*1 MINNESOTA v. CARTER No. 97-1147. Argued October 1998 Decided 1, 1998* December *Together with Minnesota v. Johns, also on certiorari to the same court (see this 12.4). Court’s Rule *2 for petitioner. cause argued Backstrom C. James III, At- Humphrey H. Hubert were briefs on him
With Prokopoioicz. Phillip D. Minnesota, of General torney States the United for cause Lamken argued A. Jeffrey brief on him With reversal. curiae urging amicus as Attorney Acting Assistant Waxman, General Solicitor were Dreeben. General Solicitor Deputy Keeney, General With respondents. for cause Colbert argued Bradford Hammer- Lawrence Stuart, M. John were brief on him † Swanson. G. Scott Wolf, L. ling, Marie Mary of State for filed was reversal urging curiae amici of †A brief Anna Maryland, of General Jr., Attorney Curran, Joseph J.by al. et land Attorney Lance, Gen G. General, Alan Attorney Lisie, Assistant L. belle General, joined Attorney Stahman, Deputy I.A Myrna Idaho, and of eral Pryor Bill follows: States respective General Attorneys by Arizona, Daniel of Woods Alaska, Grant of Botelho M. Alabama, Bruce of E. Baker Delaware, Thurbert Brady California, M. Jane Lungren E. Indiana, Modisett A Hawaii, Jeffrey Bronster S. Margery Georgia, Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondents and the lessee of apartment were sitting in one of its rooms, bagging cocaine. While so engaged they were observed a police officer, who looked through a drawn window blind. Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the officer’s viewing was a search that violated respondents’ Fourth rights. We hold that no such violation occurred. James police Thielen, a officer in the Twin Cities’ suburb *3 Eagan, Minnesota, went to apartment building to inves- tigate tipa from a confidential informant. The informant said that he had walked the window of ground-floor apartment and had seen people putting a powder white into bags. The officer looked in the same window through a gap in the closed blind and observed the bagging operation for several minutes. He then notified headquarters, which began preparing affidavits for a search warrant while he re- turned to the apartment building. When two men left the building in a previously identified Cadillac, police the stopped the car. Inside respondents were Carter and Johns. As police the opened the door of the ear to let Johns they out, observed a black, zippered pouch and a handgun, later deter- mined to be loaded, on the vehicle’sfloor. Carter and Johns were arrested, and a police later search of vehicle the day next discovered pagers, a scale, and grams of cocaine plastic in sandwich bags. Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Scott Harsh- barger of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Peter Verniero of New Jersey, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Heidi Heit- kamp of North Dakota, W. A Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, Jan Graham of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, and Mark L. Earley of Virginia.
Tracey Maclin, Steven R. Shapiro, and Lisa B. Kemler filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. apartment to returned police the ear, seizing the After iswho Thompson, Kimberly occupant, the arrested and pursu- apartment of the search A appeal. to this party anot
' kitchen on residue cocaine revealed a warrant ant Cadil- in found those similar baggies plastic and table Thompson and Johns, Carter, identified Thielen lac. bag- into powder placing observed had he people three Thompson was while learned police later gies. Chicago in lived and Johns Carter apartment, lessee pack- purpose the sole for apartment come had and been never had and Johns Carter cocaine. aging the approx- for apartment only the were and before apartment apartment, use return In imately hours. 2Vz anof one-eighth Thompson given had Johns Carter the cocaine. ounce commit conspiracy charged with were and Johns Carter aiding degree and first crime substance controlled de- first crime substance controlled abetting in a 3(a), 1(1), §§152.021,subds. Stat. of Minn. violation gree, ob- evidence all suppress (1996). They moved 609.05 toas well Cadillac, as apartment tained *4 they incriminating statements postarrest several suppress of observation initial Thielen’s argued that They made. had search unreasonable anwas activities drug packaging their all evidence Amendment Fourth of violation inadmis- was search unreasonable of a result as obtained trial Minnesota The tree. poisonous fruit sible in Minnesota defendant since, unlike held court over- were Johns (1990), Carter 91 S. 495 U. Olson, they visitors, out-of-state temporary but guests night social Fourth protection claim entitled were into intrusion government ob- Thielen’s concluded also court trial apartment. meaning within search anot was servation con- each were Johns trial, Carter After Amendment. Appeals Court The Minnesota offenses. of both victed held that respondent Carter did not have “standing” to ob ject to Thielen’s actions because his claim that he pre was dominantly a guest social was “inconsistent with the only evidence concerning his stay in the apartment, which indi cates that he used it for a business purpose package —to drugs.” 545 N. W. 2d (1996). 695, 698 In a separate appeal, the Court of Appeals also affirmed Johns’ conviction, without addressing what it termed the “standing” issue. State v. Johns, (June No. C9-95-1765 11, 1996), App. D-l, D-3 (unpublished).
A divided Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding
that respondents had “standing” to claim the protection of
“
Fourth Amendment because they had ‘a legitimate ex
pectation
”
of privacy in the
place.’
invaded
569 N. W. 2d
(1997)
169, 174
(quoting Rakas v. Illinois,
seizure
Central
Ibid.
evidence.
the
nor
vehicle
the
neither
owned
determining whether
that
idea
the
analysis was
our
to
(and
some-
not
his
of
violation
the
show
is able
defendant
of those
“definition
the
rights,
else’s)
Amendment
Fourth
one
sub-
of
purview
the
within
placed
properly
is more
rights
stand-
of
that
within
than
law
Amendment
Fourth
stantive
claim
in order
that
we held
Thus,
140.
Id.,
ing.”
dem-
must
defendant
Amendment,
Fourth
theof
protection
privacy
of
expectation
an
has
personally
he
that
onstrate
reasonable;
is
expectation
searched, and
place
Amend-
Fourth
of
outside
“a source
has
e., one
i.
personal
or
of real
concepts
by reference
ment, either
and
recognized
are
understandings that
toor
law
property
also
See
12.
n.
and
143-144,
Id., at
society.”
by
permitted
(1979).
740-741
735,
S.U.
Maryland,
v.
Smith
peo-
right
“The
guarantees:
Amendment
Fourth
The
effects,
and
papers,
houses,
persons,
secure
be
ple
vio-
be
shall
seizures,
searches
unreasonable
against
cause,
probable
upon
issue, but
shall
no Warrants
lated, and
describ-
particularly
affirmation,
or
by Oath
supported
to be
things
persons
searched, and
to be
place
ing the
unrea-
persons
protects
Amendment
seized.”
thus
[and] houses”
persons
“their
searches
sonable
right
personal
a Amendment
Fourth
indicates
United
v.
Katz
See
individual.
invoked
must
Amendment
(“[T]he Fourth
(1967)
S. U.
States,
which
extent
But
places”).
people,
protects
upon where
depend
may
people
protects
Amendment
Fourth
claim
“capacity
held
haveWe
are.
people
those
upon
.. .
depends
protection
Amend-
protection
claims
person who
whether
invaded
privacy
expectation
legitimate
ahas
ment
Ken-
Rawlings
also
See
143.
supra, at
Rakas,
place.”
98, 106
S.
tucky, 448 U.
*6
The text of the Amendment suggests that
protections
its
extend only to people in “their” houses. But we have held
that in some circumstances person
a
may have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the house of someone else.
In
Minnesota v. Olson,
“To hold that an overnight guest has legitimate a expec- tation of privacy in his host’s home merely recognizes the every day expectations of privacy that we all share. Staying overnight in another’s home is a longstanding social custom that serves functions recognized as valu- able by society. We stay in others’ homes when we travel to a strange city for business or pleasure, when we visit our parents, children, or more distant relatives out of town, when we are in jobs between or homes, or when we house-sit for a Mend....
“From the overnight guest’s perspective, he seeks shelter in another’s home precisely provides because it him with privacy, place where he and possessions will not disturbed anyone but his host and those his host allows inside. We are at our most vulnerable when we are asleep because we cannot monitor our own safety or the security of our belongings. It is for reason that, although may we spend all day public places, when we cannot sleep in our own home we seek out private another place to sleep, whether it be a hotel room, or home of a Mend.” Id., at 98-99. In Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. (1960),
defendant seeking to exclude evidence resulting from search apartment had given been the use of the apart- ment by a Mend. He had clothing in the apartment, had slept there “‘maybe a night,’” and at the time was the sole occupant of the apartment. But while the holding of Jones—that a search of the apartment violated the defend- *7 statement its valid, still rights Amendment —is Fourth
ant’s
search
a
where
premises
the
on
legitimately
“anyone
expressly
was
267,
at
id.,
legality,”
challenge its
may
occurs
Thus,
128
S.U.
439
Illinois,
v.
Rakas
in
repudiated
of
protection
the
may claim
home
in a
guest
overnight
an
with
present
merely
iswho
one
but
Amendment,
Fourth
the
may not.
householder
the
of
consent
the
guests,
overnight
obviously not
were
here
Respondents
transaction
business
a
for
essentially present
were
but
sug
nois
There
hours.
matter
a
home
only in
were
Thomp
relationship with
previous
a
they had
gestion
Nor
visit.
their
purpose
any other
was
there
son, or
relation
guest
overnight
similar
anything
there
was
into
acceptance
degree
a
suggest
ship Olson
in
for
place
dwelling
awas
apartment
While
household*
place
a
simply
respondents
these
for
was
it
Thompson,
business.
do
differ-
treated
is
purposes
commercial
for
used
Property
prop-
residential
purposes
Amendment
Fourth
ently for
premises,
commercial
in
privacy
expectation
erty. “An
similar
than,
less
indeed
from,
different
however,
Burger,
v.
York
New
home.”
individual’s
in
expectation
“home”
a was
it
while
(1987). And
S.U.
home.
was
present,
were
respondents
which
circumstances
some
held
has
Court
Similarly,
over
protection
Amendment
Fourth
claim
can
worker
opera
render
108-109, would
Ginsbtjrg’s
at
dissent, post,
*Justice
entirely
(1990), almost
91S.
Olson,
U.
Minnesota
language
tive
Fourth
extending
justification
explained
we
There,
superfluous.
an
overnight
“Staying
visitor:
overnight
protection
Amendment
recog
functions
serves
custom
social
longstanding
ais
home
other's
we
when
vulnerable
most
our
at
areWe
society....
valuable
nized
security
safety
own
our
monitor
cannot
we
because
asleep
are
aby
visit
business
short-term
any
If
Id., 98-99.
belongings.”
our
protection
share
visitor
entitles
stranger
was
in Olson
holding
itsof
explanation
Court’s
home, the
leaseholder’s
unnecessary.
quite
own workplace. See, g.,
e. O’Connor v. Ortega,
If we regard the overnight guest in Minnesota v. Olson as typifying those who may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment in the home of another, and one merely “legiti- mately on premises” as typifying those who may not do so, present case is obviously somewhere in between. But the purely commercial nature of the transaction engaged *8 in here, the relatively short period of time on the premises, and the lack of any previous connection between respondents and the householder, all lead us to concludethat respondents’ situation is closer to that of one simply permitted on the premises. We therefore hold any search which may have occurred did not violate their Fourth Amendment rights.
Because we conclude that respondents had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment, we need not decide whether the police officer’s observation constituted a “search.” The judgments of the Supreme Court of Minne- sota are accordingly reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice joins, Thomas concurring. join I opinion the of the Court because I believe it accu- rately applies our recent case law, including Minnesota Olson, 495 U. S. I write separately to express my view that that case law—like submissions parties the in this gives short case— shrift to the text of the Fourth Amendment, and to the well and long understood meaning of that text. Specifically,it leaps to apply the fuzzy standard of “legitimate expectation of privacy”—a consideration that covered seizure or search whether relevant often
is threshold “unreasonable”—to is Amendment Fourth Fourth by the covered seizure search whether question ad- is question latter If occurred. has Amendment Constitution text under analyzed and first dressed re- is ease present understood, traditionally motely difficult. people right “[t]he protects effects, papers, houses, persons, secure be S.U. . . . seizures searches unreasonable acknowledged be added). must It (emphasis Const., Arndt. is, provision houses” . . . “their phrase respective “their mean could It ambiguous. isolation, only person each extends protection so houses,” respective “their mean also it could But house. own pro- person each so houses,” other’s eaeh As else. someone house visiting when even tected ante, however, suggests, Court opinion today’s provision give possible linguistically it 88-90, “houses” respect with interpretation expansive latter, respect with interpretation same giving without *9 papers, . . . “persons, to “houses”— parallel are nouns right a constitutional me give effects”—which and ab- sois This contemplated. unreasonably searched. person your have been never knowledge my has surd person each provision meaning of obvious The and searches unreasonable secure right to has effects. and papers, house, person, own in his seizures confirm examined have I materials founding-era these (Strangely, meaning. understood was amici— its and State by the unmentioned went materials though re- even brief, reply State’s even unmentioned totaling briefs “In gauntlet: down thrown had spondents attor- 26 amici Minnesota, of State pages, over States United of General Solicitor general, neys history about word one mentioned have America and purposes of the Fourth Amendment or the intent of the framers of that amendment.” Brief for Respondents 4.) n. Like most provisions of the Bill Rights, Fourth Amendment was derived provisions already ex- isting in state constitutions. Of the four of provisions those that contained language similar to that of the Fourth Amend- ment,1 two used the same ambiguous “their” terminology. See Pa. Const., (1776) Art. (“That X the people have right a to hold themselves, their houses, papers, possessions free from search and seizure ..Vt. Const., §XI ch. (1777) I, (“That the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers, possessions free from seareh or seizure .”). . . The other two, however, avoided the ambiguity by using singular instead of the plural. See Mass. Const., pt. I, (1780) Art. XIV (“Every subject has right to be se- cure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures of per- his son, his houses, papers, his and all his possessions”); N. H. § (1784) Const., XIX (“Every subject hath right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of person, his his houses, his papers, and all his possessions”). The New York Convention that ratified the Constitution proposed an amendment that would given have every freeman “a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person papers or his property,” 4 B. Schwartz, The Roots of Bill of Rights (1980) (reproducing New pro- York posed 1778) amendments, (emphases added), and the Declara- tion Rights that the North Carolina Convention demanded prior to its ratification contained a provision similar protect- ing a freeman’s right against “unreasonable searches and sei- zures of his person, his papers and property,” (re- id., at producing North Carolina proposed Declaration Rights, 1778)(emphases added). There is no anyone indication be-
1 Four others contained provisions proscribing general warrants, but unspecific as to the objects of the protection. See Va. § Const. 10 (1776); Del. Const., I,Art. §6 (1776); Md. Const., Art. XXIII (1776); N. C. Const., Art. XI
94 York, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New the that
lieved
rather
“his”
word
using the
by
texts,
Carolina
North
and
the
contained
protections
the
narrowed
“their,”
than
Constitutions.
Vermont
and
Pennsylvania
“their
mean
to
understood
was
. houses”
..
“their
That
who
anyone
clear
been
have
houses”
respective
tres-
and
arrest
of
law
early American
and
English
knew
people’s
Amendment.
underlay the
that
pass
seizure
search
unreasonable
protection
maxim,
common-law
English
from
drawn
was
“houses”
Semctyne’s
back
farAs
castle.”
his
is
home
man’s
“A
proposition
that
for
case
English
leading
1604,
of
Case
proposition
of
discussion
his
by Coke
cited
(and a case
mere
on
based
warrants
general
outlawed
Carta
Magna
King’s
(1797)), the
176-177
Institutes
Coke,
E.4
surmise,
castle
anot
is
any one
of
house
“the
proclaimed
Bench
protect
extend
not
shall
himself,
for
but
privilege
or
77
93a,
91a,
Rep.
Co.
5
house.”
his
flies
who
person
any
discussing Black-
Cooley,in
B.).
(K.
Thus
194,198
Rep.
Eng.
house
into
break
could
a bailiff
statement
stone’s
is looked
house
“every man’s
because
arrest
conduct
Blaekstone, Commen-
W.3
castle,”
his
be
law
by the
upon
explana-
(1768), added
England
of
Laws
on
taries
is
by law
dwelling which
own
defendant’s
“[I]t is
tion:
another,
house
in be
he if
castle;
his
to be
said
purpose
his
effect
toit
enter
may break
sheriff
bailiff
Eng-
Laws
on
Commentaries
Blaekstone,
_”
3 W.
Johnson
1872).
also
See
ed.
rev.
Cooley
(T.
2d
5n.
287,
land
(C. P.
1029, 1030
Rep.
Eng.
248,
Taunt.
Leigh, may person
third
aof
door
many cases
(“[I]n
1815)
cannot; for
himself
Defendant
where
broken
castle
is
castle, own
house
every man’s
though
man”).2
another
evidence
historical
upon
doubt
Kennedy
cast
seeks
Justice
proper
[the]
dispute
“scholars
assertion
carefully generalized
(concurring
99-100
Posf, at
authorities.”
English
of “the
interpretation”
Newv.
Payton
a passage
only
cites
this, he
support
In
opinion).
*11
Of course this is not to say Fourth Amendment
protects only the Lord of the Manor who holds his estate in
fee simple. People call a house “their” home when legal title
York,
inis there. actually live they long as free—so rent occupy it against protection people’s the of criterion the is That by established is houses “their” into intrusion government 520 Mass. Shed, 13 v. Oystead of case leading American into to break sheriff for trespass ait held (1816),which court The there. lived who boarder a capture dwelling to a de- dwelling-houses” “inviolability of reasoned occupier “the to extends Coke and Hale, Foster, scribed ordinary or domicile their have who family ... his any of or “who a servant” or boarder including “a there,” residence (emphasis 523 Id., at home.” house made have sanc- amade shall house “the added, added). But, it who visitor,” a perhaps or stranger, “aas such one tuary” for another,” house refuge in take[s] pursuit, a “upon open may break officer castle; his is house “the Ibid. process.” his execute order in windows doors original). in (emphasis write today we presented question deciding the Thus, Fourth text clean. far is slate a upon which against background common-law Amendment, displayed consistently understandings adopted, was right were We clear. answer make adoption its after (1961), 610 S.U. States, v. United Chapman hold tenant apartment an protects Amendment Fourth though even dwelling, his search unreasonable an against hold right were we And leaseholder. a only he un- an (1968),that S.U. Carolina, North v. Bumper resi- her violated house grandmother’s a search reasonable area because rights grandson’s dent added). (emphasis 11n. id., home,” “was searched tradition text what limit absolute went We we (1990),when 91S.U. Olson, 495 Minnesota permit unreasonable guest overnight mere protected search of his hosts’ apartment. But whereas it is plausible to regard person’s overnight lodging as at least his “tempo- rary” residence, it is entirely impossible give that charac- terization to an apartment that he uses to package cocaine. Respondents here were not searched in “their . . . hous[e]” under any interpretation of the phrase that bears the re- motest relationship to the well-understood meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The dissent believes that “[o]ur obligation produce co- herent results” requires that *13 ignore we this clear text and
4-century-old tradition, and apply instead the notoriously un- helpful test adopted in a “benchmark]” decision that is 31 years old. Post, at 110, citing Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. my In view, the only thing past three decades have established about the (which Katz test has come to mean the test enunciated by Justice Harlan’s sepa- rate concurrence in Katz, see 360) id., at is that, unsurpris- ingly, those “actual (subjective) expectation^] of privacy” “that society is prepared ” to recognize as 'reasonable,’ id., at 361, bear an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable. When that self-indulgent test is (as employed the dissent would employ here) it to determine whether a “search or seizure” within the meaning of the Constitution has (as occurred opposed to whether that “search or seizure” is an “unreasonable” one), it has plausible no foundation in the text of the Fourth Amendment. That provision did not guarantee gener- some alized “right of privacy” and leave it to this Court to deter- mine particular which manifestations of the value of privacy “society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.’” Ibid. Rather, it enumerated (“persons, houses, papers, and ef- fects”) objects of privacy protection to which the Consti- tution would extend, leaving further expansion to good through people of Court, but not
judgment, legislature.3 in representatives into invited a person that correct may dissent The (even business common ain engage to house else’s someone be protected ought speak) business, so monkey common busi- that which room searches government against milk to deliver invited persons that conducted; and is ness hypothet- “classroom as dismisses dissent (whom pizza flesh-and- presumably, opposed, ical,” post, gov- be protected not ought hypothetieals) blood not amI occupy. they rooms searches ernment sure amIBut questions. policy those answer sure Constitu- contained remotely is answer most, im- indeed many, left —as means which tion, fed- state judgment left —to are questions portant as judges role our proper beyond goWe legislators. eral power people's restrict we when society democratic observation Court’s Katz “undervalu[e]” I asserts dissent HI, Post, at places.” people, protects “the devastating abe slogan *14 catchy That 351. S., at U. 389 citing 3,n. protec claim could a location that maintained who someone response asserted, perhaps, who Amendment —someone Fourth of the tion Stand Have Trees Stone, Should G£ too.” rights, have forests “primeval 450 Rev. L. Cal. S. 45 Objects, Natural Rights Legal ing? —Toward re whether one druidical less however, is here, issue The be “to right their violation a suffered have people) (who are spondents unreasonable effects, against houses, papers, persons, in secure Amend Fourth That 4. Const., Arndt. S.U. seizures.” searches question unresponsive simply is places protect not does ment homes. people’s other in people protects Amendment Fourth whether “the leitmotif with dafrns, dash dissent as not, this, I do saying In contraire 3; an 111,n. at Katz, post, opinion” concurring Harlan’s Justice entirely amI regard Gegenteil), im Wagnerian, more (or, be another sings dissent is it opinion, with harmony opin Court’s “As concurring): J., (Harlan, S., U. See opera. places.’ people, protects Amendment states, ‘the ion Gener people. those affords protection however, what question, ‘place.’” ato reference requires question answer here, the ally, govern themselves over the full range of policy choices that the Constitution has left available to them.
Justice Kennedy, concurring. join
I the Court’s opinion, for its reasoning is consistent my with view that almost all guests social have legitimate a expectation of privacy, and protection hence against unrea- sonable searches, in their host’s home. The Fourth protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their . . . houses,” and it is beyond dispute that the home is entitled special protection as the center private lives of our people. Security of the home must guarded by the law in a world where privacy is diminished enhanced surveillance and sophisticated communication systems. As is well established, however, Fourth Amendment protection, though dependent upon spa- tial definition, is in essence personal a right. Thus, as the Court held in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. (1978), there are limits on who may assert it. The dissent, as I interpret it, does question Rakas or the principle that not persons all in the company of the prop- erty owner have owner’s right to assert spatial pro- tection. Rakas, it is true, involved automobiles, where necessities of law permit enforcement more latitude to police than ought to be extended to houses. The analysis Rakas was not conceived,however, as a utilitarian exception to accommodate the needs of law enforcement. The Court’s premise was a more fundamental one. Fourth Amendment rights personal, are and when person objects to the search of place and invokes the exclusionary rule, he or she must have requisite connection to place. The analysis in *15 Rakas must be respected with reference to dwellings unless precedent is to be overruled or so limited to its facts that its underlying principle is, in the repudiated. end, As to the English authorities that were the historical basis for the Fourth Amendment, the Court has observed that
100 e.g., See, interpretation. proper dispute
scholars Semayne’s 592 573, S.U. 445 York, Newv. Payton 1604),says that (K. B. Rep. 194 Eng. 91a, Rep. 5 Co. Case, fortress” and castle his himtois every one of house “the family,” “his homeowner, the for privileged is home the and Rep., Eng. 93a, 91b, Id., at goods.” proper own “his and in recognized protections narrowly, the Read 198. 195, at of context the to confined been have might Semayne’s Case enforcement to application limited of be so and process, civil Case, Semayne’s time the at if, Even law. criminal of the incursion respect to with castle his not was home man’s a dispositive not matter, criminal a King in the is home man’s a axiom us. before question of the King the Pitt attributed the statement or castle, his threshold, cross not dares force his all and enter cannot (1958), has S.U. States, 357 United Miller see significance independent an power a time over acquired security in personal assurance general more a justifying con- our part of become has which assurance an home, one’s tradition. stitutional felony routine a for example, for settled, now It ob must police circumstances, the exigent absent arrest home arrest home entering a before a warrant tain too, So, 576. at supra, York, New Payton v. owner. (1981), S. States, 451 U. United Steagald v. in held Court can police consent, circumstances exigent absent that, home in warrant arrest subject of search not di warrant search obtaining first without party, a third entry. recting home- right protect strengthen eases These how- speak, They do home. his own in privacy owner home interest privacy such claim right ever, issue (noting that 218-219 g., id., e. See, another. own privacy right homeowner’s Steagald was arrest sanctuary from “claim right to home, and that, affirmed itself Steagald party”). third aof home *16 in accordance with the commonlaw, our Fourth Amendment precedents “reeogniz[e3. . . rights such as those con- by ferred Fourth Amendment personal are in nature, and cannot bestow protection vicarious on those who do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in place to be searched.” Id., at 219.
The homeowner’s right to privacy is not at issue in this case. The Court does not question reach the whether the officer’sunaided observations of Thompson’sapartment con- stituted a search. If there was in fact a search, however, then Thompson had right object to the police unlawful surveillance of her apartment and right to suppress any evidence disclosed the search. Similarly, if police had entered her home without a search warrant to arrest re- spondents, Thompson’s own privacy interests would be vio- lated and she could presumably bring an action under Rev. § Stat. 1979,42 § U. S. C. 1983,or an action trespass. Our cases establish, however, that respondents have independ- no ent privacy right, the violation of which results in exclusion of evidence against them, they unless can establish a mean- ingful connection to Thompson’sapartment.
The settled rule is that the requisite connection is an ex- pectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U. (1967) S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The application of that rule involves consider- ation of the place kind in which the individual claims the privacy interest and what expectations privacy are tra- ditional and well recognized. Ibid. I expect most, if not all, guests social legitimately expect that, in ac- cordance with social custom, the homeowner will exercise her discretion to include or exclude others for guests’ benefit. As we recognized in Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U. S. (1990), where these social expectations exist—as in the case of an overnight guest they are sufficient to create a — legitimate expectation of privacy, even in the absence of any property right to exclude others. In this respect, the dis- *17 expectations reasonable that correct be must
sent analy- This guest. by the extent, some shared, are owner have will guests rule, social general as a that, suggests sis not is That home. host’s their in privacy expectation - however. us, before case nothing more established have respondents ease this In Thompson’s with connection fleeting insubstantial and a than used respondents record, in appears that all For home. station, processing a convenient simply as house Thompson’s mechanical than nothing more involving purpose their distribution. substance packing and chopping act con- in engaged respondents that suggestion no There transac- their Thompson about with communications fidential apartment Thompson’s been not had Respondents tion. Minne- arrest. their before even they left before, and convic- respondents’ overturned which Court, Supreme sota fairly not could respondents acknowledged tions, 2d N. W. “guests.” Thompson’s characterized (Minn. Ct. 695, 698 2dW.N. (1997); also see 175-176 was he only evidence—that 1996) Carter’s (noting that App. claim with inconsistent cocaine—was package there Thompson’s guest” social predominantly “he was
apartment). afor each homes, visiting been had here respondents If appre- were cocaine bag of drop off a two, or minute home; 19th present wrongfully policeman by a hended they were where home a goods they left had if or absence, their goods seized had police staying any rejection compels Rakas said have we here, does it So assert. might respondents interest privacy meaningful tie no established have respondents given owner’s home, or owner’s owner, connection privacy. expectation principle underlying faithful remain cannot We per- amI case, reversing in without Rakas homeown- protect toit from depart need we suaded er’s own privacy Respondents interests. have per- made no suasive argument that we need to per fashion a se rule of home protection, with an automatic right for all in the home to invoke the exclusionary rule, in protect order to homeown- ers and guests police unlawful intrusion. With these join I observations, opinion. Court’s
Justice concurring in the judgment. Breyer, I agree with Ginsburg that respondents can Justice claim the Fourth *18 protection. Amendment’s Petitioner, how- ever, raises a question, second whether under the circum- stances Officer Thielen’s observation made “from public area outside the curtilage of the residence” respond- violated ents’ Fourth Amendment rights. See Pet. for Cert. i. In my view, it did not.
I would answer question the on the basis of the following factual assumptions, derived from the evidentiary record presented (1) here: On the evening May 15,1994, an anony- mous individual approached Officer Thielen, telling him that just he had by walked a nearby apartment window through which he had seen some people (2) bagging drugs; the apart- ment question in garden was apartment that was partly ground below (3) level; families frequently used the grassy just area outside apartment’s window walking or for (4) playing members of public also used just area outside the apartment’s window bicycles; (5) store in an effort verify the tipster’s information, Officer Thielen position walked ato about 1 to IVz feet in front of win- (6) dow; Officer Thielen stood there for about 15 minutes looking down through a set of (7) Venetian blinds; what he saw, namely, people putting powder white bags, verified the account he had (8) heard; and he then used that informa- tion to help obtain a search warrant. See App. E-l to E-3, E-9 to E-12, G-8 to G-9, G-12 to G-14, G-26, G-29 to G-30, G-32, G-39 to G-40, G-67 to G-71,1-2 to 1-3. Ms. within then persons that concluded court trial The of privacy expectation an have “did kitchen
Thompson’s
observa-
his
made
Thielen
Officer
where
location
from
16,1994),
Dee.
Ct.,
(Minn. Dist.
K9-94-0985
...No.
tions
out-
stood
Thielen
Officer
because
(unpublished),
E-10
App.
observa-
made
he
when
“curtilage”
apartment’s
side
Supreme
the Minnesota
And
E-12.
id., at
E-10
tions,
violated
had
Thielen
Officer
finding
Court, while
cur-
court’s
trial
challenge
Amendment, did
Thie-
Officer
assumed
indeed,
determination;
tilage
2dW.N.
curtilage.
apartment’s
outside
stood
len
is plausible
“it
(stating
(1997)
n.
177, and
was
window
apartment
outside
just
presence
Thielen’s
legitimate”).
the public
used
a place
stood
then,
Thielen,
Officer
into
window
through
see
could
one
which
dwellers
apartment’s
precautions
kitchen.
respect
failed
have
their privacy
maintain
took
Given
that place.
standing
ordinary passerby
an
offi-
say
I cannot
law,
ease
well-established
Court’s
“un-
forbids, namely,
Constitution
what
cer engaged
*19
Riley, 488
S.U.
Florida
v.
g.,
See, e.
search.”
reasonable
heli-
from
greenhouse
observation
(finding
(1989)
448
445,
owners
though
even
permissible,
airspace
public
copters
bushes
on
relied
sides,
two
on
greenhouse
enclosed
had
two
remaining
through
observations
ground-level
blocking
Ciraolo,
476
v.
roof);
California
90%
covered
sides,
from
backyard
observation
(finding
(1986)
209
207,
S.U.
fence
outer
6-foot
despite
permissible
airspace
in public
plane
United
Katz
cf.
backyard);
around
fence
inner
10-foot
351
States,
S.U.
389
conclu-
different
reached
Court
Supreme
Minnesota
en-
had
Thielen
Officer
believed
because
in part
sion
bushes,
some
over
“climbed
he
activity,
unusual
gaged
inches
to12
face
his
and placed
down
crouched
apartment
into
saw
he
because
in part
window,”
through “a small gap” in blinds that were drawn.
N. W. 2d, at 177-178. But I would not here determine
whether
the crouching and
climbing
“placing]
face”
makes a constitutional difference because the record before
us does not contain support
for those factual conclusions.
That record indicates that Officer Thielen would not have
needed to, and did not, climb over bushes or crouch. See
G-12
App.
to G-13, G-27 to G-30,
G-43
(Officer
G-46
Thie-
len’s testimony);
id., at 1-3
(photograph
apartment build
ing). And even though the primary evidence consists of Of
ficer Thielen’s own testimony, who else could have known?
Given the importance of factual nuance in this area of con
stitutional
law, I would not determine
the constitutional
significance of factual assertions
the record denies.
Cf. Walters v. National Assn. Radiation Survivors,
U. S. 305, 342 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
Brown
(citing
v. Chote,
106 from dweller apartment innocent saved likely have
more the if warrant-based, search though intrusive, physically illegal no revealed observation constitutionally permissible activity. Gins- with Justice agreeing while reasons, these For the reversing judgment Court’s in the concur I also burg, Court. Supreme Minnesota Stevens Justice whom Ginsburg, with
Justice dissenting. join, Souter Justice security of only the undermines decision Court’s resident home security also but guests, short-term personally lessee or a homeowner view, when my In
herself.
endeavor,
ain common
share
home
her
guest into
invites
activities,
leisure
in
engage
conversation,
for
it be
whether
should
guest
illicit, that
or
licit
purposes
business
for
searches
unreasonable
shelter
his host’s
share
seizures.
on
'legitimately
of the
restoration
propose
here
do not
I
States,
United
v.
Jones
stated
criterion
premises”
formulation
rejected
(1960),
the Court
257, 267
S.U.
(1978),
did
itas
128, 142
S.U.
Illinois, v.
Rakas
Salvucci, 448
v.
States
in United
standing rule”
"automatic
reach
I
disposition
First,
83,
S.U.
home—
importance
unique
responds
case
law.
recognized
privacy
bastion
essential
most
(“[Pri
(1984)
S.U.
Karo, 468
v.
States
United
See
normally
individual
which
places
are
residences
vate
author
intrusion
governmental
free
privacy
expects
not deviated
have
cases
Our
by a warrant....
ized
New Payton
principle.”);
Amendment
Fourth
this basic
pro
(“The
(1980)
573, 589
S.
York, 445 U.
In
settings.
variety of
ain
privacy
individual’s
tects
when
than
clearly defined
more
privacy
zone
none
indi
anof
dimensions
physical
unambiguous
by the
bounded
itself,
home
within
home.”).
even
Second,
vidual’s
*21
position to which I would adhere would not permit “a casual
visitor who has never seen, or
permitted
been
to visit, basement of another’s house
object
to a search of the base-
ment if the visitor happened to be in the kitchen of the house
at the time of the search.” Rakas,
unreasonable
secure.
less
practice
law
The
at 714-716.
S., U.
tempt po-
will
today’s decision
suggests
frailty
Human
find
to
warrant,
dwellings without
private
pry into
to
lice
through
there
rest
not
do
incriminating guests who
evidence
Scope
Interrelationship of the
The
Simien,
night. See
Object Unrea-
to
Standing to
and
Amendment
the Fourth
of
(“[I]f
(1988)
589
487,
Rev.
L.
Ark.
Searches,
sonable
gain
to
everything
they have
cause,
probable
no
have
police
where
circumstances
under
they search
if
nothing
lose
to
and
will
defendants
potential
of
one
at least
they know
with
temptation
tolerates
standing.”). Rakas
have
Fourth
The
Ashdown,
See
searches.
automobile
respect
Privacy,”
Expectation
“Legitimate
and
Amendment
“pre-
as
(1981)(criticizing Rakas
1289,1321
Rev.
L.
34 Vand.
nothing to lose
may be
there
in which
sent[ing]
framework
car
aof
illegal search
by the
gain
something to
S.,U.
Rakas, 439
also
see
occupant”);
one
than
more
carries
will
police
(“After
decision,
this
dissenting)
(White, J.,
at 169
occu-
vehicles
searching
unreasonably
lose
little
have
reason
impelling
no
see
I
person.”).
than one
by more
pied
United
v.
Silverman
See
home.
into
risk
to extend
[of the
(“At
very core
(1961)
U. S.
States,
into
to retreat
man
right
a Amendment]
stands
govern-
unreasonable
free from
and there
home
his own
genuinely
are
intrusion.”).
people
it,
I see
As
mental
searches
unreasonable
houses...
their...
“secure
invitations
their
if4,
Arndt.
Const.,
U. S.
seizures,”
peer-
governmental
of unwarranted
the risk
increase
others
places.
dwelling
prying into
ing a reasonable
gains
guest
invitation,
Through
host’s
Olson,
Minnesota
home.
privacy
expectation
overnight
respect to
(1990),
with
held
so
91S.
495 U.
term
shorter
extends
decision
logic
guest.
A
and Seizure:
LaFave, Search
5 W.
See
well.
guests
(3d
11.3(b),
ed.
§
p. 137
the Fourth
on
Treatise
1996) (“[I]t is fair to say that the Olson decision lends consid-
erable
support
claim that shorter-term guests also
have standing.”)*
Visiting
home of a friend, relative, or
business associate, whatever
the time of day, “serves func-
tions recognized as valuable by society.” Olson, 495 U. S.,
at 98. One need not remain
overnight
anticipate privacy
in another’s home, “a place where [the guest] and his posses-
sions will not be disturbed by anyone but his host and those
his host allows inside.”
Id., at 99.
In sum, when a home-
owner chooses to share the
privacy
her home and her com-
pany with a short-term guest,
the twofold requirement
*23
“emerging]
from prior decisions” has been satisfied: Both
host and guest “have exhibited an actual (subjective) expec-
tation of privacy”;
that “expectation [is] one [our]
society
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Katz v. United
States,
22-2B. police overnight while stayed shielded decision Court’s held Court 93-94. atS., U. him. for searched a war- protection Amendment Fourth guest had involve guest’s despite home host’s in his arrest rantless robbery, armed murder, (first-degree crimes grave ment sustained similarly have assault). decisions Other de criminality despite pleas Amendment Fourth at 583-603 S.,U. Payton, 445 g., e. See, activities. fendants’ (tel 348-359 S., at U. Katz, 389 robbery); (murder armed Silver wagers); illegal place lines state across ephoning offenses). Indeed, it (gambling 508-512 atS.,U. man, 365 con activity made illegality way. If the this must Fourth such search, unconstitutional otherwise stitutional only, innocent reserved protection, Amendment toward behavior police regulating force little have guilty. innocent either ease. my view key to isKatz leading decision Our petition- violated Government ruled we There, electronically re- when rights er’s was he while information wagering transmitting him corded wereWe 353. atS., 389 U. booth. telephone public inside *24 people, protects Amendment “the mindful monitoring of electronic this held 351, at id., places,” caller] [the upon which privacy “violated call business 353. at id., booth,” telephone using the while relied justifiably vis- often results coherent produce obligation Our exposi- current our to inform us requires law area ited Har- Justice As already established. by benchmarks tions 497, U. S. Ullman, 367 Poe dissent in his explained lan (1961): must protection to Constitutional claim new “Each pur- Constitutional background considered his- perceived rationally been they have poses, as limited exercise we Though developed. torically sharply restrained judgment, yet there is no ‘mechanical yardstick,’ no ‘mechanical answer.’ The decision of an apparently novel claim must depend on grounds which follow on closely well-accepted principles and criteria. The new decision must take ‘its place in relation to what went before and further [cut] a channel for what is to ” Ibid, come.’ Irvine (quoting v. California, 347 U. S. 128, 147 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
The Court’s decision in this ease veers sharply from the path
marked in Katz.
I do not agree that we have a more reason-
able expectation of privacy when we place a business call to
a person’s home from a public telephone booth on the side
of the street, see Katz,
3Justice Scalia’s lively concurring opinion deplores our adherence to Katz. In suggesting that we have elevated Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz to first place, ante, see at Justice Scalia undervalues the dear opinion of the Court that “the Fourth Amendment protects peo ple, not places,” S., 389 U. at 351. That core understanding is the leitmo of Justice Harlan’s tif concurring opinion. One cannot avoid a strong sense déjd vu on reading Justice Scalia’s elaboration. It so vividly recalls the opinion of Justice Black in dissent in Katz. See S., 389 U. at 365 (Black, J., (“While dissenting) I realize that an argument based on the meaning of words lacks the scope, and no doubt the appeal, of broad policy discussions and philosophical ..., discourses for me the language of the is the crucial place look.”); id., at 373 (“[B]y arbitrarily substituting the Court’s language ... for the Constitution’s language the Court has made the Fourth Amendment its vehide for holding all laws violative of the Constitution which offend the Court’s broadest concept of (“I privacy.”); ibid. will not distort the words the Amendment in order to ‘keep the Constitution toup date’ or ‘to bring into harmony with the ”). times.’ Justice Scalia relies on what he deems text,” ante, “clear 97, to argue that the Fourth Amendment protects people from searches only the places where they live, ante, at 96. Again, as Justice Stewart *25 emphasized in the majority opinion Katz, which stare decisis and rea son require us to follow, “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” S., 389 U. at 351.
%%% judg- Court’s I dissent stated, reasons For war- over surveillance judicial retain ment, allows. today’s decision searches rantless