Stiavetti v. Clendenin, 65 Cal.App.5th 691

Background

Plaintiffs (five family members of IST defendants and two ACLU affiliates) challenged systemic delays in transferring defendants found incompetent to stand trial (IST) from county jails to State Department of State Hospitals (DSH) or Department of Developmental Services (DDS) for competency-restoration ("substantive services").
Trial court found systemic due process violations and ordered DSH/DDS to commence substantive services within 28 days of the transfer-of-responsibility date (phased in over 30 months): for DSH, 28 days runs from service of the section 1370 commitment packet; for DDS, 28 days runs from service of the section 1370.1 commitment order (trial court had treated certain DDS sex-offender commitments differently).
Plaintiffs’ experts (Drs. Gage, Kupers, Warren) showed long mean/median delays (DSH: ~64/63 days from packet receipt to admission; DDS: ~53/52 days from commitment to admission) and medical/behavioral harms from prolonged jail stays; defendants presented evidence of capacity constraints and ongoing reform efforts.
Statutory context: Penal Code §§ 1367, 1370, 1370.1 suspend criminal proceedings for IST defendants and require reports within 90 days after commitment/admission; neither statute sets an explicit admission deadline.
On appeal the court affirmed that a uniform statewide constitutional outer limit is appropriate, held 28 days constitutional for commencing substantive services measured from service of the transfer document (commitment packet for DSH; commitment order for DDS), and reversed the trial court’s different transfer-date rule for certain DDS sex-offender commitments.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a uniform statewide admit-by deadline is appropriate	Statewide remedy is needed because delays are systemic and piecemeal county orders have failed	Deadlines should be individualized (case-by-case or county-by-county); statewide rule is inappropriate	Statewide deadline appropriate given systemic violations, need for uniformity and predictability; courts can impose an outer constitutional limit
Whether 28 days is a permissible constitutional outer limit to commence substantive services	28 days (or similar short limit) is necessary to protect liberty and prevent harm in jail	28 days is arbitrary, unsupported by precedent/statute, and fails to account for operational constraints	28 days is within the court’s broad equitable discretion; court balanced liberty, statutory timelines (90-day reporting), related civil timelines, and persuasive federal precedents to reach 28 days
When does responsibility transfer to DSH/DDS (trigger for the deadline)?	Transfer triggers when the court serves the document that shifts responsibility: commitment packet for DSH; commitment order for DDS	DSH/DDS argued transfer should await receipt/approval of a complete packet or (for certain DDS sex-offender commits) physical delivery with required documents	Transfer of responsibility is service of the commitment packet for DSH and service of the commitment order for all DDS commitments; DSH/DDS cannot unilaterally delay the start date by declaring packets “incomplete”
Whether DDS sex-offender commits (1370.1(a)(1)(B)(ii)/(iii)) have a later transfer date tied to physical delivery with documents; equal protection/uniformity claim	Plaintiffs: statute does not make those commits exempt; equal protection requires uniform transfer point for all DDS commits	Defendants: statute’s (a)(3) language requires documents accompany the defendant, so responsibility shifts upon delivery to facility	Reversed trial court: transfer date for those DDS sex-offender commitments is service of the commitment order (same as other DDS commits); documentation requirement does not postpone DDS responsibility

Key Cases Cited

Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (U.S. 1972) (due process limits indefinite commitment; duration must reasonably relate to restoration purpose)
In re Davis, 8 Cal.3d 798 (Cal. 1973) (California adoption of Jackson standard for IST defendants)
In re Loveton, 244 Cal.App.4th 1025 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (upheld countywide 60-day admission deadline after balancing interests)
In re Mille, 182 Cal.App.4th 635 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (habeas relief where 84‑day transfer delay unreasonable)
In re Williams, 228 Cal.App.4th 989 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (two‑year preplacement delay for developmentally disabled IST defendant violated due process)
People v. Brewer, 235 Cal.App.4th 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (courts may set transfer deadlines to give effect to statutory 90‑day reporting requirement)
Oregon Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003) (federal precedent addressing statewide IST admission timeliness)
Trueblood v. Washington State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 101 F.Supp.3d 1010 (W.D. Wash. 2015) (federal court imposing prompt admission deadlines for competency restoration)
Advocacy Ctr. for the Elderly & Disabled v. La. Dep’t of Health & Hospitals, 731 F.Supp.2d 603 (E.D. La. 2010) (federal court addressing system‑wide delays and setting an admission timeframe)
Kareem A. v. Clendenin, 46 Cal.App.5th 58 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020) (upheld sanctions for systemic DSH delays; recognized need for broader solutions)
Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (U.S. 2011) (courts must enforce constitutional rights even when resource‑strained)
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1982) (balancing individual liberty against government interests in civil‑commitment contexts)