UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DAJAHN MCBEAN, a/k/a “Jeezy Mula,” a/k/a “Freeze,”
24 Cr. 541 (PAE)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
April 15, 2025
PAUL A. ENGELMAYER, District Judge:
OPINION & ORDER
This decision resolves a motion to suppress evidence seized from the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC“) cell of defendant Dajahn McBean.
On October 17, 2024, a grand jury in this District returned Indictment S2 24 Cr. 541 (PAE). It charged McBean and two others with offenses including participation in a murder-for-hire conspiracy. See Dkt. 32 (“Indictment“). The charges center on the allegation that, in late 2023, McBean, while detained at the MDC awaiting sentencing on a separate case, orchestrated a murder-for-hire plot aimed at killing Laquan Williams, with whom he had been feuding. As alleged, that plot resulted, on December 26, 2023, in a shooting outside a Queens, New York nightclub that wounded Williams and killed Clarisa Burgos, a woman who had accompanied Williams to the nightclub. Salient here, on December 29, 2023, three days after the shooting, prison officials searched McBean‘s MDC cell. They recovered, among other contraband, a cellphone, broken in pieces, that McBean had evidently attempted to destroy while the prison officials sought entry into his cell.
I. Overview
A. The Alleged Murder-for-Hire-Scheme
The Indictment charges McBean and two others—Chelsey Harris and Karl Smith—with conspiracy to commit murder for hire resulting in personal injury and death, in violation of
In December 2023, McBean and Williams were engaged in a feud over social media. At the time, McBean was in custody at the MDC, awaiting sentencing on a charge of assault in-aid-of racketeering, to which he had pled guilty in the Eastern District of New York on September 8, 2023. See United States v. McBean, No. 20 Cr. 260 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (Dkt. 123) (the “EDNY case“). While at the MDC, McBean used a contraband cell phone to recruit and communicate with Harris and Smith, to arrange a plot to lure Williams to a Queens nightclub, where shooters recruited by or at the behest of McBean would murder Williams.
On December 24, 2023, McBean, assisted by Smith and Harris, lured Williams to Hush, a nightclub in Queens. Outside the nightclub, gunmen shot and hit Williams‘s car multiple times, but their shots missed him.
B. Pertinent Investigative Steps
In the investigation that followed, the New York City Police Department (“NYPD“) soon identified McBean as a person of interest.
On December 27, 2023, the NYPD received an anonymous tip that an inmate named Dajahn McBean, housed in federal prison, had “put a $200k hit” on Williams from prison, where “he [McBean] has a phone.” Dkt. 74, Ex. 2, paragraph 4(g) (filed under seal) (“McBean SW“). The tip further indicated that McBean had recruited a woman, whose Instagram account was associated with Harris, to set up a meeting with Williams to effectuate the hit. Id. paragraphs 4(g)-(h). The NYPD found social media evidence of a feud between McBean and Williams. And surveillance videos of the area around Xscape reviewed by NYPD showed Harris interacting with person(s) in Williams‘s car just before the shooting. Later on December 27, 2023, law enforcement officers interviewed Harris at the 107th precinct in Queens.
That same day, an NYPD detective contacted the U.S. Attorney‘s Office for the Southern District of New York (“USAO“) regarding McBean, whom the NYPD had identified as a federal inmate detained at the MDC. As developed below, the USAO thereafter conveyed to the MDC the NYPD‘s request that McBean‘s cell be searched.
On December 29, 2023, MDC officials conducted a search of McBean‘s cell at the MDC, and recovered the damaged contraband cellphone that McBean moves here to suppress.
C. McBean‘s Suppression Motion: Procedural History
Trial is scheduled to begin on July 28, 2025. On February 18, 2025, McBean moved to suppress the fruits of the search of his cell, claiming that it violated the Fourth Amendment. Dkt. 71.2 He filed a supporting memorandum of law, Dkt. 73 (“McBean Br.“), and exhibits, including factual affirmations by himself and by his counsel, Dkt. 72 (“Spilke Decl.“). On March 4, 2025, the Government opposed. Dkt. 74 (“Gov‘t Br.“). On March 10, 2024, McBean replied. Dkt. 77 (“McBean Reply Br.“). On March 12, 2025, the Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on McBean‘s suppression motion.3
On April 3, 2025, the Court held an evidentiary hearing. The Government called one witness, Lieutenant Sandra Ubiera, the MDC official who organized and led the search of McBean‘s cell. It also presented video and documentary evidence. The defense cross-examined Ubiera, but did not offer live testimony.
II. Findings of Fact
A. Evidence Considered
The factual findings below are based on the hearing testimony of Lieutenant Ubiera, McBean‘s pre-hearing affidavit, Dkt. 72 at 23-24 (“McBean Aff.“),4 exhibits annexed to McBean‘s brief, Dkt. 73, and exhibits received at the hearing. These consisted of: (1) a video
B. Facts Established
The Court finds the following facts established by a preponderance of the evidence.6 These are largely undisputed, including as to the circumstances that brought about the MDC‘s search of McBean‘s cell and the manner in which the search was carried out. The Court found the testimony of Lieutenant Ubiera—the only live witness—credible, based on, inter alia, her demeanor, competence, potential bias, and the extent to which her testimony was inherently logical and consistent with physical evidence.
As of the search of his MDC cell, McBean was awaiting sentencing in the EDNY case, in which he had been indicted in July 2020. See Dkt. 1. A Superseding Indictment, returned February 2023, charged that McBean had been a member of Real Ryte, a street gang based in Brooklyn, and that McBean and others had engaged in violent hostilities with a rival gang, Breadgang. Dkt 64 at 3-7.
On September 8, 2023, McBean pled guilty, before United States District Judge Hector Gonzalez, to assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering, in violation of
2. Pre-Search Communications to the MDC
McBean‘s brief attaches as exhibits certain email communications between law enforcement and MDC officials in the days leading up to the search of McBean‘s cell.9 These establish that (1) on the day the NYPD received an anonymous tip that McBean had used a contraband cellphone in the MDC to orchestrate the murder-for-hire scheme, an NYPD detective
3. MDC Officials Search McBean‘s Cell and Recover the Cellphone
Lieutenant Ubiera is a member of the Special Investigations Unit of the MDC. Tr. at 19. In that capacity, she oversees operations to ensure the safety of inmates, staff, and visitors, and investigates inmate misconduct, including violent incidents such as stabbings and slashings. Id. She is responsible for conducting searches of inmates’ cells to find contraband. Id. Weapons, illicit drugs, and cellphones are among the most frequent targets of cell searches. Id. at 53.
Relevant here, an inmate is forbidden to possess a cellphone, and such poses a serious security concern. Id. at 30-32. As a result, BOP regulations, and BOP officials enforcing them, treat such possession as a severe disciplinary infraction. Id. That is because an inmate can use a cellphone to orchestrate crime (including violent crime) inside and outside the MDC. Id. MDC officials frequently search inmates’ cells for contraband, including cellphones. They do so prompted by, inter alia, reports from prison staff, other inmates, members of the public, and “outside” law enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug
On December 29, 2023, sometime before the 4 p.m. inmate count, Lieutenant Ubiera‘s superior, Captain Carlos Rodriguez, notified her that McBean might possess a contraband cellphone, and directed her to search his cell. Id. at 32-34, 54, 75. He told her that the cellphone might have been used to facilitate a crime outside the MDC‘s walls, based on information he had received from Special Agent Braccini. Id. at 33, 56-57. Lieutenant Ubiera perceived a sense of “urgency” in Rodriguez‘s communication and decided to search McBean‘s cell that day. Id. at 33.
Lieutenant Ubiera prepared for the search operation during the next few hours. She reviewed video surveillance and conducted due diligence to gauge the risks presented to the search team by and around McBean‘s cell. Id. at 34, 58. She was aware that McBean shared his cell with another inmate, as is customary at the MDC; McBean‘s cellmate was Mark Waiters, a co-defendant of his in the EDNY case. Id. at 20, 32. Having previously searched McBean‘s cell on multiple occasions, Lieutenant Ubiera did not have to do extensive background research. Id. at 49, 58. She nevertheless proceeded deliberatively, aware of the safety risks faced by the prison officials who would be conducting the search. Id. at 58-60. She was also mindful that, if the search were conducted when the general population was away from its cells, there was a higher likelihood that the contraband cellphone would not be found; for example, if McBean had “rent[ed]” it to another inmate. Id. at 58, 61. She assembled a search team of around 8 to 12 officers, and prepared a tactical plan outlining team members’ roles. Id. at 34, 61-63.
After gaining entry, the search team placed McBean and Waiters in handcuffs and led them out of the cell. See GX 1, at 2:09-2:27. The search team seized part of a cellphone, which contained the glass exterior or its remnants, from McBean‘s hand. Tr. at 72-73. The team found other parts of the cellphone scattered throughout the cell, which was in a state of “disarray.” Id. at 81. These were handed to Ubiera, who collected and entered them into evidence. Id. The search continued for approximately 20 minutes. See GX 1, at 23:16.
4. McBean Is Disciplined for Possessing Dangerous Contraband
After discovery of the contraband cellphone, the BOP charged McBean with violating, inter alia, Section 108 of the BOP Inmate Discipline Program. Tr. at 48. That provision prohibits inmates and detainees from “[p]ossess[ing] . . . a hazardous tool” that is “most likely to be used in an escape or escape attempt or to serve as weapons capable of doing serious bodily
On January 4, 2024, Officer Rogers conducted the disciplinary hearing. Gov‘t Br, Ex. 5 at 1. McBean denied having “a phone in [his] hand” and “taking a swing” at a member of the search team who had entered his cell. Id. Officer Rogers found, however, that the “weight of the evidence” contradicted McBean‘s account. Id. He found that McBean had been in possession of a hazardous tool, in violation of Section 108. Id. He also found McBean guilty of assaulting an officer, in violation of Section 224A. Gov‘t Br, Ex. 5 at 1. The MDC imposed corresponding sanctions on McBean. Id.
5. Law Enforcement Obtains a Search Warrant for the Cellphone
On January 3, 2024, NYPD sought, and a state-court judge issued, a warrant authorizing a search of the cellphone seized by MDC officials. See McBean SW at 2. A supporting affidavit by NYPD Detective Philip Degorter described the search of McBean‘s cell, the recovery of “a damaged red Apple iPhone with a shattered and detached screen,” and the factual basis to find probable cause supporting a forensic search of the phone. Id. at 1. It recounted, inter alia, that the NYPD had received a Crimestoppers tip on December 27, 2023, which accused McBean of orchestrating the shooting of Burgos and Williams. It stated that:
[the shooting] happened because of an individual known as Dajahn McBean who is currently in Federal Prison in Washington D.C; that Dajahn McBean ordered the hit; that Dajahn McBean has a phone in prison and that he used a female [Harris], whose Instagram account name is Ms. Chinn, to set up a meet with a male [Williams], whose Instagram name is Chinaman; Dajahn McBean wanted Chinaman killed; Dajahn McBean put a $200k hit on Chinaman and that the female was shot by accident.
The affidavit further identified Instagram posts confirming the “beef” between McBean and Williams. See id. paragraph 4(l). Several, attributed to Williams, derided McBean. One included a photo of McBean with the following text: “[H]e lives in the basement of his moms house he never paid rent or paid a phone bill in his life he‘s a mother boy he beg me for money when he came home in 2015 none of his friends had money.” Id. Another stated: “[I]f code 33 post anything it‘s comin from the biggest hater which is jeezy mula he have no old friends looking for new ones.” Id.12 A third addressed the shooting at Hush. Williams mocked the individuals involved in the shooting: “[S]hots fire im not dead I‘m up; threw 10 shots and missed all 10 is crazy go get a refund twin; excuse me rookies y‘all did a terrible job last night refund me my money plz (laughing emojis) my mother wig is all over the net I need my name ifs all I got (laughing emojis); and get your refund.” Id.
III. Discussion
McBean argues that the warrantless search of his cell violated the Fourth Amendment, requiring suppression of the cellphone and its contents. The Government counters that, under Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), McBean, as an inmate, lacked an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell, and thus cannot claim a Fourth Amendment violation.
The Court denies McBean‘s motion. Under Hudson and its progeny, McBean lacked an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his MDC cell, barring him from challenging the search of his cell under the Fourth Amendment. That is so even assuming that, under this line of
A. Applicable Law
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
A prison cell, generally, is not such a place. The Supreme Court so held in Hudson, a seminal case. And, as reviewed below, a body of ensuing caselaw has reinforced that prison inmates lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells.
In Hudson, an inmate claimed that prison officials’ “shakedown” search of his prison cell violated the Fourth Amendment. 468 U.S. at 520. The inmate argued that the cell search was unreasonable because it had been conducted solely to “harass” him, and not for any reason related to institutional security. Id. The Supreme Court rejected the premise of this claim: It held that the Fourth Amendment‘s “proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell.” Id. at 526. That was so, the Court explained, because the inmate lacked a “legitimate expectation of privacy” in his prison cell. Id. at 530. And it framed that holding broadly:
Notwithstanding our caution in approaching claims that the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable in a given context, we hold that society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell. . . . The recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their individual cells simply cannot be reconciled with the concept of incarceration and the needs and objectives of penal institutions.
Id. at 525-26 (emphasis added). Because prison cells are “[v]irtually the only place inmates can conceal weapons, drugs, and other contraband,” the Court stated, “unfettered access to these cells by prison officials . . . is imperative if drugs and contraband are to be ferreted out and sanitary surroundings are to be maintained.” Id. at 527. Thus, the Court held, in evaluating a Fourth Amendment claim by an inmate, it does not matter whether prison officials searched the inmate‘s cell pursuant to “an enunciated general policy,” based on “suspicion . . . directed at [that] particular inmate,” or “wholly [at] random.” Id. at 529 (quoting Marrero v. Commonwealth, 284 S.E. 2d 809, 811 (Va. 1981)). Such a claim, the Court held, does not lie, and the Fourth Circuit thus had erred in recognizing a “limited privacy right” under the Fourth Amendment where a cell search had been conducted “solely” to harass a prisoner and/or to destroy his property. Id. at 521-22.13
Hudson grew out of a series of decisions by the Supreme Court that limited prisoners’ constitutional rights where necessary to accommodate the “institutional needs and objectives” of prisons. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546-47 (1979). These prison interests centered on internal security, but also were held to include retribution for unlawful conduct, deterrence, and rehabilitation. See id. at 537 (“Loss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement.“); accord Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 588 (1984); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
Important here, two years after Hudson—in a decision that is the focus of McBean‘s present motion—the Second Circuit recognized a narrow exception to Hudson, for a pretrial detainee awaiting resolution of the criminal charges against him. United States v. Cohen, 796 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1986), arose from a prison official‘s warrantless search of an inmate‘s papers while he was held pending trial on drug distribution conspiracy charges. Id. at 21. The lead prosecutor had initiated the search and dictated its scope. The prosecutor had “directed” the prison official “to look for certain types of documents” that “may have contained the names and phone numbers of [the defendant‘s] co-conspirators and witnesses” whom the defendant “had already contacted and was still in the process of trying to contact.” Id. The prison official then carried out the prosecutor‘s instructions: after entering the inmate‘s cell, the official examined, for approximately half an hour, papers of the type identified by the prosecutor. See id. The prison official then left, only to return a short time later to examine those papers for another hour. See id. The Second Circuit held that, notwithstanding Hudson, this search breached the Fourth Amendment. It held that a pretrial detainee retains a “much diminished” Fourth Amendment right, against unreasonable searches of his prison cell that (1) are instigated by “non-prison officials,” and (2) do not serve an “institutional security” purpose. Id. at 24. Because the cell search breached the “small remnant” of the Fourth Amendment right held by a pretrial inmate, the Circuit held, the evidence obtained in the search was required to be suppressed. Id.
The Second Circuit in Cohen pointedly emphasized three limits to its holding that the defendant inmate could challenge his cell search under the Fourth Amendment. First, the inmate
The Second Circuit has twice rejected efforts by inmates to extend the limited Fourth Amendment right recognized in Cohen.
In Willis v. Artuz, 301 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2002), the Circuit reaffirmed that the Fourth Amendment right recognized in Cohen is held only by pretrial detainees. The inmate there, serving a life sentence, sued for damages under
In United States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1988), the Circuit again reinforced Cohen‘s limits. The Cohen exception to Hudson, it held, did not apply to a federal inmate who was simultaneously held both as a convicted prisoner and as a pretrial detainee on new charges. Under these circumstances, the Circuit held, the inmate lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in his calls to non-attorneys on the prison‘s telephones. See id. at 20 (citing United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1987)); see Amen, 831 F.2d at 383 (“If security concerns can justify . . . wholly random cell searches, then surely it is reasonable to monitor prisoners’ telephone conversations.” (citing Hudson, 468 U.S. at 530)); cf. Ford v. Hunter, 534 F. App‘x 821, 826 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[N]o other circuit has adopt[ed] Cohen‘s rule.“).14
B. Application
Measured against these principles, McBean‘s motion to suppress the fruits of the search of his MDC cell fails. The search was undisputedly for contraband—a cellphone which BOP rules identify as dangerous and forbid inmates to possess. Under the caselaw, McBean lacked an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell against a search for such contraband, precluding his claim of a Fourth Amendment violation.
For the search of McBean‘s cell to constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, it must have implicated “a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33; see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Hudson, however, broadly holds that a prisoner does not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy within the confines of his prison cell. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526 (“[S]ociety is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell and . . . accordingly, the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell.” (emphasis added)); see also, e.g., Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 304 (asserted privacy interest must be “one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable“). Insofar as the MDC officials here were searching for an item that BOP regulations
The Fourth Amendment thus was not implicated by the search of McBean‘s prison cell. Indeed, courts in this District, applying Hudson, have routinely rejected inmates’ Fourth Amendment challenges to cell searches. See, e.g., West, 2014 WL 4290813, at *6 (“[I]nmates do not have the right to be free from searches of any kind; even searches conducted solely for harassment do not implicate the Fourth Amendment.“); Rodriguez, 399 F. Supp. 2d at 239 (“[Defendant] correctly asserts that [plaintiff] had no constitutional right to be free from cell searches of any kind, including retaliatory cell searches.“); Salahuddin, 2002 WL 1968329, at *5 (even “arbitrary” or “retaliatory” searches in prisons do not implicate the Fourth Amendment); Walker v. Keyser, 98 Civ. 5217, 2001 WL 1160588, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2001) (same); Walker v. Goord, 98 Civ. 5217, 2000 WL 297249, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2000) (same); Bey v. Eggleston, 96 Civ. 3302, 1998 WL 118158, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 1998) (“A search of an inmate—even for retaliatory reasons—does not implicate a constitutional right.“); Gadson v. Goord, 96 Civ. 7544, 1997 WL 714878, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1997) (“[S]earches of cells implicate no constitutional rights, even if the search is arbitrary or retaliatory in nature.“); see also Hayes v. Cal. Dep‘t of Corr. & Rehab., 19 Civ. 9513, 2020 WL 3963882, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2020) (“Plaintiff has no Fourth Amendment right to prevent a prison search of the contents of his contraband phone without a warrant.“) (citing Hudson, 468 U.S. at 524)); United
McBean seizes on Cohen, arguing that he fits within the narrow exception Cohen recognizes to Hudson‘s general rule. He notes that, as in Cohen, the search of his cell was initiated by a request by outside law enforcement agents—the NYPD officers investigating the murder-for-hire scheme. That feature is indeed common to Cohen and this case. But, as Cohen and the cases that have applied it underscore, the exception recognized there was further limited: to searches (1) of pretrial detainees (2) undertaken solely to gather evidence to assist the pending prosecution, and not at all to advance institutional prison interests. McBean‘s case is properly distinguished on both grounds.
First, McBean was not a pretrial detainee. He had pled guilty to an offense—assaulting an individual with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering—and the judge in that case had accepted his guilty plea. He was in custody awaiting sentencing on the basis of that adjudicated charge. As such, McBean cannot invoke the presumption of innocence in the eyes of the law that the Second Circuit highlighted in Cohen as one basis for a limited exception to Hudson. As the Circuit noted in Cohen, the inmate was “awaiting his day in court” when the prosecution asked that a search of cell for documents be undertaken for the “sole[]” purpose of obtaining information for a superseding indictment. 796 F.2d at 24. “A person lawfully committed to pretrial detention has not been adjudged guilty of any crime. He has had only a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to the extended restraint of his liberty following arrest.” Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 536 (cleaned up). For this reason, the Circuit held in Cohen, the
Contrary to McBean‘s depiction of his felony guilty plea as an anodyne procedural waypoint, his sworn admission to the racketeering assault was a consequential juridical event with meaningful bearing on his expectation of privacy while in custody. As the Supreme Court has recognized: “A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); see also, e.g., United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570 (1989) (“By entering a plea of guilty, the accused is not simply stating that he did the discrete acts described in the indictment; he is admitting guilt of a substantive crime.“); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 32 (1970) (same). Upon the entry of McBean‘s plea, his guilt was established; the court “ha[d] nothing to do but give judgment and sentence,” Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927); see also United States v. Madoff, 316 F. App‘x 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2009) (defendant who has pled guilty “is no longer entitled to the presumption of innocence“). For this reason, the federal bail statute sharply distinguishes between defendants based on whether they have pled guilty. Before a guilty plea, the Government bears the burden—subject to exceptions for certain offenses—of establishing that the defendant is a risk of flight or presents a danger to the community. See
Second, the search of McBean‘s cell by MDC officials, although initiated by the NYPD with the goal of helping solve the Burgos murder, was supported by a bona fide—and indeed, weighty—prison institutional interest. As the evidence at the suppression hearing established, BOP policy prohibits inmates from possessing contraband cellphones. BOP regulations identify cellphones as dangerous contraband. See BOP Inmate Handbook § 108 (prohibiting inmates from possessing “tools . . . hazardous to institutional security or personal safety” and identifying among such tools a “portable telephone, pager, or other electronic device“); see also Tr. at 30 (Ubiera testimony about regulations);
For this reason, upon being alerted by the NYPD that McBean was believed to harbor a contraband cellphone—not to mention have criminally used it—the MDC had a compelling institutional interest, independent of the NYPD‘s investigative interest, in searching for and seizing that phone. As Lieutenant Ubiera testified, she believed that, under BOP regulations, the MDC was required to search McBean‘s cell upon learning from the NYPD that it might contain a contraband cellphone. Tr. at 51. She further testified that MDC officials would have searched McBean‘s cell had they learned of a possible contraband cellphone in his possession by means other than a request by law enforcement to investigate a possible crime. Id.16 The MDC‘s strong and independent security interest in searching for the cellphone, which existed alongside the NYPD‘s investigative interest, sharply distinguishes this case from Cohen. There, the Government failed to show that the search of the inmate‘s papers was “even colorably motivated by institutional security concerns,” and search was undertaken “solely to obtain information for a superseding indictment.” 796 F.2d at 23-24.
In light of the MDC officials’ independent basis for initiating the search, anchored in regulations aimed at assuring safety inside and outside the MDC, McBean, like the inmate in
The Court rejects McBean‘s attempts to discredit Lieutenant Ubiera. Her testimony was highly credible. And her central point—that the MDC views contraband cellphone as a serious breach of institutional meriting cell searches—was persuasively articulated and in accord with BOP regulations. She explained that the MDC routinely undertakes cell searches based on tips
Finally, under foundational Fourth Amendment principles, the coexistence of multiple motivations for the search of McBean‘s cell does not support suppression. The Court has found that (1) the NYPD‘s request for a cell search was motivated by its investigative interest in the Burgos murder, and (2) the MDC‘s ensuing decision to undertake the search was based on its interest in security and seizing dangerous contraband such as the cellphone reported to be in McBean‘s cell. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, whether a search or seizure is justified under the Fourth Amendment turns on objective considerations: whether the facts known to law enforcement objectively justified the step under the governing standard. Where these facts objectively justify the search or seizure, it is irrelevant what the officers’ subjective motivations were, and courts are “unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of individual officers.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); see, e.g., id. at 813-16 (unanimously rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge to traffic stop based on claim that officers used traffic violation as pretext to search car of suspected drug dealer;
For all these reasons, Hudson v. Palmer controls this case, and the narrow exception recognized in Cohen does not apply. McBean lacked an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his MDC cell. His Fourth Amendment challenge therefore fails.18
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies McBean‘s motion to suppress. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion pending at Docket 71.
SO ORDERED.
Paul A. Engelmayer
United States District Judge
Dated: April 15, 2025
New York, New York
Notes
On December 28, 2023, at 6:45 a.m., Detective Alessandrino emailed Special Agent Braccini, seeking an update as to the planned cell search. Id. at 10. Special Agent Braccini responded that he had heard “nothing” but that he would inquire by telephone (the record does not disclose of whom). Id. At 8:46 a.m., Detective Alessandrino sent another email to Special Agent Braccini at 8:46 a.m., listing the names Mark Waiters and Semaj Smith (who were McBean‘s co-defendants in the EDNY case). Id. at 9.