Torres Esparza v. PorterTorres Esparza v. Porter
INTRODUCTION
Since the United States began restricting immigration into this country in the late 19th century, it has distinguished between those noncitizens seeking entry into the country and those already residing within it. Noncitizens “stopped at the boundary line” who have “gained no foothold in the United States,” Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925), do not enjoy the same constitutional protections
The Department of Homeland Security adhered to this principle until very recently, applying two distinct statutory schemes for the detention of noncitizens:
DHS has now abandoned this approach, sweeping all noncitizens who entered without inspection into § 1225(b)(2)(A)‘s mandatory detention net—regardless of how long they have lived here. This policy shift, endorsed by the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA Sept. 5, 2025), has trapped thousands in detention without bond hearings, including long-term residents with no criminal records.
Dozens of district courts across the nation—with more each day—have rejected DHS‘s expansion of § 1225(b)(2)(A)‘s mandatory detention to noncitizens already residing here.1 Only two courts, as far as the Court is aware, have sided with the government.2 This Court joins the overwhelming majority and holds that § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to noncitizens like Petitioner who were detained after living in the United States for years.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a 38-year-old citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without inspection in 2004. Dkt. 1 ¶ 21. He is engaged to a U.S. citizen with whom he has two children who are also U.S. citizens. Id. ¶ 22. He has no criminal history. Id. ¶ 26.
The crux of this dispute centers on a recent shift in DHS and Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) policy. On July 8, 2025, ICE issued “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission,” instructing that all persons who entered without inspection be subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), regardless of when they were apprehended or how long they have resided in the United States. On September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) issued a precedential decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), holding that immigration judges lack authority to conduct bond hearings for individuals who entered without admission, as they are deemed “applicants for admission” subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing The Constitution also guarantees every person in the United States due process of law, including persons who are not United States citizens. E.g., Lopez v. Heinauer, 332 F.3d 507, 512 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The Supreme Court has long recognized that deportable aliens are entitled to constitutional protections of due process.” (citing Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903))); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695. Respondents first challenge the Court‘s jurisdiction over this matter, and particularly the Court‘s authority to bar Respondents from transferring Petitioner out of the District of Idaho or taking actions to effect his removal from the United Federal district courts have limited authority to review legal questions related to removal proceedings. Under Respondents argue that § 1252(b)(9) and (g) together strip this Court of jurisdiction to consider Petitioner‘s statutory entitlement to a bond hearing. But this reading of § 1252 runs counter to Supreme Court precedent and the conclusion of dozens of district courts that have recently considered this precise question. Jurisdiction here hinges on whether Petitioner‘s question of law—his Respondents attempt to distinguish Jennings by arguing that Petitioner “does challenge the government‘s decision to detain him in the first place.” Dkt. 8 at 9. This is incorrect. Petitioner does not object to the initial decision to detain him, only to his continued detention without a bond hearing. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “claims that are independent of or collateral to the removal process do not fall within the scope of § 1252(b)(9).” Gonzalez v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf‘t, 975 F.3d 788, 810 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation omitted). The nature of the Government‘s detention authority—whether it stems from § 1225 or § 1226(a)—is precisely this sort of collateral question. See Hernandez v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 42, 42-43 (1st Cir. 2005) (explaining that § 1252 does not “preclude habeas review over challenges to detention that are independent of challenges to removal orders” (quoting H.R. Cong. Rep. No. 109-72, at 2873 (May 3, 2005)). This Court thus joins the consensus of numerous district courts that have recognized jurisdiction over this issue since DHS‘s policy change in July 2025. See, e.g., Ochoa v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-00881, 2025 WL 3125846 at *4 (D.N.M. Nov. 7, 2025) (“[D]istrict courts across the country, have found subject matter jurisdiction over petitions challenging determinations that a petitioner was statutorily ineligible for bond under § 1226(a).“); Chavez, 2025 WL 2730228, at *4 (“Petitioner‘s challenge to his detention without a bond hearing is collateral to his Finally, Respondents contest the Court‘s authority to prohibit Petitioner‘s transfer out of the Court‘s jurisdiction. Ironically, they complain that this restriction—not their own policy—prevents them from giving Petitioner his requested bond hearing. It is true that “To begin with, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)‘s bar on jurisdiction applies only to those decisions where Congress has expressly ‘set out the Attorney General‘s discretionary authority in the statute.‘” Id. at 395 (quoting Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 247 (2010)). In this regard, § 1231(g) is not a discretionary statute: it “uses the obligatory ‘shall’ rather than a permissive ‘may.‘” Id. Moreover, the statute does not mention transfers at all, meaning that any discretion granted to the Attorney General is at best implicit. Id. District courts in immigration habeas For these reasons, the Court has jurisdiction over Petitioner‘s claim and jurisdiction to prohibit his transfer to other districts. Although the Court has no power to review the removal proceedings themselves, Petitioner‘s challenge to his detention without a bond hearing is properly before the Court. As the final issue prior to reaching the merits, the Court must determine whether Petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies. For habeas claims, exhaustion is prudential, rather than jurisdictional. Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017). “[A] court may waive the prudential exhaustion requirement if administrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Because the BIA‘s decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado categorically bars immigration judges from conducting bond hearings for individuals who entered As other courts have recognized in identical circumstances, the BIA clearly staked its position here when it issued Matter of Yajure Hurtado and held § 1225(b)(2)‘s mandatory detention provisions apply to any noncitizen present in the United States “without being admitted or paroled.” See Chavez, 2025 WL 2730228, at *3. Any attempt by Petitioner to request bond would therefore be futile. See id.; Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01873, 2025 WL 2670875, at *8 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2025); Rico-Tapia v. Smith, No. 25-00379, 2025 WL 2950089, at *4 (D. Haw. Oct. 10, 2025) Accordingly, the Court finds the prudential exhaustion requirements waived for futility. It now turns to the merits of Petitioner‘s claim. The central question here is narrow but significant: whether § 1225(b)(2)(A)‘s mandatory detention provision applies to a noncitizen who entered The Ninth Circuit warns that “divining the meaning of the complex provisions of the INA is ordinarily not for the faint of heart.” Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1256 (quoting Torres v. Barr, 976 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted). To wade through the “morass” of the INA, Torres, 976 at 923, “courts must ‘use every tool at their disposal to determine the best reading of the statute,‘” Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1256 (quoting Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 373 (2024)). In this case, the Court not only has the benefit of these interpretive tools but also the numerous decisions from other courts that have grappled with this issue. As touched upon earlier, two statutes govern pre-removal detention. Section 1225 addresses noncitizens “seeking admission into the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates detention when “an alien who is an applicant for admission” is “seeking admission” and “not clearly and beyond a In contrast, § 1226 governs detention of noncitizens “already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289. Section 1226(a) establishes “the default rule“—discretionary detention with the possibility of release on bond or conditional parole. Respondents argue Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b) because he is “an applicant for admission.” The statute defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival . . . ).” As countless courts have concluded, Respondents’ proposed interpretation “(1) disregards the plain meaning of section 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the relationship between sections 1225 and 1226; (3) would render a recent amendment to section 1226(c) superfluous; and (4) is inconsistent with decades of prior statutory interpretation and practice.” Lepe v. Andrews, 2025 WL 2716910, at *4 (collecting cases). For 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply, several conditions must be met: an “examining immigration officer” must determine that the individual is (1) an “applicant for admission“; (2) “seeking admission“; and (3) “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” If Congress did not intend to distinguish between an “applicant for admission” and those “applicant[s] for admission” who are “seeking admission,” it While Petitioner may qualify as an “applicant for admission,” the phrase “seeking admission” cannot reasonably be stretched to encompass someone who entered the country years ago, established a life here, and was living peacefully in Idaho until his arrest. At the time of his apprehension, Petitioner was not “seeking” anything—he was simply present in the United States. This plain reading of § 1225 places it in harmony with § 1226 and the overall statutory scheme. See Davis v. Michigan Dep‘t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989) (explaining the words of a statute must be read in their entire context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme). The entire framework of § 1225, titled “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing,” relates to the Thus, as the Supreme Court explained, § 1225 applies “at the Nation‘s borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether an alien seeking to enter the country is admissible.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. Nothing in this framework contemplates interior enforcement against individuals who have resided in the country for years. “And just to pile on a bit,” Respondents’ construction of the statute “would create surplusage twice over,” Polansky, 599 U.S. at 432, by rendering the recent amendment to “This is a presumptively dubious result.” Martinez, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 221. Finally, Respondents’ contrary interpretation also upends decades of settled practice without clear congressional intent. Since IIRIRA‘s enactment in 1996, DHS has consistently applied § 1226(a) to noncitizens who entered without inspection but were apprehended while residing in the United States. See Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1260-61. Executive Branch regulations issued contemporaneously with IIRIRA explicitly stated that noncitizens “present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as [those] who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.” Respondents’ most compelling argument to support their position “is really a policy argument, projected onto Congress.” Romero, 2025 WL 2403827, at *12. They argue that interpreting the statutes this way creates an “anomaly” by treating But, as the district court in Romero recognized, “Respondents ask the wrong question.” Romero, 2025 WL 2403827, at *12. In reality, treating the detention of noncitizens stopped at or near the border differently from noncitizens who reside within the country is not an anomaly. Instead, it reflects the long-recognized distinction in our immigration laws and the Constitution that due process protections apply to noncitizens residing within the country but not those stopped at or near the border. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. “Civil immigration detention, which is nonpunitive in purpose and effect, is typically justified under the Due Process Clause only when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community.” Lepe, 2025 WL 2716910, at *9 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). “It is therefore reasonable to read these statutes against that backdrop.” Id. (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Moreover, policy arguments cannot override the plain meaning of the text. Id. See also Romero, 2025 WL 2403827, at *12. In sum, the Court declines to credit Respondents’ position that Petitioner is “seeking admission” to the United States and thus subject to mandatory detention Petitioner‘s continued detention without a bond hearing also violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights. The Due Process Clause prohibits deprivations of life, liberty, and property without due process of law. To determine whether civil detention violates a detainee‘s procedural due process rights, courts apply the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Mathews requires courts to weigh three factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government‘s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The interest in freedom from physical detention is “the most elemental of liberty interests.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). Courts also Petitioner, who has no criminal history, is detained alongside those facing criminal charges and convicted criminals. He is “experiencing all the deprivations of incarceration, including loss of contact with friends and family, loss of income earning, ... lack of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the lack of freedom of movement.” Gunaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1187. The first Mathews factor therefore strongly favors Petitioner. The second factor “requires courts to assess whether the challenged procedure creates a risk of erroneous deprivation of individuals’ private rights and the degree to which alternative procedures could ameliorate these risks.” Gunaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1187. Respondents contend Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b) and have provided him no bond hearing or other procedural safeguards balancing his liberty interest against the government‘s enforcement interest. The Ninth Circuit has held that when a substantial liberty interest is at stake, the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that an individual Civil detention comports with due process only when a “special justification” outweighs the “individual‘s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. The government has identified no information establishing Petitioner poses a danger or flight risk. Its only apparent interest in detaining Petitioner—which imposes additional fiscal and administrative burdens—is to fulfill an arrest quota of 3,000 immigration arrests per day set by the current administration. See Vasquez Perdomo v. Noem, 790 F. Supp. 3d 850, 868 (C.D. Cal. 2025). All three Mathews factors weigh in favor of finding Petitioner‘s due process rights have been violated and ordering his release. Concluding that § 1226(a) governs Petitioner‘s detention, the question of the proper remedy remains. Petitioner asks the Court to order his immediate release, while Respondents argue that he should merely receive a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a). In many circumstances akin to the present case, a bond hearing would indeed be sufficient to rectify the violation of Petitioner‘s unlawful detention. See E.C. v. Noem, No. 2:25-cv-01789, 2025 WL 2916264, at *12 (D. Nev. Oct. 14, 2025); see also Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 45-46 (1st Cir. 2021). Here, however, Respondents have failed utterly to articulate a legitimate interest in the Petitioner being detained. There is no evidence that he is a flight risk or poses a danger to the community. To the contrary, Petitioner‘s lack of criminal record, long residence in the United States, and familial ties to the United States all indicate that he is neither a danger nor a flight risk. In recent months, courts across the country have ordered the immediate release of detainees in similar situations. E.g., Lepe, 2025 WL 2716910, at *10; J.U. v. Maldonado, No. 25-cv-4836, 2025 WL 2772765, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025); Rosado v. Figueroa, No. 25-cv-2157, 2025 WL 2337099, at *19 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025); IT IS ORDERED that: DATED: November 19, 2025 B. Lynn Winmill U.S. District Court JudgeLEGAL STANDARD
ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction
B. Exhaustion
C. Section 1226(a), Not Section 1225(b)(2), Governs Petitioner‘s Detention
1. The Statutory Framework
2. Section 1226(a) Governs Petitioner‘s Detention.
D. Due Process
1. Private Interest
2. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
3. Government‘s Interests
E. Remedy
ORDER