GERALD THUNELIUS v. JULIA POSACKI
AC 40635
Appellate Court of Connecticut
Argued May 16—officially released October 22, 2019
Lavine, Keller and Bishop, Js.
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Syllabus
The defendant mother appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court awarding the plaintiff father sole legal and primary physical custody of the parties’ minor child and issuing certain orders. The plaintiff had filed an application seeking sole custody of the child, who had been living with the defendant since his birth. The plaintiff also filed motions for pendente lite orders to establish a parenting plan, to appoint a guardian ad litem for the child and for child support. Thereafter, the trial court issued a pendente lite order appointing H as guardian ad litem for the child and accepted the parties’ stipulation regarding pendente lite financial orders. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion seeking to hold the plaintiff in contempt for violating the pendente lite financial orders, and the plaintiff filed a motion to modify his support obligations under the financial orders, claiming a substantial change in circumstances. Following a hearing on the plaintiff‘s application for custody, the trial court found that the plaintiff had rebutted the presumption of joint legal custody and ordered that the plaintiff have sole legal and primary physical custody of the child, with parenting time for the defendant, and that the defendant pay the plaintiff $241 in weekly child support in accordance with the Connecticut child support guidelines. The court also issued a protective order pending any potential appeal to secure the custody award in order to provide a smooth as possible transition for the child. In addition, the court issued orders related to, inter alia, the child‘s education and associated costs, and ordered that H continue to serve as the child‘s guardian ad litem and issued various orders related thereto. The court also granted the plaintiff‘s motion to modify and ordered that the plaintiff‘s child support obligation would terminate on the date when the defendant‘s child support obligation began. The court, however, did not rule on the defendant‘s motion for contempt. On the defendant‘s appeal to this court, held:
- The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly delegated its decision-making authority to a nonjudicial entity when it defined the duties and responsibilities of the guardian ad litem: none of the challenged duties amounted to an improper delegation of the court‘s authority, as the breadth of tasks assigned to the guardian ad litem reflected the court‘s confidence in the commitment and talent of the guardian ad litem, and the court‘s desire to minimize the effect of the parties’ toxic parenting relationship on the child and to discourage them from heedless and incessant litigation over matters that should not require judicial intervention; moreover, contrary to the defendant‘s claim, requiring that the guardian ad litem hold the child‘s passport, monitor the parties’ communications, review the child‘s telephone bill, investigate facts, make recommendations, mediate disputes and testify in court in no way empowered the guardian ad litem to issue orders that affect the parties or the child, and although the court did authorize the guardian ad litem to select a coparenting counselor/coordinator in the absence of an agreement between the parties, any dispute regarding the selection of a coparenting counselor/coordinator reflected little more than a difference of opinion or preference between the parties and did not so implicate the best interests of the child as to require judicial resolution of the matter.
- The trial court abused its discretion in ordering that the prevailing party in any postjudgment dispute between the parties adjudicated by the court after unsuccessful mediation with the guardian ad litem be reimbursed by the other party for his or her share of the guardian ad litem‘s fees; the amount of any future fees and the parties’ respective financial capacities to pay such fees were purely speculative, and there was nothing in the record to guarantee that if any such guardian ad litem fees became due, the respective financial situations of the parties would have remained unchanged.
- The defendant‘s claim that the trial court improperly appointed the guardian ad litem without having complied with certain statutory requirements was moot, that court‘s relevant order having been superseded by subsequent orders of the court that addressed the same issues, and, therefore, there was no practical relief that this court could afford the defendant.
- The trial court did not abuse its discretion in, sua sponte, issuing its protective order: the language of the order clearly indicated that that court intended it to function as a protective order issued pursuant to Yontef v. Yontef (185 Conn. 275) that was meant to ensure an orderly transition that protected the primary interests of the child in a continuous, stable custodial placement, and the court had the inherent authority to issue such an order sua sponte to preserve the parties’ rights during the immediate postjudgment period pending an appeal; moreover, the need for such an order was amply supported by the record, as the court found that there was an extraordinarily high level of conflict and mistrust between the parties, that the parties had been wholly incapable of resolving such conflict, that the parties demonstrated a willingness to disregard court orders and to engage in self-help, and that their behavior had the potential to do irreparable harm to the child.
- The trial court abused its discretion in ordering the parties to enroll the child in private school through high school and to divide the payments for that schooling: although that court did not abuse its discretion in determining that it was appropriate for the child to continue to attend the private school that he had been enrolled in through eighth grade, there was no evidence of the cost of a private high school or that the parties had ever agreed on the child attending a private high school, as the parties’ financial affidavits listed only the cost of the child‘s current attendance at the private school, and the court‘s determination that it lacked sufficient evidence to issue an educational support order for higher education or private occupational school, pursuant to statute (
§ 46b-56c [c] ), supported the notion that the court also lacked sufficient evidence to issue an order for private high school. - The trial court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the child support guidelines worksheet in issuing its child support orders; contrary to the defendant‘s claim, the net income figures contained in the child support guidelines worksheet and relied on by the court were supported in the record.
- This court declined to review the defendant‘s claim that the trial court, by failing to order the plaintiff to reimburse her for certain expenses he allegedly should have paid in accordance with a prior stipulation between the parties, in effect, granted the plaintiff a retroactive modification of pendente lite orders to pay those expenses; because the trial court did not rule on the defendant‘s motion for contempt, and it made no findings or orders in regard to what the defendant alleged the plaintiff owed, there was no retroactive modification from which to appeal, and, therefore, in the absence of a decision on the defendant‘s motion from the trial court or an explanation for its failure to rule on the motion, this court had no basis for reviewing the trial court‘s silence.
Procedural History
Application for custody of the parties’ minor child, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk and tried to the court, Tindill, J.; judgment awarding sole legal and primary physical custody to the plaintiff, and issuing certain orders; thereafter, the court, Heller, J., issued certain orders, and the defendant appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed in part; judgment reversed in part; judgment directed in part.
Alexander J. Cuda, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion
BISHOP, J. In this protracted, high conflict custody and support matter, the defendant mother, Julia Posacki, appeals from the judgment rendered by the trial court following a sixteen day trial on the custody action filed by the plaintiff father, Gerald Thunelius. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) delegated its decision-making authority to the guardian ad litem appointed for the parties’ minor child, (2) ordered that the prevailing party in any postjudgment dispute adjudicated by the court after unsuccessful mediation with the guardian ad litem be reimbursed by the other party for his or her share of the guardian ad litem‘s fees, (3) appointed the guardian ad litem without having complied with the requirements of
The following facts and procedural history are taken from the court‘s memorandum of decision or are part of the record.1 The parties, who never married one another, are the parents of a minor child who was born on November 2, 2010. On April 18, 2012, the plaintiff filed an application seeking sole custody of the child, who had been living with the defendant since his birth. The plaintiff also filed motions for pendente lite orders to establish a parenting plan, to appoint a guardian ad litem for the child, and for child support.
On October 15, 2012, the court, Schofield, J., approved the parties’ pendente lite parenting agreement, pursuant to which the parties were to have joint legal custody of the child, with the defendant having primary physical custody and the plaintiff having parenting time every other weekend and some holidays and vacations. Subsequently, on October 2, 2013, the court, Emons, J., accepted the parties’ stipulation regarding pendente lite financial orders. Pursuant to the pendente lite financial orders, the plaintiff was required to pay the defendant $389 in weekly child support and was required to provide medical and dental insurance for the child if available through his employer. As to the child‘s unreimbursed medical expenses, qualified child care expenses, and tuition and costs for the Whitby School through June, 2014, the plaintiff was responsible for 52 percent, and the defendant was responsible for 48 percent.2
On February 24, 2014, the defendant filed a motion seeking to hold the plaintiff in contempt for violating the pendente lite financial orders. She alleged that the plaintiff had failed and refused to reimburse her for his share of child care costs in the amount of $4309. She further alleged that the plaintiff unilaterally had reenrolled the child at the Whitby School for the 2014–2015 school year without the defendant‘s consent in violation of the pendente lite parenting plan and that he had informed her that he intended to deduct from his child support payments the defendant‘s share of the tuition. The defendant, therefore, requested that the court order the plaintiff to reimburse her for the child care costs, to refrain from making deductions to his child support obligation, and to pay 100 percent of the child‘s tuition for the Whitby School for the 2014–2015 school year. Subsequently, on May 15, 2014, the plaintiff filed a motion to modify his support obligations under the 2013 pendente lite financial orders, citing a substantial change in circumstances.
A trial to the court, Tindill, J., on the plaintiff‘s custody application was conducted over the course of sixteen days between February, 2015 and October, 2016. In her proposed claims for relief filed on September 7, 2016, the defendant sought reimbursement from the plaintiff of $31,586 for child care expenses, $7117 for the child‘s health insurance premiums, $13,361 for tuition at the Whitby School for the 2014–2015 school year, and the plaintiff‘s share of all of the child‘s medical expenses incurred since October 2, 2013.
On June 29, 2017, the court issued a memorandum of decision finding that the plaintiff had rebutted, by a preponderance of the evidence, the presumption of joint legal custody under
As to the child‘s education, the court ordered that the child “shall attend the Whitby School until he completes the [eighth] grade or the parties’ written stipulation to change schools is approved and made an order of the court, whichever occurs first” and that “the parties shall split the cost, beginning the 2017–2018 academic year, of Whitby School or other private school education 56 [percent] (plaintiff) [and] 44 [percent] (defendant) through [twelfth] grade.” The court noted, however, that there was insufficient evidence presented for it to issue an educational support order for the child‘s education beyond high school pursuant to
The court further ordered that Hurwitz “shall continue to serve as guardian ad litem . . . for the minor child until further order of the court.” The court also ordered in relevant part that “[t]he parties shall work to resolve any dispute or conflict regarding the minor child by mediation first with the [guardian ad litem] prior to filing a motion with the court. The cost and fees associated with mediation of postjudgment disputes with the [guardian ad litem] shall be split equally (50/50) by the parents. In the event that a motion is filed and litigated after unsuccessful resolution with the [guardian ad litem] of the dispute or issue regarding the minor child, the party who prevails in court shall be reimbursed his/her 50 [percent] for the [guardian ad litem] fees by the other party within one week of the court order resolving the dispute or issue.” In reappointing Hurwitz as guardian ad litem, the court did not make an express finding that the appointment was in the child‘s best interests as required by
Additionally, the court ordered the parties “to work with Dr. David Bernstein, who shall serve as a coparenting counselor/coordinator, until further order of the court. . . . In the event Dr. Bernstein is not available to work with the parties as a coparenting counselor/coordinator, the [guardian ad litem] shall offer the parties no less than three options for a coparenting counselor/coordinator in writing no later than July 31, 2017. The options presented for the coparenting counselor/coordinator shall be based on the [guardian ad litem‘s] own independent research and work on behalf of her ward . . . . The parties shall notify the [guardian ad litem], in writing, no later than one week from receipt of the options of their choice . . . from the coparenting counselor/coordinator options. In the event the parties do not agree on one of the coparenting counselor/coordinator options, or do not agree in writing within one week (without good cause as determined by [guardian ad litem]), the [guardian ad litem] shall select
The court also ruled on several of the parties’ unresolved motions, including the plaintiff‘s May 15, 2014 motion to modify his pendente lite support obligations. The court granted this motion and ordered that the plaintiff‘s child support obligation would terminate as of July 1, 2017, when the defendant‘s support obligation began. The court did not, however, rule on the defendant‘s February 24, 2014 motion for contempt. Nor did the court make any findings or issue any orders regarding any claimed arrearages. This appeal followed.
I
The defendant first claims that the court improperly delegated its authority to the guardian ad litem when it “defined the duties and responsibilities of the [guardian ad litem] . . . .” We are not persuaded.
“[W]hether the court improperly delegated its judicial authority presents a legal question over which we exercise plenary review.” Zilkha v. Zilkha, 180 Conn. App. 143, 170, 183 A.3d 64, cert. denied, 328 Conn. 937, 183 A.3d 1175 (2018). “It is well settled . . . that [n]o court in this state can delegate its judicial authority to any person serving the court in a nonjudicial function. The court may seek the advice and heed the recommendation contained in the reports of persons engaged by the court to assist it, but in no event may such a nonjudicial entity bind the judicial authority to enter any order or judgment so advised or recommended. . . . A court improperly delegates its judicial authority to [a nonjudicial entity] when that person is given authority to issue orders that affect the parties or the children. Such orders are part of a judicial function that can be done only by one clothed with judicial authority.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kyle S. v. Jayne K., 182 Conn. App. 353, 371–72, 190 A.3d 68 (2018).
The defendant argues that “[t]he court has made the [guardian ad litem] a permanent governmental presence in the life of the child and the parents and has granted [the guardian ad litem] decision-making authority in some of the fundamentals of their parenting.” Specifically, the defendant notes that, pursuant to the court‘s orders, the guardian ad litem is (1) to hold the child‘s passport, (2) to have access to all family communications through OurFamilyWizard,4 (3) to receive copies of the child‘s telephone bill, (4) to investigate facts, (5) to make recommendations as to what is in the child‘s best interests, (6) to mediate the parties’ disputes, (7) to act as final arbiter in the selection of a coparenting counselor/coordinator for the parties, and (8) to testify in court if the parties are unable to resolve a dispute in mediation.5 Contrary to the defendant‘s
Moreover, requiring that the guardian ad litem hold the child‘s passport, monitor the parties’ communications, review the child‘s telephone bill, investigate facts, make recommendations, mediate disputes, and testify in court in no way empowers the guardian ad litem “to issue orders that affect the parties or the [child].” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kyle S. v. Jayne K., supra, 182 Conn. App. 371. Indeed, as recognized by the Judicial Branch in a publication developed pursuant to
In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not improperly delegate its authority to a nonjudicial entity in defining the duties and responsibilities of the guardian ad litem.
II
The defendant also claims that the court improperly ordered that the prevailing party in any postjudgment dispute adjudicated by the court after unsuccessful mediation with the guardian ad litem be reimbursed by the other party for his or her share of the guardian ad litem‘s fees. The defendant argues that this order constitutes an improper delegation of the court‘s authority to decide whether to sanction the parties. The defendant also appears to argue that the order is improper because it provides for automatic sanctions without taking into account the parties’ current financial circumstances or making a finding that the losing party‘s position was totally without color and taken in bad faith. We disagree that this order amounted to an improper delegation of judicial authority8 but agree that it was nevertheless
We first briefly set forth the applicable standard of review. “[J]udicial review of a trial court‘s exercise of its broad discretion in domestic relations cases is limited to the questions of whether the [trial] court correctly applied the law and could reasonably have concluded as it did. . . . In making those determinations, [this court] allow[s] every reasonable presumption . . . in favor of the correctness of [the trial court‘s] action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pena v. Gladstone, 168 Conn. App. 141, 149, 144 A.3d 1085 (2016).
In our assessment of this claim, we start with the oft-stated proposition that “[i]t is well entrenched in our jurisprudence that Connecticut adheres to the American rule. . . . Under the American rule, a party cannot recover [attorney‘s] fees in the absence of statutory authority or a contractual provision.” (Citation omitted.) Doe v. State, 216 Conn. 85, 106, 579 A.2d 37 (1990). Additionally, the scope of the American Rule extends beyond the payment of counsel fees and encompasses ordinary expenses and the burdens of litigation as well. ACMAT Corp. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 576, 582, 923 A.2d 697 (2007). On the basis of our decisional law, we believe that the theory and thrust of the American Rule pertains to the assignment of fees and costs in the family law context as well. In that context and as it applies to the question at hand, “[t]he court may order either party to pay the fees for [a] guardian ad litem . . . pursuant to
“The statutory authority for the award of fees for a court-appointed guardian ad litem is found in
Id., 377; see id., 377–78 (reversing order for allocation of future guardian ad litem fees to be paid 80 percent by plaintiff and 20 percent by defendant).
The order at issue in the present case provides in relevant part: “In the event that a motion is filed and litigated after unsuccessful resolution with the [guardian ad litem] of the dispute or issue regarding the minor child, the party who prevails in court shall be reimbursed his/her 50 [percent] for the [guardian ad litem] fees by the other party within one week of the court order resolving the dispute or issue.”10 In other words, the court ordered that 100 percent of any future guardian ad litem fees be paid by whichever party loses in court following an unsuccessful mediation.11 As in Lamacchia v. Chilinsky, supra, 79 Conn. App. 377–78, the amount of any future fees and the parties’ respective financial capacities to pay such fees are purely speculative, and there is nothing in the record to guarantee that if any such guardian ad litem fees become due, the respective financial situations of the parties will have remained unchanged. We conclude, therefore, that the court abused its discretion in issuing this order.
III
The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly appointed the guardian ad litem without having complied with certain statutory requirements. More specifically, the defendant contends that the court violated (1)
The following additional procedural history is relevant to this issue. Following the rendering of the June 29, 2017 judgment from which the defendant appeals, the trial court treated the portion of the judgment relating to the guardian ad litem as automatically stayed by operation of
Following the hearing, on June 11, 2018, the court, pursuant to
On July 27, 2018, the defendant filed a motion requesting that the court issue a subsequent order that included the information required by
“Mootness implicates [the] court‘s subject matter jurisdiction and is thus a threshold matter for us to resolve. . . . It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction;
In the present case, Judge Heller‘s 2018 orders addressed the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the parties’ child for a period of time postjudgment, the same issue decided by Judge Tindill in her June 29, 2017 order. Consequently, Judge Tindill‘s order has been superseded and is no longer in effect.17 Thus, we conclude that there is no practical relief that this court can afford the defendant, and, therefore, this portion of the defendant‘s appeal is moot. See Santos v. Morrissey, 127 Conn. App. 602, 605–606, 14 A.3d 1064 (2011) (appeal from custody and visitation order was moot because it was superseded by subsequent order addressing same issues); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 109 Conn. App. 591, 599–600, 952 A.2d 115 (2008) (plaintiff‘s appeal from visitation order rendered moot by subsequent order expanding amount of time and circumstances under which plaintiff could visit his children).
IV
The defendant next claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it issued a protective order without finding that there had been any domestic violence by either party or that the minor child had been abused or neglected, and without making it clear when the protective order would expire or what conduct would constitute a violation of the order. In short, the defendant equates the court‘s protective order with protective orders in cases of family violence.18 See
“An order of the court will be affirmed if it is legally correct and finds support in its factual findings. It will be overturned only on a showing of abuse of the court‘s discretion.” Lane v. Lane, 84 Conn. App. 651, 654, 854 A.2d 815 (2004). “[I]t is axiomatic that a judge has the ability to issue interim orders. . . . Our Supreme Court has expressly affirmed the necessity of interim orders in the best interests of children in dissolution proceedings. Yontef v. Yontef, [supra, 185 Conn. 293–94].” (Citation omitted.) Lane v. Lane, supra, 654.
In Yontef, our Supreme Court noted that pendente lite custody orders do not survive the rendition of a judgment and that the judgment itself, being automatically stayed by operation of Practice Book (1981) § 306519 (now
More specifically, the court stated: “In the interest of minimizing the emotional trauma so often imposed upon the children of divorce, a trial court should, at or before the time of its judgment, inquire whether its custody order is apt to be acceptable to the parties or is apt to be further litigated upon appeal. If an appeal appears likely, the court should enter whatever interim postjudgment order it deems most appropriate, in the exercise of its broad discretion, taking into consideration the needs of the minor children for continuity, stability and well-being as well as the need of the parent who appeals for a fair opportunity fully to present his or her case. These legitimate needs are not, in all probability, apt to be protected if dissatisfied parties are able to intervene unilaterally, without judicial supervision, to effect changes in custody pending appeal. A court exercising its equitable jurisdiction with regard to custody has the duty to assure itself that its judgment will be implemented equitably to serve the best interests of the children for the near as well as for the more distant future.” Id., 293–94.
The order at issue in the present case, which was issued as part of the court‘s June 29, 2017 memorandum of decision, provides: “The [p]laintiff . . . shall have sole legal custody of the minor child. Given the likelihood of appeal, the [c]ourt, sua sponte, hereby enters a protective order
The language of this order makes clear that the trial court intended it to function as a Yontef-type protective order meant “to ensure an orderly transition that protects the primary interests of the children in a continuous, stable custodial placement.” Yontef v. Yontef, supra, 185 Conn. 291–92. As recognized in Yontef, the court had the inherent authority to issue such an order sua sponte to preserve the parties’ rights during the immediate postjudgment period pending an appeal. See id., 292 (“[a]lthough there is no express statutory authority for a trial court to enter postjudgment orders, this court has recognized the inherent authority of a court to preserve rights pending an appeal“). Moreover, the need for such an order is amply supported by the record. In its memorandum of decision, the court found that there is an “extraordinarily high level of conflict and mistrust between the [parties],” that “the parties have been wholly incapable of [resolving such conflict],” that the parties “demonstrate a willingness to disregard court orders and engage in self-help,” and that the parties’ behavior “has the potential to do irreparable harm to the minor child.” (Emphasis in original.) In these circumstances, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a Yontef protective order.20
V
The defendant next claims that the court improperly ordered the parties to enroll the child in private school through high school and to divide the payments for that schooling. Specifically, the defendant argues that the order stating that the child continue in the Whitby School through
In its memorandum of decision, the trial court issued the following order in regard to the child‘s education: “The minor child shall attend the Whitby School until he completes the [eighth] grade or the parties’ written stipulation to change schools is approved and made an order of the [c]ourt, whichever occurs first. . . . The parties shall split the cost, beginning the 2017–2018 academic year, of Whitby School or other private school education 56 [percent] (plaintiff) [and] 44 [percent] (defendant) through [twelfth] grade.”
“[C]ourts have the power to direct one or both parents to pay for private schooling, if the circumstances warrant. It is a matter to be determined in the sound discretion of the court on consideration of the totality of the circumstances including the financial ability of the parties, the availability of public schools, the schools attended by the children prior to the divorce and the special needs and general welfare of the children.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carroll v. Carroll, 55 Conn. App. 18, 24, 737 A.2d 963 (1999). In addition, “the right of the custodial parent to make educational choices is . . . an insufficient basis, absent a showing of special need or some other compelling justification, for increasing the support obligation of the noncustodial parent who genuinely doubts the value of the program that he [or she] is being asked to underwrite.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 25.
We first address the defendant‘s argument that there was no evidence that continuing to send the child to the Whitby School was appropriate. Both parties in their proposed claims for relief supported the notion that the child could continue to attend the Whitby School or some other private school, but simply disagreed on who should pay for such education. In addition, the court had evidence of the cost of the Whitby School through the parties’ financial affidavits. Moreover, the court, in its findings, made the following determination: “The child has adjusted well to his home, school, and community environments. There is credible evidence before the [c]ourt that the school in which the child is currently enrolled has been a stabilizing factor amidst the parents’ prolonged legal battle. Other than his parents’ conflict, his school environment has been a steadfast, reliable element in his short life.” Thus, the record reflects that the court considered the totality of the circumstances in making its determination of whether it was appropriate for the child to continue to attend the Whitby School, including the cost for both parties as well as the benefit that the school has had on the child. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in this regard.
Turning to the defendant‘s argument in regard to the cost of high school, we agree with the defendant that there was no evidence of the cost of a private high school or that the parties had ever agreed on the child attending a private high school. As previously discussed, the parties’ financial affidavits list only the cost of the child‘s current attendance at the Whitby School. In addition, although the plaintiff‘s amended proposed claims for relief states that the parties shall equally pay the cost of private school through high
VI
The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly relied on unsupported net income figures contained in the child support guidelines worksheet prepared by the Judicial Branch in issuing its child support orders. In particular, the defendant claims that the net income figures relied on by the court in the child support guidelines worksheet were different from the figures shown in the parties’ financial affidavits and trial testimony, and, therefore, were unsupported by the evidence. In response, the plaintiff argues that the court may refuse to consider this issue because the defendant failed to raise it in her preliminary statement of issues. The plaintiff alleges that this failure prejudiced him because he is now foreclosed from timely filing a motion for articulation to help address his defense of the child support orders.22 The plaintiff also argues that the court had sufficient evidence on which to base its child support orders and
We review the trial court‘s application of the child support guidelines under an abuse of discretion standard. See Tuckman v. Tuckman, 308 Conn. 194, 208, 61 A.3d 449 (2013) (court concluded that trial court had abused its discretion in awarding child support “without determining the net income of the parties, mentioning or applying the guidelines, or making a specific finding on the record as to why it was deviating from the guidelines“).
The defendant does not identify any finding that indicates that the court‘s application was inequitable or inappropriate but, rather, alleges that the resulting child support orders were inconsistent with the evidence in the record. Contrary to the defendant‘s argument, however, the evidence supports the figures enumerated in the court‘s child support guidelines worksheet. The defendant testified that she has a gross weekly income of $2885 and a net weekly income of $1712, which match the figures listed in her financial affidavit. The defendant also testified that, in addition to her salary, she could receive a discretionary bonus as well as a retention performance based on her production and subject to her employment agreement, and that she was due to receive a forgivable loan from her new employer, which would compensate her for the deferred equity compensation she gave up when she left her prior employer. Moreover, the defendant testified that she deducts $132 per week from her gross weekly income for deferred compensation or 401 (k), which is also shown on her financial affidavit. The addition of $132 per week to her gross weekly income of $2885 equals $3017, which matches the amount set forth in the court‘s child support guidelines worksheet. As such, the net income figures contained in the child support guidelines worksheet and relied on by the court are supported in the record.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the child support guidelines worksheet in issuing its child support orders.
VII
Finally, the defendant claims that by not ordering the plaintiff to reimburse her for certain expenses she alleges he should have paid in accordance with an ear-lier stipulation between them, the trial court, in effect, granted the plaintiff a retroactive modification of pendente lite orders to pay those expenses. We decline to review the defendant‘s claim.
Unlike the present custody and support action, in a marital dissolution case, pendente lite orders merge with the judgment and, therefore, have no vitality postjudgment. Parrotta v. Parrotta, 119 Conn. App. 472, 479, 988 A.2d 383 (2010). The present case, however, is not one for a marital dissolution; rather, it is a series of orders made by the court in response to multiple filings regarding a range of issues
The appeal is dismissed with respect to the defendant‘s third claim, the judgment is reversed with respect to the court‘s orders that (1) the prevailing party in any postjudgment dispute adjudicated by the court after unsuccessful mediation with the guardian ad litem be reimbursed by the other party for his or her share of the guardian ad litem‘s fees and (2) the parties enroll the child in private school through high school and share the payments for that schooling, and the case is remanded with direction to vacate those orders; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
BISHOP, J.