State v. WogenstahlState v. Wogenstahl
App.R. 26(B)—Delayed application to reopen direct appeal of capital-murder conviction—Appellant failed to show good cause for the delay in filing his application to reopen—Claim that trial court lacked jurisdiction over appellant‘s case is barred by this court‘s caselaw precluding the filing of a successive application to reopen and by res judicata—Court of appeals’ judgment affirmed.
(No. 2023-0945—Submitted April 23, 2024—Decided October 1, 2024.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-930222.
KENNEDY, C.J., authored the opinion of the court, which KING, LUCCI, DONNELLY, STEWART, and WALDICK, JJ., joined. LUCCI, J., authored a concurring opinion, which DONNELLY, J., joined. BRUNNER, J., dissented, with an opinion.
ANDREW J. KING, J., of the Fifth District Court of Appeals, sat for FISCHER, J.
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J., of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, sat for DEWINE, J.
JUERGEN A. WALDICK, J., of the Third District Court of Appeals, sat for DETERS, J.
KENNEDY, C.J.
{¶ 1} In this appeal as of right from the First District Court of Appeals, appellant, Jeffrey Wogenstahl, challenges the denial of his delayed application to reopen his direct appeal under
{¶ 2} However, Wogenstahl failed to show good cause for the delay in filing his application to reopen, and even if he had justification for the delay, his claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over his case is barred by our caselaw precluding the filing of a successive application to reopen and by res judicata. Therefore, we affirm the First District‘s judgment denying Wogenstahl‘s untimely application to reopen.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 3} In November 1991, a ten-year-old child was taken from her home in Harrison, Ohio. Her body was discovered days later in an overgrown area in Bright, Indiana, around four miles beyond the Ohio-Indiana state line. State v. Wogenstahl, 2017-Ohio-6873, ¶ 1, 4, 10, 13, 15, 21.
{¶ 4} In 1993, Wogenstahl was convicted of kidnapping and murdering the child and was sentenced to death in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. The First District upheld his convictions and death sentence, and we affirmed. State v. Wogenstahl, 1996-Ohio-219; State v. Wogenstahl, 1994 WL 686898 (1st Dist. Nov. 30, 1994). Wogenstahl‘s petition for postconviction relief was rejected. See State v. Wogenstahl, 1998 WL 306561 (1st Dist. June 12, 1998), appeal not accepted, 83 Ohio St.3d 1449 (1998). He also sought leave from the trial court to file delayed new-trial motions in 1998, 2003, and 2014, but the trial court denied each of his requests for leave. The court of appeals affirmed those judgments. State v. Wogenstahl, 1999 WL 79052 (1st Dist. Feb. 19, 1999); State v. Wogenstahl, 2004-Ohio-5994 (1st Dist.); State v. Wogenstahl, 2015-Ohio-5346 (1st Dist.).
{¶ 5} In March 1998, Wogenstahl applied to reopen his direct appeal; the First District dismissed the application for lack of good cause for the delay in filing and because res judicata barred his application. See State v. Wogenstahl, 1998-Ohio-587, ¶ 6. We affirmed. Id. at ¶ 9.
{¶ 6} Wogenstahl‘s requests for federal habeas corpus relief have also been unsuccessful. See Wogenstahl v. Mitchell, 668 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Wogenstahl v. Warden, Chillicothe Corr. Inst., 2023 WL 6459533, *2 (S.D.Ohio Oct. 4, 2023).
{¶ 7} In 2015, Wogenstahl moved this court to vacate his pending execution date and to reopen his capital appeal. After we granted his application to reopen, State v. Wogenstahl, 2016-Ohio-2807, Wogenstahl filed a merit brief arguing three propositions of law:
(1) An Ohio court lacks subject matter jurisdiction when the state fails to prove such jurisdiction beyond a reasonable doubt. Any resulting conviction is void and violates a defendant‘s constitutional rights to [a] fair trial and due process.
U.S. Const. amends. VI andXIV .(2) A defendant is denied the effective assistance of counsel, when a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and defense counsel fails to raise the issue.
U.S. Const. amends. VI andXIV .(3) Trial of a defendant in a court without subject matter jurisdiction would necessarily violate the defendant‘s substantive and procedural constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process.
U.S. Const. amends. VI andXIV .
See State v. Wogenstahl, 2017-Ohio-6873, ¶ 3.
{¶ 8} In July 2017, we determined that the trial record did not establish in which state the child was murdered. Id. at ¶ 47. However, the applicable version of
When an offense is committed under the laws of this state, and it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense or any element thereof took place either in Ohio or in another jurisdiction or jurisdictions, but it cannot be reasonably determined in which it took place, such offense or element is conclusively presumed to have taken place in this state for purposes of this section.
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511, 134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1866, 1893. Applying that version of
{¶ 9} In a concurring opinion, Justice French agreed that the location of the murder could not be determined and that the trial court therefore had jurisdiction under former
{¶ 10} In August 2017, Wogenstahl filed in this court a “motion for rehearing and/or reconsideration.” In that motion, Wogenstahl argued that jurisdiction was an element of the offense that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. We denied the motion. State v. Wogenstahl, 2017-Ohio-9111.
{¶ 11} In May 2018, Wogenstahl moved “for order or relief” under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.01, asking us to vacate his execution date and reopen his appeal again to allow him to raise a constitutional challenge to former
{¶ 12} That same year, the United States Supreme Court denied Wogenstahl‘s petition for a writ of certiorari on his reopened appeal, in which he raised the same constitutional arguments. Wogenstahl v. Ohio, 584 U.S. 1004 (2018).
{¶ 13} In January 2023, Wogenstahl filed a delayed application to reopen his direct appeal in the court of appeals. He argued that his appellate counsel had failed to argue that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and that his conviction and sentence violated his rights to due process and a fair trial. Wogenstahl also argued that he had been denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel because of counsel‘s failure to argue on direct appeal that trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging the constitutionality of former
{¶ 14} The court of appeals denied Wogenstahl‘s application as untimely and barred by res judicata. Regarding res judicata, the court of appeals concluded that the doctrine applied because we reopened Wogenstahl‘s direct appeal in 2016 and determined in that reopened appeal that Ohio had had jurisdiction to try him for aggravated murder in 1991. Reasoning that “a court‘s jurisdiction may not be repeatedly attacked,” the court of appeals decided that because “this [was] not Wogenstahl‘s first challenge to the trial court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction, [it could] not say that Wogenstahl ha[d] demonstrated good cause to reopen his direct appeal.”
{¶ 15} Wogenstahl appealed as a matter of right. S.Ct.Prac.R. 5.01(A)(2). In his first proposition of law, Wogenstahl argues that former
II. Law and Analysis
A. App.R. 26(B)
{¶ 16}
{¶ 17} Our review of the court of appeals’ interpretation and application of
{¶ 18} The First District journalized its judgment in Wogenstahl‘s direct appeal on November 30, 1994, which means that Wogenstahl was required to file an
{¶ 19} Wogenstahl has failed to establish good cause for the delay. Tellingly, in July 2017, he was aware of the potential argument that former
{¶ 20} The conclusion that Wogenstahl has failed to demonstrate good cause is buttressed by our consistent application of the
{¶ 21} Wogenstahl contends that the fact that a challenge to a court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction can never be waived establishes good cause for his delayed filing. But that argument conflates the good-cause requirement with the merits of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. The existence of good cause is a threshold issue that must be established before an appellate court may reach the merits of a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See State v. Farrow, 2007-Ohio-4792, ¶ 7 (holding that the court of appeals properly declined to reach the merits of the appellant‘s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel when the appellant failed to establish good cause for the delay in filing the application).
{¶ 22} The court of appeals therefore properly denied Wogenstahl‘s application to reopen.
B. Successive Applications to Reopen
{¶ 23} Even if Wogenstahl established good cause for delay in filing his challenge to the trial court‘s jurisdiction, this court has explained that “‘there is no right to file successive applications for reopening’ under
{¶ 24} Wogenstahl resists the application of this long-established rule to his case by arguing that the constitutionality of former
{¶ 25} Further, the doctrine of res judicata applies to prior determinations that a court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Travelers Indemn. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 153-154 (2009). “[I]t is established that ‘a party that has had an opportunity to litigate the question of subject-matter jurisdiction may not . . . reopen that question in a collateral attack upon an adverse judgment. It has long been the rule that principles of res judicata apply to jurisdictional determinations—both subject matter and personal.‘” State ex rel. Peoples v. Johnson, 2017-Ohio-9140, ¶ 13, quoting Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982), fn. 9; see also Claxton v. Simons, 174 Ohio St. 333 (1963), paragraph four of the syllabus (“if the court determines
{¶ 26} And res judicata also bars a party from litigating a constitutional issue that could have been raised on appeal in a prior proceeding. See Blanton at ¶ 92; State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175 (1967), paragraph nine of the syllabus.
{¶ 27} This court held in the reopened appeal that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the aggravated-murder charge under
III. Conclusion
{¶ 28} Wogenstahl had ample opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of
Judgment affirmed.
LUCCI, J., joined by DONNELLY, J., concurring.
{¶ 29} This court settled the issue in this appeal in State v. Wogenstahl, 2017-Ohio-6873, ¶ 47, when it declared:
We find that it cannot be determined whether [the child] was murdered in Ohio or Indiana. Therefore, under
R.C. 2901.11(D) , the offense is conclusively presumed to have taken place in Ohio. Accordingly, we hold that Ohio had jurisdiction over the aggravated-murder charge.
{¶ 30} We are here once again because appellant, Jeffrey Wogenstahl, waited six years to raise the issue with a different twist that is based on the concurring and dissenting opinions in this court‘s 2017 decision. Wogenstahl relies primarily on Justice French‘s concurring opinion, which stated:
I agree with the majority‘s conclusion that the location of [the child]‘s murder cannot be determined and that jurisdiction is therefore proper in Ohio under
R.C. 2901.11(D) . I write separately because I believe that there is a reasonable question as to the constitutionality of that statute and that this court should have invited the parties to brief the issue before determining whether to uphold Wogenstahl‘s capital conviction.. . .
By its plain terms,
R.C. 2901.11(D) creates a mandatory presumption of jurisdiction: the jurisdiction of the Ohio courts is “conclusively” presumed. It appears, then, thatR.C. 2901.11(D) violates the rule of Francis [v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985)], and Sandstrom [v. Minnesota, 442 U.S. 510 (1979)], if jurisdiction is an element of the offense that the state bears the burden of proving. This court has not directly addressed that question. I note, however, that this court has held that venue is an element of the crime that the state must prove beyond areasonable doubt. State v. Hampton, 134 Ohio St.3d 447, 2012-Ohio-5688, 983 N.E.2d 324, ¶ 1-2, 22.
(Emphasis in original.) Wogenstahl, 2017-Ohio-6873, at ¶ 48-51 (French, J., concurring).
{¶ 31} Although I concur in the majority‘s judgment and join its opinion, I write separately because even if, as suggested in the dissenting opinion, we consider the merits of Wogenstahl‘s claim, he cannot prevail in this appeal because there is not a colorable argument that the mandatory presumption set forth in former
{¶ 32} Jurisdiction refers to multiple limitations on a court‘s authority to take action on a particular charge. 4 LaFave, Israel, King & Kerr, Criminal Procedure, § 16.1(a) (4th Ed. 2023). Territorial jurisdiction relates to “those limits on authority stemming from ‘the permissible geographic scope of penal legislation.‘” Kerfoot, Territorial Jurisdiction in Ohio Post-Wogenstahl, 71 Case W.Res.L.Rev. 1147, 1150 (2021), quoting LaFave at § 16.4(a); see also State v. Jacob, 2009-Ohio-7048, ¶ 38 (2d Dist.) (Grady, J., concurring) (“A court‘s territorial jurisdiction is its power over cases arising in or involving persons within a defined geographical unit.“)
{¶ 33} Significantly, my research fails to disclose any Ohio court that has universally deemed jurisdiction of any sort—including territorial jurisdiction, which is our focus here—a material element of a charged crime. Jurisdiction is not an element of the offense unless specifically prescribed as such by law; nor is it a matter for the jury‘s determination. Jurisdiction is a matter for determination by the court. Indeed, jurisdiction is determined before a jury is even impaneled. The jurisdictional issue was necessarily preliminary to the trial in Wogenstahl‘s criminal case. And given that the issue was whether it clearly appeared that the act or physical contact that caused the death of the child, or the death itself, could have occurred only in Indiana rather than in Ohio, its resolution did not affect the question of Wogenstahl‘s guilt or innocence. The issue of territorial jurisdiction affected only the right of the court to try Wogenstahl in Ohio—a matter that this court previously resolved in Wogenstahl, 2017-Ohio-6873, by concluding that Ohio had jurisdiction to try Wogenstahl on the aggravated-murder charge. Id. at ¶ 2.
{¶ 34} Moreover, the matter of jurisdiction, as a question of law, is reviewed on appeal de novo, and factual findings with respect to jurisdiction are reviewed only for clear error. ABN AMRO Mtge. Group, Inc. v. Evans, 2011-Ohio-5654, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.), citing Udelson v. Udelson, 2009-Ohio-6462, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.); United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1114 (11th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, territorial jurisdiction is not a factual element of a charge but a matter of law for the court to determine.
{¶ 35} Additionally, the concept of venue, prescribed in
{¶ 36} Venue is not a material element of any crime but, unless waived, is a fact that must be proven at trial beyond a reasonable doubt.1 See
{¶ 37} The essential elements of the crime of aggravated murder as charged in this case were stated in the version of
No person shall purposely cause the death of another while committing or attempting to commit, or while fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson or arson, aggravated robbery or robbery, aggravated burglary or burglary, or escape.
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 1, 139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1, 3. The foregoing are the elements, along with venue, that the State was required to prove to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. And the State met its burden of proof.
{¶ 38} In one of Wogenstahl‘s previous appeals, this court stated:
There are two problems with Wogenstahl‘s argument. First, although the Indiana side of State Street itself does not enter Ohio, there are side streets that intersect State Street that do lead into Ohio, and Wogenstahl could have turned down one of them before returning to Indiana. Second, and more importantly,
R.C. 2901.11(B) would allow Ohio to assert jurisdiction if the victim‘s death occurred in Ohio or if the fatal act occurred in Ohio, even if death ultimately occurred in another jurisdiction. The UDF employee‘s testimony may establish that [the child] was alive at 3:15, but it does not show that she was unharmed. The fatal injuries may have been inflicted earlier. Therefore, Wogenstahl has not shown that Ohio does not have jurisdiction.Wogenstahl also asserts that we found in our earlier opinion in this case that the murder occurred in Indiana. In support of this assertion, he quotes the following language from that opinion: “[Wogenstahl] physically restrained [the child] and bound her arms in the clothing she was wearing. A knife was held to [the child]‘s neck. She was transported in [Wogenstahl]‘s vehicle across the Ohio-Indiana border.” State v. Wogenstahl, 75 Ohio St.3d 344, 367, 662 N.E.2d 311 (1996). In isolation, this sentence could be read to suggest that [the child] was alive when the pair crossed the state line. But the very
next sentence in the opinion reads, “At some point, [Wogenstahl] killed [the child] when he realized that he could not return her to the apartment without being identified as the perpetrator of the aggravated burglary and/or kidnapping offenses.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Plainly, we took no position as to when in the sequence of events the murder occurred. Finally, Wogenstahl asserts that at trial, the state alleged that the murder had occurred in Indiana. In closing argument, the prosecutor described [the child] dying under the juniper tree where she was found. However, as the trial judge instructed the jurors, closing arguments are not evidence. State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 269, 473 N.E.2d 768 (1984). Moreover, as discussed above, Ohio can claim jurisdiction if the fatal blow was struck in Ohio, even if she survived long enough to die in Indiana.
The evidence does not establish that the murder occurred in Indiana.
(Emphasis in original.) Wogenstahl, 2017-Ohio-6873, at ¶ 43-46.
{¶ 39} In his current appeal, Wogenstahl relies on State v. Yarbrough, 2004-Ohio-6087, superseded by statute as stated in State v. Froman, 2020-Ohio-4523, but the court in Yarbrough distinguished that case from Wogenstahl‘s case, stating:
Ohio jurisdiction has been upheld under
R.C. 2901.11(D) in several cases in which the murder victim was found out of state, and there was evidence that the murder occurred in Ohio or the location of the murder could not be determined. See State v. Hubbard (Feb. 5, 2001), Butler App. No. CA99-12-222, 2001 WL 121122 (defendant killed girlfriend in Ohio and moved body to Tennessee); State v. Phelps (Sept. 19, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 69157, 1996 WL 532092 (blow causing death occurred in Ohio and the body was found in Pennsylvania); State v. Boyle (Sept. 26, 1991), Richland App. No. CA-2784, 1991 WL 208063 (wife murdered at Ohio residence and her remains found in Pennsylvania). Unlike in those cases, the evidence in this case unmistakably shows that [the victims] were not shot and killed in Ohio.
Yarbrough at ¶ 49.
{¶ 40} In this case, Wogenstahl asserts that because it cannot be definitively determined whether the act that caused the victim‘s death occurred in Ohio or Indiana, Ohio courts lack jurisdiction over the matter. However,
{¶ 41} The language of former
{¶ 42} It appears that former
{¶ 43} The inability to definitively determine the location of the fatal act or death does not negate the jurisdiction of Ohio‘s courts when other elements of the offense occurred within the State. Ohio courts can assert territorial jurisdiction if the fatal blow was struck in Ohio, even if the child survived long enough to die in Indiana. The evidence does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the act that caused the child‘s death, or the physical contact that caused the death, or the death itself, occurred in Indiana. Therefore, even if this case were not barred by the doctrine of res judicata, Wogenstahl could not prevail on a challenge to Ohio‘s territorial jurisdiction over the aggravated-murder charge in this case.
{¶ 44} For these reasons, I concur.
__________________
BRUNNER, J., dissenting.
{¶ 45} It is this court‘s duty to ensure that any death sentence imposed in this State is “subjected to a reliable, deliberate, and rigorous constitutional review,” State v. Lawson, 2021-Ohio-3566, ¶ 198 (Brunner, J., dissenting). This review includes testing the constitutionality of statutes that support a conviction that carries the penalty of death. This review also includes ensuring a defendant‘s right to effective representation at every stage of the proceedings. We do not need to consider every possible challenge a defendant may devise sometimes decades after his or her conviction. But when a colorable constitutional claim is made that if valid would render the trial court without authority to impose a death sentence, we should not rely on procedural flaws in the defendant‘s filing to avoid addressing it. And we should not avoid addressing such a claim just so that we will not be faced with considering similar claims in non-death-penalty cases.
Background
{¶ 46} In 1993, Jeffrey Wogenstahl was sentenced to death for the aggravated murder of a ten-year-old child. State v. Wogenstahl, 1996-Ohio-219. On November 24, 1991, the child‘s mother realized that the child was missing from her home in Ohio. Three days later, the child‘s body was found in Indiana, approximately four miles from the Ohio-Indiana border. We stated that the evidence at trial did not establish that the murder was committed in Ohio. See State v. Wogenstahl, 2017-Ohio-6873, ¶ 47 (“We find that it cannot be determined whether [the murder was committed] in Ohio or Indiana.“). But neither Wogenstahl‘s trial counsel nor his appellate counsel had questioned whether Ohio was the appropriate jurisdiction to prosecute the murder charge against Wogenstahl.
{¶ 47} In 2015, Wogenstahl asked this court to reopen his appeal. He argued that the trial court had lacked jurisdiction over
{¶ 48} In 2017, when this court examined Wogenstahl‘s reopened appeal, we reviewed the evidence that had been presented at his trial and held that the murder was “conclusively presumed to have taken place in Ohio” under former
{¶ 49} Following that decision, Wogenstahl obtained new counsel and filed a motion for rehearing and/or reconsideration. He argued that this court‘s decision improperly shifted the burden of proof from the State to Wogenstahl, requiring him to show that Ohio did not have jurisdiction. Wogenstahl acknowledged that whether jurisdiction is an element of the offense was not before the court and attempted to preserve his right to raise and fully brief that issue at a later time. This court denied his request for reconsideration. See State v. Wogenstahl, 2017-Ohio-9111.
{¶ 50} In 2018, Wogenstahl filed a motion “for order or relief” under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.01 and a motion to reopen his direct appeal. In both motions, Wogenstahl attempted to raise a constitutional challenge to former
{¶ 51} The State opposed both motions, arguing in part that Wogenstahl‘s claims were subsumed in this court‘s prior finding that Ohio had jurisdiction over the aggravated-murder charge. This court denied Wogenstahl‘s motions. State v. Wogenstahl, 2018-Ohio-3025; State v. Wogenstahl, 2018-Ohio-4288.
{¶ 52} In 2023, in the First District Court of Appeals, Wogenstahl filed a delayed application to reopen his appeal pursuant to
{¶ 53} The majority concludes that Wogenstahl has failed to establish good cause for filing his application outside of the time prescribed under
Analysis
Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or forfeited
{¶ 54}
{¶ 55} First, the timeliness requirement in
{¶ 56} It is just as
{¶ 57} The majority‘s reasoning for rejecting Wogenstahl‘s motion to reopen his case is based on what it determines to be a lack of good cause for not filing it sooner. We must not capitulate to a procedural mechanism when the constitutionality of a law that otherwise renders jurisdiction to a court is in question. Underpinning Wogenstahl‘s motion is a credible argument concerning jurisdiction—which a court must have before it can exercise authority and which can be raised at any time. And while I recognize the research and analysis efforts of the concurring justice that lead him to a differing opinion, Wogenstahl should be permitted to present his own research and analysis so that he may be heard and so that this court has a full record that includes Wogenstahl‘s arguments on this critical issue.
{¶ 58} Wogenstahl‘s arguments call into question the integrity of his death sentence and thereby the integrity of the State‘s processes in imposing it. Judicial economy and potential abuse of process by a litigant should not impede this court‘s duty to ensure that the State‘s imposition of the death penalty is constitutionally sound. This is implicit in our statutorily required plenary review of each and every death sentence imposed in this State. See
Res judicata should not be applied when it leads to an unjust result
{¶ 59} The other basis the majority leans on to reject Wogenstahl‘s claims is the doctrine of res judicata. The majority concludes that Wogenstahl could have raised the issues he presents in his current application in his prior appeal and in his first application to reopen and that because he failed to do so, he is now barred from raising those claims. Majority opinion, ¶ 23-26. This is inapposite in a death-penalty appeal, in which our duty sometimes leads to an undesirable outcome in order to “preserve the integrity of the criminal-justice system in Ohio,” Wogenstahl, 2017-Ohio-6873, at ¶ 54 (O‘Connor, C.J., dissenting). Our failure to rigorously test jurisdiction by requiring
{¶ 60} The majority also reasons that Wogenstahl‘s constitutional claims have been before this court but that “he was just unsuccessful.” Majority opinion at ¶ 24. Wogenstahl has thus far only been permitted to attempt to raise a finger to point to his constitutional challenge to former
{¶ 61} Ordinarily, one forfeits a claim that could have been but was not raised at a prior stage of a case. But this case is not ordinary. Wogenstahl‘s claims implicate the jurisdiction of the trial court, and as such, his arguments cannot be waived and may be raised at any time. See State ex rel. Ogle v. Hocking Cty. Common Pleas Court, 2023-Ohio-3534, ¶ 15. Res judicata does not apply to a judgment that was entered by a court without jurisdiction. Moreover, this court has settled the law that for res judicata to apply, a valid judgment is required. Grava v. Parkman Twp., 1995-Ohio-331, ¶ 13. (“Today, we expressly adhere to the modern application of the doctrine of res judicata, as stated in 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Judgments (1982), Sections 24-25, and hold that a valid, final judgment rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action.“). To hold otherwise is a political seizure of power that the people of Ohio have never granted to this court.
{¶ 62} In the first reopening of Wogenstahl‘s appeal, we concluded that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the aggravated-murder charge under former
Conclusion
{¶ 63} For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the First District Court of Appeals’ judgment and order that court to reopen Wogenstahl‘s appeal for further briefing on the assignments of error raised in his application.
Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip R. Cummings, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Elizabeth R. Miller, Ohio Public Defender, and Kimberly S. Rigby, and Cassandra S. Goodpaster, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant.