STEIGERWALD, APPELLEE, v. CITY OF BEREA ET AL., APPELLANTS.
No. 2024-1077
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
July 8, 2026
Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-2554
Negligence—Political-subdivision immunity—R.C. Ch. 2744—No evidence of a physical defect with respect to bench in recreation center‘s locker room was presented—A decision to place a particular model of bench in a locker room does not amount to a physical defect on recreation-center grounds under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4)—Exception to political-subdivision liability in R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) does not apply—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and cause remanded to trial court.
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-2554
STEIGERWALD, APPELLEE, v. CITY OF BEREA ET AL., APPELLANTS.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Steigerwald v. Berea, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-2554.]
Negligence—Political-subdivision immunity—
(No. 2024-1077—Submitted June 25, 2025—Decided July 8, 2026.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 112933, 2024-Ohio-2260
SHANAHAN, J., authored the opinion of the court, which DEWINE, DETERS, and HAWKINS, J., joined and KENNEDY, J., joined in accord with her separate
SHANAHAN, J.
{¶ 1} Joan Steigerwald tripped over a bench in the women‘s locker room at the Berea Recreation Center and sustained serious injuries. She passed away 12 days later. Her estate sued appellants, the Berea Recreation Center and the City of Berea, the recreation center‘s owner and operator (collectively, “Berea“).1 Berea filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting political-subdivision immunity under
{¶ 2} We disagree with the Eighth District‘s conclusion. The decision to place in the women‘s locker room a bench that has no tangible imperfection and that functions as intended does not constitute a physical defect under
BACKGROUND
{¶ 3} In April 2018, Steigerwald, a regular participant in a swimming class for seniors at the recreation center, entered the women‘s locker room. There, she tripped over the legs of a newly installed bench and sustained serious injuries. She died 12 days later.
political subdivisions are liable for . . . death . . . that is caused by the negligence of their employees and that occurs within or on the grounds of, and is due to physical defects within or on the grounds of, buildings that are used in connection with the performance of a governmental function.
{¶ 5} The trial court granted Berea‘s motion for summary judgment, finding that no genuine issues of material fact existed and that Berea was entitled to political-subdivision immunity. Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-20-931952 (May 25, 2022). The Eighth District reversed, concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the extended legs of the bench placed by Berea in the women‘s locker room constituted a physical defect. 2024-Ohio-2260, ¶ 31, 67 (8th Dist.). The court of appeals further held that political-subdivision immunity was not definitively restored under the defenses provided under
{¶ 6} We accepted Berea‘s appeal on the following two propositions of law:
Proposition of Law I: An allegedly negligent or reckless decision to use otherwise non-defective equipment cannot constitute
a “physical defect” within or on the grounds of buildings used in connection with governmental functions under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) .Proposition of Law II: The decision to use a bench that is specifically designed to have legs that extend 5.75 inches beyond the bench seat in a locker room cannot constitute a physical defect within or on the grounds of buildings used in connection with governmental functions to establish an exception to political subdivision immunity under
R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) .
See 2024-Ohio-4919.
{¶ 7} We agree with Berea.
ANALYSIS
{¶ 8} Political subdivisions and their employees are generally immune from liability for acts related to governmental functions.
{¶ 9} Berea qualifies as a political subdivision, see
{¶ 10} The Eighth District determined that the exception under
{¶ 11} The term “physical defect” is not defined in the statute, so we apply its plain and ordinary meaning. See Sharp v. Union Carbide Corp., 38 Ohio St.3d 69, 70 (1988) (“Where a particular term employed in a statute is not defined, it will be accorded its plain, everyday meaning.“). “Physical” pertains to material or tangible things. See Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary (2002) (defining “physical” as “of or relating to natural or material things as opposed to things mental, moral, spiritual, or imaginary“); Black‘s Law Dictionary (12th Ed. 2024) (defining “physical” as “[o]f, relating to, or involving material things; pertaining to real, tangible objects“). A “defect” is an imperfection that impairs function. See Webster‘s (defining “defect” as “want or absence of something necessary for completeness, perfection, or adequacy in form or function“); Black‘s (defining “defect” as “[a]n imperfection or shortcoming, esp[ecially] in a part that is essential to the operation or safety of a product“). A “physical defect,” then, is a tangible imperfection that impairs the function of an object.2
{¶ 12} Under its ordinary meaning, a “physical defect” for purposes of
{¶ 13} Here, Berea presented deposition testimony from its recreation director, who stated that he had selected the bench after evaluating over a dozen models. The chosen model was antimicrobial, movable, suitable for use in locker rooms with condensation, and compatible with cleaning equipment. The bench was
{¶ 14} The estate‘s argument against the application of political-subdivision immunity rests not on any imperfection in the bench but on Berea‘s decision to place that particular model of bench in the women‘s locker room. This decision did not create a tangible imperfection. The estate equates a hazardous condition (i.e., the extended legs of the bench in the women‘s locker room) with a physical defect under
{¶ 15} The Eighth District erred in treating Berea‘s placement of the bench as a “physical defect.” No evidence suggests that the bench was broken, malfunctioning, or defective. The estate does not allege that the bench malfunctioned or was physically damaged. Rather, its claim centers on Berea‘s decision to place that particular bench—one with extended legs—in the women‘s locker room. But as we made clear in our holding in Hoskins, 2026-Ohio-1225, at ¶ 21, a discretionary decision involving otherwise functional equipment does not convert that equipment into a physical defect under
{¶ 16} In Hoskins, the decedent‘s estate argued that a lifeguard‘s use of a folding chair instead of an elevated lifeguard chair created a dangerous condition that contributed to a person‘s drowning. The decedent‘s estate argued that the use
{¶ 17} Our holding in Hoskins establishes the principle that the use or placement of functional equipment does not constitute a “physical defect.” As in Hoskins, in which the alleged physical defect arose from the lifeguard‘s decision to use the folding chair and not the lifeguard chair, the alleged physical defect here arises from Berea‘s decision to place a structurally sound bench in the women‘s locker room.
{¶ 18} Likewise, the estate‘s reliance on Doe v. Greenville City Schools, 2022-Ohio-4618, is misplaced. The lead opinion in Doe, which posited that the absence of a fire extinguisher could create a physical defect, see id. at ¶ 27 (lead opinion), did not command a majority. Therefore, the lead opinion in Doe “articulates no binding rule of law to apply here,” State ex rel. M/I Homes of Cincinnati, L.L.C. v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2025-Ohio-4362, ¶ 38.
{¶ 19} To hold that an object that does not have any tangible imperfection and that was functioning as intended may be considered a “physical defect” under
CONCLUSION
{¶ 21} The commonly understood meaning of “physical defect” is a tangible imperfection that impairs the function of an object. No evidence was presented showing that the recreation center‘s locker-room bench had a physical defect under this ordinary meaning. The exception to political-subdivision immunity in
Judgment reversed and cause remanded to the trial court.
BRUNNER, J., dissenting.
{¶ 22} This appeal requires us to consider whether the Eighth District Court of Appeals correctly held that a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning whether appellants, the Berea Recreation Center and the City of Berea (collectively, “Berea“), were immune from liability for the premises-based tort of negligence under
{¶ 23}
political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to person or property that is caused by the negligence of their employees and that occurs within or on the grounds of, and is due to physical defects within or on the grounds of, buildings that are used in connection with the performance of a governmental function . . . .
(Emphasis added.) The majority opinion holds that the term “defect” is ordinarily understood to mean “an imperfection that impairs function.” Majority opinion, ¶ 11; see id., quoting Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary (2002) (defining “defect” as the “‘want or absence of something necessary for completeness, perfection, or adequacy in form or function‘“); id., quoting Black‘s Law Dictionary (12th Ed. 2024) (defining “defect” as “‘[a]n imperfection or shortcoming, esp[ecially] in a part that is essential to the operation or safety of a product‘” [bracketed text in original]). As demonstrated by the examples provided by Webster‘s online dictionary, a “defect” can be either physical or nonphysical: defects in a tire or porcelain are physical, while a defect in logic is nonphysical. Merriam-Webster Online, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/defect (accessed Mar. 3, 2026) [https://perma.cc/B693-CFYL].
{¶ 24} I am concerned about the tack the majority opinion takes when it arrives at the conclusion that a “physical defect” is “a tangible imperfection that impairs the function of an object.” (Emphasis added.) Id. The majority opinion appears to find that the requirement of “physical defects” in
{¶ 25} Then, hammering out another way to bar access to justice, the majority opinion proceeds to consider the allegedly defective bench in isolation, endorsing a tunnel-vision approach that focuses on whether the bench itself was “broken, malfunctioning, or defective” or whether the bench “malfunctioned or was physically damaged,” majority opinion at ¶ 15. In other words, the majority opinion
{¶ 26} I agree with the majority opinion that a defect would exist here if the bench itself were defective because it was damaged or malfunctioning. See majority opinion at ¶ 13. But the statute clearly does not limit that to be the only way there could be a physical defect in this case. Nothing in
{¶ 27} The statute by its terms requires common-sense inquiries in this case: Did the government cause the bench to be placed where it was, was that placement negligent, and did its placement in this manner at the recreation center cause the plaintiff‘s injury? Under these inquiries, there remains a genuine issue of material fact to be determined by the trier of fact.
{¶ 28} We cannot ignore that
{¶ 29} The bench used in the locker room of the recreation center at issue in this case is not materially different from the pool-filter example. It may have no inherent flaws preventing it from serving as a bench, but just as inadequate pool
{¶ 30} As the Eighth District recognized, Steigerwald presented evidence from Dr. Richard Zimmerman, an expert witness in architecture. Dr. Zimmerman observed that the horizontal bases of the bench‘s legs reached five inches beyond the edge of the bench seat. Dr. Zimerman averred that benches with legs like that “are not the type of benches typically used in locker rooms.” He then explained in his expert report that:
Those extended horizontal base legs . . . extend into the normal, expected, and foreseeable walking area of anyone using or passing by the bench, especially in narrow, cramped, or crowded locker rooms, and especially during periods of peak use as many users are present in and circulating about the locker room.
Based on that, he opined that the locker room had “dangerous tripping hazards in the form of the extended base legs of the bench.” He ultimately concluded that the “inappropriate” extension of the legs’ bases and the “lack of sufficient clear, unobstructed walking/passage space between the bench and the lockers, and among the other users of the locker room” caused Joan Steigerwald to fall.
{¶ 31} The Eighth District also recognized that Steigerwald presented evidence showing that in the weeks between the installation of the bench and Joan Steigerwald‘s fall, the recreation center received at least a dozen complaints about
{¶ 32} Following the plain text of
{¶ 33} Accordingly, I would conclude that the Eighth District correctly determined that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to the “physical defect” requirement of
Paulozzi Co., L.P.A., Todd O. Rosenberg, and Amy L. Higgins, for appellee.
Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder Co., L.P.A., Frank H. Scialdone, and Zachary W. Anderson, for appellants.
Roetzel & Andress, L.P.A., and Stephen W. Funk, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys.