ERIC SCHAAD, et al. v. BUCKEYE VALLEY LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD of EDUCATION, et al.
Case No. 15 CAE 08 0063
COURT OF APPEALS DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
February 12, 2016
2016-Ohio-569
Hon. John W. Wise, P. J., Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J., Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 14 CVC 110831. JUDGMENT: Affirmed.
For Plaintiffs-Appellees
SHAKEBA DUBOSE
THE DUBOSE LAW FIRM LLC
20 South Third Street
Suite 210
Columbus, Ohio 43215
For Defendant-Appellant Spencer
MATTHEW JOHN MARKLING
PATRICK VROBEL
SEAN KORAN
MCGOWN & MARKLING CO., LPA
1894 North Cleveland-Massillon Road
Akron, Ohio 44333
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Jason Spencer appeals the decision of the Court of Common Pleas, Delaware County, which granted in part and denied in part his
{¶2} Appellant Spencer is a middle school principal in the Buckeye Valley Local school system. Appellees Eric and Trish Schaad are the parents of the minor child L.S., who at the times pertinent to this case was a Buckeye Valley Local student. According to appellees’ complaint, in early August 2014, appellees met with appellant, along with two other school officials (a Buckeye Valley district administrator and a case manager), in order to develop a “504 Intervention Plan,” which would set forth accommodations to be implemented by the school for L.S., who had recently undergone back surgery. During the meeting, appellees allegedly presented the school representatives with school excuse/accommodation form issued on July 23, 2014 by Dr. Walter Samora of Nationwide Children‘s Hospital, Department of Orthopedic Surgery. According to appellees, on or about August 12, 2014, also for purposes of the 504 Intervention Plan, L.S. was issued a second school excuse/accommodation form that included the same restrictions set forth in the July 23, 2014 form regarding L.S.‘s physical activity while at school, as well as accommodations to be provided to L.S. by Buckeye Valley while at school. The 504 Intervention Plan was to take effect at the start of the school year, i.e., in mid-August 2014.
{¶4} On November 14, 2014, appellees filed a complaint in Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, raising claims against the Buckeye Valley Local School District, Appellant Spencer, Nationwide Children‘s Hospital, and Danielle D. Greco.
{¶5} On December 11, 2014, Buckeye Valley and appellant filed an answer to the appellees’ complaint.
{¶6} On January 20, 2015, Buckeye Valley and appellant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings (
{¶7} On January 30, 2015, appellees voluntarily dismissed Buckeye Valley, i.e., the school district itself, from the lawsuit. Furthermore, on February 6, 2015, appellees filed an amended complaint, naming the Buckeye Valley Local School District Board of Education (“Board“) as a party to the lawsuit.
{¶8} On February 13, 2015, the Board and appellant filed an answer to the amended complaint, as well as a second motion for judgment on the pleadings on immunity grounds.
{¶10} Appellant solely filed a notice of appeal on August 6, 2015, regarding the portion of the July 20, 2015 judgment entry denying his motion for judgment on the pleadings. He herein raises the following two Assignments of Error:
{¶11} “I. THE DELAWARE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT JASON SPENCER THE BENEFITS OF STATUTORY IMMUNITY UNDER
{¶12} “II. THE DELAWARE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ERRED IN FAILING TO DETERMINE THAT PRINCIPAL SPENCER HAS BEEN SUED IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY ONLY.”
{¶13} In his First Assignment of Error, appellant contends the trial court erred in finding he was not fully protected by the statutory immunities provided in
Appellate Court Jurisdiction
{¶14} As an initial matter, because the judgment entry under appeal is, at least in part, a denial of a
{¶15} Accordingly, we will proceed to the merits of the present appeal. See, also, Rucker v. Village of Newburgh Hts., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89487, 2008-Ohio-910, ¶ 3 (holding that a village‘s appeal of the denial of its 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings, which had invoked
{¶16} Motions for judgment on the pleadings are governed by
{¶17} Pursuant to
{¶18} Our appellate standard of review on a
{¶19}
{¶20} “In addition to any immunity or defense referred to in division (A)(7) of this section and in circumstances not covered by that division or sections
{¶21} “(a) The employee‘s acts or omissions were manifestly outside the scope of the employee‘s employment or official responsibilities;
{¶22} “(b) The employee‘s acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner;
{¶23} “(c) Civil liability is expressly imposed upon the employee by a section of the
{¶24} “Bad faith” has been defined as a “dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, conscious wrongdoing, breach of a known duty through some ulterior motive or ill will partaking of the nature of fraud.” Zieber v. Heffelfinger, 5th Dist. Richland No. 08CA0042, 2009-Ohio-1227, ¶ 49, quoting Jackson v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Cty. Commrs. (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 448, 454, 602 N.E.2d 363, 367 (additional citations and internal quotations omitted). “Bad faith” has also been defined as “[t]he opposite of ‘good faith,’ generally implying or involving actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, * * * not prompted by an honest mistake as to one‘s rights or duties, but by some interested or sinister motive.” Hicks v. Leffler, 119 Ohio App.3d 424, 429, 695 N.E.2d 777, 780 (10th Dist.1997), quoting Black‘s Law Dictionary (5 Ed.1979) 127.
{¶25} “Wanton misconduct” is the failure to exercise any care toward those to whom a duty of care is owed in circumstances in which there is great probability that harm will result. Anderson v. Massillon, 134 Ohio St.3d 380, 388, 2012-Ohio-5711, ¶ 33 (2012).1
{¶26} “Reckless conduct” is defined as being “characterized by the conscious disregard of or indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm to another that is unreasonable under the circumstances and is substantially greater than negligent conduct.” Anderson, supra, ¶ 34, citing Thompson v. McNeill, 53 Ohio St.3d 102, 104-105, 559 N.E.2d 705 (1990), adopting 2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 500, at 587 (1965).
{¶27} In the case sub judice, as indicated in our recitation of facts, the claims that have survived in the trial court following appellant‘s
{¶28} In considering the issues before us, we recognize, as appellant duly notes in his brief, that “the [plaintiffs‘] obligation to provide the grounds for their entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Parsons v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93523, 2010-Ohio-266, ¶ 11 (addressing
{¶29} Upon review, presently accepting the aforesaid complaint allegations as true, we find appellant could be shown to have attempted to supersede without any authorization the protections to L.S.‘s health and safety as duly advised by her own physician, potentially creating a HIPAA issue in the process.2 Therefore, appellant‘s
{¶30} Accordingly, appellant‘s First Assignment of Error is overruled.
II.
{¶31} In his Second Assignment of Error, appellant argues the trial court erred in failing to determine that he had been sued in his official capacity only. We disagree.
{¶32} Appellant maintains that generally, under
{¶33} Our review of the record indicates that the original complaint, while listing appellant as one of the defendants in the caption, does not add the words “personally,” “individually,” or specific language to denote appellant is being sued in his individual capacity. However, the bottom of the caption in the amended complaint, referring to all of the defendants, states: “Each in their individual and official capacities, where applicable.” However, the record reveals appellant was served at his school business address, not at home, and paragraph 116 of the amended complaint specifically alleges that appellant‘s actions “were done in the course and scope of his employment with Buckeye Valley.”
{¶34} Appellant provides no authority for the proposition that a defendant being sued in an individual capacity must be served at a home address. Generally, “[s]ervice must be made to an address where it can be reasonably anticipated that the service will be delivered to the defendant and apprise him of the pendency of the actions and afford him an opportunity to present any objections.” J.R. Productions, Inc. v. Young, 3 Ohio
{¶35} Accordingly, we find no reversible error in the trial court‘s lack of a specific determination at this juncture that appellant is being sued only in his official capacity.
{¶36} Appellant‘s Second Assignment of Error is therefore overruled.
{¶37} For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, the decision of the Court of Common Pleas, Delaware County, is hereby affirmed.
By: Wise, P. J.
Delaney, J., and
Baldwin, J., concur.
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