UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. TOMMY L. ANDERSON, SR., Defendant.
Case No. 22-10006-JWB
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
February 21, 2023
JOHN W. BROOMES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter is before the court on Defendant‘s motion to suppress evidence. (Doc. 24.) The government has filed a response. (Doc. 28.) The court held two evidentiary hearings on the motion: the first on January 24, 2023, and the second on January 30. The court took the matter under advisement at the conclusion of the hearings and is now prepared to rule. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant‘s motion is DENIED.
I. Facts
Defendant‘s motion to suppress challenges the lawfulness of six related searches by Wichita Police Department (WPD) officers. The first of these was a warrantless search of a Cadillac DeVille after Defendant fled from police and left the car parked on a residential street. The second and third searches involved Defendant‘s residence on Millwood Street in Wichita and were conducted pursuant to search warrants. The fourth search involved a warrantless search of a Chrysler 200 shortly after Defendant drove the car to a repair shop and was arrested. The last two searches involved residences on S. Holyoke Street in Wichita used by Defendant and were conducted pursuant to search warrants.
On April 8, 2021, WPD Officer Jeremy Gray was conducting a drug investigation focused on Defendant. Gray was part of the WPD‘s Special Investigation Bureau/Community Response Team (SBI/CRT), whose responsibilities included investigating street level drug crimes. Gray had been informed by an anonymous source that Defendant was selling drugs from his residence and from the trunk of his Cadillac. Gray had engaged in periodic surveillance of what he believed to be Defendant‘s residence at 1116 S. Millwood, Unit No. 4, in Wichita. For some period prior to April 8, 2021, Gray had also checked on activity at the residence by means of a “pole cam” — a camera installed on a utility pole outside the residence. Gray could monitor the pole cam from his cell phone and was doing so on the afternoon of April 8 with WPD Officer Clayton Van Daley in a marked patrol car a short distance from the Millwood residence.
Gray was aware on April 8 that Defendant‘s driver‘s license had been suspended. He also knew Defendant had previously been charged with narcotics offenses, had been convicted of felonies in a federal RICO case, and was believed by police to be a Crips gang member. Gray was familiar with Defendant and knew what he looked like. Gray was also familiar with two vehicles frequently seen at the residence: a silver Cadillac DeVille, which was registered to Defendant‘s brother and which Gray had seen Defendant frequently driving, and a black Chrysler 200 registered to Mary Dean, who was Defendant‘s girlfriend and who also lived at the Millwood residence. During his period of surveillance, Gray saw other vehicles frequently come to the Millwood residence, after which the occupants would enter the residence for a brief period and then leave, in a manner Gray considered to be consistent with drug trafficking.
At about 1:00 p.m. on April 8, Gray was monitoring the pole cam from his phone when he saw Defendant leave the Millwood residence wearing a black shirt, dark jeans, and black athletic
The officers got back in their vehicle, turned on the siren, and pursued. As they did so, they saw Defendant commit more than five moving violations, with the violations called out on the radio by Van Daley as they occurred. At that point the officers had probable cause to believe Defendant committed the felony offense of fleeing and eluding under
The officers radioed for a K9 unit to conduct a dog sniff of the vehicle exterior. WPD Officer Daniel Gumm and his K9 “Bane” arrived at the scene within fifteen or twenty minutes. Bane was trained and certified in detection of various drugs, including marijuana. Gumm gave Bane a “find it” command and the dog immediately began circling the car and sniffing, beginning near the front of the car on the driver‘s side. Bane raised up once or twice without touching the car, and then momentarily touched his paws on the driver‘s door as he raised up again. He lowered himself and moved backwards towards the rear driver‘s side door. Bane quickly became focused on the rear door, sniffed at the door handle, and then sat down next to it, staring intently at it and wagging his tail. The evidence showed this was the dog‘s method of indicating it had located the source of a controlled substance. Gumm opened the rear driver‘s side door to allow Bane in the interior of the car. The dog again indicated near the front center console of the car between the front seats. When Gumm attempted to open the driver‘s door, he found it was locked. He reached through the open rear driver‘s side door and lifted the “plunger” lock on the driver‘s door. When he opened the driver‘s door, the car‘s alarm went off. A search of the car‘s interior disclosed a marijuana roach in the center console, a marijuana bud, and an empty digital scale box. A set of keys was also found but they were not the keys to the vehicle. Later that day, after his shift was
2. April 15, 2021 Searches of Millwood Residence.
After the April 8 incident, Gray wanted to get a search warrant for Defendant‘s Millwood residence. The WPD‘s standard practice called for Gray to explain the facts to his supervisor, Sgt. Thode, who would review the matter for probable cause and discuss it with the District Attorney‘s (“DA“) office. Gray talked to Thode about getting a search warrant for the Millwood residence based on the items found in the Cadillac. Thode contacted an attorney in the DA‘s office. The attorney conveyed to Thode that obtaining a search warrant for the articles of clothing that Defendant was seen wearing at the time of the car chase was an option. As a result, Gray prepared an application for a search warrant to look for the following items in the Millwood residence:
- Black long sleeve shirt
- Dark blue jeans
- 2 Black athletic shoes with the letter “N” portrayed on the side
- Keys to a silver Cadillac Deville bearing Kansas tag 135MVK
- Photographs and measurements
- Indicia of occupancy or ownership
(Govt. Exh. 8) The application described the residence, detailed the anonymous complaint about Defendant‘s distribution of drugs from the residence and car, and set forth Defendant‘s criminal history (including convictions for possession of marijuana, carrying an unconcealed weapon, conspiracy, and two counts of distribution of cocaine base). It also described Gray‘s investigation and surveillance, including his findings that the Cadillac was registered to Alford Anderson (at another address) and the Chrysler was registered to Mary Dean at the Millwood address. Dean‘s criminal history was alleged to include unlawful possession of marijuana and sale of opiates. It described the circumstances and pursuit of Defendant on April 8 and alleged that Gray and Van Daley saw more than 10 traffic violations by Defendant as they pursued him which gave “rise to a
At the suppression hearing, Gray testified the purpose of the “photographs and measurements” authorization in the application was to allow officers to take photographs of evidence and, if necessary, to take measurements related to evidentiary items. He testified that “indicia of occupancy or ownership” would include bills and correspondence addressed to Defendant at the Millwood residence as well as documents showing ownership or use of the Cadillac.
On April 14, 2021, Gray completed a warrant application that was submitted to a district judge of the Eighteenth Judicial District Court in Wichita, Kansas. The judge issued a warrant the same day authorizing a search of the Millwood residence for the specified items. (Govt. Exh. 8.) The warrant refers to the application and includes some language about incorporation of items from it. (Id. at ANDERSON_000099.)1 The warrant was issued electronically and sent by electronic means to Gray.
Gray met with his unit of about ten officers the next morning, April 15, and reviewed the events of the chase from April 8, Defendant‘s history, and the search warrant. At some point, Sgt. Thode informed the officers of the items they were looking for and said they could search any place in the house where a reasonable person would believe the articles sought would be located.
3. August 3, 2021 Search of Chrysler.
On August 3, 2021, officers were near the Holyoke residence preparing to execute the above warrant when they saw Defendant and Mary Dean drive away from the residence in Dean‘s Chrysler. Officers followed the Chrysler to an auto repair shop, where they proceeded to arrest Defendant on an outstanding bench warrant just as he walked in to the repair shop. The Chrysler was backed into a parking stall. Mary Dean was in the car. Officers approached her, asked her to step out of the car, and asked her about her association with Defendant.
Officer Dustin Nail arrived at the repair shop parking lot with his trained drug-detecting canine “Nash.” Nail‘s report indicates his assistance had been requested around “13:10” (1:10 p.m.) and he arrived at “13:42” (1:42 p.m.). Sgt. Thode asked Nail to have Nash do a free-air sniff around the Chrysler. Nail positioned the dog near the rear of the Chrysler on the passenger side while Nail first walked around the vehicle, pausing at the driver‘s door to look in the window. Nail then returned and walked around the back of the Chrysler. He testified he was looking to make sure there were no hazards to a dog sniff.
Video from Nail‘s AXON body cam shows that as Nail walked along the driver‘s side prior to the dog sniff, the driver‘s door was ajar. Body cam footage from approximately thirty minutes earlier, however, shows that the driver‘s door was completely closed. (Compare Def. Exh. 33 at
After completing his walk around the car, Nail walked over to Nash and gave him a find command, directing the dog‘s attention up and down along the passenger side of the vehicle while moving toward and around the front of the car. Nash appeared to lightly touch the passenger side of the car as he sniffed around it. When Nash reached the driver‘s side near the driver‘s door, he stopped, laid down, and almost immediately sniffed and focused underneath the car. Nail testified — and the evidence showed — that the dog indicated at that point that he detected the odor of a controlled substance. Nash briefly got up and sniffed toward the back of the car, but quickly laid down again and continued sniffing under the car, this time working his way on all fours back toward the midline of the car, just under the rear part of the driver‘s door. Nash partially crawled under the car and was clearly focused on a point under the car. He made contact with the underside of the car as he crawled under it. Officers reached under the car to photograph and remove what turned out to be a box attached by magnets to the underside of the car. Officers opened the box and found what appeared to be controlled substances.
4. August 3, 2021 Search of 2442 S. Holyoke.
In the afternoon of August 3, 2021, officers executed the warrant for 2442 S. Holyoke. According to a return, they found a “firearm, illegal drugs, paraphernalia, [and] indicia of residency.” (Govt. Exh. 10.)
5. February 14, 2022, Search of 2438 S. Holyoke.
II. Motion to Suppress (Doc. 24.)
1. April 8, 2021, Search of Cadillac.
Defendant contends officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully searching the Cadillac on April 8. Defendant argues the officers unlawfully conducted “at least five trespass-based searches” of the Cadillac, including by allegedly opening or touching one of the car doors before the dog (Bane) arrived, and by having Bane touch the Cadillac exterior and sniff inside one of its windows during the initial dog sniff. (Doc. 24 at 13.)
A. Fourth Amendment Standards. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures of their “persons, houses, papers, and effects....”
More recently, the Supreme Court endorsed a trespass-based Fourth Amendment test for searches that exists as an alternative to the Katz test. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 404, 409 (2012) (“the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.“) In Jones, the Supreme Court found that the attachment of a Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking device to the undercarriage of a car to monitor its movements was a search under the Fourth Amendment. The Court said the government “physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information,” which would have been considered a “search” under the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted. Id. at 404-05.
B. Standing. Because Fourth Amendment rights are personal, and may not be asserted vicariously, a person challenging the search of a vehicle who is not the registered owner must ordinarily show a reasonable expectation of privacy by establishing that he had a legitimate possessory interest or lawful control over the car. See United States v. Eckhart, 569 F.3d 1263, 1274 (10th Cir. 2009). A defendant may do so by establishing that he gained possession from the owner or from someone with authority to grant possession. Id. (citation omitted.) Evidence presented at the hearing showed the Cadillac was registered to Defendant‘s brother. Defendant presented essentially uncontroverted testimony that his brother granted him permission to use the car.
C. Abandonment. The government asserts that Defendant abandoned any privacy interest he had in the car by leaving it on the street and fleeing. (See Doc. 28 at 6.) In view of the court‘s conclusion below that the search of the Cadillac was in fact reasonable, the court need not address the issue of abandonment.
D. Alleged trespasses on the Cadillac. Defendant alleges that prior to Officer Gumm‘s arrival with Bane, an officer “opened (or at least touched) one of the [Cadillac‘s] doors.” (Doc. 24 at 13.) This allegation is not supported by credible evidence. To the contrary, the credible testimony indicated that none of the officers on the scene touched or opened a car door before Gumm arrived and conducted the dog sniff.4 Defendant argues a prior search is suggested by the absence of body cam footage in the twenty
Defendant next contends that “Bane touched the exterior of the Deville and sniffed inside one of the Deville‘s windows during the initial dog sniff,” which was facilitated by Officer Gumm, and which constituted a trespass that violated Defendant‘s Fourth Amendment rights. (Doc. 24 at 13.) The court rejects this argument for two reasons.
The video does show that Bane momentarily touched the driver‘s door of the car with his paws at one point, but the court concludes this act did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search within the meaning of Jones. Justice Alito indicated that at early common law, “a suit for trespass to chattels could be maintained if there was a violation of ‘the dignitary interest in the inviolability of chattels....‘” Jones, 565 U.S. at 419 n.2. It is not clear that the “dignitary interest” in possession of a car on a public street is violated by the inconsequential touch of a dog, especially when the person with a right to possess the car was not even present. Even assuming that type of touch could have been considered a trespass under early common law, however, the act lacked the second required element of a Fourth Amendment search: namely, the trespass must have been “done to obtain information.” Id. at 408 n.5. A “trespass on ... ‘effects’ ... is not alone a search unless it is done to obtain information; and the obtaining of information is not alone a search unless it is achieved by such a trespass....” Id. Only where the obtaining of information “is achieved by ... a trespass” can a constitutional violation be present. Id. The government (through the dog) was engaged at the time in a search for information, but that search was unquestionably permissible insofar as the car was not touched. And the results of the search would have been no different had the dog not touched the car at all. It momentarily touched the car with its paws, but the government “achieved” no information from that trespassory act. “Trespass alone does not qualify, but there must be conjoined with that ... an attempt to find something or obtain information.” Id. The dog‘s
To the extent one might argue that the dog‘s mere contact with the car helped facilitate the information gathering because it allowed the dog to get closer to the car or gain a more advantageous position from which to sniff odors emanating from the vehicle, that is not the point under the law. The cases finding a trespass-based search under the Jones standard all involved circumstances in which information was gained directly through the trespass. For example, in Jones the trespass occurred through placement of the GPS tracker on Jones’ car. Jones, 565 U.S. at 403. Thus the trespass was indispensable to obtaining the information sought by law enforcement. Similarly, in United States v. Richmond, 915 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2019), the trespass that established the Fourth Amendment violation occurred when a law enforcement officer physically touched a tire for the purpose of determining whether there might be illegal drugs inside. Just as in Jones, the trespass in Richmond was not incidental to the information-gathering process, it was an integral part of that process; indeed, it was indispensable to the information-gathering process in that case. Unlike Jones and Richmond, in this case the government gained no information through the dog‘s contact with the car. The contact was incidental, and no more objectionable than if an officer brushed up against the side of a vehicle during a traffic stop. Accordingly, Bane‘s contact with Defendant‘s automobile in this case did not amount to a Fourth Amendment search.
2. First Search of Millwood Residence.
Defendant contends the initial search warrant for the Millwood residence lacked particularity by not specifying any crime, by authorizing “photographs and measurements” without further description, and by allowing a general search for “indicia of ownership.” Defendant argues the warrant was fatally overbroad and that the valid portions of it are not severable from the invalid ones.5 (Doc. 24 at 16-23.) Defendant further contends the good faith doctrine of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) does not preclude suppression because the warrant was so facially deficient as to preclude reliance upon it and because Gray himself drafted the warrant and cannot reasonably rely upon its inadequate description. (Doc. 24 at 28.)
A. Standards. “The Fourth Amendment provides that ‘no Warrants shall issue’ without ‘particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.‘” United States v. Suggs, 998 F.3d 1125, 1132 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting
The doctrine of severability can sometimes save a facially invalid warrant. Suggs, 998 F.3d at 1137. As explained in Suggs:
We apply a multistep analysis to determine whether a warrant is severable. First, we divide the warrant in a commonsense way. Then we examine the validity of each section. If at least one section passes constitutional muster—meaning it satisfies the probable cause and particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment—we determine whether the valid parts are distinguishable from the invalid ones. When “each of the categories of items to be seized describes distinct subject matter in language not linked to language of other categories, and each valid category retains its significance when isolated from [the] rest of the warrant, then the valid portions may be severed from the warrant.”
Suggs, 998 F.3d at 1138 (citations to United States v. Sells, 463 F.3d 1148 (10th Cir. 2006) omitted). Blanket suppression may still be required if “the invalid portions so predominate the warrant that the warrant in essence authorizes a general, exploratory rummaging in a person‘s belongings.” Id. (citation omitted.) Courts may admit seized items in this context only when the
Even when evidence is obtained as the result of a deficient warrant, the good faith exception of Leon may still prevent suppression of the evidence. The exclusionary rule does not apply “when an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 920. In that circumstance, excluding evidence will not further the ends of the exclusionary rule. After all, “[i]t is the magistrate‘s responsibility to determine whether the officer‘s allegations establish probable cause and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. “In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate‘s probable-case determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient.” Id. A warrant issued by a judge thus normally suffices to establish that a law enforcement officer acted in good faith in conducting the search. But the officer‘s reliance on the magistrate determination must be “objectively reasonable,” and will fail to satisfy that standard in the following circumstances: (1) when the magistrate was misled by an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false but for his reckless disregard of the truth; (2) when the magistrate “wholly abandoned his judicial role“; (3) when the warrant is based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable“; or (4) when the warrant is so facially deficient in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized that the executing officers cannot presume it to be valid. Id. at 923.
B. Analysis.
At any rate, the court rejects the argument that the authorization in this warrant to take “photographs and measurements” violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Reading the search warrant in a practical rather than technical sense, the inclusion of photographs and measurements among the items officers were authorized to search for is reasonably construed to mean the officers were authorized to photograph and measure to the extent their search revealed any information relating to the listed items.7 This authorization allowed searchers to reasonably ascertain and identify the things authorized to be searched and seized. It would have been impractical to predict and itemize beforehand what particular photographs and measurements might have evidentiary value — for example, a picture or measurement showing the athletic shoes described in the warrant in proximity to a particular bedroom occupied by Defendant. No greater particularity in the authorization to photograph or measure was necessary or practical under the circumstances.
Defendant makes a number of additional arguments against severance of the allegedly defective portions of the warrant, including “at least six reasons” that officers “were actually concerned with finding some very different items (e.g., drugs, paraphernalia, and guns) because they were actually interested in investigating some very different offenses (e.g., drug-trafficking and gun crimes).” (Doc. 24 at 18.) Because the court rejects the argument that the warrant was defective, it need not consider the arguments pertaining to severability. For present purposes it is sufficient to note that the officers’ hope of obtaining proof of Defendant‘s involvement in drug distribution does not invalidate the search warrant for items related to the felony offense of fleeing and eluding, nor does it render the initial search and seizure of items from the Millwood residence
The fact that an officer is interested in an item of evidence and fully expects to find it in the course of a search should not invalidate its seizure if the search is confined in area and duration by the terms of a warrant or a valid exception to the warrant requirement. If the officer has knowledge approaching certainty that the item will be found, we see no reason why he or she would deliberately omit a particular description of the item to be seized from the application for a search warrant. Specification of the additional item could only permit the officer to expand the scope of the search. On the other hand, if he or she has a valid warrant to search for one item and merely a suspicion concerning the second, whether or not it amounts to probable cause, we fail to see why that suspicion should immunize the second item from seizure if it is found during a lawful search for the first.
Horton, 496 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1990).
The evidence here shows the initial search of the Millwood residence was reasonable. There is no evidence that officers exceeded the scope of the warrant that authorized the search. The warrant was supported by probable cause to believe that Defendant committed the felony offense of fleeing and eluding and probable cause to believe that items relevant to that offense — including clothing and indicia of residency tending to show that Defendant was in fact the person who had committed the offense — would be found in the Millwood residence.8 While executing the warrant officers saw other evidence they were entitled to seize under the plan view doctrine, including marijuana. After discovering such items in plain view, officers suspended the search and sought a judicial warrant to expand the search to include various items related to drug
Good faith. Even had the court found that one or both of the challenged Millwood warrant provisions lacked the particularity required by the Fourth Amendment, the court would still find that officers relied on the warrant in objective good faith. “Even if a court ultimately determines that a warrant approved by a judge falls short of the constitutional requirements of probable cause or particularity, evidence will not be suppressed if ‘a law enforcement officer relies in objective good faith on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate.‘” United States v. Cotto, 995 F.3d 786, 795 (10th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 820 (2022) (citing United States v. Knox, 883 F.3d 1262, 1273 (10th Cir. 2018) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984))).
Defendant contends the “glaring lack of particularity in both the First Warrant and the Second warrant rendered both warrants ‘so facially deficient ... that the executing officers c[ould not] reasonably presume’ they were valid.” (Doc. 24 at 28.) The court disagrees. The courts generally presume that officers executed a search warrant in objective good faith. Cotto, 995 F.3d at 795. Nothing about the circumstances of the Millwood searches undermines that presumption. “[I]t is indicative of good faith when the officer who prepares an affidavit is the same one who executes a search.” Id. at 796 (citation omitted.) Officer Gray drafted the affidavits in support of the Millwood warrants and helped to execute them. Further, “an officer‘s efforts to obtain approval of a warrant application from a superior and an attorney also indicate the officer was acting in good faith.” Id. (citations omitted.) Gray followed that procedure here, including having the applications reviewed by an attorney with the district attorney‘s office. Most important is the language of the warrant itself, which in this instance authorized a search for three specific items
3. Second Search of Millwood Residence
Defendant contends the second Millwood search warrant was invalid for two reasons: (1) because it relied on fruits of the first search; and (2) because it contained the same “photographs and measurements” authorization. (Doc. 24 at 24.) The court rejects these arguments for the reasons indicated in the previous section, including that suppression is not appropriate given the officers’ objectively reasonable good-faith reliance upon the warrant.
4. Search of the Chrysler
Defendant contends officers “conducted at least three trespass-based searches of the Chrysler,” including when the dog (Nash) touched the Chrysler‘s exterior while sniffing it, when officers removed a magnetic box from the underside of the car and opened it, and when officers
To the extent Nash touched the passenger side of the Chrysler when he began the sniff, the court concludes this was not a Fourth Amendment search, as the alleged trespass produced no information to the government. As the court discussed previously, only where the obtaining of information “is achieved by ... a trespass” can a constitutional violation be present. See supra (citing Jones, 565 U.S. at 419 n.2). The dog‘s incidental touch of the car was therefore not a Fourth Amendment search within the meaning of Jones. Defendant also challenges Nash‘s touching the underside of the Chrysler on the driver‘s side when he went after the magnetic box underneath the car. In fact, the evidence shows that Nash alerted by laying down near the driver‘s door and sniffing under the car well before he crawled under the car and made contact with the underside of it. Nail‘s body cam video shows that Nail commented when the dog laid down and sniffed under the car that the alert “was pretty immediate.” (See Def. Exh. 34 at 18:45:42.) The uncontroverted evidence was that Nash is well-trained in detection of certain controlled substances. From the point at which Nash first alerted, officers had probable cause to believe the car contained controlled substances. See Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 248 (2013) (if the government has shown unrefuted evidence that the dog reliably detects drugs, the court should find probable cause). Any
As noted previously, although the driver‘s door of the Chrysler was slightly ajar at the time of the dog sniff, video evidence showed the door had been completely closed about a half an hour earlier, indicating someone had opened it in the interim. The evidence did not explain how this occurred, but the most reasonable inference is that one of the officers opened the door at some point. Assuming this to be so, and further assuming that it involved some sort of search by the officer, the evidence shows that the probable cause from the dog‘s alert was obtained independently of any search of the car interior and was in no way tainted by it. The dog immediately and emphatically alerted on the underside of the vehicle where the magnetic box was located, and the fact that the driver‘s door was slightly ajar at that point clearly had no impact or effect on the dog‘s alert. Moreover, Nail‘s report indicates his assistance was first requested at 1:10 p.m., when the evidence suggests the driver‘s door was still completely closed, such that the request for his assistance was in no way related to any entry into the Chrysler. (Def. Exh. 44.) In sum, notwithstanding the door issue, the drugs found in the magnetic box under the car were the product of a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment and are not subject to suppression. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (suppression turns on whether evidence “has been come at by exploitation of [an] illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable
5. Searches of 2442 and 2438 S. Holyoke.
Defendant contends these two searches were tainted because the applications underlying the search warrants included unlawfully obtained evidence from the prior searches challenged above. (Doc. 24 at 26-27.) The court rejects this argument because it finds that the evidence from the prior searches discussed above was lawfully obtained.
III. Conclusion
Defendant‘s motion to suppress evidence (Doc. 24) is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED this 21st day of February, 2023.
s/ John W. Broomes
JOHN W. BROOMES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE