Thomson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.Thomson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.
Rendered on February 9, 2010
Michael Thomson, pro se.
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, and Ashley D. Rutherford, for appellees.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
BRYANT, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Michael Thomson, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion of defendants-appellees, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC“), Terry Collins, the Director of ODRC, and Carl Anderson, Warden of Toledo Correctional Institution (together, “defendants“), to dismiss plaintiff‘s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Because the trial court did not err (1) in dismissing plaintiff‘s complaint in
I. Procedural History
{¶2} On July 16, 2008, plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and preliminary injunction against defendants. Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated at Toledo Correctional Institution at the time he filed his complaint, sought a judgment declaring defendants violated his constitutional and statutory rights by recommending he be removed from protective control. Plaintiff further challenged as unconstitutional ODRC‘s procedures for placement in and removal from protective control, including the review process afforded inmates following notice of defendants’ intention to remove an inmate from protective control. Lastly, plaintiff‘s complaint sought a preliminary injunction ordering ODRC to maintain his protective control classification for the duration of the lawsuit. On August 19, 2008, plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO“) to prevent defendants from discharging him from protective control.
{¶3} On August 20, 2008, defendants filed a
II. Assignments of Error
{¶4} Plaintiff appeals, assigning four errors:
- The Court Erred in Determining Appellant was not in Imminent Danger of Being Removed from Protective Custody.
- The Court Erred by not Affording Appellant with a Hearing on the Preliminary Injunction and Motion(s) for a Temporary Restraining Order.
- The Court Erred by Failing to Address Appellant‘s Issues as Raised in His Complaint for Adjudication.
- The Court Erred in Neglecting to Grant Appellant‘s Motions to Compel and Award of Sanctions.
III. First and Third Assignments of Error – Motion to Dismiss
{¶5} In his first and third assignments of error, plaintiff asserts the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff argues a review of the merits of his complaint demonstrates the trial court erroneously determined plaintiff was not in imminent danger of being removed from protective control.
{¶6} “When reviewing a judgment granting a
{¶7} “In order to sustain dismissal of a complaint under
A. Declaratory Relief Claim
{¶8} ODRC originally assigned plaintiff to the protective control unit in 1994. Plaintiff‘s complaint states that during his time in protective control, he learned he suffers from Asperger‘s Syndrome, a “distinct form of autism.” (Complaint, 3.) Plaintiff‘s complaint asserts his Asperger‘s Syndrome, coupled with his physical stature and appearance, subject him to an “increased risk” of sexual victimization and exploitation. (Complaint, 4, 8.) His complaint, in part, sought a declaration that he could not be removed from protective control.
{¶9} A declaratory judgment action is a civil action that provides a remedy in addition to other legal and equitable remedies available. Aust v. Ohio State Dental Bd. (2000), 136 Ohio App.3d 677, 681. “The essential elements for declaratory relief are (1) a
{¶10} Inherent in determining whether a complaint sets forth a justiciable issue is the question of ripeness. Ripeness is “a question of timing.” State ex rel. Elyria Foundry Co. v. Indus. Comm., 82 Ohio St.3d 88, 89, 1998-Ohio-366, quoting Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases (1974), 419 U.S. 102, 140, 95 S.Ct. 335. “The ripeness doctrine seeks to prevent courts from engaging in premature adjudication.” Johnson v. Ferguson-Ramos, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-1180, 2005-Ohio-3280, ¶22, citing Elyria Foundry Co. at 89. Premature claims are not justiciable, so trial courts lack jurisdiction to review them. Id., citing Stewart v. Stewart (1999), 134 Ohio App.3d 556, 558, quoting Section 4(B), Article IV, Ohio Constitution.
{¶11} Defendants contend plaintiff‘s complaint was not yet ripe for review, as plaintiff‘s complaint neither alleged plaintiff had been removed from protective control nor
{¶12} Initially, plaintiff‘s argument misapprehends the nature of a
{¶13} Secondly, as plaintiff‘s complaint suggests, the Ohio Administrative Code provides a procedure for dealing with the substance of plaintiff‘s complaint.
{¶14} Under the provisions of the rule, the warden may recommend an inmate be removed from protective control based on his own interview or based on the findings of the reclassification committee.
{¶15} On November 30, 2007, the acting warden of Toledo Correctional Institution recommended plaintiff‘s discharge from protective control and his placement in the general population. Plaintiff appealed the recommendation to the Bureau of Classification on December 4, 2007. At the time plaintiff filed his complaint in the common pleas court, the Bureau of Classification had not made a final determination regarding plaintiff‘s continued placement in protective control, making plaintiff‘s challenge of his possible removal premature. Leslie v. Ohio Dept. of Dev., 171 Ohio App.3d 55, 2007-Ohio-1170,
{¶16} Moreover,
{¶18} Plaintiff‘s complaint also sought a declaration that
{¶19} The common law rule in Ohio requiring that administrative remedies be exhausted before declaratory relief is sought arguably does not apply to plaintiff‘s complaint where the constitutionality of a statute or rule is involved. Leslie, supra; Fairview Gen. Hosp. v. Fletcher (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 146, 149-50 (concluding that because no constitutional claims were involved, declaratory relief was unnecessary until
{¶20} Contrary to the language of the statute, plaintiff did not allow the administrative review procedure to be completed before bringing his constitutional challenge. See Baksi v. Mitchell (C.A.6., 2000), 211 F.3d 1268 (concluding
{¶21} Accordingly, the declaratory relief aspects of plaintiff‘s first and third assignments of error are unpersuasive.
B. Injunctive Relief Claim
{¶22} Plaintiff‘s complaint also seeks injunctive relief. According to the complaint, plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction pending the outcome of his request for declaratory relief. Plaintiff‘s complaint does not assert he was about to be released from protective control during the pendency of the administrative review.
{¶23} “In deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction, a court must look at: (1) whether there is a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the merits, (2) whether plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) whether third parties will be unjustifiably harmed if the injunction is granted, and (4) whether the
{¶24} The primary goal of preliminary injunctive relief “is to preserve the status quo pending final determination of the matter.” Ohio Urology, Inc. v. Poll (1991), 72 Ohio App.3d 446, 454; Dunkelman v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 158 Ohio App.3d 604, 2004-Ohio-6425, ¶45 (noting the “purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo of the parties pending a decision on the merits“). Here, nothing in plaintiff‘s complaint asserts he will lose protective control status pending the outcome of the administrative review. Based on the allegations of plaintiff‘s complaint, no injunctive relief is needed to preserve the status quo while the administrative review process resolves plaintiff‘s protective control status.
{¶25} Moreover,
C. ADA Claim
{¶26} Plaintiff also contends the trial court erred in not addressing his assertion that defendants’ refusal to allow him to present evidence of his Asperger‘s Syndrome during his Protective Control Review Committee hearing violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA“). In order to state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a prisoner must allege: “(1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that defendants are subject to the ADA; and (3) that plaintiff was denied the opportunity to participate or benefit from defendants’ services, programs, or activities or was otherwise discriminated against by defendants, by reason of plaintiff‘s disability.” Hoepf v. Parks (S.D.Ohio, 2006), No. 1:05CV314, quoting Toney v. Goord (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2006), No. 04-CV-1174. Apart from any other deficiencies plaintiff‘s ADA allegations may suffer, plaintiff‘s complaint fails to assert he was denied protective control, the requested accommodation: the administrative review had yet to determine whether plaintiff would be removed from protective control. The trial court thus did not err in dismissing his claim under the ADA for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
{¶27} For the stated reasons, we overrule plaintiff‘s first and third assignments of error.
IV. Second Assignment of Error – Hearings for Preliminary Injunction and TRO
{¶28} Plaintiff next asserts the trial court erred in not affording him a hearing on either his requests for a TRO or a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff argues that because
{¶29}
{¶30} Plaintiff‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
V. Fourth Assignment of Error – Motion to Compel and Sanctions
{¶31} In his fourth and final assignment of error, plaintiff asserts the trial court erred in failing to grant his motions to compel discovery and for an award of sanctions for defendants’ failure to comply with an order compelling discovery.
{¶32} We review the trial court‘s resolution of discovery matters under an abuse-of-discretion standard. State ex rel. Keller v. Columbus, 164 Ohio App.3d 648, 2005-Ohio-6500, ¶39, citing State ex rel. The V Cos. v. Marshall (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 467, 469 (noting that, absent an abuse of discretion, an appellate court must affirm a trial
{¶33} Here, plaintiff filed his motion for an order compelling discovery on September 12, 2008, after defendants filed an August 21, 2008 motion to stay discovery pending the resolution of their August 20, 2008 motion to dismiss. On November 24, 2008, the trial court granted defendants’ motion to stay discovery. Pursuant to Watley, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendants’ motion to stay discovery and in denying plaintiff‘s motion to compel discovery.
{¶34} Additionally, an appellate court will not disturb on appeal the trial court‘s decision whether or not to grant an award of sanctions absent an abuse of discretion. Toney v. Berkemer (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 455, 458 (noting ”
{¶35} In the final analysis, the trial court did not err in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, as plaintiff‘s complaint did not assert a justiciable claim for declaratory relief or the factual predicate for injunctive relief. Because the allegations of his claim for injunctive relief were insufficient, the trial court did not err in not affording plaintiff a hearing on either his request for a TRO or a preliminary injunction. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in staying discovery pending disposition of defendants’ motion to dismiss and, in light of that ruling, denying plaintiff‘s motions to compel discovery and for award of sanctions. Having overruled plaintiff‘s four assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
SADLER and McGRATH, JJ., concur.
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