{¶ 1} Plаintiff-appellant, James E. Scott, appeals the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his complaint against defendants-appellees, city of Columbus, city of Columbus Department of Public Utilities, and city of Columbus Department of Public Service (collectively, “the city”), pursuаnt to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the following reasons, we reverse.
{¶ 2} Scott filed this negligence action on August 27, 2009, against the city of Columbus Department of Public Utilities, the city of Columbus Department of Public Service, and a John Doe defendant. With leаve of court, Scott subsequently amended his complaint to add the city of Columbus as a defendant. Scott alleged that on or about August 28, 2007, while walking on a sidewalk near the intersection of State Route 161 and Karl Road, he stepped on an “improperly attached” manhole cоver, causing his leg to drop into the manhole. Scott alleged
{¶ 3} The city filed a motion tо dismiss Scott’s action, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). The city argued that it was entitled to immunity pursuant to the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, R.C. Chapter 2744. In response, Scott argued that his claim fell within an exception to the city’s statutory immunity, as set forth in R.C. 2744.02(B)(2). The trial court granted the city’s motion to dismiss.
{¶ 4} Scott filed a timely notice of appeal and now asserts the following assignment of error:
The trial court erred when it granted [the city’s] motion to dismiss by ruling that [Scott’s] claim is barred by statutory immunity for political subdivisions.
{¶ 5} A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is procedural and tests the sufficienсy of the complaint. State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1992),
{¶ 6} When faced with a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must presume that all factual allegations in the complaint are true and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co. (1988),
{¶ 7} R.C. Chapter 2744 establishes a three-tiered analysis for reviewing claims of political-subdivision immunity. Colbert v. Cleveland,
{¶ 8} In Ohio, a notice-pleading state, the plaintiff need not prove his or her case at the pleading stage. York at 144-145. Thus, a plaintiff need not affirmatively dispose of the immunity question altogether at the pleading stage. Fink v. Twentieth Century Homes, Inc., 8th Dist. No. 94519,
{¶ 9} The pаrties agree that absent an applicable exception under R.C. 2744.02(B), the city qualifies for the blanket grant of immunity provided by R.C. 2744.02(A)(1). Therefore, we turn to the question whether any of the stated exceptions apply to the facts alleged in Scott’s complaint. See Hewitt v. Columbus, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-1087,
{¶ 10} R.C. 2744.01 provides the applicable, mutually exclusive definitions of governmental and proprietary functions. See Smith v. Martin,
{¶ 11} Because our review is limited to the allegations in Scott’s complaint, we now turn to those allegations. Scott alleged that the manhole cover was “improperly attached” and that the city “negligently allowed the manhole cover to become improperly anchored.” Scott contends that these allegations relate to a proprietary function, whereas the city argues that the allegations relate to a governmental function. Although the trial court misstated the issue as whether the manhole cover itself functioned as a part of the sidewalk or a part of the sewer, the central issuе resolves to whether the action for which Scott seeks to hold the city liable is part of a governmental function or part of a proprietary function. See Burns v. Upper Arlington, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-680,
{¶ 12} The Eighth District Court of Appeals considered an analogous factual scenario in Tyler v. Cleveland (1998),
{¶ 13} In Burns, this cоurt considered a defense of political-subdivision immunity when the plaintiff had tripped over a manhole cover, which was set in the sidewalk in a manner that created a raised edge. The plaintiff alleged that the city of Upper Arlington failed to properly fit and align the manhole cover with the sidewalk and negligently failed to maintain the sidewalk in a reasonably safe condition. Like here, the plaintiff argued that R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) provided an applicable exception to immunity for proprietary functions.
{¶ 15} Since Bums, this court has held that a city’s need to inspect and replace missing components for the safe operation of a storm-water system falls within the definition оf a proprietary function. Martin v. Gahanna, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-1175,
{¶ 16} The city maintains that the issue in Bums is identical to the issue here and that Burns is, therefore, dispositive. Specifically, the city contends that the alleged act here — allowing the manhole cover to become improperly anchored — is indistinguishable from the alleged improper alignment of the manhole cover in Bums because both involve the placement of a manhole cover. We disagree. In Bums, the plaintiff tripped over a manhole cover protruding above the level of the sidewalk and allеged that Upper Arlington negligently failed to align the manhole cover with the sidewalk. That the protrusion was a manhole cover was,
{¶ 17} Although Tyler suggests that the plaintiff there filed suit after obtaining the results of an investigation revealing deterioration underneath the manhole cover, the specificity of the allegations in the complaint is not evident from that decision. It is important to reemphasize, though, that unlike in Tyler, Bums, and Martin, the trial court here was reviewing a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, which merely tests the sufficiency of the complaint, rather than a motion for summary judgment. The trial court’s review, like our review here, was constrained to the allegations in Scott’s complaint. Scott does not specify in his complaint whether the аctivity upon which he bases his claim was part of a governmental or proprietary function, and he does not specifically allege the cause for the collapse of the manhole cover. Nevertheless, whether a function is proprietary or governmental often depends on the particular facts of the case. Beauford v. Columbus (Oct. 13, 1981), 10th Dist. No. 81AP-471,
{¶ 18} Whether Scott will ultimately prove he is entitled to relief remains to be seen through the discovery process. See Fink,
{¶ 19} Fоr these reasons, we sustain Scott’s assignment of error, reverse the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, and remand this matter to that court for further proceedings consistent with this decision and the law.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Notes
. The Burns plaintiff also asserted the exceptions to immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) and (5), but both the trial court and this court held that those exceptions were inapplicable.