DAVID TOURGEMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. NELSON & KENNARD et al., Defendants and Respondents.
No. D063473
Fourth Dist., Div. One.
Jan. 16, 2014.
222 Cal.App.4th 1447
Johnson & Weaver, Frank J. Johnson and Brett Michael Weaver for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Simmonds & Narita, Tomio Buck Narita and Jeffrey A. Topor for Defendants and Respondents.
AARON, J.—
I.
INTRODUCTION
David Tourgeman brought a putative class and representative action against Dell Financial Services, L.P. (Dell Financial Services),1 and respondents Nelson & Kennard and Robert “Scott” Kennard. In his complaint, Tourgeman contended that respondents violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) (
Tourgeman voluntarily dismissed his action against respondents. After the action was dismissed, respondents filed a motion for attorney fees. (§ 425.16, subd. (c)(1).)3 Tourgeman opposed the motion. In his opposition, Tourgeman conceded that the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on respondents’ motion for attorney fees, but argued that the trial court was required to determine whether respondents would have prevailed on their special motion to strike as a prerequisite to awarding them attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute. Tourgeman further argued that respondents would not have prevailed on their special motion to strike because the action was exempt from the anti-SLAPP statute, under the public interest exception to the statute (§ 425.17).4
On appeal, Tourgeman contends that the trial court erred in concluding that his action was not subject to the public interest exception (§ 425.17, subd. (b)) to the anti-SLAPP statute. We conclude that Tourgeman‘s action satisfied each of the requirements of the public interest exception and that his complaint was therefore not subject to a special motion to strike. The trial court thus erred in awarding respondents attorney fees and costs pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and the attorney fees and costs order and remand the matter to the trial court with directions to deny respondents’ motion for attorney fees and costs.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Tourgeman‘s complaint
In May 2012, Tourgeman filed a complaint against Dell Financial Services and respondents. In his complaint, Tourgeman alleged that he purchased a Dell computer in November 2001 and that Dell Financial Services had arranged for Tourgeman to obtain a loan from CIT Online Bank. Tourgeman alleged that in January 2007, Nelson & Kennard “generated . . . a collection letter to [Tourgeman] on a form template” that misidentified the original creditor of Tourgeman‘s loan. Tourgeman further alleged that Scott Kennard had “spent very little time reviewing this letter, and did not review [Tourgeman‘s] file or account notes, before signing it.” Tourgeman claimed that as a result, Kennard had not been ” ‘meaningfully involved,’ ” in connection with the collection of the debt as required by the FDCPA.
Tourgeman further alleged that Nelson & Kennard had “sent collection letters to hundreds of consumers that falsely identified the consumer‘s original creditor.” Tourgeman also alleged that Scott Kennard had not conducted any “meaningful review” before signing these letters.
Tourgeman claimed that Nelson & Kennard had filed a lawsuit against him that misidentified the original creditor of Tourgeman‘s loan, that he had
Tourgeman stated that he was bringing the action on behalf of himself and the following classes:
“All consumers who financed a Dell-branded product through Dell Financial Services, Inc. and to whom . . . Nelson & Kennard sent, to an address in California, a collection letter that identified the consumer‘s original creditor as an entity that was different than the entity with which the consumer actually had a loan agreement. [[¶] . . . [¶]]
“All consumers who financed a Dell-branded product through Dell Financial Services, Inc. and against whom Nelson & Kennard filed a California state-court lawsuit that alleged the consumer entered into a written loan agreement with an entity that was not the entity with which the consumer actually had a loan agreement.”
Tourgeman alleged a single cause of action against Dell Financial Services and respondents for violation of the UCL on behalf of himself, “members of the [c]lass, and of the general public.” Tourgeman claimed that respondents continued to send collection letters and file collection lawsuits without “enact[ing] measures to ensure that they obtain complete and accurate information about consumers before sending out collection letters and/or filing suits.”
In his prayer for relief Tourgeman sought:
“An injunction enjoining, preliminarily and permanently, the [respondents] from continuing the unfair, unlawful, and/or fraudulent conduct alleged herein, including an injunction requiring the [respondents] to enact sufficient measures that will include the name of the correct original creditor on any collection letters they send out or in any lawsuits that they file in the future. [¶] . . . [¶]
“An injunction enjoining, preliminarily and permanently, [the respondents] from continuing the unfair, unlawful, and/or fraudulent conduct alleged herein, including an injunction requiring [respondents] to enact policies and procedures to ensure that an attorney is ‘meaningfully involved’ in the attempt to collect debts by, among other things, conducting a sufficient review of the consumer‘s file before signing a collection letter.”
In August 2012, respondents filed a special motion to strike pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. Tourgeman subsequently dismissed this action against respondents without prejudice. After the dismissal, respondents filed a motion for attorney fees and costs pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute.
Tourgeman opposed the motion, contending that respondents were not entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute because they would not have prevailed on their special motion to strike. Specifically, Tourgeman argued that the action was exempt from application of the anti-SLAPP statute pursuant to the public interest exception (§ 425.17).
In support of his claim that the action was exempt from the anti-SLAPP statute, Tourgeman emphasized that he had not sought “any monetary damages or restitution for himself,” and that the sole remedy that he had sought in his complaint was injunctive relief designed to ensure that California consumers were not harmed by respondents’ allegedly unfair, unlawful and fraudulent debt collection practices in the future. Tourgeman further argued that he had not sought any benefit for himself and that instead, he had brought this case “purely for the benefit [of] a large class of Californians who might one day wind up on the receiving end of a collections letter or lawsuit from [respondents] that violates the FDCPA.” Tourgeman also argued that his action would benefit the public interest, and that private enforcement was necessary and placed a disproportionate burden on him.
Respondents filed a reply in which they argued that Tourgeman‘s action did not meet the three requirements of the public interest exception to the anti-SLAPP statute (§ 425.17). With respect to the first prong, i.e., that the plaintiff have sought no greater or different relief than that sought for the general public or class, respondents contended that in a related federal action, “Tourgeman sought relief personal to himself, different from and far greater than the injunctive relief he sought on behalf of the class” in this action. With respect to the second prong, i.e., that the action would enforce an important right affecting the public interest, respondents argued that Tourgeman had “provided argument, but no evidence.” Specifically, respondents contended that Tourgeman had failed to present evidence as to how many of its collection letters and lawsuits had misidentified the consumer‘s original creditor. Finally, with respect to the third prong, i.e., that private enforcement was necessary and placed a disproportionate burden on the plaintiff, respondents argued that the Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau were authorized to enforce compliance with the FDCPA, and that they had done so in several recent cases. Respondents further argued
C. The trial court‘s ruling
On November 16, 2012, the trial court entered an order granting respondents’ motion for attorney fees and costs. The court concluded that Tourgeman‘s action did not come within the public interest exception to the anti-SLAPP statute, reasoning: “Plaintiff‘s complaint in this action sought only injunctive relief, and it is unlikely Plaintiff would have benefitted from the requested injunction. However, Plaintiff has not shown an important public interest that affected a large group of persons would have been vindicated by his complaint or that private enforcement was necessary and placed any financial burden on Plaintiff greater than his stake in this action.”
The court noted that Tourgeman had not otherwise opposed the anti-SLAPP motion: “Plaintiff does not dispute his sole claim for violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 arose from the [respondents‘] exercise of their constitutional right to petition. Plaintiff also does not attempt to demonstrate he could meet his burden of establishing a probability of prevailing on the merits of his section 17200 claim.”
The court awarded respondents attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1) in the amount of $11,581.02. On December 26, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of respondents against Tourgeman for $11,581.02.
D. The appeal
Tourgeman timely appeals.6
DISCUSSION
The trial court erred in awarding respondents attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1)
Tourgeman contends that the trial court erred in awarding respondents attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1).
A. Respondents’ contention that we may affirm the attorney fees and costs award regardless of whether the public interest exception applies is unpersuasive
Citing Coltrain v. Shewalter (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 94 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 600] (Coltrain), respondents contend that we may affirm the trial court‘s attorney fees and costs order on the ground that they realized their objectives in the litigation, irrespective of whether they would have prevailed on their special motion to strike.
In Coltrain, a panel of the Fourth Appellate District, Division Two,7 concluded that when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses its complaint while a special motion to strike is pending, it is within the trial court‘s “discretion to determine whether the defendant is the prevailing party for purposes of attorney‘s fees under . . . section 425.16, subdivision (c),” and that “[i]n making that determination, the critical issue is which party realized its objectives in the litigation.” (Coltrain, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 107, italics added.) The Coltrain court added, “Since the defendant‘s goal is to make the plaintiff go away with its tail between its legs, ordinarily the prevailing party will be the defendant.” (Ibid.)
Numerous courts have agreed with the Coltrain court‘s conclusion that a trial court retains jurisdiction to award attorney fees pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1) after a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses its complaint while a special motion to strike is pending. (See, e.g., Liu v. Moore (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 745, 752 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 807] (Liu); Pfeiffer Venice Properties v. Bernard (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 211, 217 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 647] (Pfeiffer);
Thus, under Liu and other cases that have adopted its reasoning, “the trial court‘s adjudication of the merits of a defendant‘s motion to strike is an essential predicate to ruling on the defendant‘s request for an award of fees and costs.” (Liu, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 752; see ibid. [disagreeing with Coltrain to the extent that it permits an award of attorney fees and costs ” ‘regardless of whether the action is a SLAPP suit or not’ ” (quoting Coltrain, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 107)]; accord, Pfeiffer, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 218 [“the statement in Coltrain[, supra, at page 107], that ‘the trial court has discretion to determine whether the defendant is the prevailing party for purposes of attorney‘s fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c),’ is not accurate“].)
We agree with the Liu court and disagree with Coltrain to the extent that Coltrain permits the trial court to award attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1) without first determining whether the defendant would have prevailed on the special motion to strike. Subject to exceptions not applicable here, section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1) authorizes an award of attorney fees and costs to a “prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike.” (Italics added.) Thus, a determination of whether a defendant would have prevailed on its motion to strike is an essential prerequisite to an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1). (Liu, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 752; Pfeiffer, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 218.)
Accordingly, we conclude that we may not affirm the trial court‘s award of attorney fees and costs on the alternative ground that the trial court had discretion to determine that respondents were the prevailing party under
B. Tourgeman‘s action was not subject to a special motion to strike because it was protected by the public interest exception to the anti-SLAPP statute
Tourgeman claims that his action was not subject to a special motion to strike because it was protected by the public interest exception to the anti-SLAPP statute (§ 425.17, subd. (b)).9 We apply the de novo standard of review to Tourgeman‘s claim. (See People ex rel. Strathmann v. Acacia Research Corp. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 487, 498 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 361] (Strathmann).)
1. Section 425.17
Section 425.17, subdivision (b) provides:
“(b) Section 425.16 does not apply to any action brought solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public if all of the following conditions exist:
“(1) The plaintiff does not seek any relief greater than or different from the relief sought for the general public or a class of which the plaintiff is a member. A claim for attorney‘s fees, costs, or penalties does not constitute greater or different relief for purposes of this subdivision.
“(3) Private enforcement is necessary and places a disproportionate financial burden on the plaintiff in relation to the plaintiff‘s stake in the matter.”
In Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club (2008) 45 Cal.4th 309, 316 [86 Cal.Rptr.3d 288, 196 P.3d 1094] (Club Members), the Supreme Court explained that “[i]n 2003, the Legislature enacted section 425.17 to curb the ‘disturbing abuse’ of the anti-SLAPP statute. (§ 425.17, subd. (a).)” “According to the sponsor of . . . section 425.17, Senator Sheila Kuehl, the same types of businesses who used the SLAPP action were inappropriately using the anti-SLAPP motion against their public-interest adversaries. Hence, the Legislature expressly designed subdivision (b) of section 425.17 to prevent the use of the anti-SLAPP device against ‘specified public interest actions,’ among others. [Citation.]” (Blanchard v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 903, 913 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 385] (Blanchard).)
The court in Ingels v. Westwood One Broadcasting Services, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1066 [28 Cal.Rptr.3d 933] (Ingels), summarized section 425.17, subdivision (b) and the Legislature‘s intent in enacting that provision as follows: “On its face, subdivision (b) appears to exempt class actions and private attorney general suits from treatment under section 425.16.10 A review of the legislative history confirms that was the intent of the Legislature. ‘[Senate Bill No.] 51511 would make the SLAPP motion inapplicable to public interest and class action lawsuits “brought solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public” when three specified conditions are met. In general, the qualifying language would clearly encompass claims brought under the Unfair Competition Law (Business and Professions Code Section 17200 et. seq.), the Unfair Practices Act (Business and Professions Code Section 17500 et. seq.), the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (Civil Code Section 1750 et. seq.), as well as any other public interest or class actions lawsuits where the three specified conditions are met.’ (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 515 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 1, 2003, p. 13; see also Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. On Sen. Bill No. 515 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 27, 2003, p. 11.)”
“The three conditions of . . . section 425.17, subdivision (b)(1) through (3) mirror the three elements for determining the eligibility for a fee award under
If a plaintiff‘s lawsuit comes within section 425.17, subdivision (b), it is exempt from the anti-SLAPP statute, and thus, a trial court may deny the defendants’ special motion to strike without determining whether the plaintiff‘s causes of action arise from protected activity, and if so, whether the plaintiff has established a probability of prevailing on those causes of action under section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1). (See, e.g., Strathmann, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 498; Northern Cal. Carpenters Regional Council v. Warmington Hercules Associates (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 296, 299 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 918] (Carpenters).)
2. Tourgeman‘s action satisfied each of the requirements of the public interest exception
a. Tourgeman‘s action was brought solely in the public interest
Section 425.17 applies only to actions brought “solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public.” “[T]he term ‘public interest’ is used to define suits brought for the public‘s good or on behalf of the public.” (Club Members, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 318.) The term “solely” as used in section 425.17, subdivision (b) “expressly conveys the Legislative intent that section 425.17[, subdivision] (b) not apply to an action that seeks a more narrow advantage for a particular plaintiff.” (Club Members, supra, at p. 317.)
To determine whether Tourgeman‘s lawsuit met those definitions, “we rely on the allegations of the complaint because the public interest exception is a threshold issue based on the nature of the allegations and scope of relief sought in the prayer.” (Strathmann, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 499; see Club Members, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 316 [“If a complaint satisfies the provisions of the applicable exception, it may not be attacked under the anti-SLAPP statute.” (italics added)]; accord, Carpenters, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 300 [concluding action was brought solely in the public interest based on allegations of the complaint].)
In light of the nature of Tourgeman‘s claim and the relief that he sought, we conclude that Tourgeman‘s action was brought “solely in the public interest.” (§ 425.17, subd. (b); see Strathmann, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 501 [“Section 425.17[, subdivision] (b) was intended to exempt . . . private attorney general actions from the anti-SLAPP statute . . .“]; Carpenters, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 300 [concluding putative class action seeking enforcement of city‘s prevailing wage policy was brought solely in public interest]; cf. Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 715, 741 [9 Cal.Rptr.3d 544] [“By preventing ‘a failure of justice in our judicial system’ [citation], the class action not only benefits the individual litigant but serves the public interest in the enforcement of legal rights and statutory sanctions.“].)
b. The trial court properly determined that Tourgeman did not seek relief greater than or different from the relief sought for the general public
Respondents contend that the trial court erred in concluding that Tourgeman did not seek relief greater than or different from the relief he sought for the general public. Respondents do not dispute that Tourgeman‘s complaint did not seek any relief in this action different from that which he sought for the general public. Rather, respondents contend that “in his federal court lawsuit, Tourgeman sought relief personal to himself, different from and far greater than the injunctive relief he sought on behalf of the class.” (Italics added.) However, the plain language of section 425.17, subdivision (b) states that the exception applies to “any action” as to which certain conditions exist. (Italics added.) Subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 425.17 expressly state that they apply to “the action,” and “the matter“; there is no language in any of the provisions of section 425.17 that suggests that a court may consider relief sought by the plaintiff in other lawsuits between the parties in determining
Accordingly, we conclude that Tourgeman did not seek any relief greater than or different from the relief that he sought for the general public. (§ 425.17, subd. (b)(1).)
c. Tourgeman‘s action, if successful, would enforce an important right affecting the public interest and would confer a significant benefit of the general public
As noted above, Tourgeman‘s complaint alleged that respondents violated the FDCPA (
In enacting the FDCPA, Congress stated that it had found “abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors.” (
Respondents’ arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Respondents do not dispute that the FDCPA provides important rights to the general public, or that Tourgeman‘s complaint sought to further the public policy goals of the FDCPA. Rather, respondents contend, as they did in the trial court, that Tourgeman failed to present evidence that his action, if successful, would benefit the public. Specifically, respondents contend that Tourgeman failed to present “evidence of how many of [respondents‘] letters or lawsuits allegedly misidentified the original creditor or otherwise ran afoul of the law.” (Italics added.)
Respondents’ suggestion, unsupported by any authority, that Tourgeman was required to make an evidentiary showing in order to establish this prong of the public interest exception, is unpersuasive. Whether Tourgeman‘s action would benefit the public is determined by examining his complaint to determine whether his lawsuit is of the kind that seeks to vindicate public policy goals. (Strathmann, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 499 [“the public interest exception is a threshold issue based on the nature of the allegations and scope of relief sought in the prayer“]; see, e.g., id. at p. 504 [concluding public benefit requirement of § 425.17, subd. (b)(2) met where qui tam action sought to further objectives of Insurance Frauds Prevention Act (
In a related argument, respondents contend that Tourgeman failed to demonstrate that this action would benefit the public because a federal court rejected related claims on the merits. Section 425.17, subdivision (b)(2) states that a court is to assume that the challenged action will be successful in considering whether the action benefits the public. (Ibid. [“The action, if successful, would enforce an important right affecting the public interest, and would confer a significant benefit . . . on the general public or a large class of persons.” (italics added)].) The merits of Tourgeman‘s claim are thus irrelevant in determining whether the action meets the public benefit requirement of section 425.17, subdivision (b)(2).
i. The necessity of private enforcement
” ‘[C]ongress chose a ‘private attorney general’ approach to assume enforcement of the FDCPA” [citation].’ ” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1003 [156 Cal.Rptr.3d 26].) Our Legislature also has authorized private attorney general actions with respect to the enforcement of the UCL (
It is undisputed that no public entity has sought to enforce the rights that Tourgeman sought to vindicate in his lawsuit. Under these circumstances, we conclude that private enforcement was necessary to enforce the right at issue in Tourgeman‘s action. (See Strathmann, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 504 [“In this case, private enforcement is necessary because neither the Attorney General nor the Insurance Commissioner has intervened to prosecute the action.“]; Carpenters, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 301 [concluding “private enforcement action is necessary ‘[b]ecause the City of Hercules has failed to take any action to enforce the City‘s Wage Policy on the Project’ “].)
Respondents contend that the Federal Trade Commission is authorized to enforce compliance with the FDCPA and that the “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau [is] beginning to take an active role in FDCPA enforcement.” However, as the cases cited above make clear, the possibility that a public entity might bring a lawsuit to vindicate certain rights does not demonstrate that a private plaintiff‘s action to vindicate such rights was not
ii. Disproportionate financial burden
In Blanchard, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at pages 915–916, in discussing the law to be applied in considering whether a plaintiff has demonstrated that private enforcement placed a disproportionate financial burden on the plaintiff in relation to the plaintiff‘s stake in the matter (§ 425.17, subd. (b)(3)), the Court of Appeal stated the following: “It has been said about this element that ‘the less direct or concrete a personal interest someone has, the more likely he or she will satisfy the element. . . . ’ [Citation.] [¶] Courts first focus on what sort of financial stake the plaintiff had in the outcome [citation], i.e., what the plaintiff hoped to gain financially from the litigation in comparison to what it cost. [Citation.] . . . The relevant inquiry is whether ‘the “cost of the [plaintiffs‘] legal victory transcends [their] personal interest.” ’ [Citation.]”14
In this case, as discussed above, Tourgeman did not seek any financial benefit from the lawsuit, and, as the trial court noted, it is unlikely that Tourgeman would have benefitted from any potential injunctive relief, since it is doubtful that he will again be the subject of respondents’ debt collection efforts. This fact, alone, supports the conclusion that the financial burden on Tourgeman is disproportionate to his stake in the action. (See Carpenters, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 301 [concluding the “financial burden on the Plaintiffs is disproportionate to their stake in the action” because plaintiffs “bring the action to vindicate a public interest relating to enforcement of the Prevailing Wage Policy but do not themselves belong to the undercompensated class of nonunion workers“]; compare with Blanchard, supra,
Further, Tourgeman could reasonably have expected to incur significant litigation costs in attempting to prove that respondents violated the FDCPA and that injunctive relief was an appropriate remedy to deter future violations.15 Tourgeman also could reasonably have anticipated that he might be found liable for an adverse award of costs. (See Strathmann, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 505 [concluding that plaintiff may demonstrate that a lawsuit places a disproportionate burden on him because of the possibility that he may become subject to an attorney fees and costs award].)
In arguing to the contrary, Respondents again contend, without citation to authority, that Tourgeman was required to make an evidentiary showing in order to establish this prong, arguing that Tourgeman failed to “submit any evidence of the financial burden this litigation would impose on him relative to his stake in the matter.” (Italics added.) We reject this argument. As discussed previously, the applicability of the public interest exception is determined by examining the complaint. (See, e.g., Strathmann, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 499.)
Respondents also argue, contrary to Strathmann, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th 487, that a plaintiff‘s potential liability for an award of attorney fees and costs “is and should be irrelevant” in determining whether an action places a disproportionate financial burden on a plaintiff. We agree with respondents that such risk will not necessarily establish that a plaintiff faced a disproportionate financial burden in litigating the matter. For example, in a case in which the plaintiff seeks to gain significant personal relief, the specter of such relief may outweigh the possibility of an adverse award of costs in determining whether the plaintiff faces a disproportionate financial burden.
Accordingly, given the circumstances discussed above, we conclude that Tourgeman‘s filing this action placed a disproportionate financial burden on him in relation to his stake in the matter.
e. Conclusion
Because Tourgeman‘s action satisfied each of the requirements of the public interest exception to the anti-SLAPP statute, we conclude that Tourgeman‘s action was exempt from application of the anti-SLAPP statute.16
C. The judgment and order granting respondents’ motion for attorney fees and costs must be reversed
We concluded in part III.A., ante, that, prior to awarding respondents attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), the trial court was required to determine whether respondents would have prevailed on their special motion to strike. We concluded in part III.B., ante, that respondents would not have prevailed on their special motion to strike because Tourgeman‘s action is exempt from application of the anti-SLAPP statute, under the public interest exception (§ 425.17). Accordingly, the judgment and order granting respondents’ motion for attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1) must be reversed.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment and the trial court‘s order granting respondents’ motion for attorney fees and costs are reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court
McDonald, Acting P. J., and Irion, J., concurred.