UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. CHRISTIAN RODRIGUEZ,
Case No. 25-cr-20201-BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
November 15, 2025
BETH BLOOM
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant Christian Rodriguez‘s Motion for Bill of Particulars, ECF No. [30], Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss Indictment, ECF No. [31], Defendant‘s Motion In Limine, ECF No. [34], and the Government‘s Motion In Limine, ECF No. [33]. The Government filed Responses to Defendant‘s Motions, ECF Nos. [35], [36], [46]. Defendant filed Replies as to his Motion for Bill of Particulars and Motion to Dismiss Indictment. ECF Nos. [42], [43]. Defendant filed a Response to the Government‘s Motion In Limine. ECF No. [41]. The Court has carefully reviewed the Motions, the supporting and opposing submissions, the record in this case, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons discussed bеlow, the Motions are granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 1, 2025, Defendant was charged by Indictment with one count of wire fraud (Count I) and two counts of money laundering (Counts II and III), in violation of
did knowingly, and with the intent to defraud, devise, and intend to devise, a scheme and artifice to defraud, and to obtain money and property by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, knowing
that the pretenses, representations, and promises were false and fraudulent when made, and for the purpose of executing the scheme and artifice, did knowingly transmit and cause to be transmitted, by means of wire communication in interstate and foreign commerce, certain writings, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds[.]
ECF No. [3] at 2.
The Indictment further alleges that the purpose of the scheme and artifice was for Defendant “to unlawfully enrich himself by misappropriating Victim Company‘s money for his personal use and benefit by making materially false and fraudulent representations to Victim Company, аnd concealing and failing to state material facts concerning, among other things, the use of Victim Company‘s funds and the existence of certain viable business opportunities.” Id. ¶ 3.
To accomplish the purpose of the scheme and artifice, the Indictment alleges that, from April 10, 2020 through April 24, 2020, Defendant “discussed with Victim Company a business opportunity to purchase 20,000,000 personal protective equipment (“PPE“) masks during the COVID-19 pandemic.” Id. ¶ 4. Defendant “represented that he, along with his business partners, would source the PPE through a manufаcturer in Turkey with a guaranteed delivery to Victim Company by on or about April 30, 2020.” Id. ¶ 5. On April 20, 2020, Defendant “provided Victim Company an invoice for the purchase of the PPE[,]” after which, “Victim Company wired approximately $1,000,000 to Company 1‘s Bank 1 account ending in 5075.” Id. ¶ 6. From April 27, 2020 through April 28, 2020, Defendant “on behalf of Company 1, misrepresented to Victim Company that the PPE would be delivered via air cargo to Frankfurt, Germany.” Id. ¶ 7 After receiving the funds from Victim Company into Company 1‘s Bank 1 account ending in 5075” on April 24, 2020, Defendant “transferred approximately $500,000 into Company 2‘s Bank 2 account ending in 7613.” Id. ¶ 8. On May 7, 2020, Defendant “also transferred approximately $200,000 from Company 1‘s Bank 1 account ending in 5075 into Company 2‘s Bank 2 account ending in
for the purpose of executing and in furtherance of the aforesaid scheme and artifice to defraud, and to obtain money аnd property by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, knowing that the pretenses, representations, and promises were false and fraudulent when made, did knowingly cause to be transmitted by means of wire communication, certain writings, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds, that is, an email from [Defendant] in Miami-Dade County, Florida, to Victim Company in London via email address us**********@emfi.uk, causing a wire transmission from inside the Southern District of Florida to outside of the state of Florida.
Id. ¶ 10.
In support of Counts II and III, the Indiсtment alleges that Defendant
did knowingly engage and attempt to engage in a monetary transaction affecting interstate commerce, by, through, and to a financial institution, in criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000, such property having been derived from a specified unlawful activity knowing that the property involved in the monetary transaction represented the proceeds of some form of specified unlawful activity.
Id. at 4-5.
Regarding Count II, the Indictment alleges that on May 8, 2020, Defendant wire transferred аpproximately $25,000 from a Bank 2 account ending in 7613 in the name of Company 2, which Defendant controlled, to “E.M.R.” Id. at 5. Regarding Count III, the Indictment alleges that, on May 14, 2020, Defendant wire transferred approximately $41,246.71 from a Bank 2 account ending in 7613 in the name of Company 2, which Defendant controlled, for the payment of an American Express credit card. Id.
II. LEGAL STANDRD
A. Motion to Dismiss Indictment
A defendant may challenge an indictment on various grounds, including failure to state an
“Under
An indictment is sufficient “if it: (1) presents the essential elements of the charged offense, (2) notifies the accused of the charges to be defended against, and (3) enables the accused to rely upon a judgment under the indictment as a bar against double jeopardy for any subsequent prosecution for the same offense.”
United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Dabbs, 134 F.3d 1071, 1079 (11th Cir. 1998)); see also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974).
Even when an indictment “tracks the language of the statute, it must be accompanied with such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform the accused of the specific offense, coming under the general description, with which he is charged.” United States v. Bobo, 344 F.3d 1076, 1083 (11th Cir. 2003).
B. Motion for Bill of Particulars
The court may direct the government to file a bill of particulars. The defendant may move for a bill of particulars before or within 10 days after arraignment or at a later time if the court permits. The government may amend a bill of particulars subject to such conditions as justice requires.
“The purpose of a true bill of particulars is threefold: to inform the defendant of the charge against him with sufficient precision to allow him to preрare his defense, to minimize surprise at trial, and to enable him to plead double jeopardy in the event of a later prosecution for the same offense.” United States v. Anderson, 799 F.2d 1438, 1441 (11th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A bill of particulars, properly viewed, supplements an indictment by providing the defendant with information necessary for trial preparation.” Id.
“[A] defendant is not entitled to a bill of particulars ‘with respect to information which is already available through other sources.” United States v. Martell, 906 F.2d 555, 558 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 1986)); see also United States v. Roberts, 174 F. App‘x 475, 478 (11th Cir. 2006) (“A bill of particulars is not required where thе information sought has already been provided by other sources, such as the indictment and discovery and it is not designed to compel the government to detailed exposition of its evidence or to explain the legal theories upon which it intends to rely at trial.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
C. Motion In Limine
A motion in limine asks the Court “to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually offered.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984). “In fairness to the
“Evidence is admissible if relevant, and evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to prove or disprove a fact of consequence.” United States v. Patrick, 513 F. App‘x 882, 886 (11th Cir. 2013);
III. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Dismiss Indictment
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Indictment pursuant to
The elements of a wire fraud charge under
Defendant cites United States v. Takhalov, which dealt with a scheme in which “a B-girl lured a man into Pavlenko‘s bar, where the man proceeded to use his AMEX card. Looking back on the encounter from the clearer light of day, thе customer decided he had been defrauded and contested the charge with AMEX.” United States v. Takhalov, 838 F.3d 1168, 1169 (11th Cir. 2016). On April 19, 2010, “AMEX determined that the charge was not fraudulent and sent its customer a letter saying so.” Id. However, two days later, “for whatever reason, Pavlenko sent AMEX an email covering up his relation with the B-girl.” Id. But by then, the Eleventh Circuit concluded, Pavlenko “had nothing
Defendant also relies upon Krulewitch v. United States, in which the Supreme Court held that a co-conspirator‘s hearsay statement should not have been admitted at trial because it was not made “in furtherance of the conspiracy charged[.]” Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 443 (1949). The Supreme Court rejected the Government‘s argument that “even after the central criminal objectives of a conspiracy have succeeded or failed, an implicit subsidiary phase of the conspiracy always survives, the phase which has concealment as its sole objective.” Id. However, in Krulewitch, the Government conceded “that that the chief objective of the conspiracy—transportation for prostitution purposes—had ended in success or failure before the reported conversation took place[.]” Id. No such concession has been made here.
Within the context of the wire fraud statute, “[a] transmission is ‘for the purpose of executing’ the scheme if it is ‘incident to an essential part of the scheme.” United States v. Evans, 473 F.3d 1115, 1118 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954)). With regard to the mail fraud statute,1 the Supreme Court has stated that where a scheme “had
The Indictment alleges that the May 4, 2020 wire was “in furtherance of the aforesaid scheme and artifice to defraud[.]” ECF No. [3] ¶ 10. Therefore, reviewing the face of the Indictment, the Court concludes that it “contain[s] the elements of the offensе intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprise[s] the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet.” Sharpe, 438 F.3d at 1263 (quoting Bobo, 344 F.3d at 1083).
Defendant also argues that the “$1,000,000 was voluntarily wired to an entity associated with the Defendant on April 24, 2025 (outside of the five-year statute of limitations).” ECF No. [31] ¶ 9. The Government responds that “the Defendant‘s statute of limitations argument is premised on two exhibits attached to the Motion.” ECF No. [36] at 5. And by looking beyond the face of the Indictment, the Government argues, the Court would “do precisely what the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly warned against—namely, granting summary judgment in a criminal proceeding.” Id. (citing United States v. Salman, 378 F.3d 1266, 1267-68 (11th Cir. 2004)). In Salman, the Eleventh Circuit stated that “[b]y looking beyond the face of the indictment and ruling
The Government also cites United States v. Ashdown in which the former Fifth Circuit2 stated that “[t]he statute of limitations is a defense to prosecution, not a rule of evidence. Therefore, once prosecution is timely instituted, the statute of limitations has no bearing on the admissibility of evidence.” United States v. Ashdown, 509 F.2d 793, 798 (5th Cir. 1975). In Ashdown, the prosecution was timely instituted, but the defendants argued that acts occurring outside of the five-year statute of limitations were inadmissible. Id. at 797. However, the Fifth Circuit held that “it is not the scheme to defraud, but the use of the mails to execute the scheme which constitutes the offense.” Id. at 798. It therefore concluded that “[i]t would be a bizarre result indeed if a crime properly prosеcuted within the limitations period could not be proven because an essential element, such as intent, could only be established by proof of incidents occurring outside the period.” Id. Here, the “wire occurred on May 4, 2020—within the statutory period— and thus there is no limitations problem.” ECF No. [36] at 7. Defendant does not dispute that the prosecution was timely instituted, nor does he otherwise address this argument in his Reply. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss the Indictment regarding Count I is denied.
Because the Court denied Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment with rеgard to the
B. Motion for Bill of Particulars
Defendant states that, through his discussions with the Government, he learned that the Government contends Defendant committed wire fraud by stating in an email on May 4, 2020, “‘Yes I will take care of it’ in response to Sheikh Usman‘s request to refund a deposit.” ECF No. [30] ¶ 3. Therefore, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Bill of Particulars seeking “[c]larity regаrding what property was conveyed or fraudulently induced on or after May 4th[.]” ECF No. [30] ¶ 8. The Government responds that the Motion for Bill of Particulars is “premised on a fundamental misunderstanding of a wire fraud charge” because the elements of wire fraud do not require that the Government prove that the May 4, 2020 wire caused the victim to wire additional funds to Defendant. ECF No. [35]. Defendant replies that if the Government “is relying on the conduct which occurred prior to May 2, 2020 to satisfy its burden,” then “no further inquiry is necessary and the matter will be addressed in a Mоtion in Limine to address irrelevant material being presented which could prove more prejudicial than probative.” ECF No. [42] at 2. If, however, “the Government contests [Defendant‘s] understanding,” then Defendant seeks clarification regarding how the May 4, 2020 email furthered the scheme and artifice to defraud and what money or property was obtained by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representation and promises knowingly made. Id. ¶ 8.
As stated above and contrary to Defendant‘s argument, the Government may rely on conduct prior to May 2, 2020 to establish the elements of wire fraud. As such, the Motion for Bill of Particulars is denied.
i. Defendant‘s Motion In Limine
Defendant‘s Motion In Limine seeks to exclude (1) the $1,000,000 wired in April; (2) conduct constituting money laundering regarding the purchase of a new vehicle or payment towards credit cards; (3) any mention of a “fraudulent invoice (generated by the manufacturer and allegedly forwarded by the Defendant)“; and (4) statements “that the initial payment was ‘criminally derived[.]’” ECF No. [34] ¶ 8-11. Defendant argues that this evidence is outside of the statute of limitations and “more prejudicial than probative.” Id. (citing
Defendant‘s argument that the evidence is outside of the statute of limitations is without merit. Ashdown rejected the argument that evidence of a scheme that predates the statute of limitations should be excluded on evidentiary grounds. See ECF No. [46] at 5 (citing e.g., United States v. Beard, No. 20-cr-00351, 2024 WL 1308054, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2024)).
Regarding Defendant‘s argument that the evidence “is more prejudicial than probative,” ECF No. [34] ¶ 8-11, Defendant provides no explanation as to how the probative value of each piece of evidence is “substantially outweighed” by “unfair prejudice.”
ii. Government‘s Motion In Limine
The Government‘s Motion In Limine seeks to preclude Defendant from (1) introducing any self-serving hearsay; (2) referencing or making argument regarding selective prosecution, charging decisions, or the relative culpability of co-conspirators; (3) referencing or making arguments regarding statutory penalties or the potential sentence in this case; (4) introducing evidence, argument or commentary regarding any purported negligence of the victim; (5) introducing prior good-act evidence or general good-character evidence; (6) raising forum-based defense arguments or commentary with the jury; and (7) raising jury nullification or sympathy arguments. ECF No. [33].
Regarding the “self-serving hearsay” evidence, Defendant “agreed that all hearsay is inadmissible unless an exception applies.” ECF No. [41] at 1. Indeed, it is unclear what specific “self-serving hearsay” the Government anticipates Defendant will introduce. Because “[m]otions in limine should be limited to specific pieces of evidence and not serve as reinforcement regarding the various rules governing trial,” the Motion In Limine is denied. Powers v. Target Corp., No. 19-cv-60922, 2020 WL 1986968, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2020) (quoting Holder v. Anderson, 2018 WL 4956757, at *1).
Regarding arguments of selective prosecution, charging decisions, or the relative culpability of co-conspirators, Defendant “agreed” that “selective prosecution is not at issue.” ECF
Regarding the statutory penalties or potential sentences, Defendant “agreed that the degree of penalties are not at issue[,]” however “the customary phraseology of ‘loss of liberty’ and ‘consequences’ associated with criminal conduct are permitted.” ECF No. [41] at 2. Therefore, the Motion is granted.
Regarding evidence of the purported negligence of the victim, Defendant “agreed that the victim‘s negligence or suggestion that ‘he deserved to be defrauded aren‘t intended to be made.” Id. However, Defendant argues it would be relevant and admissible to argue that “the alleged victim received the benefit of his bargain, paid a downpayment on goods and failed to pay the balance when due resulting in the forfeit of the downpayment[,]” and that the “victim‘s failure to pay thе balance when due to the manufacturer is the entire reason the deal did not proceed forward.” Id. Because it is unclear what specific evidence the Government seeks to preclude and the purpose for which the evidence may be offered, the Motion is denied.
Regarding prior good acts or general good character evidence, Defendant opposes the Motion “to the degree that the Government is seeking to abrogate [Federal Rule of Evidence] 404(2). . . Otherwise, the Dеfendant fully intends to comply with R. 404.” Id. As stated above, the
Regarding the forum-based defense or commentary, Defendant “agreed [that] only arguments directed at the allegations in the Indictment are intended to be made.” ECF No. [41] at 2. However, the Government states that “thе fact of a civil lawsuit in this matter, and the accompanying consent judgment, are relevant facts.” ECF No. [33] at 17. Defendant “dispute[s] that evidence of a civil lawsuit and consent judgment are relevant or establish[] ‘continuing false representations’ or is otherwise part of an uncharged conspiracy to defraud.” ECF No. [41] at 2-3. Therefore, Defendant “cross-move[s] for exclusion” to the extent “the Government is seeking to make forum-based arguments or support its pursuit of this civil matter in criminal court with evidence of a settlement in civil court[.]” Id. at 3. Because it is unclear exactly what evidence the Government seeks to exclude and whether the parties themselves understand the scope of their request regarding a forum-based defense or commentary, the Motion is denied.
Regarding jury nullification or sympathy arguments, Defendant “agreed that jury nullification will not be argued and that only relevant evidence will be admitted that supports the Defendant‘s defenses and/or negates his guilt. Mention of his background is intended to be presented to the customary limitеd degree.” Id. at 3. Accordingly, the Motion is granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
Defendant‘s Motion for Bill of Particulars, ECF No. [30], is DENIED. - Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss Indictment, ECF No. [31], is DENIED.
- The Government‘s Motion In Limine, ECF No. [33], is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
- Defendant‘s Motion In Limine, ECF No. [34], is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on November 15, 2025.
BETH BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to: Counsel of record