RACHEL TANIBAJEVA v. SKYTOP LODGE CORP. et al.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23-CV-01846
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
September 3, 2024
MEHALCHICK, J.
Case 3:23-cv-01846-KM Document 79 Filed 09/03/24
This action arises out of strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty claims filed by Rachel Tanibajeva (“Plaintiff”) on October 2, 2023, against Sky Top Lodge Corp. (“Skytop”), Edelrid GmbH & Co. KG (“Edelrid GmbH”), Edelrid North America (“Edelrid NA”), Petzl America, Inc. (“Petzl”), Challenges Unlimited, Challenge Design Innovations, Inc. And High Country Hardware (“CDI”) (collectively, “Defendants”), and John Doe Corporation 1-10. (Doc. 1). Presently before the Court are seven motions to dismiss filed by CDI, Skytop, Edelrid NA, Petzl, Challenges Unlimited, and Edelrid GmbH.1 (Doc. 24; Doc. 26; Doc. 28; Doc. 32; Doc. 46; Doc. 70; Doc. 72). For the following reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. (Doc. 24; Doc. 26; Doc. 28; Doc. 32; Doc. 46; Doc. 70; Doc. 72).
The following background is taken from Plaintiff‘s amended complaint and is considered to be true for the purposes of the instant motion to dismiss. (Doc. 21). On October 24, 2021, Plaintiff visited Treetop Adventure Course and Zip Lines at Skytop Lodge in Sky Top in Pennsylvania as a business invitee. (Doc. 21, at 2). Skytop advertises its “Treetop Adventure Course” as follows:
For the thrill of speed and altitude, visit The Adventure Center at Skytop Lodge, the pinnacle of action and adventure in the Poconos. Treat yourself to a four-hour treetop adventure. See how exhilarating life can be 50 feet off the ground. With 14 different zip lines and over 40 different mid air elements, this is sure to be an experience to remember!”
(Doc. 21, ¶ 32).
During her visit, Plaintiff attempted to ride one of the ziplines at Skytop‘s adventure course. (Doc. 21, at 2). While Plaintiff was on the zipline, its components malfunctioned and failed, causing her to fall approximately 12 feet to the ground. (Doc. 21, ¶ 39). Plaintiff suffered numerous injuries, including a traumatic brain and spinal injuries, as a result of the fall. (Doc. 21, at 2). Seeking compensatory and punitive damages, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on October 2, 2023. (Doc. 1). The instant, operative complaint was subsequently filed against Defendants and John Doe Corporation 1-10 on November 27, 2023. (Doc. 21).
On December 1, 2023, CDI filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for more definite statement as well as a brief in support. (Doc. 24; Doc. 25). On December 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed an answer to statement of facts and a brief in opposition to CDI‘s motion. (Doc. 30; Doc. 31). On December 7, 2023, Skytop filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
On January 11, 2024, Challenges Unlimited filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and accompanying exhibits. (Doc. 46). On January 18, 2024, Challenges Unlimited filed a brief in support of its motion to dismiss. (Doc. 49). On January 19, 2024,
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
After recognizing the required elements that make up the legal claim, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint‘s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions’ . . . ” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor need a court assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O‘Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). This “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v. President of the U.S., 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
B. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A Federal Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant to the extent permissible under the laws of the state in which the court sits. Mellon Bank (E.) PSFS, Nat. Ass‘n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1221 (3d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). The forum state in this instance is Pennsylvania, and the applicable long arm statute is codified at
With respect to this constitutional inquiry, the “Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that nonresident defendants have ‘certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Kehm Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 537 F.3d 290, 299-300 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Int‘l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). “Having minimum contacts with another state provides ‘fair warning’ to a defendant that he or she may be subject to suit in that state.” Kehm Oil, 537 F.3d at 299-300 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)). As such, personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause depends upon “the relationship among the defendant[s], the forum, and the litigation.” Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
There are two types of personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants—general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. O‘Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 317 (3d Cir. 2007). General jurisdiction may be asserted when a non-resident defendant has maintained “systematic and continuous contacts with the forum state.” Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 296 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1984)); see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (“A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.”) (citing International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317). When subject to the general jurisdiction of a state, “that [defendant] can be called to answer any claim against [it], regardless of whether the subject matter of the cause of action has any connection to the forum.” Mellon Bank, 960 F.2d at 1221. Thus, general jurisdiction requires that the defendant‘s contacts with the forum state are “of the sort that approximate physical presence.” William Rosenstein & Sons Co. v. BBI Produce, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 268, 274 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (quoting Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000), holding modified by Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L‘Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006)).
Pursuant to Pennsylvania‘s longarm statute, this Court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant that “contract[s] to supply services or things in this Commonwealth.”
C. MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response. The motion must be made before filing a responsive pleading and must point out the defects complained of and the details desired.
“A motion for a more definite statement is not a substitute for the discovery process” and such motions disfavored. Wheeler v. United States Postal Service, 120 F.R.D. 487, 488 (M.D. Pa. 1987). A motion for more definite statement is typically only granted where pleadings are “unintelligible or if it is virtually impossible for the opposing party to craft a responsive pleading.” Maya v. Chertok, No. 1:15-CV-00484, 2015 WL 5254377, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2015) (quoting Morris v. Kesserling, No. 1:09-CV-1739, 2010 WL 4362630, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2010), aff‘d sub nom. Morris v. Kesselring, 514 F. App‘x 233 (3d Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted)); see Schaedler v. Reading Eagle Publ‘n, 370 F.2d 795, 798 (3d Cir. 1966) (such motions are “directed to the rare case where because of the vagueness or ambiguity of the pleading the answering party will not be able to frame a responsive pleading”). The opposing party must be unable to respond “even with a simple denial[ ] in good faith or without prejudice to himself.” Brueggman v. Fayette Cnty., Pennsylvania, No. CIV.A. 95-446, 1995 WL 606796, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 1995); see Kimberton Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Primary PhysicianCare, Inc., No. CIV.A. 11-4568, 2011 WL 6046923, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2011) (“a motion for a more definite statement is generally . . . used to provide a remedy for an unintelligible pleading rather than as a correction for a lack of detail” (quotations omitted)).
The Third Circuit has, however, “highlighted the usefulness of a motion for a more definite statement when a complaint does not disclose the facts underlying a plaintiff‘s claim for relief such that the defendant cannot reasonably be expected to frame a proper, fact-specific defense.” Miller v. Atl. Freight Sys., Inc., No. 1:11-CV-01954, 2013 WL 1308235, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2013), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Miller v. Atl. Freight Sys., No. 1:11-CV-1954, 2013 WL 1292907 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2013) (citing Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 301 (3d Cir. 2006)). In this circumstance, “the
D. MOTION TO STRIKE
“Content is immaterial when it has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief. Content is impertinent when it does not pertain to the issues raised in the complaint. Scandalous material improperly casts a derogatory light on someone, most typically on a party to the action.” Champ v. USAA Casualty Insurance Company, 2020 WL 1694372, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 2020); quoting Lee v. Eddystone Fire & Ambulance, No. 19-cv-3295, 2019 WL 6038535, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2019) (quotation omitted). “[S]triking a pleading or a portion of a pleading ‘is a drastic remedy to be resorted to only when required for the purposes of justice.’” Id.; quoting Lee v. Dubose Nat‘l Energy Servs., Inc., No. 18-cv-2504, 2019 WL 1897164, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2019) (same). Thus, motions to strike pursuant to
Further, “[w]hen faced with allegations that could possibly serve to achieve a better understanding of plaintiff‘s claims or perform any useful purpose in promoting the just disposition of the litigation, courts generally deny such motions to strike.” Cestra v. Mylan, Inc., No. 14-825, 2015 WL 2455420, at *7 (W.D. Pa. May 22, 2015) (quoting Eisai Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 2d 416, 425 (D.N.J. 2009), as amended (July 6, 2009)).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants CDI, Skytop, Petzl, Edelrid NA, and Edelrid GmbH each argue that Plaintiff‘s claim for “willful and wanton misconduct and/or reckless indifference” should be dismissed because Pennsylvania law does not recognize the same as a separate cause of action; Plaintiff‘s claim for punitive damages should be dismissed because she fails to allege facts any sufficient to demonstrate evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of others in the amended complaint; that this Court should strike allegations that all Defendants are jointly and severally liable because Pennsylvania Fair Share Act eliminated joint and several liability. (Doc. 25, at 4-5; Doc. 27, at 4-5; Doc. 29, at 3; Doc. 33, at 3, 5, 8, 9, 10; Doc. 73, at 2). Defendants CDI, Skytop, Edelrid NA, and Petzl also request a more definite statement as to the claims against them.3 (Doc. 25, at 4-5; Doc. 27, at 4-5; Doc. 29, at 3; Doc. 33, at 3, 5, 8, 9, 10). Additionally, Defendants Petzl and Edelrid GmbH argue Plaintiff‘s breach of express warranty claim must be dismissed. (Doc. 33, at 10; Doc. 73, at 2). Lastly, Challenges Unlimited and Edelrid GmbH argue that this Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over it. (Doc. 49, at 6, 8; Doc. 73, at 2). The Court will address each of these arguments in turn, beginning with Challenges Unlimited and Edelrid GmbH‘s challenges to this Court‘s jurisdiction. (Doc. 49, at 6, 8; Doc. 73, at 2).
A. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
There are two types of personal jurisdiction, general and specific. Hellauer v. Automated Scis. Grp., Inc., No. CIV. A. 94-7050, 1995 WL 113021, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 1995). Here, the parties do not dispute that this Court does not have general jurisdiction over either
1. Specific Jurisdiction over Challenges United
Challenges United asserts that this Court lacks specific jurisdiction over it because it “never sold or supplied any of its products to Skytop, the only Pennsylvania-based party in this action, nor has it ever had any communication or business relationship with them. The only contact [Challenges United] had was with High Country, a North Carolina-based company that purchased Elelrid Conecto swivels from it.” (Doc. 49, at 9). While Challenges United admits that “[a]s a matter of convenience, High Country requested that [Challenges United] drop ship the [product] directly to the construction site at the Skytop resort in Pennsylvania, where High Country was constructing the zip-line challenge course,” it maintains that this contact with the forum state is too insignificant to result in this Court‘s jurisdiction over it, especially given its location in Canada. (Doc. 46-3, ¶¶ 24, 28; Doc. 49, at 9-10). Both Plaintiff and CDI refute this contention, requesting this Court find it has jurisdiction over Challenges United‘s or at least order discovery on the limited issue of jurisdiction. (Doc. 51, at 15, 30; Doc. 52, at 10).
Courts in this Circuit have concluded that “a single shipment of a product to Pennsylvania is not enough to confer specific personal jurisdiction.” Winters v. Akzo Nobel Surface Chemistry, LLC, No. CV 19-5398, 2020 WL 2732136, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 2020).
A more developed record would assist the Court in making a decision regarding its jurisdiction over Challenges United in this case. The Court recognizes that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court‘s jurisdiction over the moving defendants.” Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004). However, to meet this burden, Plaintiff, as well as CDI on Plaintiff‘s behalf, requests limited discovery on the issue of jurisdiction. (Doc. 51, at 30; Doc. 52, at 10). CDI contends “[j]urisdictional discovery is likely to reveal the sale of products by [Challenges United] to many other customers within the borders of the United States of America (and possibly even the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania)!” (Doc. 52, at 8). “Although the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating facts that support personal jurisdiction, courts are to assist the plaintiff by allowing jurisdictional discovery unless the plaintiff‘s claim is ‘clearly frivolous.’” See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 456 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002)) (internal citations omitted). In their briefing, CDI and Plaintiff have each explained why such discovery would not be frivolous, citing the fact that despite being a Canadian company, Challenges United is active in an American based association and likely regularly does business within the United States. (Doc. 51, at 30; Doc. 52, at 9-10). Accordingly, this Court will permit limited discovery on the issue of jurisdiction and DENY without prejudice Challenges United‘s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. (Doc. 46); see In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litigation, 2002 WL 31261330, at *9 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2002) (denying a motion to dismiss and permitting
2. Specific Jurisdiction over Edelrid GmbH
The Court next turns to the question of specific jurisdiction over Edelrid GmbH. In averring this Court lacks jurisdiction over it, Edelrid GmbH claims it has no direct contacts with Pennsylvania and that it has never conducted business in Pennsylvania. (Doc. 73, at 9). In support of this proposition, Edelrid GmbH attaches a Declaration from one of its Sales Manager Professionals. (Doc. 72-5). Citing to this declaration, Edelrid GmbH states the product “Plaintiff claims was involved in her alleged accident was sold to a Canadian company and sent to Canada, with no understanding that it would ultimately be re-sent to Pennsylvania.” (Doc. 73, at 9). CDI, arguing against dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, provides “this Court should deny Edelrid‘s Motions to Dismiss because Edelrid purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by its very own admissions to this Court!” (Doc. 74, at 3). As CDI sees it, Edelrid GmbH‘s acknowledgment that its product was shipped directly to Pennsylvania, albeit by another company, confirms Edelrid GmbH purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Pennsylvania. (Doc. 74, at 3). Without citing to any evidence or caselaw, Plaintiff similarly provides, “[w]hile the [Edelrid GmbH] denies that it knew the products were going to Pennsylvania, it routinely sells this type of material to Pennsylvania through its distributors and through various retailers.” (Doc. 76, at 20).
Courts, including the Third Circuit, have rejected the “stream of commerce” theory for personal jurisdiction. See Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d 760, 780 (3d Cir. 2018); see also Bogle v. JD Techs., Inc., No. 2:21-CV-00319-MJH, 2021 WL 3472151 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2021) (“a stream of commerce theory alone would not support this Court conferring specific
As discussed supra, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court‘s jurisdiction over the moving defendants.” Miller Yacht Sales, Inc., 384 F.3d at 97. Here, Plaintiff again requests limited discovery on the issue of jurisdiction to meet this burden. (Doc. 76, at 30). In support of Plaintiff‘s position, CDI contends “[j]urisdictional discovery is likely to reveal the historical timing, locations and quantities of products by Edelrid [GmbH] to each customer within the borders of the United States of America (and possibly all others in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania)!” (Doc. 74, at 9). “Although the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating facts that support personal jurisdiction, courts are to assist the plaintiff by allowing jurisdictional discovery unless the plaintiff‘s claim is ‘clearly frivolous.’” See Toys “R” Us, Inc., 318 F.3d at 456 (citing Pinker, 292 F.3d at 368) (internal citations omitted). Here, CDI has averred that jurisdictional discovery would not be clearly frivolous because “[i]t is clear that Edelrid already regularly and systematically conducts business in the United States of America. Edelrid [GmbH] has admittedly shipped products into the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to its ‘direct customer,’” and “[i]t would be unfair for this litigation to proceed against every defendant except the party that actually designed, manufactured, and distributed the allegedly
B. JOINT AND SEVERABLE CLAIMS
Defendants CDI, Skytop, Petzl, and Edelrid NA aver that this Court should strike Plaintiff‘s claims for joint and several liability because the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act eliminated joint and several liability. (Doc. 25, at 11; Doc. 27, at 11; Doc. 29, at 3; Doc. 33, at 9). Plaintiff responds that she has properly alleged that Defendants are joint and severally liable for the claims asserted against them because the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act does not apply when the plaintiff is not comparatively negligent. (Doc. 31, at 1). Because there is nothing in the amended complaint suggesting Plaintiff was comparatively negligent, this Court agrees and will not strike Plaintiff‘s allegations of joint and several liability from the
The parties’ arguments turn on whether the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act applies to this dispute. (Doc. 25, at 11; Doc. 27, at 11; Doc. 29, at 8-9; Doc. 31, at 21). Pennsylvania courts have concluded that for the “Fair Share Act to apply, the plaintiff‘s negligence must be an issue in the case.” Spencer v. Johnson, 2021 PA Super 48, 249 A.3d 529, 559 (2021); see also Snyder v. Hunt, 268 A.3d 416, 2021 WL 5232425, at *6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2021) (finding defendants were not shielded from joint and several liability where plaintiff was not found to be contributorily negligent). Interpreting Pennsylvania law, the Western District of Pennsylvania has concluded the same.5 See Anderson v. Motorist Mut. Ins. Co., 608 F. Supp. 3d 214, 224 (W.D. Pa. 2022).
At this early stage of the litigation, it is impossible to determine whether Plaintiff‘s own negligence is at issue. Plaintiff argues that “there is no indication whatsoever that [she] was negligent, nor can she be comparatively negligent by law as to claims of strict liability, which do not permit allegations of comparative negligence.” (Doc. 31, at 21). A review of the amended complaint suggests the same, and none of the moving defendants argue otherwise in their briefing. Accordingly, Defendants CDI, Skytop, Petzl, and Edelrid NA‘s motions to strike allegations of joint and several liability are DENIED without prejudice. (Doc. 24; Doc. 26; Doc. 28; Doc. 32).
Plaintiff asserts two claims for “willful and wanton misconduct and/or reckless indifference,” one against Skytop and one against all the remaining Defendants together in Count IV and Count V of the amended complaint. (Doc. 21, ¶¶ 111-134, 135-158). Defendants CDI, Skytop, Edelrid NA, Petzl, and Edelrid GmbH aver that there is no separate cause of action for willful and wanton misconduct and/or reckless indifference in Pennsylvania. (Doc. 25, at 6; Doc. 27, at 6; 29, at 6; Doc. 33, at 3; Doc. 73, at 10-11). Whereas Plaintiff disagrees, maintaining that her amended complaint “properly separates distinct claim or allegations into separate counts,” Defendants are correct in concluding that outrageous conduct, wanton conduct, and reckless indifference are not recognized as separate causes of action under Pennsylvania law. See White v. Trybala, No. 3:19CV14, 2019 WL 2119982, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 15, 2019) (dismissing counts from plaintiff‘s complaint “to the extent that those counts allege separate and independent causes of action for outrageous, wanton, reckless, or gross indifference to the safety of the plaintiff.”); see also Archibald v. Kemble, 971 A.2d 513 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009). Allegations of reckless and wanton behavior are better placed in claims recognized under Pennsylvania law, such as negligence. See Spence v. ESAB Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 215 at n.2 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Hunter v. Squirrel Hill Assocs., L.P., 413 F. Supp. 2d 517, 520 at n.2 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (“While Pennsylvania courts acknowledge differing standards of care, they do not recognize degrees of negligence as separate causes of action.”)); cf. Bopp v. Holbrook, No. 3:23-CV-0128, 2024 WL 1837213, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2024) (denying defendants’ motion to strike and motion to dismiss where plaintiffs sufficiently alleged reckless conduct in his claims for wrongful death and negligence). Thus, “[b]ecause the plaintiff[] ha[s] already raised negligence claims [in her] complaint, the defendants’ motion to dismiss [] will be granted to the extent those counts state separate causes of action for
D. BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY
Defendants Petzl and Edelrid GmbH argue that Plaintiff‘s breach of an express warranty claim against them must be dismissed as insufficiently pled and “unsustainable.” (Doc. 33, at 10; Doc. 73, at 13). Petzl argues that Plaintiff‘s claim is deficient because she has failed to allege that she was a purchaser of Petzl‘s product. (Doc. 33, at 10-11). According to Edelrid GmbH, “Plaintiff does not allege that she was a purchaser of any product from Edelrid GmbH, and her Complaints do not make any specific allegations as to the existence or details of the alleged warranty she seeks to recover with respect to Edelrid GmbH.” (Doc. 73, at 13). Plaintiff fails to rebuke these arguments, instead stating only “to the extent the Court grants moving defendant‘s motion only as to a breach of express warranty, Plaintiff
“Under Pennsylvania law, express warranties are ‘specifically negotiated;’ they are created by a seller through ‘any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain.’” McDonnell v. Flowonix Medical Inc., No. CV 21-1404, 2022 WL 221612, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2022) (citing Goodman v. PPG Indus., 2004 PA Super 151, 849 A.2d 1239, 1243 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004);
E. MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
Defendants CDI, Skytop, Edelrid NA, and Petzl complain that Plaintiff‘s amended complaint improperly lumps together all defendants in Counts I, II, III, and V, in violation of
IV. LEAVE TO AMEND
The Third Circuit has instructed that district courts generally must permit a curative amendment if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the Third Circuit has also acknowledged that a district court has “substantial leeway in deciding whether to grant leave to amend.” Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000). Here, considering the deficiencies with Plaintiff‘s amended complaint outline supra, amendment would not futile or inequitable to Defendants. Thus, the Court will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to cure the deficiencies with her amended complaint, particularly as they relate to her claim for punitive damages and allegations of reckless, wanton, and outrageous behavior, and to file a second amended complaint that is complete in all respects.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. (Doc. 24; Doc. 26; Doc. 28; Doc. 32; Doc. 46; Doc. 70; Doc. 72). Edelrid GmbH‘s first motion to dismiss is DENIED as MOOT. (Doc. 70). Challenges United‘s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is DENIED without prejudice. (Doc. 46). Edelrid GmbH‘s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is DENIED without prejudice. (Doc. 72). The parties are directed to engage in limited discovery on the issue of jurisdiction. The Court will reconsider Defendants Challenges United and Edelrid GmbH‘s challenges to jurisdiction upon the refiling of their motions with the benefit of this limited discovery. Defendants CDI, Skytop, Petzl, Edelrid NA, and Edelrid GmbH‘s motions to dismiss Plaintiff‘s claims for “willful and wanton misconduct and/or reckless indifference” and punitive damages are
Dated: September 3, 2024
s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States District Judge