UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jerry Wayne MERGERSON, and Richard Uchechukwu Anunaso, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 92-1179.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
July 12, 1993.
995 F.2d 1258
* Editor‘s Note: This opinion was originally published at 995 F.2d 1258. It is published here as corrected.
Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
KING, Circuit Judge:
Jerry Wayne Mergerson (“Mergerson“) and Richard Uchechukwu Anunaso (“Anunaso“) were convicted of various drug offenses in connection with a heroin ring in which they were involved. Mergerson was also convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Mergerson and Anunaso appeal their convictions and corresponding sentences. We affirm both Anunaso‘s drug convictions and sentences. We affirm Mergerson‘s convictions on counts one through four of the indictment, but reverse his conviction on count five. We likewise affirm Mergerson‘s sentences for his convictions on counts two through four, but vacate Mergerson‘s sentence for count one of the indictment. We remand for resentencing.
I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.
On October 8, 1991, a grand jury returned a five-count indictment against Mergerson and Anunaso. Count one of the indictment charged the defendants and Mergerson‘s girlfriend, Sheila Guy, with conspiracy to traffick heroin in violation of
Mergerson and Anunaso were tried on December 4, 1991, and both were found guilty of all charges against them. On January 3, 1992, pursuant to
On February 21, 1992, Anunaso was sentenced to concurrent 250-month terms of imprisonment on counts one, three, and four
B.
This case involved three distinct drug transactions that occurred in late 1991. The first transaction took place on August 19, 1991, when DEA Special Agent David Battiste met with Mergerson in a parking lot in Fort Worth, Texas, for the purpose of purchasing an ounce of heroin. At that meeting, Mergerson told Battiste that he did not have the heroin, but would retrieve it at another location. At that point, Mergerson and Battiste got in Battiste‘s car and began driving to Anunaso‘s apartment complex. While en route to Anunaso‘s apartment, Mergerson told Battiste that his heroin business was thriving and that he had “several girls” working for him. Mergerson then made a number of phone calls on Battiste‘s mobile phone, one of which was later identified as being made to Anunaso‘s mobile phone. During one of the phone calls, Mergerson told the other party that he would be over shortly and that he was bringing a friend. Contemporaneously, a DEA agent conducting surveillance saw Anunaso outside of his apartment building talking on a mobile phone.
Upon reaching the apartment complex, Mergerson went into Anunaso‘s building and returned within a few minutes accompanied by Anunaso. Anunaso made eye contact with Battiste, who stood next to Mergerson, and nodded. Mergerson then informed Battiste that he had the heroin all along and directed Battiste to return to Mergerson‘s car. When they returned to his car, Mergerson delivered 24.9 grams of heroin to Battiste in exchange for $5,500.
On September 5, 1992, Battiste again met with Mergerson at a hotel. During this second transaction, which was videotaped, Mergerson sold 100.2 grams of heroin to Battiste. Shortly thereafter, DEA Special Agent Misha Harrington, acting undercover, joined Mergerson and Battiste. Harrington entered the room with two bundles of cash and asked Mergerson to count it. During the same meeting, the undercover agents asked Mergerson how much heroin he could supply at any one time. Mergerson replied that “the sky was the limit.” After some discussion in which Mergerson offered to sell to them a kilogram of heroin that afternoon, Battiste and Harrington told him that they wished to purchase a kilogram later in the week. As the three men left the hotel room, Mergerson introduced himself to Harrington by his nickname “Big Merk.” Later that day, surveillance officers followed Mergerson to a business by the name of “Communications on the Run,” where Mergerson claimed to be employed, and later to Anunaso‘s apartment.
At approximately 12:30 p.m. on September 11, 1991, Mergerson negotiated with Battiste by telephone for the sale of one kilogram of heroin to Battiste and Harrington for $170,000. The drugs were to be delivered to the same hotel where the prior transaction had occurred. At 1:00 p.m., Mergerson called Battiste to tell him that he was only able to acquire 350 grams. Surveillance personnel observed Mergerson arriving at Anunaso‘s apartment complex in a automobile registered to Anunaso. Mergerson left the apartment complex in the same vehicle and drove it to the hotel. There Mergerson met with the two agents and delivered to the agents 334.8 grams of heroin. At the outset of the meeting, the agents questioned Mergerson about why he did not bring an entire kilogram. Mergerson answered that he was not
A search warrant was executed at Anunaso‘s apartment after Mergerson was arrested. Police seized a number of items of incriminating evidence, including: (i) a piece of paper containing notations that were later identified as referring to the heroin used in the transaction as well as heroin used in other transactions, (ii) a small electronic business organizer which contained the name “Merk” together with the address and telephone number of “Communications on the Run” and Mergerson‘s pager number, (iii) a notebook containing notes of what appeared to be narcotics transactions, which included the name “Merk,” (iv) a box containing several plastic baggies, and (v) a loaded .25 caliber pistol. A search conducted at Mergerson‘s residence on October 11, 1991, resulted in the seizure of an inoperable nine millimeter pistol from beneath the mattress and box spring in the master bedroom, a shoe box containing zip lock baggies, and 7.8 grams of cocaine. Anunaso was also arrested.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence: the Drug Convictions
Mergerson and Anunaso both challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions under the first count of the indictment, which alleged a conspiracy to traffick in heroin in violation of
The standard of review in assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case is whether a “reasonable trier of fact could have found that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc), aff‘d on other grounds, 462 U.S. 356, 103 S.Ct. 2398, 76 L.Ed.2d 638 (1983). In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, a court views all evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the government. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). This standard applies whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial. See United States v. Triplett, 922 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 111 S.Ct. 2245, 114 L.Ed.2d 486 (1991).
i) The Conspiracy Count
In a conspiracy prosecution under
Anunaso argues that the Government‘s evidence is insufficient because it proves only a mere association between Mergerson and Anunaso. In support of his contention, Anunaso points out that the Government failed to find any direct evidence, such as heroin, in the search of his apartment. Moreover, he argues, at no time during any of the three drug transactions was there direct evidence to link him to the conspiracy. During the two videotaped transactions, Anunaso points out, there was no direct mention of his participation whatsoever. Nor did co-defendant Sheila Guy mention Anunaso‘s involvement.
In a similar vein, Mergerson argues that the evidence was insufficient to show any conspiratorial agreement between Mergerson and either Sheila Guy or Anunaso. With respect to Guy, Mergerson contends that the evidence proves no more than that he lived with her and that she drove him to the hotel on the day of the third transaction, September 11, 1991. It is undisputed that Guy remained in the car until Mergerson was arrested. Mergerson argues that there is no evidence that she knew anything about the transaction taking place in the hotel room, or of the previous two transactions. With respect to Anunaso, Mergerson maintains that the evidence shows only that the two men were acquainted. Conceding that their associations were suspicious, Mergerson argues that “suspicious circumstances ... are not enough to sustain a conviction for conspiracy....” United States v. Nusraty, 867 F.2d 759, 764 (2d Cir.1989).
The Government argues that the evidence regarding each of the three transactions establishes much more than a mere association. During the first transaction, Mergerson told Battiste that they would have to go retrieve the heroin, and in so doing they drove directly to Anunaso‘s apartment. While driving to Anunaso‘s apartment, Mergerson bragged to Battiste that his drug business was going so well that he had several females making deliveries for him. The Government also notes that only after Anunaso looked Battiste over and nodded at Mergerson did Mergerson consummate the heroin sale. During the second delivery of heroin, Mergerson told the agents that “his man” set the price of the heroin and that Mergerson did not control the heroin supply. Immediately after the deal was made, Mergerson met with Anunaso and drove to Anunaso‘s apartment. During the third transaction, Mergerson told Battiste that he had to go get the heroin, and ten minutes later agents spotted Mergerson arriving at Anunaso‘s apartment. Mergerson drove to the transaction in Anunaso‘s car. A digital electronic gram scale was later discovered in that automobile. We also observe that agents found documents at Anunaso‘s apartment which contained notes of narcotics transactions which listed “Merk” as a participant. Anunaso‘s electronic business organizer contained the name “Merk” along with Mergerson‘s phone number and pager number.
Although almost entirely circumstantial, the evidence of a conspiratorial relationship between Mergerson and Anunaso was extensive. Viewing that evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from it in a light most favorable to the government, Glasser, 315 U.S. at 80, 62 S.Ct. at 469, we believe that a rational jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Anunaso was Mergerson‘s heroin supplier. As such, Anunaso and Mergerson not only agreed to violate the narcotics laws, but also each actively participated in the drug trafficking operation.2
ii) Anunaso‘s Distribution Convictions
Anunaso further contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions under the aiding-and-abetting statute for Mergerson‘s three separate distributions of heroin to the undercover agents. To prove aiding and abetting in a criminal venture, the prosecution must prove that the defendant: i) associated with the criminal enterprise, ii) participated in the venture, and iii) sought by action to make the venture succeed. See United States v. Stone, 960 F.2d 426, 433 (5th Cir.1992). The above-
B. Did the district court employ the proper standard of proof in finding that the conspiracy involved more than one kilogram of heroin?
Pursuant to a federal statute, the district court‘s factual finding that Mergerson had the quantity of heroin at issue in this case—more than one kilogram—triggered a mandatory term of life imprisonment without possibility of release in Mergerson‘s case. See
At the sentencing hearing, the district court made its finding regarding the quantity of heroin under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard and, alternatively, under the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard. Mergerson contends that the district court should have instead employed the reasonable doubt standard. It is well-established law in this circuit that, as a general matter, the burden of proof at sentencing is by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Angulo, 927 F.2d 202, 205 (5th Cir.1991) (“[T]he district court need only determine its factual findings at sentencing by a ‘preponderance of relevant and sufficiently reliable evidence.‘“) (citation omitted); United States v. Kinder, 946 F.2d 362 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 112 S.Ct. 2290, 119 L.Ed.2d 214 (1992). Mergerson argues, however, that the due process clause requires an exception to the traditional preponderance standard when a particular sentencing fact found by the district court dramatically alters the statutory maximum for the offense of conviction.3
We recognize a growing number of cases decided by courts in other circuits in which a higher standard of proof has been suggested or required when a finding of a particular fact relevant to sentencing dramatically alters the sentencing options of the court to the disadvantage of the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1101 (3rd Cir.1990), (requiring finding by clear-and-convincing-evidence standard); United States v. Julian, 922 F.2d 563, 569 n. 1 (10th Cir.1990) (in remanding to district court, suggesting same); United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 661, n. 12 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (citing Kikumura with approval); United States v. Townley, 929 F.2d 365, 370 (8th Cir.1991) (same); see also Richard Husseini, Comment, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Adopting Clear and Convincing Evidence as the Burden of Proof, 57 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1387 (1990); but see United States v. Masters, 978 F.2d 281, 287 (7th Cir.1992). We also recognize dicta in the Supreme Court‘s decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986), to the same extent. See id. at 88; 106 S.Ct. at 2417 (suggesting that in cases where certain sentencing fact is a “tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense,” reasonable doubt standard may be required); see also Kinder v. United States,
In a recent Sentencing Guidelines case, we recognized the Third Circuit‘s decision in Kikumura, supra, and commented on the possibility of requiring a higher standard than the preponderance standard in certain sentencing situations. However, we saw no need to decide the issue because the defendant simply had argued that a clear-and-convincing standard was all that was necessary and the district court in that case had in fact employed such a standard. See United States v. Billingsley, 978 F.2d 861, 866 (5th Cir.1992). In the instant case, although the district court applied both the preponderance standard and the clear and convincing standard, we must address the merits of the issue because the appellant has argued that the district court should have applied the reasonable doubt standard.
We believe that, although there may be certain cases where a sentencing fact is a “tail that wags the dog of the substantive offense,” McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88, 106 S.Ct. at 2417, and might arguably require a finding beyond a reasonable doubt, id., this is not such a case. Accordingly, the preponderance standard was sufficient. We observe that Mergerson would have faced punishment as a career offender under
Mergerson alternatively argues that the reasonable doubt standard should have been employed because a mandatory life sentence without the possibility for release was automatic once the district court found over a kilogram of heroin. This argument, which assumes that such an extremely harsh punishment requires a heightened standard of proof regarding dispositive sentencing facts, implicates concerns traditionally raised in the Eighth Amendment context. Outside the capital sentencing context, such heightened protections during the sentencing phase of a criminal trial are generally unnecessary simply because the punishment is life imprisonment without the possibility for release. Cf. Harmelin v. Michigan, --- U.S. ---, ---, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2701-02, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole for the crime of possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine was not cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980) (life sentence without parole for three relatively minor non-violent felonies not Eighth Amendment violation); see also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.) (requiring heightened protections in capital sentencing context, commenting that “[d]eath, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two“). Although numerous lower courts have required that sentencing facts must be found beyond a reasonable doubt in the capital sentencing context,4 such cases were
C. Did the district court err in finding the applicable drug quantities for sentencing purposes?
Both Anunaso and Mergerson challenge the correctness of the district court‘s findings regarding the applicable drug quantities for purposes of sentencing. A district court‘s determination of the amount of drugs involved in an offense is protected by the clearly erroneous standard of appellate review. See United States v. Mir, 919 F.2d 940 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. Sarasti, 869 F.2d 805, 806 (5th Cir.1989). As discussed, in the instant case, the appropriate standard of proof was the preponderance standard.
We initially observe that we must engage in two separate sufficiency analyses regarding the district court‘s findings. The first concerns the district court‘s quantity findings made pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines. The presentence investigation report, which was adopted by the district court, found that 1650 grams of heroin5 was involved in the conspiracy for purposes of sentencing under the Guidelines. That finding was based not only on the amounts of heroin actually proven to have been possessed with the intent to distribute, but also those amounts negotiated during the Government‘s undercover sting operation. The second sufficiency analysis concerns the district court‘s quantity finding for purposes of sentencing Mergerson to a mandatory life sentence under
i) The district court‘s quantity findings for the Guidelines sentences
The appellants’ first objection to the 1650-gram is that it allegedly includes both the 334.8 grams of heroin sold on September 11, 1991, and the one kilogram of heroin that the parties negotiated for prior to the September 11 sale. The appellants contend that the 334.8-gram figure should be merged into the one kilogram figure so that the maximum amount that could be found from the September 11 negotiations and transaction is one kilogram. This argument ignores the fact that on September 11, 1991, after he sold the heroin to Battiste, Mergerson negotiated
The appellants next argue that the one-kilogram figure should not be used in the Guidelines calculations at all because Mergerson‘s statements about being able to provide a kilogram were mere “puffing” and that in fact he could not actually produce that quantity of drugs. Anunaso relies on
[In] an offense involving negotiation to traffick in a controlled substance, the weight under negotiation in an uncompleted distribution shall be used to calculate the applicable amount. However, where the court finds that the defendant did not intend to produce and was not reasonably capable of producing the negotiated amount, the court shall exclude from the guideline calculation the amount that it finds the defendant did not intend to produce and was not reasonably capable of producing. (emphasis added).
See also United States v. Garcia, 889 F.2d 1454, 1456-57 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1088, 110 S.Ct. 1829, 108 L.Ed.2d 958 (1990). Mergerson‘s prior deliveries and promises for future deliveries, when taken in conjunction with the narcotics transaction notes found at Anunaso‘s apartment, are evidence from which a fact-finder could reasonably determine that Mergerson had both the intent and ability to produce the negotiated amount.7 Thus, the district court‘s finding regarding the applicable drug quantity for sentencing purposes was not clearly erroneous.
ii) The district court‘s quantity finding for purposes of Mergerson‘s mandatory life sentence on count one
In order to sentence Mergerson to a mandatory life term of imprisonment under
It is essentially undisputed that Mergerson actually possessed approximately 450 grams of heroin, the quantity actually distributed to the agents. The only other evidence offered by the Government to support its allegation that Mergerson conspired to possess over a kilogram of heroin with the intent to distribute was a small, undated piece of paper with handwritten notes that, the Government argues, refer to narcotics transactions. That piece of paper was seized during a search of Anunaso‘s apartment. In addition to a substantial amount of indecipherable writings and a telephone number, the paper contains the name “MERK” and a series of numbers written as follows:
825368
1360
MERK 8 — 500 — 860
500 — 360
We believe that the district court clearly erred in accepting the Government‘s interpretation of the piece of paper for purposes of sentencing Mergerson to a mandatory term of life imprisonment. To begin with, we believe that the piece of paper, besides the reference to Mergerson‘s nickname “Merk,” is of extremely slight probative value regarding proof of the quantity of heroin used in the conspiracy alleged in count one of the indictment. The writings on the paper do not in any way refer to heroin. It is undisputed that Mergerson also dealt in at least one other drug, i.e., cocaine. Furthermore, there is no proof that the numbers are references to grams. The numbers could just as easily refer to dollar amounts. Nor is there any mention of dates of the alleged transactions. Count one of the indictment specifically limits the charged conspiracy to the period from August 19, 1991, to September 11, 1991.
In sum, we hold that the district court clearly erred in finding that Mergerson possessed over a kilogram of heroin with the intent to distribute. We further believe that the district court would have likewise erred in finding that Mergerson conspired to possess over a kilogram of heroin with the intent to distribute. Therefore, we vacate Mergerson‘s mandatory life sentence imposed for his conviction on count one and remand for resentencing.
D. Did the district court err in its determination of the respective roles of each defendant in the offenses?
The district court determined, based upon the information in the presentence investigation report (PSI), that each defendant was “an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive,” see
The Government argues that we need not reach the appellants’ argument here because the four-level increase was justified on the independent ground that the criminal activity was “otherwise extensive,”
E. Was the evidence sufficient to support Mergerson‘s conviction on the firearm count?
Mergerson was convicted of count five of the indictment, which charged him with being a felon in possession of a firearm. See
It is well-established that possession may be actual or constructive. See United States v. Smith, 930 F.2d 1081, 1085 (5th Cir.1991); United States v. Posner, 868 F.2d 720, 723 (5th Cir.1989). This is clearly a case
Numerous other courts have addressed this precise question and held that “[w]here ... a residence is jointly occupied, the mere fact that contraband is discovered at the residence will not, without more, provide evidence sufficient to support a conviction based upon constructive possession against any of the occupants.” United States v. Reese, 775 F.2d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir.1985) (citations omitted); accord United States v. Ford, 993 F.2d 249, 252 (D.C.Cir.1993) (“[I]n cases in which contraband or firearms are discovered in a place occupied by more than one person, the Government must establish ‘the likelihood that in some discernible fashion the accused had a voice vis-a-vis’ the items in question.“) (citations omitted); United States v. Bonham, 477 F.2d 1137, 1138-39 (3d Cir.1973) (en banc) (co-defendant did not have constructive possession over heroin hidden in bedroom shared with half-brother when Government‘s only evidence linking him to heroin was joint occupancy of room). Although we do not adopt the “affirmative link” test adopted by some of these courts, see, e.g., Reese, 775 F.2d at 1073 (requiring there to be some “affirmative link” between defendant and contraband or weapon in order to establish constructive possession),16 we do believe that something else (e.g., some circumstantial indicium of possession) is required besides mere joint occupancy before constructive possession is established.
In our previous joint occupancy cases, this court has adopted a “commonsense, fact-specific approach” to determining whether constructive possession was established. Smith, 930 F.2d at 1086. We have found constructive possession in such cases only when there was some evidence supporting at least a plausible inference that the defendant had knowledge of and access to the weapon or contraband. See, e.g., United States v. McKnight, 953 F.2d 898, 902 (5th Cir.1992) (weapon was found in plain view); Smith, 930 F.2d at 1086 (same). In the instant case, the weapon was not in plain view17 and there were no other circumstantial indicia that established that Mergerson even knew of the weapon. Indeed, there was evidence to the contrary—namely, the pawnshop receipt that showed that Sheila Guy was the owner of the weapon.
Thus, we hold that the evidence supporting Mergerson‘s conviction on the fifth count of the indictment is constitutionally insufficient. The Government may not retry Mergerson on that count. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978).18
F. Did the district court err in finding that Anunaso and Mergerson possessed a firearm during the commission of a drug offense for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) ?
The district court applied
The Government may prove that the defendant personally possessed the weapon by showing that a temporal and spatial relationship existed between the weapon, the drug trafficking activity, and the defendant. See United States v. Hooten, 942 F.2d 878 (5th Cir.1991); United States v. Suarez, 911 F.2d 1016, 1018 (5th Cir.1990). Generally the Government must provide evidence that the weapon was found in the same location where drugs or drug paraphernalia are stored or where part of the transaction occurred. United States v. Blankenship, 923 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 111 S.Ct. 2262, 114 L.Ed.2d 714 (1991); Hooten, 942 F.2d at 882; United States v. Otero, 868 F.2d 1412, 1414 (5th Cir. 1989).
The DEA agents found a gun during their search of Anunaso‘s residence. The fact that Mergerson left Anunaso‘s apartment shortly before he delivered the 334.8 grams of heroin, taken together with the fact that the officers discovered, on the same day, Anunaso‘s loaded gun at the apartment creates a spatial and temporal connection between the weapon and the offense. We do not believe that the district court‘s finding was clearly erroneous.
With respect to the two-level increase assessed to Mergerson‘s offense level, the district court found that the increase was proper in view of either the weapon found within Mergerson‘s residence or the weapon found in Anunaso‘s apartment. Because we have previously found that there was insufficient evidence to establish that Mergerson had constructive possession of the firearm found in his residence, we will only review the district court‘s application of
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM all of Anunaso‘s convictions and corresponding sentences. We AFFIRM Mergerson‘s convictions on counts one through four of the indictment but REVERSE his conviction on count five of the indictment on the ground that the evidence was constitutionally insufficient. We further AFFIRM Mergerson‘s sentences on counts two through four, but VACATE Mergerson‘s sentence for his conviction on count one. We REMAND to the district court for resentencing on count one.
KING, Circuit Judge
Notes
The purity of the controlled substance, particularly in the case of heroin, may be relevant to the sentencing process because it is probative of the defendant‘s role or position in the chain of distribution. Since controlled substances are often diluted and combined with other substances as they pass down the chain of distribution, the fact that a defendant is in possession of unusually pure narcotics may indicate a prominent role in the criminal enterprise and proximity to the source of the drugs.