Doğukan Günaydın v. Donald J. Trump, et al.
File No. 25-CV-01151 (JMB/DLM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
May 21, 2025
CASE 0:25-cv-01151-JMB-DLM Doc. 41 Filed 05/21/25
Doğukan Günaydın,
Petitioner,
v.
Donald J. Trump, in his official capacity as President of the United States; Joel Brott, in his official capacity as the Sherburne County Sheriff; Peter Berg, in his official capacity as the St. Paul Field Office Director for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Jamie Holt, in her official capacity as Homeland Security Investigations St. Paul Special Agent in Charge, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Todd Lyons, in his official capacity as Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Kristi Noem, in her official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security; and Marco Rubio, in his official capacity as Secretary of State,
Respondents.
ORDER
Friedrich A. P. Siekert and Ana H. Voss, United States Attorney‘s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondents Donald J. Trump, Joel Brott, Peter Berg, Jamie Holt, Todd Lyons, Kristi Noem, and Marco Rubio.
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Doğukan Günaydın‘s Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under
BACKGROUND
A. Findings of Fact Concerning Günaydın‘s Arrest and Initial Detention
Günaydın is a citizen of Türkiye who has resided in the United States since January 2022, when he was lawfully admitted on an F-1 visa. (Doc. No. 11-1 at 1, 2.) Until his arrest on March 27, 2025, Günaydın was a full-time and high-performing MBA student at the Carlson School of Management at the University of Minnesota. (Doc. No. 26-1 ¶¶ 1, 4, 14.) He has one prior criminal conviction for an offense on June 24, 2023. (Doc. No. 11-2 at 1.) He pleaded guilty to and was sentenced for Third-Degree DWI, a gross misdemeanor. (Id.) The state court imposed a sentence of 180 days but stayed execution of the sentence and placed Günaydın on probation. (Id. at 1-2.)
On the morning of March 27, 2025, while on his way to class, plainclothes Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers approached Günaydın without warning and forced him into an unmarked vehicle. (Doc. No. 26-1 ¶ 7.) He feared he had been kidnapped. (Id.) At the time of his arrest, ICE officials informed Günaydın that they had arrested him because his “F-1 visa is retroactively revoked.”1 (Doc. No. 37-1 ¶ 60.)
That same afternoon, also hours after his arrest, an official from the Department
At some point after his arrest, Günaydın was presented with, but was not given a copy of, a Notice to Appear, which stated that DHS had initiated removal proceedings against him on the following grounds:
You were admitted to the United States at Chicago, IL on or about January 13, 2022 as a F-1 Student nonimmigrant.
Respondents informed Günaydın that he had been detained because his F-1 visa was revoked, the Bureau of Consular Affairs Visa Office sent him a non-descript email “[o]n behalf of the United States Department of State.” (Doc. No. 15-1.) Günaydın could not view this email when it was sent because he was detained without access to email. Nevertheless, the email informed Günaydın that the State Department had actually revoked his “B1/B2 nonimmigrant tourist visa.” (Id.)
You have failed to maintain your status, to wit: in 2025 the United States State Department retroactively revoked the F-1 student visa based on your criminal history.2
(Doc. Nos. 11-4, 11-5.) This notice charged Günaydın under
Then, the day before his initial hearing, Günaydın learned that Respondents changed the basis for his detention and alleged removability. Instead of failing to maintain his status under
On April 11, 2025, the Immigration Judge conducted a hearing pursuant to Matter of Joseph, 22 I&N Dec. 799 (BIA 1999), which permits an immigration judge to determine whether the removal proceedings are “properly included” in a mandatory-detention category. Under Matter of Joseph, proceedings are “properly included” in a mandatory-detention category unless the person subject to removal can show that DHS is “substantially unlikely” to establish the charge of removability that would otherwise subject him to mandatory detention. Id. at 802–03, 806. At the Joseph hearing in this case, counsel for DHS indicated that the charge against Günaydın under
Then, on April 30, 2025, the Immigration Judge issued a written decision on the merits of the removal proceedings. (Doc. No. 29 ¶ 7; Doc. No. 29-5.) The Immigration Judge dismissed the charge of removability against Günaydın and terminated his removal proceedings. (Doc. No. 29-5 at 5.) In doing so, she determined that DHS had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that Günaydın was removable because while Günaydın had “engaged in dangerous activity” when he committed his DWI offense, the evidence did not show that he had “placed a large segment of the general population at risk.” (Id. at 4.) In support of her conclusion that Günaydın “did not pose an imminent or substantial risk to person or property,” she found that there were no restaurants, bars, pedestrians, or additional motorists in the vicinity of Günaydın‘s route, Günaydın traveled at a “normal pace,” and police followed Günaydın “for seven blocks before stopping him.” (Id.) Based on this evidence, she concluded that Günaydın‘s DWI offense fell outside the narrow scope of criminal conduct that would render an individual removable under
In a sworn affidavit, Günaydın describes the “dehumanizing experience” of remaining in detention at a county jail after having prevailed in immigration court—including lack of access to the outdoors, physical activity, clean jumpsuits, and privacy—which has brought him to the point of feeling “mentally and emotionally exhausted” and “sub-human.” (Doc. No. 33-1 ¶¶ 28–49.) During the nearly two months he has been detained, Günaydın has been unable to continue his studies, for which he took out $40,000 in loans, and has fallen behind in his degree. (Doc. No. 26-1 ¶ 17; Doc. No. 37-1 ¶¶ 12, 14, 104.) He continues to pay rent on an apartment in which he can no longer reside. (Doc. No. 37 ¶ 102.) He fears that his continued detention will result in his “los[ing] everything [he] ha[s] worked so hard for since [he] came to the
B. Development and Implementation of the Automatic Stay Regulation
Section 236(a) of the INA (codified as
A brief history of this automatic stay provision is helpful to the Court‘s decision today. Prior to 2001, detainees subject to discretionary detention under
This new interim rule took effect without first permitting public comment. Due in part to the “detention of a large number of individuals” as a result of “the current investigation in connection with recent terrorist activities,” Attorney General John Ashcroft determined that “the delays inherent in the regular notice-and-comment process would be ‘impracticable, unnecessary and contrary to the public interest.‘” Id. at 54911.
The new automatic stay regulation raised due process concerns from its inception. For instance, although the rule
During this same period, several federal district courts concluded that the automatic stay provision violated the due process rights of detainees. In Ashley v. Ridge, 288 F. Supp. 2d 662, 673 (D.N.J. 2003), for example, the District of New Jersey vacated the automatic stay on a detained noncitizen‘s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, finding that “the continued detention of Petitioner without judicial review of the automatic stay of the bail determination, despite the Immigration Judge‘s decision that he be released on bond, violates Petitioner‘s procedural and substantive due process constitutional rights.” Id. at 675. Likewise, in Bezmen v. Ashcroft, 245 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D. Conn. 2003), another habeas action, the District of Connecticut dissolved the automatic stay, finding that the government‘s stated goal of preventing the release of noncitizens posing a threat to national security or the public was not adequately served by the petitioner‘s ongoing detention and was outweighed by the petitioner‘s Fifth Amendment right to be free from governmental detention. Id. at 450–51. Federal courts in California and Michigan reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Zabadi v. Chertoff, No. 05-CV-1796 (WHA), 2005 WL 1514122 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2005) (finding the automatic stay provision unconstitutional); Zavala v. Ridge, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (same); Uritsky v. Ridge, 286 F. Supp. 2d 842 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (same).
In 2006, the Department of Justice promulgated its final rule. See Executive Office for Immigration Review; Review of Custody Determination, 71 Fed. Reg. 57873 (Oct. 2, 2006). The final rule included the language of the interim rule, with some notable changes. First, “to allay possible
DISCUSSION
In his Petition, Günaydın argues for his immediate release on grounds that the regulation that keeps him detained—the automatic stay provision at
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing
The Constitution also guarantees every person in the United States due process of law, including persons who are not United States citizens. E.g., Lopez v. Heinauer, 332 F.3d 507, 512 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The Supreme Court has long recognized that deportable aliens are entitled to constitutional protections of due process.” (citing Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903))); see also, e.g., Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U. S. ___, 145 S. Ct. 1003, 1006 (2025) (per curiam) (“‘It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law’ in the context of removal proceedings.” (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993))); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (“[T]he
Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.“).
To determine whether a civil detention violates a detainee‘s due process rights, courts apply the familiar three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022) (collecting cases and noting that, “when considering due process challenges to [discretionary noncitizen detention] other circuits . . . have applied the Mathews test“); see also Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2021) (applying Mathews test to
As a threshold matter, the Court observes that Respondents develop no argument concerning the particular procedural question presented by the Petition: whether a regulation can permit an agency official to unilaterally detain a person after a judge has ordered the person‘s release and after a judge has dismissed the underlying proceedings. Respondents’ written submission instead relies on cases involving unrelated and dissimilar procedures, such as the continued detention of persons against whom an immigration judge has issued a final order of removal, Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 683, persons who have been ordered detained or held under a high bond by an immigration judge, Miranda v. Garland, 34 F.4th 338, 347 (4th Cir. 2022); Ali v. Brott, 770 F. App‘x 298, 299 (8th Cir. 2019), and persons who have committed crimes expressly listed in a mandatory detention statute or who did not prevail at (or did not even request) a Joseph hearing. Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 395 (2019); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513–14 (2003); Banyee v. Garland, 115 F.4th 928, 930 (8th Cir. 2024).
Rather than justifying Günaydın‘s detention, Respondents’ inapposite cases highlight the distinctiveness of Günaydın‘s circumstances and tend to support his legal arguments accordingly. Indeed, Respondents cite cases that rely on the opportunity for an adversarial hearing, including a Joseph hearing, to justify the constitutionality of continued detention in the face of a due process challenge. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 n.1 (2018) (noting that “[a]nyone who believes that he is not covered by [the mandatory detention statute] may also ask for what is known as a ’Joseph hearing‘“); Demore, 538 U.S. at 514 n.3 (noting that Joseph hearings are “immediately provided” to any detainee who requests one); Reno, 507 U.S. at 309 (noting that juvenile detainees “may request a judicial redetermination at any time later in the deportation process“). Respondents go on to argue that, based on these cases, no due process violation has occurred because the Immigration Judge held a Joseph hearing. (Doc. No. 39 at 7 (stating that the Joseph hearing “afforded Günaydın ample due process” and “properly accounted for Günaydın‘s individual liberty interests“); id. at 22 (characterizing the Joseph hearing as “more due process than that to which [Günaydın] was entitled“).) The question presented, however, is not whether the opportunity for a Joseph hearing satisfies the Mathews factors. The question presented is whether the challenged regulation—one that permits one party in the adversarial process to unilaterally override the outcome of a Joseph hearing—passes the Mathews test. In this way, Respondents’ argument rings hollow, for it relies on the availability of a Joseph hearing, which its own regulation renders meaningless.
Here, Günaydın not only availed himself of these procedural safeguards, he also prevailed before the Immigration Judge at the Joseph hearing and again on the merits of the underlying removal action. (See Doc. No. 22-1 (ordering Günaydın‘s release on bond); Doc. No. 29-4 (concluding that DHS has not established removability and ordering removal proceedings be terminated).) Because of the Immigration Judge‘s two decisions in his favor, Günaydın presents a much stronger case than the petitioners in the cases on which Respondents rely. Respondents cite to no case, and they develop no argument, involving the propriety of the continued detention of a person who has been ordered released by an immigration judge and whose underlying proceedings have been dismissed on the merits by an immigration judge. The Court cannot overlook the important distinguishing features of this case.
In short, the absence of any argument from Respondents regarding the particular procedures followed in this case is sufficient and independent grounds for granting the Petition. Nevertheless, the Court alternatively conducts a due process analysis under the factors set forth in Mathews.
II. MATHEWS FACTORS
A. Private Interest
The first Mathews factor requires consideration of the private interest affected
First, Günaydın has a significant interest at stake; being free from physical detention is “the most elemental of liberty interests.” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529, 531 (directing courts, when assessing the first Mathews factor, to consider only the petitioner‘s interests at stake in ongoing detention without consideration of the respondents’ justifications for the detention (quotation omitted)); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (advising that an individual‘s interest in being free from detention “lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects“).
Second, the conditions of Günaydın‘s detention further tip this first factor in his favor. When assessing this factor, courts consider the conditions under which detainees are currently held, including whether a detainee is held in conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration. See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 28 (involving noncitizen detainee held “alongside criminal inmates” at a county jail); Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 852 (observing noncitizen was “not detained” but, rather, was incarcerated in conditions identical to those imposed on criminal defendants after being convicted of “violent felonies and other serious crimes“). Günaydın is and has been held at Sherburne County Jail, a facility that houses civil detainees in the immigration context, pre-trial criminal arrestees, and incarcerated prisoners serving criminal sentences. He is experiencing all the deprivations of incarceration, including loss of contact with friends and family, loss of income earning, interruptions to his education, lack of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the lack of freedom of movement. (Doc. No. 37-1 ¶¶ 18–54, 83–89.)
Third, Günaydın has also identified other significant private interests affected, such as the completion of his academic semester, the possible forfeiture of a semester‘s tuition, the loss of privacy, the loss of a prestigious summer internship, and detrimental impacts on his post-graduation career prospects. (Id. ¶¶ 12–13, 18.)
Thus, Günaydın has established that the first Mathews factor strongly favors granting the Petition.
B. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The second Mathews factor requires courts to assess whether the challenged procedure creates a risk of erroneous deprivation of individuals’ private rights and the degree to which alternative procedures could ameliorate these risks. Upon review, the Court concludes that
First, the risk of deprivation is high because the only individuals adversely affected by this regulation are those detainees who have already prevailed in a judicial hearing. The regulation only confers on agency officials the right to invoke an automatic stay and, presumably, agency officials would not act to stay favorable decisions. Thus, the challenged regulation permits an agency official who is also a participant in the adversarial process to unilaterally override the immigration judge‘s decisions. Such a rule is anomalous in our legal system, and Respondents direct the Court to no other instance in any context in which a non-prevailing party is granted such authority. It represents a basic conflict of interest of which courts have disapproved in other contexts. See, e.g.,
Second, the automatic stay regulation includes no requirement that the agency official invoking it consider any individualized or particularized facts, which increases the potential for erroneous deprivation of individuals’ private rights. In the context of a bond order, the parties in immigration court contest whether the detainee poses a danger to the public and whether the detainee is a flight risk. See Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2006). To obtain an order of release at a Joseph hearing, like Günaydın did, the detainee must establish that the agency is substantially unlikely to establish the charge of removability. In re Joseph, 22 I&N Dec. 799, 802–03, 806 (BIA 1999). The immigration judge making a detention decision and deciding the outcome of a Joseph hearing is required to tailor the decision to the individual and make a particularized assessment of the applicable factors. However, an agency official invoking the automatic stay provision need not make any individualized or particularized justification for an action that results in the continued deprivation of liberty.
Third, the automatic stay regulation does not include any standards for the agency official to satisfy and operates as an appeal of right. In this way, the regulation runs counter to the more typical process, in which a stay pending appeal is deemed “an extraordinary remedy,” M.M.V. v. Barr, 459 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2020), and “an intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial review,” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009) (quotation omitted), and is never awarded as “a matter of right.” Id. Moreover, a stay of an order directing the release of a detained individual is an “especially” extraordinary step, because “[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). To obtain a traditional stay on appeal, the party seeking the stay must satisfy a threshold standard by making a showing of likelihood of success on the merits, risk of irreparable injury, and the balance of interests. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 434. In this analysis, “the first two factors . . . are most critical.” Id. To be granted a stay on a court order, the party seeking the stay must make a strong showing that they are likely to ultimately prevail; in making this showing, “[i]t is not enough that the chance of success on the merits be better than negligible.”9 Id. (quotation omitted);
As to the value of additional procedural safeguards, the regulation itself includes an obvious alternative—one that, as noted above, follows a more traditional process of requesting a stay from the appellate court.
The Court therefore finds that the second Mathews factor supports Günaydın‘s claim that the automatic stay provision violates the Due Process Clause.
C. Respondents’ Competing Interest and Burdens of Additional or Substitute Procedural Requirements
The third step of the Mathews test directs the Court to weigh the private interests at stake and the risk of erroneous deprivation of those interests against Respondents’ interests in persisting with the regulation, including the fiscal and administrative burdens of an additional or substitute procedural requirement. For the following reasons, the Court concludes that this factor also favors granting the Petition.
At the outset, the Court concludes that ensuring that persons subject to possible removal do not commit crimes or evade law enforcement during the pendency of their removal proceedings presents a significant governmental interest. However, in this case, Respondents make no argument that public safety or future court appearances require a stay of the order
As noted above, the current regulation also provides for a process through which DHS may request an emergency stay from the BIA pending appeal of an immigration judge‘s order.
rare and somewhat exceptional action in the first place.12 See Executive Office for Immigration Review; Review of Custody Determination, 66 Fed. Reg. 54909 (Oct. 31, 2001) (describing the automatic stay as a “limited measure“). Thus, given the absence of an argument to the contrary, and in light of the infrequent invocation of the automatic stay regulation, the Court is compelled to conclude that Respondents’ interest in preserving the automatic stay regulation is almost entirely, if not entirely, reduced by the mechanisms already in place for requesting an emergency stay from the BIA.
In conclusion, all three Mathews factors favor Günaydın‘s position, and the Court concludes that the automatic stay regulation at
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
-
Petitioner Doğukan Günaydın‘s Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 37) is GRANTED. - Petitioner shall be released from custody, immediately, subject to the conditions previously imposed by the Immigration Judge, including the $5,000 bond.
- By 4:00pm CST on May 22, 2025, Respondents shall file notice with the Court confirming Petitioner‘s release.
Dated: May 21, 2025
s/Jeffrey M. Bryan
Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan
United States District Court