JONATHAN THOMPSON, ET AL Plaintiffs-Appellees -vs- BUCKEYE JOINT VOCATIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL Defendants-Appellants
Case No. 2015 AP 08 0047
COURT OF APPEALS TUSCARAWAS COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
April 29, 2016
[Cite as Thompson v. Buckeye Joint Vocational School Dist., 2016-Ohio-2804.]
Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, P.J.; Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J.; Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from the Tuscarawas County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2015 CT 04 0218; JUDGMENT: Affirmed in part; Reversed and Remanded in part
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiffs-Appellees: STACIE ROTH, The Carnegie Building, 236 Third Street SW, Canton, OH 44702
For Defendants-Appellants: MATTHEW MARKLING, PATRICK VROBEL, 1894 North Cleveland-Massillon Road, Akron, OH 44333
O P I N I O N
{¶1} Appellants appeal the July 20, 2015 judgment entry of the Tuscarawas County Court of Common Pleas overruling their motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Facts & Procedural History
{¶2} On April 13, 2015, appellees J.T., a minor child, and Tim and Karen Thompson, as natural guardians of J.T., filed a complaint against Buckeye Joint Vocational School District (“BJVSD“), Buckeye
{¶3} The complaint states J.T. was a student enrolled in a landscaping course taught by Davis. Further, J.T. was being harassed, tormented, and threatened by fellow student Altier. Because of the threats, harassment, and/or torment, J.T.‘s parents met with Davis and expressed their concern. Davis told them he would monitor Altier and ensure J.T.‘s safety. The complaint states Davis took no further action to report Altier‘s behavior to the property entities or individuals.
{¶4} The complaint alleges in April of 2013, Davis transported students, including J.T. and Altier, to his private residence and instructed them to landscape his yard, lawn, and curtilage. Further, that Davis recklessly and with wanton disregard, left the students unattended for a significant period of time. During this time, Altier attacked, battered, and physically assaulted J.T., fracturing his skull and resulting in permanent injuries and damages.
{¶5} In their first, second, and third causes of action, appellees allege assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Altier. In their fourth cause of action, appellees allege reckless supervision. The complaint states the defendants had a duty to exercise reasonable supervision and control over their employees and students to avoid injuries to students. Further, that defendants, acting in their individual and official capacities, breached this duty by recklessly and with wanton disregard failing to exercise reasonable supervision and control over Altier and in allowing Davis to transport students to his private residence notwithstanding prior knowledge of Altier‘s propensity to be violent towards J.T.
{¶6} In their fifth cause of action, appellees allege failure to report child abuse pursuant to
{¶7} After the defendants filed answers to the complaint, BJVSD, BCC, their boards of education, and Davis filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing they were immune from liability. Appellees filed a memorandum contra on June 5, 2015 and appellants filed a reply brief on June 18, 2015.
{¶8} The trial court issued a judgment entry on July 20, 2015. The trial court found the Buckeye appellants and Davis are generally immune from liability. However, the trial court found appellees alleged sufficient facts that, if true, may create an exception to this liability pursuant to {¶9} Appellants appeal the July 20, 2015 judgment entry of the Tuscarawas County Court of Common Pleas and assign the following as error: {¶10} “I. THE TUSCARAWAS COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS BUCKEYE JOINT VOCATIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, BUCKEYE JOINT VOCATIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, BUCKEYE CAREER CENTER, AND BUCKEYE CAREER CENTER BOARD OF EDUCATION THE BENEFITS OF STATUTORY IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY UNDER {¶11} “II. THE TUSCARAWAS COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT JOHN DAVIS THE BENEFITS OF STATUTORY IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY UNDER {¶12} “III. THE TUSCARAWAS COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ERRED IN FAILING TO DETERMINE THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT JOHN DAVIS HAS BEEN SUED IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY ONLY.” {¶13} Generally, a judgment overruling a motion for judgment on the pleadings is not a final appealable order. Paul C. Harger Trust v. Morrow County Regional Planning Commission, 5th Dist. Morrow No. 03-CA-19, 2004-Ohio-6643. However, {¶14} Motions for judgment on the pleadings are governed by Civil Rule 12(C), which provides: “After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Pursuant to Civil Rule 12(C), dismissal is only appropriate where a court (1) construes the material allegations in the complaint, with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in favor of the nonmoving party as true, and (2) finds beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious, 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 664 N.E.2d 9331 (1996). {¶15} Our appellate standard of review on a Civil Rule 12(C) motion is de novo. Columbus v. Sanders, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 11 CAE 05 0047, 2012-Ohio-1514. Under a de novo analysis, we must accept all factual allegations of the complaint as true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Kramer v. Installations Unlimited, 147 Ohio App.3d 350, 2002-Ohio-1844, 770 N.E.2d 632 (5th Dist.). {¶16} Appellants first argue the trial court erred in denying the Buckeye appellants immunity from liability under Chapter 2744. We agree. {¶18} Pursuant to {¶19} However, if one of the exceptions outlined in * * * a political subdivision is liable for injury, death, or loss to person or property when civil liability is expressly imposed upon the political subdivision by a section of the Revised Code, including, but not limited to, sections 2743.02 and 5591.37 of the Revised Code. Civil liability shall not be construed to exist under another section of the Revised Code merely because that section imposes a responsibility or mandatory duty upon a political subdivision, because that section provides for a criminal penalty, because of a general authorization in that section that a political subdivision may sue or be sued, or because that section uses the term “shall” in a provision pertaining to a political subdivision. {¶20} When interpreting statutes, we must give words their ordinary and natural meaning unless a different interpretation appears in the statute. Layman v. Woo, 78 Ohio St.3d 485, 678 N.E.2d 1217 (1997). The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the term “expressly” as used under {¶21} In this case, {¶22} Since “political subdivision” or “board of education” is not included in {¶23} The Buckeye appellants finally argue {¶24} Appellants’ first assignment of error is sustained. {¶25} In their second assignment of error, appellants argue the trial court erred in denying Davis immunity under {¶26} The three-tiered analysis of liability applicable to a political subdivision does not apply when determining whether an employee of the political subdivision will be liable for harm caused to an individual. Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 113 Ohio St.3d 266, 2007-Ohio-1946, 865 N.E.2d 9. Instead, a court must utilize {¶27} {¶28} The trial court found, in construing the allegations in a light most favorable to appellees, there were sufficient facts from which, if proven, from which a reasonable person could find Davis acted in a wanton or reckless manner. We agree. {¶29} “Wanton misconduct” is the failure to exercise any care toward those to whom a duty of care is owed in circumstances in which there is great probability harm will result. Anderson v. Massillon, 134 Ohio St.3d 380, 2012-Ohio-5711, 983 N.E.2d 266. “Reckless conduct” is defined as being characterized by the conscious disregard of or indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm to another that is unreasonable under the circumstances and is substantially greater than negligent conduct. Id. {¶30} In their complaint, appellees alleged that: Tim and Karen Thompson met with Davis and expressed their concern to him about Altier‘s harassment and torment of J.T.; Davis told them he would monitor Altier to ensure J.T.‘s safety; Davis took no further action to report this harassment and threats; and Davis acted recklessly and with wanton disregard in failing to exercise reasonable supervision over Altier when he transported students to his private residence and left the students unattended for a significant period of time notwithstanding his prior knowledge of Altier‘s propensity to be violent and aggressive to J.T. {¶31} Appellants argue the complaint fails to allege facts to demonstrate Davis acted in a wanton or reckless manner. We recognize appellees’ obligation “to provide the grounds for their entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Schaad v. Buckeye Valley Local School District Bd. of Education, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 15 CAE 08 0063, 2016-Ohio-569, quoting Parsons v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93523, 2010-Ohio-266. However, “because Ohio is a notice-pleading state, the plaintiff need not prove his or her case at the pleading stage.” Id., quoting Scott v. Columbus Dept. of Pub. Utils., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-391, 2011-Ohio-677. Furthermore, issues regarding whether an actor‘s conduct was wanton or reckless are generally for the jury to decide. Id. {¶32} Upon review and construing the allegations of the complaint as true and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to appellees, we find appellees at this stage have sufficiently alleged, at minimum, that appellees engaged in wanton or reckless conduct. {¶33} The trial court also found appellees alleged sufficient facts that, if true, may create an exception to Davis’ immunity pursuant to {¶34} When interpreting statutes, we must give words their ordinary and natural meaning unless a different interpretation appears in the statute. Layman v. Woo, 78 Ohio St.3d 485, 678 N.E.2d 1217 (1997). The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the term “expressly” as used under {¶35} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the use of the term “person” {¶36} In their complaint, appellees assert their claims against Davis “individually and/or his official capacity as teacher.” Appellees further aver that Davis, acting as a school employee, owed a statutory duty pursuant to {¶37} Appellants’ second assignment of error is overruled. {¶38} In their third assignment of error, appellants argue the trial court erred in failing to determine that Davis had been sued in his official capacity only. We disagree. {¶39} Appellants maintain that generally, under {¶40} Our review of the record indicates the original complaint does contain specific language to denote appellant Davis is being sued in his individual capacity. The caption of the complaint lists Davis “individually, and/or in his official capacity as a teacher” and, in paragraph eight of the complaint, appellees allege that “at all times relevant herein, defendant John Davis (“Defendant Davis“) was a person acting individually and/or within the course and scope of his employment as a teacher with Defendants.” Furthermore, the request for punitive damages suggests Davis is being sued as an individual as well, as punitive damages cannot be awarded against a political subdivision performing a governmental function. Schaad v. Buckeye Valley Local School District Board of Education, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 15 CAE 08 0063, 2016-Ohio-569. {¶41} Finally, in {¶42} Appellants’ third assignment of error is overruled. {¶43} Based on the foregoing, we sustain appellants’ first assignment of error and overrule appellants’ second and third assignments of error. The July 20, 2015 judgment entry of the Tuscarawas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. By Gwin, J., and Delaney, J., concur Farmer, P.J., dissents Farmer, P.J., dissents {¶44} I respectfully dissent from the majority‘s view that (A)(1)(a) No person described in division (A)(1)(b) of this section who is acting in an official or professional capacity and knows, or has reasonable cause to suspect based on facts that would cause a reasonable person in a similar position to suspect, that a child under eighteen years of age or a mentally retarded, developmentally disabled, or physically impaired child under twenty-one years of age has suffered or faces a threat of suffering any physical or mental wound, injury, disability, or condition of a nature that reasonably indicates abuse or neglect of the child shall fail to immediately report that knowledge or reasonable cause to suspect to the entity or persons specified in this division.*** {¶45} Within (A) Is the victim of “sexual activity” as defined under (B) Is endangered as defined in (C) Exhibits evidence of any physical or mental injury or death, inflicted other than by accidental means, or an injury or death which is at variance with the history given of it. Except as provided in division (D) of this section, a child exhibiting evidence of corporal punishment or other physical disciplinary measure by a parent, guardian, custodian, person having custody or control, or person in loco parentis of a child is not an abused child under this division if the measure is not prohibited under {¶46} I fail to find the harassment or threats of one minor against another minor is contemplated by {¶47} I would find the trial court erred in not dismissing the fifth cause of action against appellant Davis.Appellate Court Jurisdiction
Civil Rule 12(C)
I.
II.
Civil Liability - R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(c)
III.