failure justified have making incrimi words, taxpayer other n. S.U. could Grosso after Marchetti filed return aon disclosures nating prosecution criminal in a disclosures those use the necessarily prevent privilege. the way to assert effective an afforded been had because -Marchetti post the analogous believe, is situation, we Murphy’s effectively failed but privilege the asserted have he could taxpayer: Since incriminations. compelled as viewed cannot be so, disclosures do with whom Justice Justice joins, Marshall, Stevens and with whom joins except as to Part Justice Brennan dissenting. II-A, opinion helpfully scope clarifies the privilege against self-incrimination may be asserted by probationer when questions by asked an officer of the State. As points majority principles out, two shape the probationer’s rights. constitutional probation First, because proceedings revocation are not criminal in Gagnon nature, Scarpelli, 411 U. (1973), S. and because the Fifth compelled ban on applies self-incrimination only to criminal proceedings, possibility that a truthful answer question to a might result in the revocation probation of his does probationer not accord the right constitutional to re respond. fuse to Ante, n. 7. proba 435-436, Second, a tioner retains enjoyed by all citizens to refuse “to answer questions put official any to him in proceed . . . ing, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future proceedings,” criminal Lefko Turley, witz v. 414 U. S. 70, 77 Ante, at 426. From foregoing propositions, it power follows of a compel State probationer given to answer a question varies depending upon the manner in which probationer’s might answer incriminate him. If response a truthful might reveal that he has violated a condition of but subject would not him prosecution, may State insist respond that he may penalize him refusing to do so.1 See ante, at By 435-436, n. if contrast, there is a chance that a truthful given answer question to a ex pose probationer liability for a crime different from crime for which already he has been right convicted, he has a to refuse to answer and may the State attempt to coerce 1 Thisis not to suggest that a State must or organize should its system ain fashion that compels probationers respond under these cir cumstances, only that a State is prevented by the Federal Constitution from doing so.

442 majority the 435. As at ante, right.2 See forgo that

him to to might both lead question to a if answer points the out, has the State revocation, to sanctions criminal respond, in return probationer insisting the that option of the liability.3 immunity criminal from of express guarantee an for however, option, that it exercises Unless 7.n. Ante, right “to probationer’s the may with interfere not State the unfettered speak in the to chooses he unless silent remain Hogan, 378 U. S. Malloy v. will,” own his of exercise (1964). analysis in its not lies opinion of the in the flaw The in but probationer, ato rights available constitutional the of case. in this violated rights not were finding those that its incrimi- Murphy revealed “since that, majority concludes asserting Fifth timely his of instead nating information compelled in- were disclosures privilege, his is my conclusion that view, Ante, at criminations.” of dealing invocations with prior cases our with inconsistent reasons, Mur- independent For two Amendment. Fifth against self-incrimination privilege his claim phy’s to failure regarding inquiry probation officer’s his responding before for- result did murder in the participation ain his admissions object the use right of his feiture Minne- the State First, prosecution. subsequent criminal proba that conduct whether no difference It makes which crime for or after before committed reveal might tioner itself. conviction after or or before convicted Amend- “the that persuaded I remain Brennan 3 Justice any jurisdiction requires self-incrimination against ment’s immunity absolute grant him himself incriminate a man compels testi- revealed any transaction prosecution from laws its under (Brennan, J., (1971) 548, 562 York, U. S. New Piccirillo mony.” however, Court, majority A dissenting). Marshall, J., joined as not violated is prohibition constitutional the view adheres use, in a criminal immunity accorded witness long as g., e. See, thereof. Lefkowitz fruits testimony or the prosecution, 70, 84 Turley, 414 U. S. sota had threatened penalty refusing respond questions; our decisions make clear that such a target threat duty its relieves to claim the benefit of the Fifth Amendment. Second, under the circumstances obliged prove case, this the State was Murphy aware of rights freely his constitutional waived them; showing nothing more than that failed assert his answering, before carry State failed to its burden.

I majority As the acknowledges, if an officer of a State asks person question a a under deprive circumstances that him of a “‘free deny, choice to admit, to or to refuse to answer,’” question and he answers the attempting without to assert privilege against response self-incrimination, his will be “compelled” deemed to have been and will be as inadmissible against evidence him. Garner v. United States, S.U. (1976)(quoting 648, 656-657 Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. (1941)); see ante, at 429. Our cases make clear that the State will deprived be person found to have of such a “free choice” if it threatens him with a substantial sanction if respond. he refuses to Turley, 414 U. S., at Lefkowitz 82-83. Two foregoing rules flow from principle: If the presents person State with the “Hobson’schoice”of incrim inating suffering or penalty, himself and he nevertheless respond, refuses to constitutionally State cannot make good penalize on its threat him. Id., at 77; Sanitation Men v. Commissioner Sanitation, 392 U. S. 280, (1968); Gardner (1968). v. Broderick, 392 U. S. Conversely, if person the threatened decides to talk instead asserting privilege, the State cannot use his admissions against subsequent him in a prosecution. Garrity Jersey, New 385 U. S. 493, might appear

It that these two rules would defeat one person presented another. A appears with what to be a charged Hobson’s choice could knowledge be with the that, option may choose either precedents, he this Court’s under nei- can use the State impunity. awareness His with him seem his confessions nor his silence ther supposedly the situa- inherent in “compulsion” eliminate argued might because that, be specifically, it More tion.4 asserting penalized person be cannot settled is now talk rather privilege, if he decides his Fifth Amendment right silent, his state- to remain constitutional assert his than voluntary. deemed ments should consistently rules allow the two refused has

This Court way.5 refusal derives Our in this other each to undercut many probably most —of First, two considerations. from — they refuse to if sanctions persons threatened knowledge this sufficient lack official answer is idle. threat the State’s to be aware decisions Court’s self-incriminating attempt state- coerce Second, the State’s penalize by promising is itself constitution- silence ments profited possibility that the State ally the mere offensive, and the use of attempt it to make to forbid is sufficient the from supra, Broderick, v. Gardner it elicited. See admissions at 279. person threat- has been who reasons, when

For similar self-incriminating statements, we penalty with a makes ened 4 The for Constitu Tomorrow: Case Friendly, The Fifth Amendment See Klein, 385 (1968); Spevak v. Change, L. U. Cin. Rev. tional (1967) (White, J., dissenting). 511, 531 U. S. prior deci its Turley, supra, the described Thus, in v. Court Lefkowitz following Broderick, (1968), terms: in the sion Gardner in 392 U. S. invalid and Garrity any may have been “Although under executed waiver purport evidence, did not the State answers elicited inadmissible any penalty the attempted coerce a waiver on recognize and instead as much requiring statutory provision Hence, employment.... State’s loss not stand.” immunity could waive for his [appellant’s] dismissal refusal acknowledged that S., opinion, Court at 80-81. In the 414 U. same S., at 414 U. Garrity law. good remained rule itself announced line vitality 79-80, today question either 82. The does Court Garrity. originating in in Gardner or the originating line of cases inquire have declined to speak whether his decision to proximate result of the threat. In most cases, would person prove difficult for the that, but for the threat, he peace would have held his and that no intervening other (such conscience) pangs causes as him induced to confess.6 having pressures The State, repugnant exerted to the Con- stitution, profit should not be allowed to uncertainty from the pressures those whether ity had their intended effect. Sensitiv- foregoing concerns is reflected in our decision in Garrity Jersey, swpra. petitioners New in that case argued had never that their confessions were in fact induced by warning they might State’s they be fired if re- fused to answer, and the lower courts had not so found.7 Nevertheless, petitioners’ concluded statements “were infected the coercion inherent in this questioning scheme of and cannot voluntary.” be sustained as (footnote omitted). Id., at 497-498 majority

In sum, the suggests errs when it that, claim the benefit of person Amendment, a who made self- being statements after pen- threatened with a alty if he remained apprehension silent must show that his carry that the State promise objectively out its ” “reasonable, ante, at 438. Our decisions make clear that the 6Such proof especially would be difficult in cases in which the defendant has confessed to a crime, serious thereby subjecting himself penalty— to a in the protracted form of incarceration —far more severe penalty than the that the State impose threatened to if he Despite refused to answer. the implausibility, under such circumstances, allegation of an that the State’s threat induced the confession, we have suggested never that the defendant would be unable to avail himself of the Garrity. doctrine in enunciated In deed, the in Garrity presented situation jüst itself the fits scenario described. 7As Justice Harlan observed in dissent: “All of petitioners consented give statements, displayed none any significant hesitation, none suggested that the decision to offer pos information was motivated sibility discharge.” S., 385 U. at majority 505. The question did not Justice Harlan’s description of the case. testimony subsequent all render sufficient is threat alone ma- supra, Likewise, 443-444.8 at See “compelled.” duty has a defendant implies it when errs jority motivation, other some threat, and the State’s prove that our ante, Under 437-438. at see confession, prompted pre- State only prove need the defendant precedents, choice and impermissible constitutionally him with a sented supra, 444-445. at himself. incriminated thereupon he it case, to this applied are principles foregoing When 1974 murder confession Murphy’s clear that becomes Murphy When “compelled.” to have been must deemed be forth setting a letter given probation, was placed discharged. perti- he was under which the conditions provide: of the letter nent portions If released. conditionally only are you present

“For the you of your the conditions with comply you at discharged expiration to be may expect the require- comply If fail to you stated. period time any at be returned may ments you . . . or commitment. hearing further fol- strictly obey necessary you “It will be conditions: lowing in mat- all Officer Probation your

“BE TRUTHFUL to (emphasis to Pet. for Cert. C-33 — C-34 App. ters.” original). had that he letter, attesting sign required Id., C-35. understood the instructions.

read and (1964) (White, J., dissent Illinois, 378 U. 478, 8 Cf. Escobedo S. better, know (“If does not answer and is told he must ing) an accused be used could resulting very that the admissions doubtful him”). It is well context. Fourth Amendment principle A obtains similar nothing more than consists that a to search that established “consent” warrant colorably search authority” of a valid “presumed submission (1979); York, Sales, New 442 U. S. g.,E. Inc. Lo-Ji invalid. Carolina, Bumper v. North U. S. The majority contends that the foregoing passages merely required Murphy to answer nonincriminating questions him forbade to make false statements to his probation officer. Ante, at 437. The majority’s interpretation, which is essen- tial to its result, is simply incredible. A reasonable layman would interpret the imperative, “be truthful in ... all mat- ters,” aas command to answer all honestly questions pre- sented. Any ambiguity inherent in the language of the di- rective is dispelled by its context. The to be duty truthful in dealings with the probation officer is listed as the first term of the conditions of probation. The critical phrase is capital- ized. And the injunction is immediately preceded an instruction “to obey strictly the following conditions.”9

In short, State Minnesota presented with a Murphy set of official instructions that a reasonable man would have interpreted to require him, upon pain of the revocation probation, to answer truthfully all questions asked by his probation officer.10 Probation revocation surely constitutes a 9The Solicitor General observes: required “Citizens are often to be truth ful in their dealings with the government; any person a crime commits if, for example, he makes a false statement to a federal law enforcement officer in connection with a matter within the jurisdiction. officer’s U. S. C. 1001.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae pre It is cisely because proscriptions such government on lying to are officials so common emphatic that the injunction Murphy’s probation contained con ditions must interpreted be impose on him more obligations. extensive 10 Atthe time confession, made his no Minnesota court had authoritatively interpreted probation either the or the condition issue Minnesota statute from which it derives. Nor can definitive construc tion of these aspects crucial of state opinions law found in of either the trial court or the Supreme Minnesota Court in this case. After cat aloging the considerations on which it its ruling Murphy’s founded con fession admissible, court “Against trial observed: these factors is the fact that a condition was that he be honest with his probation officer, and that he ostensibly was there further treat discuss regard ment in to his current probation. through Failure to follow either of these could have resulted revocation of the potential imprisonment.” App. to foregoing Pet. for Cert. B-14. The therefore, precedents, our Under sanction.”11 “substantial to if he refused that sanction with Murphy threatening by authority of constitutional itself deprived answer, Minnesota prosecu- in a criminal answers subsequent Murphy’s use to him. tion unper- are avoid conclusion to efforts

The majority’s to ask failing for faults Murphy First, majority suasive. of the terms “clarification” for a officer his probation in- the State which Ante, by The letter at probation. no contained his probation terms of of the Murphy formed “clarification”; on a to such entitled was suggestion re- that he Murphy informed letter contrary, enumerated the conditions strictly” “obey quired im- More in his “commitment.” result might so to do failure a establish decisions above, our indicated as portantly, a Murphy under assumed that trial court that the suggests passage officer, is too probation but by his presented questions all duty to answer of the “interpretation” upon as an fairly relied ambiguous be in- Murphy’s confession Supreme Court held Because State condition. whether occasion to decide reasons, not have it did different for admissible have probation officer would by his asked refusal to answer majority professes probation. The Murphy to revocation exposed con- state-court of an authoritative “hesitant,” the benefit “[w]ithout be duty to Murphy a impose upon condition,” it to to construe of the struction in- Ante, reasons For at 437. duty not to lie. to a in addition answer to me hesitation; majority’s it seems text, I share the do not dicated require interpreted the letter man would have that a reasonable clear of the import agreed that the if I But even questions. all to answer him disposition majority’s object to I apparent, phrase is crucial Minnesota would be remand proper course the case. construction” provide “authoritative an Supreme to allow it dispute revolves. law around which of state provisions made use of statements forbidding line of critics of the cases Even the acknowledge sanction an economic threatened a witness a State after refusing to answer jail person put may not threaten that State Greenawalt, 676; Silence Rev., L. at Friendly, U. Cin. questions. See 15, 66-68 Mary L. Rev. Right, 23 Wm. & a Moral Constitutional as person told may penalized the State that he refusing to answer does responsibility not bear the to determine whether the good State would or could make on its threat. swpra, majority 443-444. Second, the relies on the absence of “direct evidence that confessed because he feared that his would be if revoked he remained ” silent. precedents, Ante, at 437. Under our no such “direct evidence” of a causal link between the threat and the re- sponse required prevent in order to the use in a criminal prosecution Murphy’s supra, confession. See at 444-445.

In Murphy’s conclusion, because terms of de- prived deny, him of “a free choice to admit, to or to refuse to answer” when his officer confronted him with the allegation that he had committed the 1974murder, our deci- sions against forbid introduction into evidence him of his confession.

II impaired Even if Murphy’s Minnesota had not freedom to respond respond toor refuse to to re- garding the 1974 I murder, would hold his confession inad-

missible because, view of the circumstances under which interrogated, he was duty prove the State had a to Mur- phy privilege against waived his self-incrimination, and it has showing. not made such a

A It is now privilege settled that, most contexts, the against self-executing. “[I]n self-incrimination is not ordinary person questioned by if case,” an officer of the damaging State asserting makes disclosures instead of privilege, right object subsequent he forfeits his use of against his admissions him. States, Garner United person S., U. at 654. This if forfeiture even is occurs subject general legal duty respond to a officer’s questions. Washington, See United States v. 431 U. S. (1977); regardless ante, at 427. And it occurs of whether the upon a privilege founded claim person’s failure his constitutional intelligent to waive knowing decision and might incriminate questions that right those to answer not supra, see also 9;n. States, v. United Garner him. at 427-428. ante, incompatible with seems doctrine harsh blush, this first

At importance of the repeated assertions our Twenty scheme. privilege in our constitutional Amendment ago, years observed: we prosecution accu- system is

“[T]he American inquisitorial, . the Fifth . . and satorial, mainstay. Governments, . . . its essential constitutionally compelled are thus federal, state freely independently by guilt evidence to establish charge prove may coercion secured, Hogan, Malloy v. mouth.” his own out of an accused omitted). (citation atS., 378 U. princi- foregoing adherence our continued view of allow appears contexts, in most we that,

ples,12 anomalous advantage failure, some- of witnesses’ governments take momentary ignorance inattention, or as a result times “timely” privilege in a fashion. of the claim benefit willingness seemingly explanation callous our The rights must be of Fifth forfeitures countenance sought most First of three factors. in a combination people presume importantly, are aware most we question an- a truthful they an official when need not answer prosecution. this might expose “At to criminal them swer schoolboy virtually every history is familiar point in our ban concept, language,” the constitutional if not the Michigan Tucker, compelled v. self-incrimination. (1974). granted that, take for We thus S. U. damaging person informa- discloses instances, when a most States, S., at 655-656. g., e. Garner v. See, 424 U. response tion in inquiry, to an official he has made an intelli- gent decision to waive his rights. Fifth Amendment majority

Second, in the vast of situations in which an offi cer of the State question, asks citizen the officer has no response reason know that a truthful would reveal that the citizen has committed crime. Under such circumstances, one principles underlying central the Fifth Amend governments ment—that should “deliberately see[k] to independent avoid the investigation burdens of by compelling self-incriminating disclosures”—has little relevance. Garner supra, United States, at 655-656. ordinary Thus, in the case, few constitutional values are gov threatened when the preface ernment inquiry fails to an explicit with an reminder response required that a might expose if it respond prosecution. ent to general requirement

Third, a government pref officials questions ace all with such highly reminders would be bur densome. protection Our concern with the of constitutional rights should not blind us general, gov that, fact right ernments everyone’s have the testimony. g., E. Branzburg Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 688 A rule re quiring asking officials,before citizens information, to tell they them that need not incriminating reveal evidence would unduly impede capacity government gather the data effectively.13 needs to function 13 might It argued be that no general such rule would required be persons ensure that did not incriminate themselves without first making intelligent decisions waive their rights. constitutional All that would be necessary would be a rule forbidding the any State make use of a self- prosecution disclosure in a its maker unless he had been reminded of before making the police statement. (and officials) other free to ask without accompanying warnings. person If a questioned made damaging disclosures, the State could not use his against him, statements but the thereby State would be in no worse position than if had not been asked at all. The police simply would obliged be thereupon to conduct an independent inves- prosecution, before requiring the general rule sum, intelli- defendant prove that introducing confession, right to incriminate not voluntarily waived gently and (because their know most persons protect few would himself legal un- values promote the little rights), do would impair substantially would Amendment, Fifth derlie government.14 capacity of information-gathering not do considerations these apparent be It should today, the Until contexts. equal all force apply with relevance in their to variations sensitive been has general to the adhered Accordingly, have we strength. fails if he forfeits principle a defendant only in situ- making statements it before assert prin- support the factors of the implicating several ations only principle applied the specifically, have we ciple. More following statements two at least in which in cases damaging (a) disclosures time theAt true: been have right to make constitutional defendant’s made, were (b) given established, The defendant clearly them was potentially incrimi- asked warning be would that he sufficient independently “evidence basis of on the a conviction and to secure tigation, (1964). 1, 8 Hogan, 378 U. S. Malloy secured,” freely see sort of the that, in a is situation foregoing argument response The position worse significantly in a be would indeed described, the State just that, in a subse- The reason asked. been questions had if the than made proving that burden bear the would State prosecution, quent Kastigar v. See incriminating disclosures. of the use whatever no that burden sustaining (1972). difficulty of The 441, 460 States, U. S. & Westen prosecution. wholly to frustrate such as often Emerging The Balk, To Lie: Talk, or Mandell, To To 521, 531-532 L. Rev. Am. Crim. Response,” 19 “Preferred Doctrine officials government induce situations would such to avoid Desire asking from warnings to refrain or questions with preface their either government capacity of to reduce net effect would be them all. information. needed obtain (1973) 227-234, 242 Bustamonte, 412 U. S. Cf. Schneckloth testing the standard reasons, adopt a waiver (refusing, similar searches). consents voluntariness nating questions legal be to able to secure advice re- upon (c) respond, flect how he would The environment in questions which the were asked impair did not the defend- ability intelligently ant’s (d) rights, to exercise his The questioner had no reason to responses assume that truthful self-incriminating. would be

A review of leading a few of the cases should suffice point.15 to establish the In United States v. Kordel, 397 (1970), 1S.U. the Government interrogatories submitted to the defendant Though (a in a civil suit. the defendant officer) corporate was aware plan that the Government was ning bring a criminal action him, he answered questions the asserting instead of privilege against his self-incrimination. The Court ruled that his answers could ensuing prosecution. be in admitted holding, In so emphasized Court the facts that established law made clear that the right defendant had a constitutional to refuse to interrogatories, answer the that he was free to consult with responding, counsel before nothing and that in the circum stances under which presented impaired were ability the defendant’s appreciate consequences of his actions. Id., at 7, 9-10.

The defendant in Garner v. States, U. S. (1976), professional gambler was a who made disclosures his Form 1040income tax returns. prosecuted

held that he could partly on the basis of Though admissions. right defendant’s constitutional provide refuse to requested perhaps information less straightforward clear and right than the of the usual defend ant, the Court stressed that other factors rendered inexcus able his failure to learn and assert his entitlements. Thus, 15 Ido not renounce the expressed views I in concurrence or dissent in several of the eases discussed My purpose below. in canvassing the rele vant simply decisions is that, demonstrate analysis even under adopted by majorities cases, those the result reached the Court today wrong. is to consult free the defendant pointed out the Court his leisure return at tax out fill lawyer and could awith Moreover, choosing. Id., environment an every Gov- 1040; Forma required fill out taxpayer assume duty, no reason has imposing that in ernment, self-incriminating.16 be responses will taxpayer’s any given be faulted could Gamer in States the United Thus, provided. defendant that the information requesting the 181 Washington, S. 431 U. v. Finally, States in United proposition a witness that the (1977), confirmed the Court jury the benefit claim grand must testify before called acknowledged that The Court it.17 forfeit or atmosphere conducive engenders an jury grand room “the pressure on might some have exerted truthtelling” thus In addi- at rights. Id., assert not to defendant recognized the Government that Court tion, the investigation focused had a criminal as insofar blameless ample questioners had reason and thus defendant self- by defendant answers that truthful believe incriminating.18 con- situation reasoned, the the Court But, 16 1974) (Ste (CA7 Oliver, F.2d 505 v. States Cf. United reporting income purposes, J.) for Fifth vens, (distinguishing, group a select from incriminating disclosures procure “designed to statutes “applicable statutes reporting conduct” in engaged criminal persons in neutral are information large, [whose] . . . demands public at to the earnings and illegal have the few who evenly to they apply that the sense not”). many who do in been advanced frequently had Washington, proposition 17 Prior 564, 574-575 Mandujano, S. U. g., States v. e. United See, dictum. (alterna (1951) 367, 370 States, 340 U. S. (1976) (dictum); Rogers United v. (dictum). (1943) 424, 427 Monia, U. S. States United holding); tive that the fact I remain convinced Brennan Justice tip the is sufficient jury witness grand on a focused investigation has prove prosecution requirement favor of a balance constitutional upon a were founded by the witness made damaging disclosures any S., 431 U. rights. the witness’ intelligent waiver of knowing and States J., dissenting); Marshall, (Brennan, by J., joined Marshall, J., (Brennan, J., joined supra, at 596-602 Mandujano,

tained other safeguards that warranted adherence principle that a privilege not asserted is lost. First, defendant’s right to refuse to respond had perfectly be.en clear; indeed, at the outset of the proceeding, defendant had been explicitly warned of his right not to answer ques- tions if his responses might Id., at 186, incriminate him. 188.19 Second, not only had the defendant been afforded an opportunity before appearing to seek legal advice, but also, at the start of the hearing, he was told that a lawyer would be provided for him if he wished and could not afford one. Id., at 183-184. Under those circumstances, the Court con- cluded that it was inconceivable that the defendant’s decision not to assert his privilege was uninformed or involuntary.20 concurring in judgment). However, argument advanced the text depend does not upon that conviction. 19The declined, however, to decide whether such warnings were constitutionally required. 431 S.,U. 186, at 20See also United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner Immigra of tion, 103, 273 (1927) (defendant U. S. 113 who made incriminating disclo sures questioned when by an immigration (in inspector dictum) deemed to have waived his privilege when right his to refuse to clear, answer was he had given been adequate notice of the sort questions of asked, would be and he was represented by counsel at hearing); the United States v. Mur dock, 284 (1931) (when U. S. 148 defendant was summoned to appear before agent, revenue consulted with just counsel prior to the interview, clearly and right had a not to himself, incriminate his failure to invoke the justification as a Amendment for his refusal to answer in resulted a waiver of his privilege) (dictum); Beckwith v. States, United 425 U. S. (1976) (incriminating disclosures made taxpayer who was in interviewed place home and of business by Internal agents Revenue being after reminded of his Fifth rights held prosecution in admissible a against him); Oregon v. Mathiason, (1977) curiam) (per U. S. 492 (pa rolee’s confession to police a officer held parolee admissible where was not in custody at the time of questioning, the parolee ample had warning that he would be asked incriminating questions, parolee and clearly entitled to refuse to respond); Roberts States, (1980) 445 U. S. (in a case in which the Government had “no substantial reason to believe requested the disclosures likely [were] incriminating,” and the clearly defendant right had a not to himself, incriminate the defendant’s only the statements one By which in contrast, in cases true, the been swpra, has 452-458, at see above, enumerated privi- general a rule that to adhere refused has Court upon a show- has insisted instead lege lost, is and claimed not intelligent knowing de- ing made defendant the right to incriminate forgo his constitutional cision to interro- custodial sort is of this situation The classic himself. gation. (1966), the 384 U. S. Arizona, In Miranda police suspect right in cus- acknowledged the Court However, established. tody well not to answer impair the aspects the situation other we stressed rights the and threaten suspect ability exercise suspect is un- underlying Amendment: the Fifth values respond regarding he should how counsel able consult pre- questions are questions; which environment suspect (the is forbid- police from station, which sented leave) towill “work[s] the individual’s to undermine den other- speak would compel where he him resist interrogators are well freely,” id., 467; do so wise likely to questions are to their answers truthful aware that only cir- four suspect. one of the short, incriminate principle general exist favoring application theof cumstances mitigate interrogation. To custodial context of involuntarily fail to ignorantly suspects or risk that these against under self-incrimination their claim requirement imposed in Miranda circumstances, used properly privilege held without asserting his answer refusal to sentence). of in determination him the the set- legitimates safeguards likewise four presence of two incrimi- potentially asked custody not in who citizen principle tled of benefit claim police officer must nating questions by a privilege. retain his answering if he wishes to instead of circum- (1966). such Under Arizona, Miranda 384 U. S. refuse right to a well-established stances, only the citizen have does discourage or frustrate as to is not such answer, environment but also the id., at 478. right. of his the assertion be they shown to have freely waived their rights after Id., at 475-479.21 being fully of them. apprised B If we remain sensitive to the concerns in implicit the fore going pattern cases, we should insist that the in State, instant case, demonstrate that Murphy intelligently waived his right to remain silent. None of the four conditions that favor application of the principle a defendant forfeits his if privilege he fails to claim it before can confessing be found in the circumstances under which Murphy was interrogated. First, the existence and scope Murphy’s constitutional right refuse to were at testify best unclear when he ap 21 Aless involving well-known situation paucity safeguards similar against inadvertent or uninformed abandonment of rights constitutional presented is that in States, Smith v. (1949), 337 U. S. 137 and Emspak States, v. United case, 349 U. S. 190 In each the defend ant was testify summoned to body, appeared, before an official early proceeding privilege invoked Question self-incrimination. (in ing continued grant one case under a immunity, in the other on unre topics). lated proceeding, Later in the the defendant was asked whether he wished to claim the regard specific ques to a substantive case, tion. each three ability, factors reduced the defendant’s at that point, intelligently to exercise his rights constitutional rendered activities of his interrogators constitutionally suspect: right the defendant’s to refuse to answer question unclear; at issue was the environment in which presented moderately coercive; were and the na proceeding ture of the as well prior privi as the defendant’s assertion of his lege against self-incrimination alerted questioner to the likelihood that a truthful answer to question expose the crucial the defendant to liability. cases, In both the Court held that the defendant could prosecuted on the question only basis of his answer if the to the decisive Government were sufficiently able to demonstrate that he had made a un equivocal intelligent rights satisfy waiver of his Fifth Amendment (1938) standard Zerbst, enunciated Johnson v. 304 U. S. (“an relinquishment intentional right privi or abandonment known or of a lege”). instances, In both the Court had concluded that Government failed to showing, make such a and therefore reversed the defendant’s conviction. undisputed It is office. officer’s in the probation

peared a himon imposed Murphy’s probation of conditions the offi his probation by presented all questions answer to duty rights.22 Amendment Fifth his implicating those except cer The from apparent. far were was rights those exactly What authorita the first constitutes case in this opinion majority avail self-incrimination analysis tive privi of that scope of ambiguity The probationer. able to a Solicitor fact the by suggested is today prior lege curiae, amicus as States for the General, appearing as been might have rights misconceived seriously officer.23 by his examined when Murphy by serted for research opportunity substantial afforded being If, after err the Nation represent who lawyers reflection, principles, constitutional relevant of explication their his of knowledge be charged cannot surely entitlements.24 impose on conditions Murphy’s probation majority construes 22 The exemption an but contain respond questions, duty general him a Ante, at rights. Amendment upon his Fifth impinged questions case, adopts the same in this Minnesota, in its brief of The State

436-437. probationers (arguing that Petitioner Brief for interpretation. by their asked all obliged to answer are in Minnesota privilege). claims they may assert “valid” to which except those officers it supra, I, I assume Part see implausible, Though I find that construction that, the time at simply is here The made purposes. point present rights Fifth Amendment scope interrogated, Murphy was —and duty to general exemption from hypothesized scope of the therefore ambiguous. answer —was person that, “[w]hen argued in the alternative General Solicitor limited can be rights crime, his constitutional convicted of has been penal government’s necessary reasonably accommodate extent may constitu government interests,” and therefore that rehabilitative himself pressures incriminate probationer tionally upon a exert a crime. convicted not been who had upon exert citizen could not prop id., That 8; 27-32. see Curiae Amicus as Brief for United States today. rejected the Court osition (“A may not (1975) layman 449, 466 Meyers, 419 U. S. Cf. Maness nuances, boundaries scope, the precise aware of privilege”). contrary suggestion Second, majority, of the ante, Murphy given at 432, was warning no that would be asked potentially incriminating questions. The letter in which Murphy’s probation officer instructed him ap- to make an pointment informed purpose him that the meeting “[t]o further discuss plan a treatment for the remainder of probation.” [his] App. to Pet. for Cert. C-36. In of view Murphy the fact that legal remained obligation under a to at- tend treatment sessions,25 why there nowas reason he should have assumed from the letter planned that the officer question regarding prior him activity.26 In short, prior to the moment he was asked whether he had committed Murphy the murder, suspect had no reason to that he would obliged respond be incriminating questions. He thus opportunity had no lawyer, to consult a or even to consider proceed. how he should Third, the environment in questioning which the occurred

impaired Murphy’s ability recognize claim his constitu rights. tional It is majority true, as points out, that the probation discussion between a probationer officer and a is likely to be less coercive intimidating than a discussion police between a suspect officer and a custody. Ante, at precisely But it is danger that fact that the lies. contrast to inherently relationship adversarial between a suspect policeman, and a relationship proba between a tioner and the officer reports to whom he likely incorpo rate elements confidentiality, friendship. even Indeed, many probation deliberately officers cultivate such bonds 25Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, ante, 432, at nothing in the record indicates probation that the officer had “excused” from the condition probation that required him pursue “to . . . Alpha treatment,” App. to Pet. for C-35; Cert. Supreme Minnesota merely found that she agreed had not to seek revocation of because of his breach of that condition, see 340, N. W. 2d 26Indeed, for reasons infra, discussed appears the letter shrewdly designed to prevent Murphy from discerning in advance the purpose true meeting. overstated; point not be should charges.27 The

with their entirely the fact blind probationers undoubtedly, are few allied, . . “peace . officer[s], are probation officers their peace offi [their] fellow with extent, greater lesser or to a (1979). On 442 U. S. C., Michael Fare v. cers.” “relationship[s] develop many probationers hand, other at 722.28 Id., officers. cooperation” their trust of Through elicit can officer trust, a abuse probationer would probationer that the from admissions interrogator. police unlikely hostile to a make danger. she Before aptly illustrates The instant case appoint- asking make an Murphy him to letter to her sent try him induce to to had probation decided officer ment, informa- killing turn over and 1974 to the to confess success- if she were that, police. aware She was to the tion murder.29 tried and arrested Murphy be soon would ful, the information prospect whatsoever no thus There program to design a treatment be used would elicited she proba- during of his Murphy the remainder followed be purpose of letter, she described inYet, her tion. meeting plan.” “discussing] When treatment a as that deceit; persisted meeting, she Murphy at the arrived do to with informing intended once she him at what instead of him told murder, she 1974 anticipated to the his confession 27 Parole Probation Berlin, Introduction & L. A. Smith See Officers, 36 Fed. Humanity of Probation (1979); Mangrum, The Administration on the (June 1972); Note, Observations 47 Probation Parker, 82 App. Div. People (1970); 698, 704-708 Parole, Yale L. J. 815, 441 2d aff’d, Y. (1981), 57 N. 2d 661, 667, 442 N. Y. S. 2d 2d 1118 N. E. officer probation Fare that between relationship issue in 28 The can observations many the Court’s But juvenile probationer. probationer. an adult an officer relationship between extended 27, supra. n. probation in, his it was himself to turn Indeed, Murphy refused when for his arrest. the order secured officer who

that “her main concern was to talk to him about the relation- ship prior crime and the one of which he was convicted and about his need for treatment under the circumstances.” (Minn. 1982). 324 N. 2d 340, W. Murphy That suc- deception cumbed apparent sequence from the responses. denying Instead of responsibility for the 1974 killing, guilt he admitted sought explain but that ex- tenuating circumstances accounted for that crime. Be- cause longer those circumstances no argued, existed, he no had need Only further treatment. after had made his confession did the officerinform him of her intent to transmit that police. information to the In short, the envi- ronment in which the interview was conducted afforded the opportunities officer capitalize reinforce and Murphy’s ignorance right that he had a to refuse to answer incriminating questions, and the deliberately officer and ef- fectively exploited opportunities. those

Finally, indisputable it is that the officer had reason to know that responses truthful to her expose Murphy liability. This case does spontaneous not arise out of a question confessionto a routine innocently by government asked origi- official. Rather, precisely nates the sort of situation the Fifth Amendment designed prevent government, which a instead of —in establishing guilt through defendant’s independent investi- gation, seeks to induce him, his will, to convict him- self out of his own mouth.

In sum, none of the factors justify that, in most contexts, application principle of the that a defendant loses his Fifth Amendment timely unless he claims it in a fashion present are in this Accordingly, case. the State should be obliged to Murphy demonstrate knew of his constitu- rights tional freely waived them. Because State has made no showing, such I would hold his confession inadmissible. I

I I safeguards system justice contains The criminal by damage Court’s decision done minimize should attorneys responsible defense today. future, In the probation clients, those given inform will are clients whose disregard they may con- pro- interviews, final their with are inconsistent conditions as those insofar ditions attorneys rights. then will bationers’ rights of those the nuances carefully clients on their instruct this knowl- explicated Armed them.30 have now we as pressure to the sort edge, probationers will succumb few Murphy. that overwhelmed deceit of none the benefit had himself Because judgment of the just affirm the safeguards I would described, into evidence Supreme that the admission Minnesota probation officer violated to his he made the disclosures Constitution. respectfully I dissent. who currently moreover, persons hoped, It is to be the cen informed by somehow be longer represented counsel will no

are has a probationer decision: that principle the Court’s established tral expose might which answer to respond question right to refuse of his immunity from the use granted liability he is unless him criminal prosecution. subsequent against him in a answer

Case Details

Case Name: Minnesota v. Murphy

Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States

Date Published: Feb 22, 1984

Citation: 465 U.S. 420

Docket Number: 82-827

Court Abbreviation: SCOTUS